(Archived document, may contain errors)
Hong Kong and the Future of China Three Years''After the Tiananmen
Squiie-Masisacre
By Senator Mitch McConnell
Introduction Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to
discuss U. S. policy toward Hong Kong and the People's Rep4blic of
China. Now that the sun has set on the Soviet empire, only the PRC
remains as the last communist superpower. Yet right next to it, on
a tiny peninsula, is the capital- ist enclave of Hong Kong-probably
the Ereest market in the world. In fact, Hong Kong's prodigious
economic success has inspired a new generation of capitalists on
the other side of the border, who have transformed the southeastern
province-of the PRC into an economic power in its own right. This
province, called Guangdong has already integrated its economy with
the fi-ee capitalism of Hong Kong, and increasingly Z@s to the West
for its future inter e sts-and away from Beijing. Just five years
from now, sixty short months, the last communist Goliath will
swallow up this little capitalist David. One wonders whether the
traffition-bound bureaucrats of Beijing will even be able to handle
the aggressive, i n novative capitalists of Hong Kong-or whether
Beijing will simply resort to its traditional and often brutal
methods of containing firedom. Just three years ago today, we
watched in horror as PRC tanks and troopers violently sup- pressed
the pro-democracy d emonstrations in Tiananmen Square. For the
first time in history, mass communication turned the entire free
world into a courtroom. We all saw those images of cruelty and
bloodshed on CNN; and afterwards, the world delivered its judgment
against the butch e rs of Tiananmen Square. That was only three
years ago from this very day. Accelerated Economic Liberalization.
If the old guard in Beijing learned anything fi-om this shameful
event, they learned that the world is watching-and that the pursuit
of economic and political ftedom will continue despite whatever
brutal methods are employed against it. Since the Tiananmen Square
infamy, these same leaders have accelerated the PRC's economic
liberal- ization program. These efforts are designed to fully
integrate t h e economies of the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, and to
hasten the creation of a "Greater China." Hong Kong and the PRC are
moving toward a political integration as well, one that is to be
completed in 1997. Even the polit- ical deep-fi-eeze that exists
bet w een Taiwan and the PiC is thawing somewhat. In the U. S. this
week, President Bush announced his intention to renew China's
most-favored- nation trade status, and legislation was introduced
in Congress to condition that renewal on changes in the PRC's beh a
vior. So the stage is set for another bitter, divisive debate over
the President's policy toward the PRC. It is already clear that
this battle will be fought more with an eye on the presidential
elections in November than on the long-term future of U. S.
relations with the PRC and Hong Kong. I think that is very
unfortunate, because there is no doubt that our diplomatic and
economic interests in this region are of paramount importance-and
they should
Senator blitch McConnell, a Republican, represents Kentucky in
the United States Senate. He spoke at The Heritage Foundation on
June 4, 1992. ISSN 0272-1155. @1992 by The Heritage Foundation.
not be used as pawns in the ongoing war between the Republican
White House and the Demo- cratic Congress. -I 'WM have more to say
about the uptoming'bittlCo-vier-NIFN fbrChiha, bift-firMdt me talk
about an important aspect of U.S.-China policy that is often
overlooked: the U.S.-Hong Kong re- lationship.
The U.S.-Hong-Kong Relationship
In the last ten months, I have visited Hong Kong twice. During both
visits, I was struck by the tremendous U. S. presence in Hong Kong,
and by the stake we have in the territory's future. I was also
struck, however, by the complete lack of any policy in t h is
country for dealing with the 1997 reversion. In the past, the
U.S.-Hong Kong relationship was considered-:-ff it was considered
at all-' within the context of a U.S.-China or U.S.-United Kingdom
relationship. At the time, that seemed appropriate becaus e Hong
Kong was a dependent of the United Kingdom and because U. S.
economic interests there were not great. But all that has changed,
and therefore our policy must change. U.S. Economic Interests.
First of all, American economic intmsts in Hong Kong have g rown to
an all-time high. Last year, Hong Kong purchased $7 billion worth
of American-made prod- ucts. On a per capita basis, that is three
times more than Japan bought from us. Over nine hundred U. S.
companies maintain representative offices in Hong Kon g , and U. S.
banks have $99 billion in deposits there. There are 160
U.S.-controlled factories in Hong Kong, employing 35,000 workers.
Overall, 22,000 Americans call Hong Kong home. Confidence and
Stability. Despite this massive level of investment, repres e nting
a strong eco- nomic commitment to Hong Kong's future, many of the
territory's residents are concerned about the PRC's intentions
after the 1997 reversion-and about America's role in guarding the
pre- cious freedoms that Hong Kong currently enjoys. B e ijing is
already showing aggressiveness in its dealings with Hong Kong-even
though the reversion is still five years away. By demanding a say
in the construction of a new airport, and by attempting to hinit
the growth of democratic institutions in Hong Ko n g, Beijing's
leaders have made it clear they intend to tightly control Hong
Kong's post-1997 autonomy. I don't want to be an alarmist about
such developments. I believe and hope that Beijing will act in its
own self-interest, and not kill the goose that l a ys golden eggs
by crushing Hong Kong's economic powerhouse. However, given the
unpredictable nature of China's leadership, it seems only prudent
for the U. S. to do everything it can to ensure a secure, healthy
post- 1997 Hong Kong. If nothing else, a fir m U. S. policy in this
area will calm jittery, nerves and shore up the economic climate in
Hong Kong. Growth of Democracy. But there is another reason 'for
the U. S. to take a deeper interest in the 1997 reversion. Hong
Kong presents a unique opportunity f o r the U. S. to influence the
growth of democracy in a region where it is sorely needed. The
first-ever direct elections to Hong Kong's Legislative Council were
held just a short time ago. Although these elections were only a
small step towards full democr a cy-and I would personally like to
see more directly- elected representatives in the future-it is
nonetheless an important move in the right direction. After 1997,
Hong Kong could end up being the only province of China with any
democratic rights or fteedo ms. That is, of course, if the PRC
allows democratic institutions like the Legisla- tive Council to
continue. That is why the United States has a role in standing up
for political
2
rights and freedoms in Hong Kong-with the hope that such new
institutions will spread to other parts of China, just as Hong
Kong's capitalism has overtaken the province of Guandong across
....the-border.
Emergence of "Greater China"
As many China watchers have observed, the increasing economic and
political integration of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the PRC is
producing, for all practical purposes, a single "Greater China." As
the PRC seeks to open up its economy, Hong Kong and Taiwan are
seeking new mar- kets and new sources of inexpensive labor.
Economic necessity and conveni e nce are drawing the three
together. Politically, Hong Kong and China will be one after 1997,
and even Taiwan and the PRC are warming their political ties. The
creation of a Greater China-whether it is.formal union or merely
an-informal one- poses an econo m ic and security challenge for the
U. S. As the European Community moves to- ward integration, U. S.
economic interests risk being locked out. To avoid a similar
scenario in Asia, we must deepen and broaden our relationship with
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the P RC- now, before integration proceeds
further. For these and many other reasons, the U. S. needs a
coherent policy with respect to Hong Kong, both before and after
1997. The U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act, which I introduced last year
and which passed the Senat e last month, lays out such a policy.
The Bill
My bill is based on the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration,
under which Britain agreed to transfer sovereignty over Hong Kong
to China in 1997. The Joint Declaration makes clear that China, as
the sovereign state, will exercise responsibility for all defense
and foreign affairs mat- ters. However, it gives Hong Kong
responsibility for its own internal affairs under the principle of
"one country, two systems." Basically, the Joint Declaration
authorizes Hong Kong to pursue independent bilateral relations in
nine areas: economic, trade, financial, monetary, shipping, com-
munications, tourism, culture, and sport. My U.S.-Hong Kong Policy
Act establishes policy guidelines for each of these fields. This
bill als o recognizes Hong Kong's legal status in U. S. law,
ensuring that this status will not be af- fected by the 1997
transition. Finally, the bill requires the Secretary of State to
report to Congress on all developments affecting U. S. interests in
Hong Kong. As I mentioned, the U. S. - Hong Kong Policy Act has
passed the Senate, and it is my hope that the House will act on it
in the coming weeks. The Administration supports my approach, and I
am confident the bill will be- come law this year.
Conclusion
Let me reiterate why I think this measure is important. As U. S.
economic interests in Hong Kong have expanded, so has our stake in
Hong Kong's post-1997 existence. The burgeoning democratic movement
in Hong Kong is in great need of international recognition and
support. Many of Hong Kong's residents are looking for assurance
that the free world will uphold Hong Kong's autonomy after 1997.
And, finally, the development of a "Greater China7potentially
threatens U. S. access to important markets.
3
We've reach ed a point where we need a Hong Kong policy that
conveys our deep concern about Hong Kong after 1997. It's time for
the U. S. to stand up and say to Beijing that-despite ..its
insistence that-Hong-Kong -is -a-private-issue between.-Britainand
the.PRC-.the . United States does have a stake in, and does care
about, the former colony's future. We need tomake clear to Beijing
that America intends to fully support the autonomy promised to Hong
Kong under the Joint Declaration after reversion to the PRC. My
bill p r epares the U. S., both legally and politically, to provide
that support. MIFN for China. Clearly, the threat exists that China
could severely harm Hong Kong after 1997. At the moment, however, I
am concerned about a more immediate threat to the territory a nd
the entire region: withdrawal of China's NIFN trade status by the
United States Congress. Despite protests to the contrary by my
Democratic colleagues, there is simply no way around it: Given the
economic and political integration of Hong. Kong and Chi n a,
denial of China's MIFN status will devastate Hong Kong. And in
addition to causing harm to Hong Kong, there am many other reasons
for not withdrawing-or conditiohing renewal of-China's MFN status.
I am one of those who support President Bush's policy o f active
engagement with China, and I believe this policy is working. When
you think about it, active economic engagement is really a very
simple concept-even members of Congress ought to be able to figure
it out. By engaging economically with the PRC, the U. S. can
support and promote continued economic develop- ment in China.
Economic development undermines central political control, which
will bring about the social and political reforms we all want to
see in China. One need look no further than Guangdon g Province for
proof that capitalism conquers Com- munism. Guangdong is a
bustling, economically liberated, free-market province. If you
visit around Canton or Shenzhen and talk to the people, you quickly
realize that Beijing is largely ir- relevant to the lives of the
people there. Even the Party leaders in Guangdong believe in the
capitalist system. To put it bluntly, everyone is too busy making
money to be concerned with party dogma. And you can bet on this:
The next thing this new generation of capitali s ts is going to
want is some say in how their government operates. News of
Opportunity. Word about the economic success in Guangdong is
spreading to the in- terior. Peasants who leave the rice paddies of
interior China to take jobs in the coastal provinces return to
their villages with news of opportunity, prompting more people to
head for the coast. In fact, controlling the population shifts from
the interior provinces to the economically free coastal provinces
is a major problem for Beijing. This is the g o od news. The bad
news is that such promising developments can be quickly snuffed out
with a simple congressional withdrawal of MFN. Yet this is exactly
what Democrats in Congress proposed to do this week. Now, I am the
first to recognize that arguments fo r removing or conditioning
NIFN status are based on some very real behavioral problems within
China's communist leadership. Human rights violations, illegal
trade practices, and dangerous arms sales are all serious problems
which both the Administration an d Congress have'a responsibility
to address. Nevertheless, I believe-and many in Hong Kong
believe-that MFN is the wrong tool to fix these problems. I also
believe that President Bush's policy of active engagement is
starting to bear fruit. For ex- ample, t he PRC ratified the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and has agreed to abide by the
Missile Technology Control Regime. Selective use of our trade laws
has wrung significant con- cessions, from China on intellectual
property rights protection. China also ha s promised to ban the
export of falsely labeled goods and products manufactured by prison
labor.
4
Moreover, the Administration's policy to ward the PRC is anything
but laissez-faire. It is inves- tigating Chinese trade barriers and
threatening future targeted trade sanctions. Under pressure from
the. Administration and the.rest of-the-world-community., -China
is.slowly.rele#singpol-iticaI pr i soners and has accounted for
others still held. PoRtical Year. I agree that the pace of progress
is frustratingly slow. The recent harassment of Washington Post
reporter Lena Sun is a deeply discouraging sign. And as China's
political lead- ership prepare s for the Fourteenth Party Congress
in December, we can expect more such occurrences. We shouldn't
forget that in China, like here, this is a political year and the
struggle between the conservatives and the reformers is
particularly acute this time around . However, withdrawing or
conditioning China's MFN status would only play into the hands of
the hard-liners-those who want less engagement with the U.S. and
less influence from the West. While it might provide some emotional
satisfaction, such a diplomatic blunder would most definitely
retard; not speed, the process of reform in China. And just as
important, the withdrawal or effective withdrawal of China's NIFN
status would se- verely compromise the present economic health and
future security of Hong Kong. The reversion of Hong Kong to the PRC
in 1997 promises to be one of the final great confron- tations
between communist totalitarianism and capitalist freedom. As the
old communist Goliath of China squares off with the robust
capitalist David of Hong Kong, the United States needs to take its
position and clearly announce its intentions: that we will
support-and maintain solidar- ity with-all those in the world who
aspire to economic and political freedom. -
5
}}