When the Italian adventurer Amerigo Vespucci landed on the eastern
coast of South America, he never could have imagined that the
entire Hemisphere one day would carry his name. Nor could he have
envisioned what we see today -- that after 500 years of starkly
different histories among its many nations, the Hemisphere finally
may be finding a common future. There is, however, no guarantee
that Vespucci's Americas will realize their full potential. In
fact, it is more accurate to say there are far more roadblocks
ahead of us than those we have already cleared away. History may
well look back on the '90s in the Americas as a decade of
opportunities lost. I strongly hope this is not the case, but
recent events do not engender confidence that we are well on the
road to a robust commercial and economic integration of the
Americas.
This is all the more frustrating given that the U.S. has the
power and the influence, if it wishes to use them, to be a force
for positive change in the Americas. Our market dwarfs all others
in the Hemisphere, and is arguably more open than any other
country's, with perhaps the exception of Chile's in some areas.
This huge U.S. market is extremely attractive to Latin American
countries and can give us enormous leverage in opening markets in
the region. However, we are on the verge of losing this strategic
advantage by shirking our role as the natural leader in promoting
economic liberalization.
It does not have to be this way. There is still time for the
U.S. to alter its course and reassert itself. But in order for us
to do that, we must take an honest look at what has gone wrong and
how to fix it. First, a look at what has gone wrong.
Contrary to the many accounts that the vision of the Summit of
the Americas (in reference to the Hemispheric Summit in Miami in
1994) is being fulfilled, the Hemispheric trade agenda is in a
holding pattern. That nothing of tremendous substance came out of
the Cartagena meetings should be of no surprise. In fact, that they
even agreed to meet again next year to continue the dialogue should
give us great cause to celebrate. There are several reasons why the
Hemispheric trade agenda at this moment appears to be a rudderless
ship, being pulled here and there by the daily tides: the peso
crisis in Mexico, election year politics in the U.S., and the
increased influence of Brazil in promoting a Hemispheric trade
regime different from the NAFTA.
U.S. Retreat After NAFTA
Coming off an all-time high from the negotiation and passage of
the North American Free Trade Agreement, we perhaps overlooked the
fact that there would be bumps in the road and occasional setbacks.
So when the peso crisis hit Mexico in December 1994, the free trade
opponents like Ross Perot and Pat Buchanan said it only showed that
they were right all along -- Mexico was just waiting to trick the
U.S. into signing the NAFTA so it could devalue the peso and flood
the U.S. with Mexican goods. Of course, it didn't show that at all.
In fact, without a NAFTA the U.S. would have seen its exports to
Mexico drop by over 50 percent, like it did in 1982 when Mexico
devalued, instead of the 17 percent drop we experienced last year.
But the Perot/Buchanan accusations were superficially appealing,
and so they stuck, and politicians in the U.S. began to worry about
coming out too strongly in favor of trade in the Americas. Then the
economic situation in Mexico deteriorated rapidly and the U.S. came
to their aid as the leader of a $48 billion loan guarantee package.
This had the unintended consequence of splitting the free trade
coalition in Congress (many of the supporters of the NAFTA were
opposed to the loan guarantees), and placing the Clinton
Administration in the unenviable position of defending the loan
guarantees during an election year in which the vast majority of
Americans opposed the loan package. From that time forward it was
apparent that we would see little if any action from Congress or
the White House to advance the FTAA until after the elections, in
1997. When the election cycle kicked into high gear several months
ago, it became even more apparent that free trade would be under
attack when Pat Buchanan made trade the focus of his political
campaign.
With the U.S. stepping back, a political vacuum was created in
the Hemisphere. This vacuum has now been partially filled by the
ascendance of the Brazilians, who favor a "go slow" approach to an
FTAA. They believe that NAFTA-styled free trade would hurt Latin
American countries, and instead have proposed a South American free
trade agreement first, which would then be able to negotiate with
the U.S. on much more so-called favorable terms. I say so-called
favorable, because that type of a trading regime most likely would
not be favorable to U.S. businesses, nor do I believe it would be
favorable to South American economies in the long run. It would,
however, most likely be favorable to the economic interests of the
status quo that I will describe later.
However, as much as I am worried about the Brazilian initiative,
I am far more troubled by the lack of U.S. leadership. After all,
we are the ones holding most of the cards, and we cannot blame the
Brazilians for pursuing their own interests once we have stepped
back from the table. And although U.S. retrenchment may be
understandable given our domestic political situation, we must
realize this carries a price: namely, that Latin American countries
will not unilaterally open their markets without reciprocity from
the U.S. Ironically, the "opening" the U.S. needs to make is rather
minor, given our already low tariffs and non-tariff barriers. But
without providing a secure market for Latin American goods under a
NAFTA-styled trade agreement, we will not be able to wrest
political concessions from our Hemispheric trading partners. Why?
Because the commercial status quo is so hard to change. We only
need to look at our own textile or agricultural industry to be
convinced of that.
The Political Nature of Trade
Let's be honest, free trade is not good for everyone. It is not
good for monopolies and it is not good for those seeking special
favors or protections through government laws or regulators. Just
to give you one example from my own industry. Up until just a few
years ago, most local, long distance, and international telephone
services in foreign countries were owned by government monopolies.
In several countries in Latin America that still is the case. These
monopolies produce poor service at high prices and reap windfall
profits for doing so. In contrast, in Chile today
telecommunications service is good, prices are down, and
competition flourishes. In Argentina, competition in local service
has also increased service, while its monopoly service for
international long distance continues to keep prices well above
market rates. So why don't the other Latin American countries
quickly adopt the Chilean model? Because there is more money to be
made, and more political interests to be protected, by keeping
things as they are. This rule works in Argentina and Mexico just
like it works here in the U.S. In other words, although global
competition may encourage market liberalization, the decision to
open markets or keep them closed ultimately is a political one.
It is neither good nor bad that market liberalization depends on
politics. It is only bad when we fail to realize trade in this
political context, and then wonder why our policies are
ineffective. In other words, leaders in Latin America cannot place
some of their protected industries in jeopardy under a free trade
pact unless they can at the same time provide their competitive
industries with access to our markets. The same political dynamic
applied to President Clinton and Bob Dole when they sought passage
of NAFTA. So if our agenda to create an FTAA by 2005 is seen in
Latin America as harming more political and commercial interests
than it helps, it will most likely be unacceptable. This is what is
happening now. As Latin American politicians have come to believe
we will not provide them the political cover they need --
consistent entry into the world's largest market through accession
to NAFTA -- they have either postponed or withdrawn plans to make
concessions to open their markets to our products and
businesses.
Four Key Areas of U.S. Trade
Policy
Assuming we can once again commit ourselves to this agenda,
there are four areas on which we need to focus our efforts as we
attempt to create an FTAA. They are: 1) intellectual property
rights, 2) procurement, 3) competition policy, and 4) services, and
a fifth issue that covers all of them -- transparency. Let me
describe the challenges we at AT&T and U.S. businesses face in
each area.
Intellectual Property Rights
Although most of the debate of IPR has centered on the
pharmaceutical company, there is much more at stake. Lax or
nonexistent enforcement of intellectual property rights robs U.S.
businesses of billions of dollars worldwide. The growing U.S.
software and entertainment industries and what could be termed its
emerging "information-based" industries are not protected in many
Latin American countries. Although some Latin American countries
believe they are benefiting from this lax enforcement, they are
undermining a respect for property rights in general, and that will
ultimately undermine the growth of their own nascent
technology-based industries.
Procurement
Procurement of government services plays a much larger role in
Latin American economies than it does in the U.S., with some Latin
American governments controlling directly or indirectly the
majority of the spending power in the country. And although the
issue of procurement in the trade arena has generally dealt with
how government contracts would be awarded, the telecommunications
industry is particularly interested in a broader definition. The
telecommunications industry is such a highly regulated field that
its very existence depends on a clear and concise regulatory regime
in the awarding of government contracts -- that is, in the awarding
of concessions for the right to provide a wide range of
telecommunications services. Our trade negotiators must attempt to
remove any barriers that would prevent U.S. businesses from getting
a fair chance in bidding on these "contracts."
Services
The services industry in the U.S. employs far more workers than
any other sector of the economy. And a larger percentage of our
exports are now in services. Over 20 percent of exports to Latin
America are in services, and that number would be much higher if we
were provided all the protections our industries are provided here
in the U.S. In Latin America many services industries, like
telecommunications and financial services, still are considered
"strategic," and as such are controlled by the government. In many
Latin American countries, foreign investment is limited to a
minority stake. For example, Brazil is liberalizing its
telecommunications industry by allowing competition in cellular
phone services. However, it is limiting foreign investment in those
projects to 49 percent. If it maintains that restriction, it will
limit the ability of AT&T and other U.S. companies to invest;
but it will also limit the ability of the Brazilians to have the
most advanced and well capitalized telecommunications system
available. Lifting all restrictions on foreign investment would
truly be a win/win proposition for both parties. A Brazilian
official recently mentioned that his government might change this
limitation. This is encouraging, and we hope the changes are made,
but the U.S. would be in a much better position to influence the
outcome if it were actively engaged in the process.
Competition Policy
Competition policy is perhaps the most important area of
interest. It was finally included as a legitimate subject of
inquiry at Cartagena, when a working group was formed to study its
implications. Broadly defined, competition policy is a set of
principles that will foster competition at the local as well as
international level. One of those principles is the creation and
protection of long-term property rights, including contract rights.
This requires a judicial process where contracts are respected and
enforced. Contracts that extend beyond a five-year period are rare
in Latin America, and you will hardly ever find contracts beyond
ten years. This is mainly because businesses and people in the
region have little confidence that their governments will respect
property rights over the long term. In the case of AT&T, we
have had an ongoing problem with contractual obligations we have
entered into with various government or private sector monopoly
phone companies. In international telecommunications, calls
traditionally have been delivered by international carriers, like
AT&T, which must hand off telephone traffic to the monopoly
carrier in the foreign country. The payments regime for these
"hand-offs" is known as the accounting rates process. Historically,
accounting rates have not reflected market rates, with monopoly
foreign carriers reaping windfall profits. AT&T and other U.S.
foreign carriers are in the process of renegotiating contracts with
these foreign carriers to get these rates down, but many of these
carriers use their monopoly position to violate their contract
rights or discriminate against U.S. carriers in violation of prior
agreements. We should include strong provisions for the respect for
property rights and the adjudication of property rights disputes in
any trade agreement.
Another aspect of competition policy deals with the elimination
of monopolies. In the case of accounting rates, monopoly carriers
have the power to reduce the profitability of AT&T and other
U.S. carriers, and thus the ability of our companies to create
wealth and jobs here in America. Monopoly foreign
telecommunications carriers also raise the prices for U.S.
customers who end up subsidizing the programs of the foreign
monopolies, such as lower domestic rates in the foreign country.
The result is often poor quality and limited services for both U.S.
and Latin American customers. U.S. carriers must pay hundreds of
millions of dollars annually in settlement payments to these Latin
American carriers, with few benefits flowing to the customer.
As liberalization occurs in Latin America, competition policy
will play an even larger role as the regulatory issues become more
complicated and subtle. The telecommunications industry is a
perfect example of this. As foreign governments allow competition
in international long distance, the big issue now is how will the
costs for interconnection into the local network be decided. In
Mexico, we see this very process going on today. AT&T and the
other international carriers are preparing to enter the Mexican
long distance market. We are asking to interconnect with the local
monopoly at what we believe is a cost-based rate. However, there is
a great disparity between what the long distance carriers believe
is a cost-based rate and the current position of the telephone
monopoly. We obviously don't agree on what the rate should be at
this time, but that is why competition policy becomes so important.
As markets are liberalized, businesses become ever more susceptible
to market pricing, and so our cost structure must realistically
reflect what the market demands. AT&T CEO Bob Allen has taken
some harsh criticism recently about his decision to lay off
thousands of workers in what people are describing as heartless and
unnecessary. But as economist and Washington Post writer
James Glassman said recently, AT&T must change because it
cannot survive with its old monopolistic structure -- it is no
longer a monopoly. We fight for market share on a daily basis
against companies like MCI and Sprint that continue to grow. As
competition in telecommunications increased here in the U.S., it
became imperative to operate the company on a cost-based structure.
In fact, critics five years from now may well say the restructuring
was not radical enough. Consequently, since most U.S. businesses
work under these exacting conditions of the market, we must insist
that equal competition exists in the countries with which we will
be trading under an FTAA. So our trade negotiators must insist on
including mechanisms in any future FTAA that will limit the
discretion of governments to impose political criteria on what
needs to be a cost-based, market-driven process. In this particular
case, that would mean establishing a clear set of rules and
standards for cost-based interconnection fees.
To show how active U.S. engagement can make a difference in this
particular area, we can look to Mexico. Because of our close
relationship with Mexico through NAFTA, Mexico has recently
announced it will follow an FCC-styled bidding process for the
allocation of PCS services throughout Mexico. This process
establishes a clear set of rules and procedures for bidding, and
requires an open process.
There is one other area that tends to influence all commercial
activities in Latin America, but does not clearly fit into any of
the categories above. That is the issue of transparency. Until all
government decisions are open to public scrutiny there will always
be room for corruption and behind-the-scenes deals. This
environment may help a select few businesses with the right
connections, but it harms the economy overall and it is extremely
inefficient because it injects uncertainty into the commercial
transaction. This way of doing business has serious costs for U.S.
businesses. The Department of Commerce recently concluded that
since 1994 there have been over 100 instances of foreign firms
using bribery to undercut U.S. firms' efforts to win international
contracts worth roughly $45 billion. Foreign firms that bribe win
bids approximately 80 percent of the time. U.S. trade negotiators
must establish clear and concise rules of commercial conduct when
governments are involved, and we must insist on opening up the
process to public scrutiny.
Reviving the Trade Agenda
So how do we bring about these very difficult changes in Latin
America? We do it through active and aggressive engagement. We do
it by showing the American people why we need Hemispheric free
trade to remain internationally competitive. We do it by showing
how free trade can be a win/win for those who are not seeking
special favors from governments. We don't do it by folding our
hands and talking a good line about how everyone wins under free
trade. We don't do it by failing to reward those countries, like
Chile, that have done their utmost to open their markets. Chile is
the crown jewel of Latin America. Many sectors of its economy are
more open than ours. Its international telecommunications industry
is so competitive, there have been times this year when it was
cheaper to call from New York to Santiago, than from New York to
Los Angeles. It has a strong democracy and a flourishing middle
class. What kind of message do we send to the rest of Latin America
when we fail to even engage Chile in negotiations?
Conclusion
What happened in Cartagena was inevitable given the direction of
our current trade policy. But that direction can be altered with
sufficient political will. One thing is certain. Good intentions by
the U.S. are not enough.
I met with Commerce Secretary Ron Brown in Nicaragua last week.
I believe he is committed to free trade in the Americas, as is U.S.
Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, but personal commitment is not
enough. The forces against Hemispheric integration are simply too
strong. And much more is at stake here than Hemispheric
integration. U.S. global leadership rests on our ability to create
a trading model at home, that we can then export to the rest of the
world. Imagine how much more influence we would have with our Asian
trading partners if we had just concluded a Hemisphere-wide,
comprehensive, NAFTA-style FTAA? The benefits would be enormous for
U.S. businesses and the world economy as a whole.
But the reality today is that our trade agenda is still in a
holding pattern. I sincerely hope we can remove the obstacles from
the runway before we run out of gas.