Delivered April 26, 2007
The attacks of September 11, 2001, and their aftermath have
renewed Washington's focus on the importance of reaching out
to foreign audiences, particularly within the Muslim world, in
order to boost support for U.S. values and policies. During the
Cold War, U.S. policymakers understood the importance of the tools
of public and cultural diplomacy in foreign policy. President
Ronald Reagan defined public diplomacy as "Those actions of the
U.S. government designed to generate support for U.S. national
security objectives."[1]
Recent polls show that the image of the U.S. is declining
throughout the world and that large majorities of Muslim
populations believe the U.S. seeks to undermine Islam as a
religion.[2] Defeating terrorist ideology requires
that we dispel such negative perceptions of America and that
we engage more actively and deliberately with the Islamic world.
While we will never change the minds of murderous terrorists who
despise America and its democratic ideals, we should reach out to
those large segments of Muslim populations that do not support
violence against Americans but who still have mixed feelings about
the U.S. and its role in the world.
Efforts to Improve Public Diplomacy
Shortly after 9/11, it became clear that merging the United States
Information Agency (USIA) into the State Department in 1999 had
damaged overall U.S. public diplomacy efforts by cutting valuable
resources for programs and undervaluing the mission of public
diplomacy in supporting U.S. national security objectives. The
Bush Administration has sought to address the shortcomings of U.S.
public diplomacy over the last five-and-a-half years, with some
positive results. However, much work lies ahead.
In the early days following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush
Administration responded to the gaps in our public diplomacy
strategy by putting in place an Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy, Charlotte Beers, who had spent her career in the private
sector as a well-renowned marketing expert. The White House also
instituted regular White House-run interagency strategic
communication meetings. Three years later, as opinion polls showed
America's reputation continuing to plummet worldwide-and former
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked his famous question
about whether America was capturing and eliminating more terrorists
than it was creating-the soul-searching to develop a better U.S.
public diplomacy campaign continued.
In September 2004, the Office of the Under Secretary for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics released the Report of
the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic
Communication. The report concluded that the U.S. needed
to transform its strategic communications efforts through a
presidential directive to "connect strategy to structure" and
improve interagency coordination. The report called for greater
government-private sector collaboration and the creation of an
independent, nonprofit, and nonpartisan Center for Strategic
Communication.[3]
In April of 2003, The Heritage Foundation released a report
titled "How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy," which included
recommendations that the Administration and Congress restore
public diplomacy's independent reporting and budget channels
that were lost during the USIA/State merger in 1999 and return
public diplomacy, currently dispersed among other State
Department bureaus, into one public diplomacy hierarchy.[4]
The Bush Administration has made several attempts since 9/11 to
streamline the public diplomacy bureaucracy and tighten
strategic communications. Given the myriad and diverse public
diplomacy efforts of the U.S. government, however, this has proved
to be a far more difficult task than anyone originally
expected.
In January 2003, President George W. Bush formally
established the Office of Global Communications (OGC) to
facilitate and coordinate the strategic direction of the White
House and individual agency efforts to communicate with foreign
audiences.[5] One year ago, President Bush established a
new Policy Coordination Committee on Public Diplomacy and
Strategic Communication, led by the State Department Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. This committee
is responsible for coordinating interagency activities, unifying
public messaging, ensuring that all public diplomacy resources are
supporting the messages, and ensuring that every agency gives
public diplomacy a high priority.
Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
Karen Hughes has moved forward with developing a unified
strategic communications apparatus, but progress has been
slow, and she will have to persevere in her efforts to corral the
disparate efforts. Hughes's office has also had some success in
boosting the role of public diplomacy in our overall diplomatic and
security policies, but this also has proven to be a bureaucratic
challenge.
The most notable progress in developing unified messaging
efforts has been in the establishment of a rapid response team that
follows newscasts around the world and offers talking points on
breaking international news to rebut negative media stories about
the U.S. in the Muslim world. The State Department has also tasked
15 overseas posts to develop country-specific communications plans
to better focus efforts on counterterrorist ideology.
Funding for public diplomacy is increasing and will likely
continue to do so as we ramp up public outreach, foreign exchange,
and scholarship programs, as well as public diplomacy training
for State Department officers.
- The State Department requested almost $1 billion for
public diplomacy efforts around the world for fiscal year 2008 and
increased public diplomacy spending in the last two years in key
regions like the Middle East (25 percent) and South Asia (nearly 40
percent).[6]
- The State Department has also revived the Fulbright
Scholarship Program, but experts say it will take time to
re-establish its effectiveness, since it had been so grossly
underfunded throughout the 1990s.
- The State Department created the Global Cultural
Initiative last year to coordinate all government-backed art,
music, and literature programs abroad and increased the number of
participants in State Department educational and cultural programs
to nearly 39,000 this year.[7]
In early January of this year, the State Department held a
major conference with over 150 participants, including senior
U.S. executives, to discuss how American companies can help improve
the U.S. image abroad. The conference represents a significant
step in meeting a key recommendation raised in May 2006 by the
Government Accountability Office, which called on the
Secretary of State to develop a strategy to promote the active
engagement of the private sector beyond international
exchanges.[8] The conference included intensive breakout
sessions to generate specific ideas on how the U.S. private sector
can get involved in public diplomacy. Recommendations for U.S.
businesses with operations overseas included making public
diplomacy actions a corporate officer's responsibility;
becoming part of the local community through employee volunteerism;
greater engagement with responsible non-governmental organizations
(NGOs); and creating "circles of influence" through relationships
with organizations, chambers of commerce, journalists, and
local business leaders.[9]
During this conference, James E. Murphy, Chief Marketing and
Communications Officer of Accenture, reported that U.S.
private giving to developing countries exceeds $70 billion
annually. This includes gifts from foundations, corporations,
private organizations, and individuals. Most of the world is
unaware that Americans are providing this level of private and
corporate giving to developing countries.
One example of effective private-public partnership to
address the most pressing international problems is the U.S.
corporate response to the devastating South Asia earthquake on
October 8, 2005. Shortly after the earthquake-which killed over
74,000 people and displaced tens of thousands- U.S. private-sector
executives from GE, UPS, Pfizer, Xerox, and Citigroup agreed to
lead a nationwide effort to raise awareness and resources to help
survivors of the earthquake rebuild their lives and
communities. The group has raised over $100 million for the
earthquake victims.
The State Department's recent establishment of the Office of
Private Sector Outreach to engage and work with businesses,
universities, and foundations on public diplomacy issues should
also help to identify opportunities and implement various
projects that foster cooperation between the U.S. public and
private sectors in their overseas missions.
Expanding U.S. Soft Power
While strategic communication is an important element in
influencing foreign populations' opinions of America, it is
equally important to promote deeper, more frequent cultural
engagement, people-to-people exchanges, and targeted development
assistance programs to assert America's "soft" power. In a recent
Washington Post op-ed, Homeland Security Secretary
Michael Chertoff said it well:
Moreover, this war cannot be won by arms alone; "soft" power
matters. In these ways, our current struggle resembles the Cold
War. As with the Cold War, we must respond globally. As with the
Cold War, ideas matter as much as armaments. And as with the Cold
War, this war requires our patience and resolve.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has
become more involved in public diplomacy since the 9/11
Commission reported to Congress that some of the largest recipients
of U.S. foreign aid had very strong anti-American sentiment among
their populations. Establishing a State-USAID Policy Council and a
Public Diplomacy Working Group has helped USAID to establish closer
ties with the Department of State to publicize America's
humanitarian and development aid initiatives.
The U.S. response to the South Asia earthquake in the fall of
2005 and its positive impact on Pakistani attitudes toward the
U.S. demonstrates that humanitarian assistance can influence
popular views of America. I visited Pakistan to attend the
International Donors' Conference on November 19, 2005, as a staffer
for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and saw firsthand the
change in the Pakistani population's views of the U.S. because of
our rapid and robust humanitarian response to this monumental
disaster. Even our harshest critics admitted that America had come
through for Pakistan at its greatest hour of need. The U.S.
Chinook helicopters that rescued survivors and ferried food and
shelter materials to the affected areas became a symbol of
America's helping hand.
The U.S. response was well-coordinated among the State
Department, Department of Defense (DOD), and USAID. DOD established
mobile medical units in remote areas of the Northwest Frontier
Province and makeshift schools in the badly affected capital
of Azad Kashmir, giving the Pakistanis a new perspective on the
U.S. military and demonstrating U.S. interest in the
well-being of the Pakistani people.
Polling shows that U.S. earthquake relief efforts doubled the
percentage of Pakistanis with favorable views of the U.S. from 23
percent to 46 percent from May 2005 to November 2005. This figure
had dropped to 27 percent by 2006, however. Similarly, the U.S.
response to the tsunami disaster had a positive impact on
public opinion of America in Indonesia. Favorable views of the
U.S. went from 15 percent to 38 percent. The point is simple: When
the U.S. acts out of good will to provide humanitarian
assistance, the world notices and develops a more positive view of
Americans because of it.
Engaging with civil society and local religious leaders on
issues such as human rights, political and economic reform, and
religion in society also will help build greater understanding and
help defeat misperceptions of the U.S. Twelve years ago, as a
Political Officer serving at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, I
participated in a USIA-sponsored program to bring together
female U.S.-based Islamic scholars and Pakistani female lawyers,
human rights workers, and NGO leaders to discuss the role of women
in Islam. I felt then-and even more so now-that it was one of the
more worthwhile activities I was involved in as a diplomat.
The U.S. has an important role to play in facilitating these kinds
of open exchanges and in supporting human rights, democracy, and
economic development at the grassroots level. The State Department
should encourage officers' initiation and participation in such
programs on a broad scale.
Recent Polling
We clearly have our work cut out for us. Recent major polls tell
us that opinions of America have generally declined-to all-time
lows in some countries-over the past few years. Some of these
polls have revealed additional information for consideration.
Recent polling on views of the U.S. role in the world released by
the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, for example, shows that most
countries reject the idea of the U.S. as preeminent world
leader; however, majorities in these countries still want the
U.S. to participate in international efforts to address world
problems. At the same time, this poll showed that many publics view
their country's relations with the U.S. as improving.
A recent Gallup World Poll, "How Citizens of the U.S. and
Predominantly Muslim Nations View Each Other," shows that Muslims
generally admire the West for its advanced technology and democracy
and admire their own societies for their respect for Islam and its
teachings and their own family values. In January 2007, 57 percent
of Americans reported "not knowing much" or "nothing" about
Islam.
Although perhaps not the role of the State Department, it seems
clear that we as a nation need to learn more about the Muslim faith
and get to know and respect its traditions and practices. The
Gallup World Poll also concluded that Muslims and Americans
generally agreed on the need to control extremism. The polling
shows that not only do we need to think about the messages we are
sending to the Muslim world, but we also need to search for
practical ways to engage with it and to build upon our shared
values.
Moving Forward
The worldwide polls revealing declining support for America are
discouraging. But polls change, and with the right public diplomacy
strategies and with perseverance, ingenuity, and decisiveness in
asserting U.S. soft power, the U.S. can begin to win
support from moderate Muslims. Our message needs to be unified
and consistent with our actions, or it will not be credible. To
improve U.S. public diplomacy, we should:
-
Continue to raise the status of public diplomacy as
a key element in fighting Islamic extremism and protecting U.S.
national security. Under Secretary Hughes has made
progress on this front by empowering ambassadors to speak more
frequently to the media and by including public diplomacy as a key
job element in senior State Department officers'
evaluations. There has been resistance within the State
Department bureaucracy to having officers spend more time on
public diplomacy activities, which has led some outside
experts to conclude that a separate public diplomacy entity like
USIA needs to be re-established.
Given Under Secretary Hughes's steady progress in raising the
mission of public diplomacy at the State Department, it may be too
early to make a decision in this regard. The transformation of
the State Department may take some time, but in the end, it may be
more beneficial to have a large corps of public diplomacy-savvy
diplomats and an integration of U.S. foreign policy and strategic
communication.
-
Elevate the mission of USAID and the role of development
and humanitarian assistance in achieving core national security
objectives and ensure close coordination between USAID and State
Department on programming for aid projects, especially those
related to democracy and governance. The bureaucratic
stovepiping of resources has often made us our own worst enemy.
USAID officials in-country who are working closely with the
development community often have a better understanding of the
needs of the grassroots level of society.
If we are trying to reach out to these communities and
build support for American values and policies, we will have to
break down bureaucratic barriers that inhibit efficient
communication and operational cooperation between the State
Department and USAID. As we seek to promote democratic and economic
reform, it is essential that USAID play a prominent role in the
planning and implementation of projects aimed at reaching all
levels of society.
-
Consider establishing a semi-governmental entity to
conduct public opinion research in individual countries to allow us
to tailor our messages to different audiences and to give U.S.
public diplomacy efforts a solid factual foundation. The
Intelligence and Research Bureau of the State Department has done
limited public polling, and there are several credible
non-government entities like Zogby International, the Pew Research
Center, and WorldPublicOpinion.org that conduct international
polls on a regular basis. However, it would be useful to have a
semi-governmental agency that would be responsive to government
tasking and whose staff could interact closely with government
officials.
-
Re-establish the once-popular American libraries in city
centers to supplement our efforts to reach people through the
Internet and electronic media. Foreign interlocutors have
emphasized their positive experiences visiting the libraries
in the past and the strong impression these experiences left with
them about America. Libraries could help reach audiences that
do not have access to the Internet and offer a traditional forum
for reaching out to the local population.
The Bush Administration should also revive USIA's once-robust
book translation program, which now operates sporadically and
mostly in Spanish. Expanded offerings on U.S. history, economics,
and culture should be directed at essential target audiences in
Arabic, Urdu, Hindi, Indonesian, Russian, and Chinese and involve
private foundations and industry in donating and distributing
materials.
-
Revitalize U.S. international broadcasting leadership
and recommit resources and funding to the Voice of
America. Members of the Broadcasting Board of Governors
(BBG) have at times not been efficient in their
decision-making and staff direction in accordance with the
importance of their mission. BBG members sometimes adopt pet
projects instead of providing policy guidance to staff
directors.
Congress should consider making the BBG more of an advisory body
and granting executive power to a chairman who would be responsible
for strategic planning and implementation of international
broadcasting programs. Although the BBG increased America's
presence over Arab airwaves by creating Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra TV,
it did so by taking resources from the Voice of America. As a
result, U.S. programming in South Asia, Africa, and Latin America
now lacks content, lively discussion, and airtime.
If we are to root out the hateful and totalitarian ideologies
that brought catastrophic terrorist events throughout the world,
such as 9/11, the Madrid train attacks, the Bali nightclub
bombings, the London subway bombings, the Mumbai commuter
train blasts, and the recent string of attacks in Morocco, we will
need to focus more foreign policy attention and resources on soft
power strategies.
In order to isolate and defeat the extremists' agenda, we need
to win support from moderate Muslims worldwide. Right now, the
score is not in our favor. However, with a sustained and focused
strategy, and with some patience and perseverance, we should begin
to see the fruits of our labor in the years to come.
Lisa A. Curtis is
Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center
at The Heritage Foundation. These remarks were delivered in
testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and
Oversight.
[1]
Juliana Geran Pilon,
Why America Is Such a Hard Sell: Beyond
Pride and Prejudice (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2007), p. 220.
[2]
Steven Kull, "Muslim Public Opinion on U.S. Policy, Attacks on
Civilians, and al Qaeda," worldpublicopinion.org, April 24, 2007.
[3]
Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task
Force on Strategic Communication, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, September 2004, pp. 1-3, 7, 8.
[5]
U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Public
Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of
a National Communication Strategy," GAO-05-323, April
2005.
[6]
Jess T. Ford, "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts Lack
Certain Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges,"
testimony before the Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of
State, Justice, and Commerce, Committee on Appropriations, U.S.
House of Representatives, May 3, 2006, p. 2.
[7]
Karen Hughes, testimony to the Subcommittee on State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs, Committee on Appropriations,
U.S. House of Representatives, April 19, 2007.
[8]
Ford, "U.S. Public Diplomacy."
[9]
U.S. Department of State, "Private Sector Summit on Public
Diplomacy: Models for Action," January 9, 2007, pp. 12, 13.