LAWRENCE H. MIREL:
Before joining the
Washington, D.C., law firm of Wiley Rein & Fielding in
October of 2005, I served for more than six years as the
Commissioner of Insurance, Securities and Banking for the District
of Columbia. As Commissioner, I became involved in health insurance
issues, and I spent a considerable amount of time and effort trying
to find better ways to make sure that the citizens of the District
of Columbia had access to reasonable and affordable health
insurance.
That is no easy task.
Advances in medical science and technology assure that health care
costs continue to rise as people receive more expensive care and
live longer as a result.
In addition, the
District's unlimited tort recovery system means that premiums for
medical malpractice insurance go up every year, adding further
costs to the system. Medical providers-doctors, hospitals, and
clinics-are increasingly being squeezed between rising costs
for medical malpractice insurance and flat or even declining
reimbursement by health insurance companies that are trying to hold
down the cost of health insurance. For some, and especially those
physicians and clinics that serve the poor, the squeeze is
threatening their survival.
Comprehensive solutions
are hard to come by. I did undertake two separate initiatives,
however, as Commissioner that were aimed at ameliorating some
of the more egregious problems with the current system. Both of
these initiatives are still in the works, so their value has yet to
be proven, but I believe that they hold out real promise for
improving our health delivery system in the District of
Columbia.
Large vs. Small
Groups:
An Artificial Distinction
The first is aimed at
what I consider to be unfair discrimination between persons who are
employed by large employers-private or government-and have
reasonable health insurance options, regardless of their
medical history, and persons who are employed by small employers,
are self-employed, or are not employed at all. People in this
latter group have a much tougher time finding decent insurance
coverage, usually pay more for the coverage they do get, and,
if they have a history of medical problems, may not be able to
get insurance at all.
There is no good reason
for this discriminatory treatment. Insurance is subject to the "law
of large numbers," which simply means that the larger the number of
people in a group of insured, the easier it is to cover them all,
even those who have or will have medical problems. That is because
most people are healthy, meaning that the premiums they pay
for health insurance can cover the costs for the much smaller
number in the group who become ill. For those in small groups,
however, or those who are self-employed, there is no large body of
healthy people to share costs with. They pay according to their
individual health status.
This distinction
between large and small groups is entirely artificial. If we lump
enough small groups together, we end up with a large group. That is
the basic idea behind a bill that was drafted in the D.C. Insurance
Department, known as the Equal Access to Health Insurance Act.
Under that bill, which was introduced in the Council of the
District of Columbia but has not been enacted, all persons who
live, work, or go to school in the District of Columbia would
be treated as a single group for purposes of health insurance
rating. Members of this large group would be able to choose from
among a wide array of private health plans-health maintenance
organizations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs),
high-deductible plans, etc.-the particular policy that best suits
their needs. But they would pay group rates for those
policies and would not be individually
underwritten.
Looked at another way,
the legislation would require that the District of Columbia
Employees Health Benefits Plan, which provides a menu of options at
standard rates to all District government workers, be opened up to
all persons who live, work, or go to school here. No longer would
someone who works for a restaurant or small retail business have
fewer choices and pay higher prices for health insurance than
people who work for the District of Columbia government. No longer
would someone who is self-employed be individually underwritten
while someone with exactly the same medical history but who
works for the District government pays standard rates regardless of
that medical history.
The Equal Access bill
is designed to create a structured market for providing personal,
portable health insurance in the District. Under the Equal Access
bill, small employers would no longer have to negotiate health
plans for their employees each year, deciding whether it would be
better to include dental coverage or maternity benefits and whether
they can afford either. Instead, small employers could provide
defined health benefit payments for their employees, and those
employees could then sign up for one of the policies offered
under the District-wide program that would be set up under the
Act.
Not only employers, but
also churches, civic organizations, and social service agencies
could help their members and constituents purchase insurance
through this program. We think just the ease of being able to
access the health insurance system without having to find, design,
and negotiate individual plans on a yearly basis will increase
the number of people who are insured.
D.C. Health Benefits
Program
The legislation would
create a District of Columbia Health Benefits Program, which
would be a central clearinghouse through which anyone who lives,
works, or attends an institution of higher education in the
District of Columbia, and their dependents, could obtain health
insurance coverage. Any District employer could designate the
program as its "employer-group" health insurance plan for its
workers and their dependents-both those who live in D.C. and those
who live elsewhere. District residents could also enroll in
the program directly.
Once enrolled,
individuals would be able to select coverage from a menu of health
insurance plans offered through the program and could elect to
change coverage during an annual open season.
All of the insurance
plans offered through the program would be private plans offered by
health insurers licensed to do business in the District. They would
be regulated by the D.C. Department of Insurance, Securities and
Banking (DISB) and would have to comply with all applicable D.C.
health insurance laws, just like any other licensed health
insurance plans. The program itself would operate much as the
federal Office of Personnel Management does in making available
private health insurance plans to federal employees; that is, it
would administer the offering of a menu of private insurance
options.
Although the D.C.
Health Benefits Program would be similar in some ways to health
insurance purchasing or pooling arrangements established by some
states, it also differs in that it is designed to be considered
"employer-group" insurance for purposes of federal tax and
employee benefit law. In extensive discussions with the federal
Departments of Labor, Treasury, and Health and Human Services,
we worked out a novel approach as follows:
-
Any employer could
contract with the D.C. Health Benefits Program to make the Program
its "employer-group" health insurance "plan." For purposes of
federal law, that employer's "plan" would consist of the menu of
insurance product choices offered through the program and the
premium subsidy provided to its workers by the
employer.
-
This means that any
contribution made by the employer to the premium for a policy
purchased through the program would be tax-free to the worker.
It also means that employees and dependants covered through the
program would receive all of the protections afforded by federal
law to workers covered by "employer-group" health insurance.
However, because the policies offered through the program are
personal, portable, D.C.-regulated insurance products,
workers would be able to keep their coverage when they switch
employers.
The program would also
operate a payroll withholding system to facilitate collection
of premium contributions by workers and/or their employers.
Employers could choose to augment the coverage offered through the
program with their own separate, supplemental plans providing
additional benefits such as vision care, dental care,
long-term care, and health care flexible spending
accounts.
As the legislation is
currently drafted, the program would offer a choice of 10 to
15 health plans selected so as to offer a choice of plan types
(indemnity, HMOs, PPOs, consumer-directed, etc.). All plans
offered through the program would have to provide major medical
coverage (defined as hospital benefits, surgical benefits,
in-hospital medical benefits, ambulatory patient benefits, and
prescription drug benefits) and meet D.C. mandates, but within
these broad parameters, insurers would be free to design specific
benefit packages in response to consumer preferences.
Policies sold through
the program would charge standard, age-adjusted rates, without
underwriting, to all enrollees who had at least 18 months of
previous coverage or who enrolled in the program as part of a
participating employer-sponsored group. Each participating plan
would be free to set its own table of standard, age-adjusted rates,
subject to review by the DISB, to ensure that the rates reasonably
reflected the anticipated costs of the offered
benefits.
Persons who joined the
program as part of a participating employer-group would be
able to obtain coverage at standard rates and without underwriting,
regardless of previous coverage. Persons who enroll in the program
directly as individuals would be able to buy coverage at standard
rates without underwriting if they have at least 18 months
prior creditable coverage. Individual enrollees with less than 18
months prior creditable coverage could be charged premiums of up to
150 percent of standard rates for up to two years and could be
subject to pre-existing condition exclusions of up to 12 months,
reduced by the number of months of creditable coverage.
The program would be a
self-governing, separate legal entity, sponsored by the D.C.
government and subject to regulatory oversight by the DISB. The
administrative costs of the program would be financed out of
assessments on participating carriers, apportioned according
to the share of enrollees electing coverage offered by each carrier
through the program.
Any enrollee who ceased
to be eligible to participate in the program by reason of a
qualifying event (employment termination, divorce, loss of
dependent status, etc.) would be permitted to continue
participating in the program for up to 36 months on the same terms
as other enrollees, regardless of the loss of
eligibility.
Insurance agents who
brought individuals or groups to the program would be paid a 5
percent commission by the plans selected by those individuals.
Associations and private social service organizations that
enrolled groups or individuals in the program would be similarly
compensated.
The legislation
specifies that the D.C. government would put its employees
into the program. Thus, the program would start with a core group
of about 30,000 (about 19,000 D.C. workers and their dependents).
The presence of this large, stable, initial core group in the
program would be a strong inducement to insurers to participate in
the program and to offer attractive rates and benefit packages.
Then, as private businesses and individuals join the program,
its growing size would make it even more attractive to insurers and
encourage even more vigorous competition for enrollees.
Health Insurance Risk
Transfer Pool
Finally, the Equal
Access legislation would also establish a separate Health Insurance
Risk Transfer Pool. The pool would be a "back-end reinsurance pool"
structured as an industry-run, mandatory association. It would
allow participating carriers to transfer claims for high-cost
enrollees to the pool and then evenly spread those expenses across
all insured individuals. That way, no single carrier would bear a
disproportionate share of the costs associated with high-risk
individuals. This would also permit high-risk individuals to have
the same health plan choices as everyone else.
The pool would be
self-governing and financed by assessments on all health insurance
carriers selling health insurance in the D.C. market, both in
and outside of the D.C. Health Benefits Program, as well as any
self-funded employer plans that also elected to participate in the
pool.
Clinics and Medical
Malpractice Insurance
The other initiative is
designed to help the economic viability of the network of
clinics that serves the District's population, and especially its
less affluent members. Because of the District's unlimited
liability tort system, the cost for medical malpractice
insurance continues to rise astronomically. Obstetricians, for
example, now pay more than $150,000 a year for medical malpractice
insurance while health insurers hold down the amount paid for
deliveries, making the practice of obstetrics in the District of
Columbia financially unviable.
Particularly at risk in
this financial squeeze are the dozen or so independent clinics that
provide much of the city's primary care for its poorer
citizens. Especially since the demise of the old D.C. General
Hospital, these clinics have become the major source of primary
health care for a large portion of the city's most vulnerable
citizens. If they were to fold, the people they serve would have no
choice but to take their medical problems directly to hospital
emergency rooms-a most dangerous and uneconomical way to provide
the care they need.
Medical malpractice
insurance premiums have become a huge burden to these clinics. I
know of one clinic-the Family Health and Birth Center in Northeast
Washington, which provides essential prenatal, birthing,
post-partum and pediatric care to hundreds of District
residents-that recently saw the cost of its medical malpractice
insurance go from $90,000 to $175,000 in one year. The total budget
of this clinic is only $1 million a year. These clinics must have
malpractice insurance, if for no other reason than that the
District cannot contract with them to provide their health services
unless they do. And much of their business is done under contract
with the District government.
In my former position
as D.C. Insurance Commissioner, I proposed that the District
set up its own medical malpractice insurance company-a
"captive" insurer-to cover all medical malpractice risks to
which the District government is exposed, either directly because
of health services it provides to its citizens or indirectly
because of health services provided by clinics under contract
with the government.
Individual clinics have
little or no leverage with malpractice insurers. They are generally
so small that there are few insurers willing to even make them an
offer of insurance. They are victims of the same inflexible
insurance "law of large numbers." But the District government is a
large player, and it can negotiate among insurers for good
rates. By sweeping the private clinics into the District's own
insurance mechanism, we can ensure that the clinics enjoy the
better rates that the District can command, and the District can
subsidize those costs when necessary.
Moreover, the captive
insurance company will be able to provide important risk management
services to those clinics. At present, the District may be
liable for malpractice committed at those clinics, but because they
are independent organizations, the District government cannot help
them to properly mitigate their risks.
Currently, the District
government is self-insured for tort claims, including medical
malpractice. Since there is no sovereign immunity for the District
government, and since there are no legal limits in District
law on tort claims, the government has open-ended exposure for
claims of medical malpractice committed by District employees
or contractors. What it pays out in judgments and settlements each
year comes from a "settlements and judgments fund" in the
District's annual congressional appropriation. There is little
ability for the government to control or account for the amount of
money paid out each year, or to engage in the kinds of rigorous
risk management that could reduce those claims. By setting up a
wholly owned captive insurance company that would be professionally
managed, the District will be able to budget better and better
manage its liability risks.
By allowing clinics to
buy insurance from the captive insurance company, the District will
enable these private entities to realize the market stability and
savings that will come from the pooling of risks with the
government.
Moreover, the District
will have the ability to subsidize the insurance costs for those
clinics that cannot afford to pay them without jeopardizing their
ability to provide patient care. Those subsidies will be a
bargain for the District government because they will ensure that
the private clinics will be able to continue their mission to serve
the District's poorest population without the need for more
expensive and cumbersome programs that the government would have to
establish if they did not exist.
Finally, having a
professionally managed insurance company involved in providing
liability coverage for these clinics will ensure that the best
risk management practices are required, thus providing maximum
safety to the patients of the clinics as well as to the District
government.
These are modest but
important initiatives that I believe can help the District provide
better medical care for its citizens on a more rational and
cost-effective basis. Because they are innovative ideas, they
naturally meet with some resistance from persons who do not
understand what they are trying to do or who are genuinely
concerned that matters not be made worse. But innovation is what is
needed, and these are ideas that will work.
Lawrence H.
Mirel is a partner in the Washington, D.C., law firm of Wiley Rein
& Fielding. Before joining the firm in October 2005, he served
for more than six years as the Commissioner of Insurance,
Securities and Banking for the District of Columbia. These
remarks are an edited version of testimony delivered before the
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia of the U.S. Senate
Committee on Appropriations.
EDMUND F.
HAISLMAIER: There exists a
substantial body of data and analytical research on health
insurance coverage, including analyses of the demographics of the
insured and uninsured populations according to various demographic
factors such as income, age, race, sex, geography and
employment. However, the vast majority of that analysis and
research can be summarized by saying that in the case of any given
uninsured person, his or her lack of coverage is attributable to
one or more of the following three basic factors: the
affordability, the availability, and the perceived value of
health insurance.
Affordability
Some of the uninsured
simply do not have sufficient incomes to pay for coverage.
Furthermore, even if coverage could be made less expensive than it
currently is, many of those individuals would still be unable to
afford health insurance absent additional assistance in the form of
some kind of public subsidy.
The biggest public
policy issue in this regard is the current binary, or "all or
nothing," structure of publicly funded health coverage programs.
Those who qualify get full coverage, while those who do not qualify
get nothing. In the case of the District of Columbia, this applies
to Medicaid, D.C. Healthy Families (the District's S-CHIP program),
and the Alliance. It should be noted in passing that the
federal Medicare program works the same way.
For income-related
programs, the reality is that some individuals with incomes just
under a program's eligibility thresholds could probably afford
to contribute something toward their coverage, while many of those
just above the eligibility thresholds will certainly need some
subsidy to afford health insurance. In recognition of this
reality, some states have expanded their public programs
by permitting income-related "buy-in" arrangements. For example,
Maryland permits families with incomes between 200 percent and 300
percent of poverty to "buy into" S-CHIP coverage for their
children by paying a partial premium. Less common is the
alternative approach of providing qualified individuals with
income-related contributions to subsidize private
coverage.
Availability
For other uninsured
individuals, the issue is one of availability as much as (or more
than) it is one of affordability. In general, these are persons who
lack access to employer-provided insurance. For many of them, the
availability problem quickly translates into an affordability
issue. That is because the current system of federal tax
subsidies for employer-sponsored coverage, combined with state
insurance laws that divide the market into small-group,
large-group, and non-group segments, each with different
regulations, makes employer-group insurance significantly less
expensive than the alternative of non-group
insurance.
However, it is
important to keep in mind that non-group insurance does offer the
advantage of coverage portability, while employer-group
insurance is never truly portable. Thus, were governments
to equalize the costs of employer-group insurance versus non-group
insurance through public policy changes, the purchase of non-group
insurance would likely become the preferred solution for many
individuals, particularly those who change jobs more
frequently.
Value
Finally, the principal
issue for some of the uninsured is one of perceived value.
These are individuals who have access to coverage and can
afford to pay for it but still decline to purchase health
insurance (either group or non-group) because they
perceive it to have low value for the price charged (premium).
This perception of health insurance as a "poor value for money" can
result from several factors, including:
-
Community rating
practices that make coverage more expensive for younger and
better-risk individuals;
-
Regulations that
prevent the offering of less comprehensive, and thus less
expensive, plans;
-
A system of public
subsidies for uncompensated care that perversely encourages
the healthy uninsured to go without coverage, knowing that someone
else will pay for their treatment should they in fact happen to
need care; and
-
A general market
structure that results in the offering of plans that focus on
near-term protection at the expense of long-term protection,
such as by applying underwriting in the non-group market equally to
those who are with and without continuous prior
coverage.
Given the interaction
of these three basic factors, it is not possible to simply
subdivide the uninsured into three groups. Rather, the reality for
any given uninsured individual is that one of these three
factors is the dominant reason for a lack of coverage while
one or both of the remaining factors also influence the coverage
decision.
Three Sets of
Reforms
However, this analysis
is useful in suggesting a three-pronged approach that policymakers
can take to measurably expand health insurance coverage. The most
promising strategy is to systematically address the three basic
factors that produce uninsurance with three complementary sets
of reforms.
Set One:
Undertake reforms
designed to moderate the cost of coverage in general and to
permit health insurance markets to better align premiums with
perceived value.
Set Two:
Institute reforms
in the ways that health insurance is bought and sold to make
coverage more accessible and available, particularly for those
whose employment patterns do not match the premise of long-term
employment at a large firm offering employer-group coverage that
underlies the current market structure.
Set Three:
Reform public
programs to provide subsidies to more individuals, but scale them
according to income and need. Also, convert existing subsidies
for uncompensated care, currently directed to medical providers,
into coverage subsidies directed to individuals.
The data indicate that
many of the uninsured are part-time or contingent workers,
including significant numbers employed by federal, state, and
local governments and large private employers. Another significant
share consists of those working for small businesses, particularly
"micro" businesses with 10 or fewer employees, and the
self-employed. Finally, almost all of the remaining uninsured
individuals are the dependents of workers in the first two
categories.
National research also
shows that the long-term uninsured comprise only a small portion of
the total uninsured population. A recent study that looked at the
total population experiencing one or more spells of uninsurance
over a four-year period found that only 12 percent were
consistently uninsured. In contrast, fully one-third cycled
repeatedly in and out of insurance coverage, and another 29 percent
experienced coverage gaps during the four-year period. These
results led the authors to conclude that continuity of coverage
should be an explicit and principal policy goal for health
reform.[1]
The simple reality is
that employment-based health insurance works well only for those
who are long-term employees of large firms, and Medicaid is
reliable coverage only for the very poor. Neither system, alone or
in combination, is doing an acceptable job of ensuring health care
coverage for the people who don't fit either of those
categories.
Enhancing Availability
and
Continuity of Coverage
The D.C. Equal Access
to Health Insurance legislation is designed to make health
insurance coverage more readily available to District
residents and promote greater continuity of coverage. It would
create a single "clearinghouse," in the form of a new D.C. Health
Benefits Program, through which those who live and work in the
District could obtain the health insurance plan of their choice. In
the case of individuals whose employers elected to make the
D.C. Health Benefits Program their "group-health insurance
plan," they would be able to buy coverage through the program
using tax-free contributions made by their employer.
The effect would be
that, as those individuals changed employers, they could keep their
chosen health insurance policy and take it with them from job to
job-just as they now do with their auto, home, or life insurance.
Thus, as they changed jobs, the only thing that would differ from
one employer to the next is the arrangement for paying for coverage
with tax-free dollars. Instead of standardizing the insurance
benefit package, as Maryland and some other states have done
in their small-group markets, the D.C. Equal Access bill would
standardize and centralize the administrative functions
involved in offering a menu of plan choices, managing an annual
open season, handling enrollment, and transmitting premium
payments to the chosen insurers.
In short, the D.C.
Health Benefits Program would provide for all District residents
and participating employers the same kinds of administrative
services that the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program now
provides for workers throughout the federal government.
As noted, studies of
the data on health insurance coverage over time have led
researchers to conclude that, "To the extent that job turnover
undermines coverage stability, designing ways for employers to
contribute to the cost of coverage, without directly administering
health insurance, could enhance continuity."[2] The D.C.
Equal Access bill is designed to implement precisely the solution
called for by these researchers.
The researchers also
point out how such an approach can provide benefits beyond simply
reducing the number of uninsured. They note that reducing coverage
gaps will also aid efforts to improve continuity of care, which can
in turn result in better health outcomes, improvements in health
status, and potentially lower system costs. Specifically, they
conclude that:
Efforts to reduce
churning in public and private plans or to assure more seamless
transitions from one source of coverage to another would also
enhance the efforts of physicians and other clinicians to provide
effective care. The possibility of changing networks of care,
frequent transitions from one insurance program to another, and
losing coverage entirely are likely to undermine the continuity,
timeliness, and appropriateness of care.
Thus, another (and very
important) benefit of the proposed D.C. Health Benefits Program is
that it would facilitate and reinforce delivery system
initiatives designed to improve the effectiveness of care,
specifically the "medical homes" initiative of the District's
primary care clinics.
Other Advantages of
Reform
The design of the Equal
Access legislation and the D.C. Health Benefits Program would offer
a number of other advantages as well.
For example, the D.C.
Health Benefits Program would administer "premium aggregating"
mechanisms, including a uniform payroll withholding system, to
facilitate the collection of premium payments. Those
mechanisms would be able to combine contributions from
multiple sources.
Thus, a two-earner
couple would no longer have to choose coverage from one spouse's
employer and forgo the coverage contribution offered by the
other spouse's employer. Instead, they could combine the
contributions from the two employers and use the total amount to
buy the coverage they really want for their family through the
exchange. Similarly, an individual with two part-time jobs
could ask for a prorated contribution from each employer and then
combine them to buy coverage through the program.
With these features in
place, small employers would no longer face the risks and
administrative burdens associated with trying to obtain group
coverage for their handful of employees. Rather, a
business could designate the program as its "group" health
insurance plan and give its employees whatever tax-free
contribution the business can afford to help them buy
coverage.
Under the Equal Access
legislation, insurance brokers would continue to receive
commissions for bringing employer groups and individuals to the
program. They would earn their commissions by providing workers
with benefits counseling on picking the best plan for their
personal situations and by assisting employers in setting up
arrangements, currently permitted under federal and state tax
law, that make the share of the premium paid by their workers also
tax-free to the workers. Today, while such arrangements are common
among large firms, small firms rarely offer them.
Furthermore, the Equal
Access bill is designed to open up additional avenues for providing
coverage to hard-to-reach subpopulations. One provision
would allow private social service entities, such as clinics or
church groups, to subcontract with the program to handle enrollment
for populations that they serve. Another provision
stipulates that if membership groups bring their members into
the program, those groups would be paid the same commission as
insurance brokers. In other words, business and professional
associations as well as civic, religious, or social service
organizations would be rewarded for ensuring that those they serve
get health insurance coverage. That could greatly augment
outreach and enrollment efforts.
The Equal Access bill
would also require the District government to take the lead by
providing health insurance to its own employees through the
program. This provision would have several positive
effects.
First, D.C. government workers
would gain a wider choice of coverage options.
Second,
it would
facilitate getting coverage to those government employees,
particularly contractual and contingent workers, who are
currently uninsured.
Third, the presence of such a
large number of workers plus their dependents (about 30,000 in
total) would be a catalyst for ensuring the program's success.
Insurers would have a huge market incentive to offer
attractive benefit packages at attractive premiums through the
program, while small businesses and their employees would be eager
to join.
Finally,
the costs of
coverage for D.C. government workers might actually decline
somewhat under such an arrangement. This is because the average age
of workers with employment-based insurance tends to be
significantly higher that the average age of the uninsured. Thus,
expanding coverage to uninsured workers who are generally younger
and healthier should have a favorable impact on premiums for all
covered individuals.
Improving the Equal
Access Bill
The D.C. Equal Access
to Health Insurance Act of 2004 was the first legislative proposal
in the country to embody this new approach to restructuring
state health insurance markets. As is true with pioneering efforts
in any field, subsequent models that replicate and modify the
original design often reveal aspects of the original design that
could be further improved.
A number of states have
produced, or are in the process of developing, their own versions
of the D.C. Equal Access legislation, most notably the recently
enacted reforms in Massachusetts and the Consumer Health Open
Insurance Coverage Act of 2006, introduced during the 2006 session
of the Maryland General Assembly.[3] These
subsequent versions have identified several areas for further
improvement in the original D.C. Equal Access legislation,
most notably:
-
Carrier and plan
participation. The Equal Access bill
as introduced in the D.C. Council limited to between 10 and 15 the
number of insurance plans that could be offered through the new
D.C. Health Benefits Program and further provided that no more
than three to four of those plans could be of any one type of
product: specifically, indemnity, HMO, PPO, or consumer-directed
plans. The intention behind those limits was to spur carriers to
compete aggressively for the available "plan slots" while also
ensuring that a diversity of plan types is made available to
participants.
In contrast, the
Massachusetts and Maryland reforms take what could be called an
"any willing plan" approach, meaning that their state health
insurance exchanges would have to offer any plan that gained normal
pre-market approval from the state's insurance regulator. The
latter approach is probably the better one, as it provides for
broader competition while simplifying participation in the program
for insurance carriers.
-
Elimination of parallel
markets. The original Equal
Access legislation permits the District's current non-group and
small-group health insurance markets to continue operating in
parallel with the new D.C. Health Benefits Program. In
contrast, the Massachusetts legislation will fold that state's
non-group market into the new Massachusetts Health Insurance
Connector and creates a commission to study the
feasibility of also folding the state's small-group market
into the Connector as well at some later date.
The Maryland
legislation goes even further and proposes simply to make the new
Maryland Health Insurance Exchange the only place in the state
where individuals and small groups could buy insurance. Under the
Maryland bill, separate group plans could be sold only to employers
with more than 50 employees.
The case for combining
those submarkets is that such a move would not only reinforce and
accelerate the creation of a "single market" for health insurance
in a state, but, more important, would also serve to eliminate
potential residual selection effects. That is a very important
consideration with respect to the non-group market, but it is also
a relevant issue in the small-group market, particularly for
so-called micro employer groups of 10 or fewer where the observed
selection behavior is very similar to that in the non-group
market.
-
Use of Section 125
plans. A particularly
noteworthy innovation included in the Massachusetts
legislation is the addition of a provision requiring employers
seeking to cover their employees through the Connector to agree
also to establish a Section 125 "cafeteria plan" for their workers.
Under Section 125 of the federal tax code, employers may offer
their workers a menu of benefits, and the workers may make
"voluntary salary reduction" elections to pay for those benefits on
a pre-tax basis, including paying their share of the premiums
for employer-sponsored health insurance. Thus, by adding the
Section 125 plan feature to the exchange, 100 percent of the
premiums paid for, or by, anyone participating in the exchange as
part of an employer group becomes completely tax-free. The obvious
advantage to the state is that it is indirectly tapping another
source of federal subsidy for more of its residents.
At the same time, such
a requirement essentially makes moot any debate over how much
of a premium contribution participating employers should be
required to make as a condition of participating in the exchange.
Since employer group health insurance premiums are simply a
subset of total compensation, as long as both employer and employee
payments receive the same tax treatment, it is irrelevant to
the state how various employers and their workers decide to divide
those payments for accounting purposes. The state's interest
in encouraging individuals to purchase coverage is satisfied by the
fact that workers declining the offered coverage would lose a very
substantial tax benefit.
The Equal Access bill
as introduced in the D.C. Council was silent on the question of
Section 125 plans, though the authors did recognize that it would
be to the advantage of both employers and workers to create such
plans voluntarily as a "wrap around" product for any employer group
electing to participate in the D.C. Health Benefits program.
Revising the Equal Access legislation to make sponsorship of a
Section 125 plan one of the conditions for employer-group
participation in the D.C. Health Benefits Program would be an
improvement on the original legislation.
Helping the Low-Income
Uninsured
The remaining missing
piece of the puzzle is how to address the needs of the low-income
uninsured, for whom affordability of coverage is a major
barrier. The good news is that the District took the first step in
the right direction when it transferred the subsidies it was paying
D.C. General Hospital for uncompensated care to the new D.C.
Healthcare Alliance. The next step would be to convert the
D.C. Healthcare Alliance funding into premium support payments to
assist the target population in obtaining personal, portable health
insurance through the D.C. Health Benefits Program.
That is precisely the
strategy embodied in the comprehensive health reform package given
final approval by the Massachusetts legislature just the other day.
The Massachusetts legislation includes a health insurance exchange
that is taken, with some modifications, directly from the D.C.
Equal Access bill, which we shared with them. But the
Massachusetts bill also takes the next step of converting that
state's present system of provider subsidies, currently paid
out of a hospital uncompensated care fund, into income-related
premium support payments.
The final, still
missing piece would be to assist the District's primary care
clinics in creating the necessary infrastructure to accept
insurance reimbursement.
When all of these
elements are put together, the vision emerges of a D.C. in which
all residents can easily obtain and keep personal, portable health
insurance; those with low-incomes have the cost of their insurance
subsidized through the redirection of existing public funding; and
individuals use their insurance to obtain necessary medical care
provided or coordinated by the doctor or clinic that is their
"medical home."
It is a vision in which
all of the incentives in the system are aligned to put the needs of
the patient first, in which health insurers compete for customers
by offering the best value for money, and in which providers
compete for patients by offering the best quality of care at
the best price. It is a vision in which patients, providers, and
insurers all have incentives to collaborate in managing the
patient's care to achieve optimum long-term benefits at the lowest
long-term cost. It is a vision worthy of the nation's
capital.
Edmund F.
Haislmaier is a Research Fellow in the Center for
Health Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. These
remarks are an edited version of testimony delivered before
the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia of the U.S.
Senate Committee on Appropriations.
[1]Pamela Farley Short and
Deborah R. Graefe, "Battery-Powered Health Insurance? Stability in
Coverage of the Uninsured," Health Affairs,
November/December 2003. See also Pamela Farley Short, Deborah R.
Graefe, and Cathy Schoen, "Churn, Churn, Churn: How Instability of
Health Insurance Shapes America's Uninsured Problem," Commonwealth
Fund Issue Brief No. 688, November 2003, and Kathryn Klein,
Sherry Glied, and Danielle Ferry, "Entrances and Exits: Health
Insurance Churning, 1998-2000," Commonwealth Fund Issue
Brief No. 855, September 2005.
[2]Short, Graefe, and
Schoen, "Churn, Churn, Churn: How Instability of Health Insurance
Shapes America's Uninsured Problem."
[3]The Consumer Health
Open Insurance Coverage Act of 2006, Senate Bill 530 and House Bill
1416, Maryland General Assembly, 2006 session.