Dr. Larry
Wortzel: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, I'm Larry
Wortzel, the Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage
Foundation. This morning, we are honored to have Dr. Ing-wen Tsai,
Chairwoman of the Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan of
the Republic of China, to brief us on recent developments in
relations across the Taiwan Strait.
As
most of you know, just one month ago, the World Trade Organization
voted to admit both Taiwan and China, and there have been high
hopes that the entry of both "Chinas" into the WTO would help ease
tensions across the Taiwan Strait. And just 13 days ago, Taiwan's voters went
to the polls and delivered the unmistakable message that, despite
an economic downturn in Taiwan, their priority issue was
maintaining Taiwan's identity as separate from China's.
To
discuss those issues with us today, we have Taiwan's foremost
authority on the politics, economics, and law of cross-Strait
relations. No one is better positioned to guide us through the
complexities of that relationship than Dr. Tsai. One of Taiwan's finest
attorneys, she has served as one of Taiwan's top trade negotiators
and was a key player in Taiwan's WTO application process for nearly
a decade. Because of
her legendary talents as a trade negotiator and her keen legal
mind, she was chosen by Taiwan's former President, Lee Teng-hui, to
be his expert advisor on cross-Strait issues. Her formidable
reputation impelled Taiwan's current President, Chen Shui-bian, to
reach outside his own political party and tap her to oversee the
formulation of the full spectrum of cross-Strait policy and law for
his government.
As
Chairwoman of the Executive Yuan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC),
Dr. Tsai is a ministerial-rank officer in the cabinet-level agency
which coordinates and formulates all aspects of the cross-Strait
relationship from the Taiwan side. Prior to her current appointment to the MAC
chair in May 2000, Dr. Tsai was an Advisor on International
Economic Organizations in the Ministry of Economic Affairs from
1992-2000, where she oversaw Taiwan's application for membership in
the World Trade Organization. In 1999 she was named Senior Advisor
to Taiwan's National Security Council under President Lee
Teng-hui.
Dr.
Tsai's expertise is in international trade law. She was Professor
of Law at the Graduate Institute of International Trade at Taiwan's
National Cheng-chi University, and served as a member of Taiwan's
International Trade Commission from 1993 to 2000. She also has extensive
experience in drafting legislation to govern Taiwan's continuing
economic relations with Hong Kong and Macau by virtue of her
service as "Convener of the Drafting and Research Group on the
Statute Governing Relations with Hong Kong and Macau" for the years
1994-1995. From 1994 to 1998, she continued as a member of the
Mainland Affairs Council Advisory Committee. During that time, she
was also a member of Taiwan's Fair Trade Commission, and served on
an advisory committee to the Ministry of the Interior.
Dr.
Tsai received her law degree from National Taiwan University in
1978, and was awarded an LL.M. by Cornell University in 1980. She
received her doctorate in international trade law from the London
School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, in
1984. Please join me
in welcoming, Dr. Ing-wen Tsai.
Dr. Ing-wen Tsai : Thank you, Larry, and
good morning to you all.
Earlier this week, on December 11, the
People's Republic of China, which I will refer to in the following
as "China," formally became a member of the WTO. The Republic of
China, which I will refer to as "Taiwan" for the sake of
convenience, will become formally a member on January 1, 2002,
under the name of the "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan,
Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu." This would mark the end of a long
negotiation process for each side since 1992, when the General
Council of the then-GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
established two separate Working Parties for the respective
accessions of Taiwan and China. This would also mark the beginning
of a new era for the respective external trade relations of the
parties. The two entries are also meaningful to the international
trading community, as Taiwan is currently the worlds 14th largest
trading country and China, the 7th largest.
Many
people also see the two entries as the beginning of a new era for
the bilateral relationship between Taiwan and China. I would see
the accessions to the WTO as presenting a great opportunity for
both sides to interact in a more structured and systemic manner,
which is very much needed after more than a decade of exchanges
between the two sides in trade, investment, and tourism. It would
also help stabilize the bilateral relations, which is very much
needed for both sides to engage in their respective internal
reforms. What is more significant, hopefully, is the possibility of
both sides to use the WTO as a venue to open bilateral discussions
on WTO issues and a bridge for discussions on a wider spectrum of
issues in a separate context. The possibility is there. It is a
matter of the will of the Chinese political leadership to explore
such possibility.
Before
I turn to the likely impact of the WTO accessions to the bilateral
relations, I will first give you a historical review of the
cross-Strait relations and the relations today.
Historical Overview of the Cross-strait
Relations
I am
sure most of you, if not all of you, are aware that when the
Japanese government surrendered its sovereignty over Taiwan after
the War, the government of the Republic of China took control and
continued to function in Taiwan, after losing the Chinese civil
war. However, it gradually lost political recognition from the
major countries. Over a period of fifty years, Taiwan has developed
from an agriculture-based economy to a major producer of high-tech
products. At the same time, the political structure has been
changed from an authoritarian regime to a democracy that is close
to Western democracies. The relationship with China has been
changed from rivalries in civil war, to Taiwan's unilateral
termination of hostility towards China in the late 1980s, and to a
relationship emphasizing dialogue and exchanges in the 1990s. Both
sides continued to debate among themselves and in the international
setting on the sovereignty issues. Despite the sovereignty
controversy, it is very clear that each side exercises full control
and jurisdiction over a clearly delineated territory and there is
no issue of political subordination to each other. The Republic of
China on Taiwan does exist, and is a full-functioned country.
The Relationship Today
With
the increasing exchanges between the two sides in the 1990s, the
relationship now is a complicated one, especially in the trade and
economic areas. Let me first give you some statistics to illustrate
the magnitude and nature of the relationship today. Between 1987
and 2000, indirect trade between the two sides grew by around
twenty-one times. For 2000 alone, China is Taiwan's third largest
market, with total trade valued at US$31.25 billion. In terms of
Taiwanese business investment to China, by the end of 2000,
official figures show that Taiwan investments to China totaled
US$17.1 billion (actual figures could be as high as US$60 billion
to $70 billion), which accounts for 40 percent of Taiwan's outward
investment. Conservative estimation shows that Taiwan investment to
China has contributed to the creation of at least 3 million jobs.
With Taiwan investments to China exceeding trade figures, this
could imply the shift of our job opportunities to China.
Turning to travels by people to China,
estimates show 300,000 Taiwanese are regularly in China for
business reasons. If we add Taiwanese tourists and visitors to this
figure, the total will run as high as 400,000 to 500,000 people in
China at any given time. At the moment, without direct air-links
with China, Taiwanese are already making around 3 million trips to
China per year; with direct air-links planned for the future, we
are expecting as many as 5 million trips per year.
These
flourishing economic and trade flows between the two sides are
expected to be furthered, with China's greater opening after its
WTO accession and Taiwanese firms expanding their operation to
China, especially high-tech firms such as integrated circuit
manufacturers. China has become very relevant to our economy,
especially in our business firms' efforts to globalize their
business operations. However, as many observers have pointed out,
the continuing outflow of capital, technology, and personnel with
management skills is very likely to lead to the hollowing-out of
the Taiwan economy, or else making Taiwan overly dependent on the
Chinese economy. I would like to note here that the danger of
hollowing-out is not unique to Taiwan but also a threat to
neighboring countries in the region. We have seen signs of foreign
investment diverted to China from Southeast Asia, South Korea, and
Japan.
At the
same time, there is a rather ironic contradiction in the
relationship. China continues to claim its sovereignty over Taiwan
and makes every possible effort to undermine Taiwan's political
identity in the international setting. Militarily, China poses
threats to Taiwan by building up its military capability,
conducting military exercises in the coastal area, and installing
hundreds of missiles directed at Taiwan.
Taiwan's Cross-strait Agenda
Political Agenda
In
cross-Strait relations, politically, our policy is clear, i.e., we
will continue to maintain peace and stability, and not to be
provocative. We remain confident with the relationship, and despite
the political differences, we would make every possible endeavor to
resume dialogue with China, and manage in one way or another to
develop rules of engagement with China to make the stability
sustainable.
Most
importantly, President Chen, since his inauguration last year, has
made a series of efforts to assure China that there would be
continuity in the cross-Strait policy, and the Administration will
have the necessary patience to wait for the best time to resolve
the issues facing the two sides. The President's inauguration
speech mentioned the "four no's plus one." 1 He said that, during
his presidency, as long as the other side does not have the
intention to use force against Taiwan, he will make no change to
the national title, the Constitution, or the status quo with
respect to the question of independence or unification. The
President also said that we are prepared to work with the other
side on the question of a future one China. More recently, in his
New Year's cross-century remarks, the President went a step further
by raising the possibility of integration in economic and cultural
terms, and followed by political integration. These messages are
clear indication of the Administrations intention to improve the
relationship by telling the other side that Taiwan is prepared to
be positive and pragmatic about the relationship.
Economic Agenda
Economically, we are going through a
process of (i) correcting what has been accumulated in the past and
trying to reverse the trend of hollowing out, and (ii) pursuing
proactive policies to make use of the market and resources in
China. In this regard, we have concrete measures taken in four
major areas:
- On investment, we have developed a new
investment review system that is transparent and flexible--a system
to suit the needs of businesses and emphasizing macro rather than
micro aspects of the investment flows. At the same time, we stress
partnership between the government and businesses in managing risks
associated with investment in China, which despite the
opportunities offered, is still highly risky for investors and
their home countries.
- We are building up a system to facilitate
two-way investment, trade, and capital flows, to make the
relationship more balanced. The first stage of the exercise
involves the use of OBUs (offshore banking units) to facilitate the
two-way flow of funds with the hope that they could develop into
financing centers for Taiwan businesses in China.
- On trade, we want to follow WTO rules and
regulations, and our WTO accession commitments in opening up our
markets for Chinese products and services, to the extent that this
does not seriously jeopardize our national security. This would
also involve Chinese investment in the real estate market, services
market, and possibly, in the future, the securities market.
- On direct transportation links, the
government is fully aware of the importance to the businesses of
establishing direct transportation links with China. It is well
known that this is not something that is entirely within the
control of the government in Taiwan. There are cross-Strait
political difficulties that we have to overcome in order to
establish full direct transportation links but before that, we will
try every possibility to take interim measures to lower down the
transportation cost for the businesses.
Impact of the WTO on Taiwan and on
China
Impact on Taiwan
Accession to the WTO will undoubtedly
benefit Taiwan in many ways. Especially, it will assure Taiwan of
access to the world market and will deepen its integration into the
world economy. However, accession would also mean much greater
competition. On top of this, Taiwan's economy is facing a critical
turning point. After decades of rapid economic prosperity as an
export-oriented economy depending heavily on the world market, the
world recession is, of course, a major factor affecting our economy
today. At the same time, Taiwan is now faced with structural
changes which are much triggered by the rapid global changes, the
technology changes, and the emergence of other economies as
competitors in areas where Taiwan once excelled. An apparent
example is, of course, China. With WTO accession, this structural
adjustment is to be expedited.
With
so many changes going on, Taiwan has to consider its industrial
strategies and make plans for the next five to ten years. The
government has to restructure the agricultural sector, to make it
less of a welfare burden, and at the same time, develop the sector
into a competitive one in modern terms. The services industries
have to be developed so that after a long period of protection,
they can face the competition of today. While Taiwan is trying to
catch up with people that are ahead, it has to be careful, so as
not to be out-competed by people behind. The changes Taiwan is
facing are enormous, and coupled with the slowdown of the economy,
make some people back home lose confidence in the economy, in the
government, and in the country. Therefore, the government has to
educate its people and take confidence-building measures, so that,
as people in more matured economies, they are able to cope with
changes with the necessary degree of calmness.
Despite the challenges Taiwan is facing, I
remain confident that the essential elements that have made Taiwan
a success in the past few decades are still there. Its
entrepreneurship, the level of education, the level of technology,
management skills, Taiwan's democracy and political structure, and
its diversified culture and open society are helping it to maintain
competitiveness vis-à-vis the
newly-emerged competitors. This is so despite the fact that Taiwan
needs to continue to improve in every aspect of its economy and
society, in order to maintain the gap between Taiwan and such
competitors, and to maintain its significance in the world
economy.
Impact on China
For
China, WTO membership will also help its further integration into
the world trading community. This could mean accelerating China's
reform into a market-based economy, towards a more transparent and
predictable market, which will in turn attract more foreign capital
and resources. This will no doubt add impetus to and benefit
China's economy in the long run.
China's accession to the WTO will amplify
its problems associated with its economic development. WTO
membership and rapid economic development in the last decade will
inevitably result in adjustment problems, which in many cases mean
unemployment, redistribution of wealth; this could entail social
and political problems. In addition, China has to find a proper
role for its military in a modern setting. Moreover, its regional
imbalance, its urban-rural divide, its problems with minority
groups, and distribution or re-distribution of power between local
and the central governments may all be sources of its
instability.
With
this set of complicated and difficult problems, China has to move
from an authoritarian to a democracy-based political structure,
under which balance can be found between different interest groups,
and mechanisms can be built in to resolve conflicts without resort
to revolution or violence. China has to move at a speed that is
commensurate with the change brought about by its economic growth
and its integration into the world system. This is not an easy job.
Failure to do so may not only slow down its economic growth, but
can also have explosive effects on its fragile internal
balance.
Peace and Stability in the Face of WTO
Accession
The
challenges facing Taiwan and China at this juncture are already
enormous, even without the WTO. The adjustments that would follow
the entries to the WTO will deepen the difficulties. If not
properly managed, the short-term difficulties may become permanent,
and the expected longer-term benefit will not be realized. Both
governments need full concentration for their respective domestic
reforms, and would expect least disruptions from the outside.
Therefore, stable and peaceful cross-Strait relations are very much
in the interest of both sides. China would not want the Taiwan
issue to become a disruption to its internal balance; and Taiwan of
course, would not wish to exhaust itself in dealing with the
cross-Strait issues. Undoubtedly, properly established cross-Strait
trade and economic ties would create benefits for both sides. China
would benefit from our investments, and our businesses would
benefit from the market and resources in China.
It is,
of course, important to have the intentions to maintain peace and
stability, and to understand the importance of establishing
mutually beneficial trade and economic ties. However, this is still
not enough. What is more important is for both sides to have the
political will to overcome political difficulties and to maintain
internal balance, so as to be politically ready to make joint
efforts.
For
Taiwan, I am pleased to say that after the election of December 1
for legislators and local magistrates, the political stability we
have been waiting for is emerging. The Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP), i.e., the ruling party, has obtained a renewed and
reinforced mandate from the people, and is in a position to lead a
political process which hopefully would eventually lead to a more
sustainable political stability. We would also hope to see smooth
political transition in China.
What
is also important is to seek a proper framework, a venue for both
sides to interact and to communicate, so as to build trust and
confidence, and to avoid misunderstanding/miscalculation that may
cause unnecessary disruption to the relationship. The WTO presents
itself as a possibility, and the Taiwan side is prepared to explore
such a possibility. I would also note that we do not consider WTO
the only possibility; we have been making efforts, and will
continue to make efforts, to find ways to re-establish the
bilateral dialogue mechanism of the 1990s.
WTO Accession in Light of the Cross-strait
Agenda
WTO Will Enhance Peace and Stability in the
Relations
Globalization has proved to be a major
stabilizing factor in cross-Strait relations and this trend will be
furthered when the WTO moves forward with its trade liberalization
agenda. Taiwan's economy has integrated into the international
trading system for decades and its economy cannot sustain without
changing with the global trend. The opening of China to the world
in the last two decades has also made it a significant part of the
world economy. Both sides will deepen their integrations with their
respective WTO entries. The freer flow of goods, personnel,
capital, and services between the two sides is not only bilaterally
meaningful; it also has its multilateral dimension. The
international business community will find the cross-Strait
interactions very relevant to their interests, trade/commercial and
otherwise. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait cannot simply ignore
what the international community has to say as they rely on the
world market for their exports, and foreign capitals for developing
their economies.
The
international community also has an interest in keeping peace and
stability in the Taiwan Strait and peaceful resolution of the
problem facing the two sides. This common expectation and interest
of all parties concerned serves as a very important stabilizing
factor in the relationship.
WTO Will Help Balance the Relationship
Through its Multilateralism
It is
obvious that Taiwan's economy is a much smaller one than China's,
despite the fact that Taiwan's industrial development and level of
technology are much more advanced. There is no doubt that China is
trying to catch up. Also, Taiwan is a much smaller player in
international politics, and presumably a politically weaker party
in the bilateral relations. If both sides engage in trade and
investment only in a bilateral setting, Taiwanese products and
investors are very vulnerable to the likely discriminatory
practices of the PRC authorities. The multilateralism of the WTO,
as embodied in its most-favored-nation (MFN) principle and national
treatment principle, offers protection to members who are smaller
or weaker parties in bilateral relations or in the multilateral
setting. MFN would mean whatever treatment, market access or
otherwise, China offers to other members of the WTO is to be
offered to Taiwanese traders and investors, and vice versa.
National treatment would mean once Taiwanese products and services
get into China's market, they will be granted treatment no less
favorable than that the Chinese authorities offered to their own
traders and investors.
WTO Will Provide a Structure and Regulatory
Framework for Cross-Strait Trade Flows
Both
sides have not had a real opportunity to jointly develop a
framework and a set of rules between themselves in regulating the
cross-Strait trade and investment. This is so, despite the fact
that both sides had limited dialogue on the so-called "functional
issues" in the 1990s. The intensity and volume of trade and
investment flows between the two sides today are such that without
proper joint efforts, there is always a danger of disorder and
therefore, damage to the interest of traders and investors. The set
of trade rules of the WTO developed over the course of a few
decades can to a large extent apply to the cross-Strait trade, as
both parties have made adjustments or committed to make adjustments
to their trade regimes, to make them compatible with WTO standards.
However, in certain areas such as SPS (sanitary and phyto-sanitary
measures) and the recognition of standards, bilateral processes are
still required to make the respective trade regimes of both sides
compatible with each other. A transition is also required to bring
the bilateral trade relations fully in line with the WTO
requirements. Arrangements to be made for this transition also
require consultation between the two sides.
WTO Will Provide Opportunities for Trade
Officials to Interact in a Multilateral Context
WTO
has a culture of its own and has its own language when trade
officials communicate among themselves. Over the past ten years,
the trade officials of both sides have had plenty of opportunities
to interact with other members in their respective accession
negotiations and therefore, have learned the culture and the
language of the WTO. To many of them, what WTO symbolizes, such as
trade liberalization, is a belief and a mission to achieve. I am
sure trade officials on both sides responsible for the trade
negotiations in the past few years share, to a certain extent, this
feeling towards WTO. And these common background and feelings are
exactly what is lacking in the cross-Strait relations today. This,
I would hope, could help to initiate a process of
confidence-building that will eventually make possible for both
sides to have meaningful dialogue on a wider spectrum of issues in
a perhaps non-WTO context.
The
WTO could provide the opportunity for trade officials of both sides
to discuss multilateral issues, together with other members. We
will also have an opportunity to hold bilateral meetings which are
a part of the multilateral market access negotiations; or bilateral
meetings that would address difficulties arising from the
application of WTO rules in a bilateral context, which may lead to
a trade dispute. Of course, we do not rule out the possibility of
facing China's trade officials in a dispute settlement proceeding
of the WTO. These encounters could be driven by common interest on
particular trade issues, e.g., we may be working with China's trade
officials in the next multilateral round of agricultural
negotiation, because we have common interest in a number of
agricultural items, such as rice. We may be facing each other in an
adversarial context when we have difficulties in each other's
application of WTO rules, which may have the potential of
developing into a dispute. The different encounters under the WTO
and the intensity of contacts offer a great opportunity for each
side to understand each other and to build trust and
confidence.
Conclusion
China
is a source of military threat, and a force that tries to undermine
our political status. But, at the same time, China is our
partner/competitor in businesses. The relationship is complicated
and requires careful handling. WTO deepens the integration of both
parties to the international community. Therefore, cross-Strait
interaction is to be constrained by the common expectation of the
international community. WTO accession also brings massive changes
to domestic economies, politics, and social structure; the two
governments will be facing unprecedented challenges. If the
governments fail to meet the challenges, the WTO will bring more
harm than benefit. A stable cross-Strait relationship is essential
for the pursuit of domestic agendas. WTO offers a forum for both
sides to interact in a multilateral context and try to learn to
live with each other under one roof, as competitors, business
rivals, or even partners. This, in my view, would be a good
exercise for both sides to build trust and confidence and develop
rules of engagement for themselves. Taiwan is prepared to make best
use of this opportunity and hopes that China would do the same.
Ing-wen Tsai, Ph.D., is
Chairwoman of the Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan of
the Republic of China.