(Archived document, may contain errors)
HOW THE UNITED NATIONS CAN BE REFORMED
The Recommendations of Four Former Ambassadors to the U.N.
M ohamed Sahnoun Ambassador of Algeria to the United States
Permanent Representative to the United.Nations 1982-1984
Gunther van Well Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany
to the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations
1981-1984
Tommy T.B. Koh Ambassador of Singapore to the United States
Permanent Representative to the United Nations 1968-1971, 1974-1984
Charles M. Lichenstein Senior Fellow, The Heritage Foundation
Alternate U.S. Representative to the U.N. 1981-1984
A ugust 7, 1986 The Lehrman Auditorium The Heritage Foundation
HOW THE UNITED NATIONS CAN BE REFORMED
The Recommendations of Four Former Ambassadors to the U.N.
B URTON YALE PINES, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION: I am delighted to welcome you to the Lehrman
Auditorium. We at The .Heritage Foundation are honored today to
host a very distinguished panel of diplomats who in previous years
represente d their countries at the United Nations. It is very
appropriate for them to address today's topic,, "How the United
Nations Can Be Reformed."
Now it is a very timely, relevant issue. it comes at a time when
American views about the United Nations have been changing
dramatically and profoundly and when American public support for
the United Nations is near an all time low. American views of the
United Nations have changed from support to indifference to dismay.
And this change in American views, of course, i s reflected here in
Washington on Capitol Hill. It comes as no surprise to anyone in
this room that barely a fortnight passes without some bill being
introduced in the Congress that in one way or another reflects
congressional dismay with the United Natio ns and which one way or
another has as its aim reducing American participation in the
United Nations.
Time may be running out for the United Nations and time may be
running out for the United States at the United Nations. We at The
Heritage Foundation, in fact, have been calling for changes at the
U.N. for some time. Our United Nations Assessment Project is now
more than four years old and has published some 75 studies an the
United Nations and hosted several dozen roundtable discussions such
as this and a n endless number of working group luncheons.
We at Heritage probably rightfully can claim a tiny bit of credit
for the changing views regarding the United Nations. We work very
closely with members of Congress, the Administration, and the
press. If it is t rue that we are partly-responsible for changing
U.S. views of the U.N. then we have done a service to the United
States, given its role in the United Nations, and a service, above
all, to the United Nations. If the United Nations is going to be
saved, it can only be saved by being reformed.
We can also claim some credit for exploiting the skills and the
talents of Ambassador Charles Lichenstein, who for the past two
years has been a Senior Fellow at The Heritage Foundation. Before
that Ambassador Lichenste in, as all of you well know, represented
this country at the United Nations, serving on Jeane Kirkpatrick's
staff in
a dual position as Alternative Representative for Special
Political Affairs at the General Assembly and as a Deputy U.S.
Representative for the Security Council. This meant, of course,
that Chuck was almost always at the Security council.
Ambassador Lichenstein brings many other talents to the
Foundation and to us. He is in a sense a veteran warrior in the
conservative revolution. He is i n a way a veteran of the
conservative long march, taking us from the political wilderness to
victory. He served both in the Nixon and Ford Administrations. He
began working with Richard Nixon in 1959, in Nixon's presidential
campaign in 1960, the gubernat orial campaign in 1962, and helped
write several of Richard Nixon's books. It therefore is with great
pleasure that I introduce the moderator for this morning,
Ambassador Charles Lichenstein.
AMBASSADOR CHARLES LICHENSTEIN: Thank you very much,, Burt. I am
sorry my Mao tunic is at the cleaners or I would have come in more
appropriate "long march" type uniform. The relationship between
diplomacy and dentistry is that after you are away from the venue
for a while, you forget all of the pain and you forget al l of the
agony of sitting around both in the dentist chair and in the U.S.
chair at the U.N. Security Council and you remember only friends
and colleagues. I join Burt in welcoming all of you and in
welcoming especially our three most distinguished guests. Each will
address the topic of "How the United Nations Can Be Reformed." I
suppose the prior question is, should it be? Each will address the
topic for between 15 and 20 minutes and then I hope we will have
some time for questions from all of you. I have decided on
strict-U.N. procedure this morning and so.the speakers list is by
alphabetical order, by country, according to the English
alphabet--Algeria, the Federal Republic of Germany, and then
Singapore batting cleanup.
Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun has rep resented his country of
Algeria in Washington since September 1984. For two and half to
three years prior to that date, he was the Permanent Representative
of Algeria to the United Nations. He has.long been a leading figure
in the principal political grou p of his country--first within the
liberation movement and then in the nation of Algeria. He served
for almost ten years as an Assistant Secretary-General of the
Organization of African Unity and has served as well successively
as Algerian Ambassador to We st Germany and to France. it is a
privilege to welcome an old colleague and friend to The Heritage
Foundation, Mohamed Sahnoun, Ambassador of Algeria.
AMBASSADOR MOHAMED SAHNOUN: Today, the United Nations is an
organization that is a little over forty years of age. Ever since
it was set up to replace the ill-fated League of Nations, it has
experienced ups and downs, just like any other kind of human
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endeavor. Because the United Nations is first and foremost a
human institution, its performance rests upon the work,
performance, and achievements of those who meet within its walls.
it is people who are the architects of what the United Nations was,
is, a nd will be. As a human institution with such a diversity of
opinions and wishes being expressed on its floor, the United
Nations should not be labeled as useless and subjected to an
outright condemnation. Our assessment of the United Nations'
performance s hould be undertaken in a realistic mariner, keeping
in mind that a past endeavor, namely the League of Nations, failed
where the present institution has succeeded. Indeed, .the United
Nations has so far shown a capacity for adaptation and a commitment
to human development. Yet I believe that forty years is long enough
for its members to assess the work done so far and suggest
much-needed reforms.
Anyone who has observed the scene of international affairs would
indeed acknowledge that the world institution is very much in need
of reforms. But what kind of reforms? I personally believe that
what needs to be changed is the overall approach to the
decision-making process in all its fora. Whatever the issue, the
General Assembly's decisions are not binding. The y are or have
gradually become recommendations directed to the member states.
Then, one might ask, how should the General Assembly's
recommendations be interpreted? Effectively, morally, or just as an
expression of a particular feeling of the world communi ty at a
specific time? And I believe, in most cases, it is indeed a mere
expression of that feeling and we should accept it as such. That,
therefore, should be kept in mind when we articulate our approach
to the decision-making process.
The General Assembl y makes different types of recommendations.
Roughly speaking, the first type comprises recommendations of
universal interest, that is to say, recommendations that concern
everybody and deal with issues such as disarmament, outer space,
peace, and so on. T h ese recommendations actually are dealt with
mostly in the First Committee of the General Assembly, which by the
way should be meshed with the Special Political Committee. And some
of them are dealt with directly in the Plenary Session of the
General Assem bly. I believe that these recommendations should be
made strictly on the basis of a consensus, if we are to reflect the
concerns of overall world public opinion.
The second type of recommendation relates to political issues
that generally deal with local o r regional conflicts, such as the
Middle East, southern Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central America.
This category creates serious political issues which ideally should
also become an object of consensus. Nonetheless, I think that it is
unrealistic for th e moment to envisage such a decision-making
process. These questions are usually debated in the Fourth
Committee or Special Political Committee or directly by the Plenary
Session of the General Assembly. I believe that in these cases, any
recommendation ma de by the General Assembly should be interpreted
as
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an expression of the feeling of the public opinion directly
concerned. And, consequently, a majority decision should be
interpreted as an expression of that opinion. The views of the
minority, however , should be explained and passed an in a more
adequate manner so that the rules of the democratic process are
respected.
The third category of problems plaguing the United Nations deals
with economic and humanitarian issues. These are dealt with
principal ly by the Second and Third Committees. In this case, the
General Assembly should be a mere coordinating body of the
activities of the specialized agencies. Unfortunately, the General
Assembly has A tendency to engage in lengthy and fastidious debates
on i s sues .already discussed by other bodies. This is, I think, a
very strenuous and unhealthy exercise on the part of the General
Assembly. In fact, it could and should simply take note of the
reports submitted by the Economic and Social Council, which is the
coordinating body of the General Assembly. One immediate measure,
in my opinion, would be to merge the Second and Third
Committees.
The fourth category of problems comprises legal issues that are
covered by the Sixth Committee. I believe this is one of th e most
important functions of the United Nations. The purpose is to shape
a body of international'law. In this case, the decision-making
process can only be dealt with in a pragmatic way and should seek
unanimity or general agreement. Member states could signal their
opposition to an issue by making reservations but should not hinder
the process, which is a very long one.
Today, almost everybody agrees an the fundamental issue, i.e.,
that the world institution needs an infusion of new blood. That
should be the concern of all. As for me, I believe that the overall
performance of the United Nations could be improved with the help
of some changes.
First of all, as I said before, the making of decisions by
consensus should be encouraged and incorporated in the rules of
procedure.
Second, a period of "reflection and cooling off" should be
instituted before any proposal is put to a vote.
Third, more serious consideration should be given to negotiating
procedures and devices.
Fourth, the agenda of the General Assembly should be drastically
reduced.
Fifth, the number of resolutions also should be drastically
reduced. I was amazed during the short time I spent in the United
Nations when I went to the First Committee and saw so many
resolutions
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on one single item. On disarmament we had over 68 resolutions; a
lot of them in effect repeating themselves.
Sixth, the length of statements should be reduced in order to
deal with a greater number of issues within a shorter period of
time.
Seventh, the volume of documents necessary for the various
conferences should be reduced and their quality improved.
Eighth, there should be a ban on the creation of committees and
subcommittees that need services, and better use made of the
Secretary-General's staff instead.
Ninth, there should be a limitation of the duration of the
regular session of the General Assembly.
Tenth, budgetary implications of all resolutions should be
minimal.
There is, however, one aspect of the decision-making pr ocess
that also should be underlined. That is the influence and pressure
exercised by some countries on others. There is nothing strange
about that, since the General Assembly reflects more or less the
nature of bilateral relations that exist between vari o us
countries and the ability of country 11X11 to use its prestige or
influence without prejudice to international ethics. If the
influence of country 11X11 is temporarily at a low because of its
behavior in foreign politics, or because of its lacji__@f ge
nerosity, country 11X11 should then blame no one but itself.
We have mentioned how some of the program discussion is merely a
repetition of prior discussions undertaken by specialized
institutions. This process has serious consequences on the
elaboration o f the budget of the world institution. Besides there
is also the pattern of creating new bodies whose usefulness is
questionable, which exercises a strain an the institution. How the
budgetary decisions should take into consideration the weighted
contribu tion of the member states is a matter that deserves
serious study, which the Committee of Eighteen, I believe, is
undertaking. I remain, however, aloof to the idea of changing the
existing scale of assessments.
Very often, when people are frustrated with t he United Nations,
they say that the institution has no authority or they even talk
about sending it back to the drawing board. I personally have a
different opinion in this regard. My comments and suggestions do
not represent defense of the United Nation s Der se. They are'a
defense of the principle that nations, small and large, need a
forum where issues can be debated--if not always resolved--in a
peaceful manner and according to democratic principles. Before the
inception of the United Nations, the only form of real authority
was the actual power of the strongest
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states. The world institution was founded to replace this state
of affairs, to deal with issues in a different manner. However, in
order for the United Nations to achieve real international
authority, there must be a steady consensus of the world communit y
on important matters. That consensus has never really emerged
because of ideological differences that led to discord, but this
should not stop us from continuing to strive for it.
The Security Council of the United Nations may not appear to be
the best m echanism for fixing things up between quarreling states.
But it would be*hard to find a replacement for achieving 'the same
objective of resolving issues in a peaceful manner. The Security
.Council is the most important organ of the United Nations. It is w
here .we turn when we want an acute crisis situation handled--at
least,, that should be the case. Unfortunately, the Security
Council has, in fact, become a kind of mini-General Assembly, and
that is regrettable. I believe that, by becoming a forum used f o r
argument for the mere sake of argument, the Security Council will
lose its credibility and efficiency. Strict measures indicating
when and how the Security Council can be seized should be
introduced in the rules of procedure of the Security Council. Thi s
means that some members will have to determine whether a situation
should be considered an acute crisis and whether an immediate
meeting of the Security Council would be helpful.
The current procedure involves what are called "consultations"
before a for mal gathering of the Security Council takes place.
Such consultations, however, are meaningless. It is thus necessary
to give a clear mandate to those who are entrusted with the formal
authority to convene a meeting of the Security Council. in my
opinion, such a capacity should be granted to the
Secretary-General, the Chairman of the Security Council, and the
member states holding veto powers. in this respect, however, I
suggest letting America, Africa, and Asia be through individual
countries represented a mong the permanent members. In the case of
Asia, that would obviously be another representative in addition to
the People's Republic of China. These members should be made aware
of the serious character of a Security Council meeting.
Furthermore, we shoul d also retain the possibility for members of
the Security Council to issue a statement after consultation an
problems and issues that do not reflect the urgency of an acute
crisis.
Among the reforms that should be introduced is one relating to
the role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. I feel
that he should play an important coordinating role and that he
should have more control of the agenda discussed by the member
states. The Secretary-General should provide the organization with
pragmatic l eadership. He should be a chief executive for the
feasibility and quality control of the various programs. He should
also be assured publicly by the permanent members of the Security
Council that they will respect his autonomy in management matters.
The S ecretary-General of the United Nations should be the
initiator and
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monitor of the global watch functions. He should be responsible
for addressing the General Assembly whenever necessary to focus
world attention on emerging issues that are likely to req uire
multilateral response at the regional or local level. He should
vigorously defend his duties and prerogatives as chief executive.
flis role under the Charter requires that he be a risk taker and
not a caretaker. He will, however, gain more credibilit y and moral
authority if staff management is kept at a minimum cost for the
member states. A position in the Secretariat should not become a
life career. I think the Secretary-General should have a single
mandate of five to six years.
Today the world organ ization is in great need of refurbishment.
.Some of its mechanisms are not working properly or at all. There
is a great need for all members of the institution to redefine some
aspects of its role. The nations of this world can and should work
together fo r the sake of preserving this forum, for the sake of
maintaining open communication channels, for the sake of the
institution, for the sake of us all.
AMBASSADOR LICHENSTEIN: Thank you very much, Ambassador Sahnoun.
I do not know whether you solved any of the problems,, but I think
you have put virtually every key issue on the agenda.
Ambassador Gunther van Well has represented the government of
the Federal Republic of Germany in Washington since July 1984. His
career, after studies in law and economics in Bonn, embraces the
entire foreign office establishment in his country. He rose to the
level of State Secretary for the Foreign Office of the Federal
Republic of Germany. He has actually had two stints at the United
Nations. From 1954 to 1959, he was part of the Permanent Observer
Mission before West Germany's membership in the United Nations and,
of course, from 1981 to 1984 he served West Germany as its
Permanent Representative to the United Nations. It is a great
pleasure and a great personal privilege for me to introduce Gunther
van Well.
AMBASSADOR GUNTHER VAN WELL: Thank you very much for the
invitation.
I am glad that Mohamed Sahnoun looked at the problem very much
from the organization side. I would like to look at the role of the
major countries in the United Nations, particularly the crucial
role of the United States.
When President Reagan took office in 1980, U.S. foreign policy
was reviewed in depth and changed in many substantial
aspects--among them U.S. policy vis-a-vis multilateral processes ,
international organizations, and in particular, the United Nations.
Let me mention only the Law of the Sea Convention, UNESCO, global
negotiations on economic development, southern Africa. The Heritage
Foundation played an important role in this review of U.S. policy.
The review reflected
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the change of mood and a change of attitude toward the outside
world felt throughout this country.
People have been talking of a U.S. shift away from
internationalism and toward global unilateralism, away from
consultation, from the search for compromise and consensus toward
tough pursuit of national interest, a shift away from international
law and in t ernational arbitration toward the primacy of national
law and national interest. People quote as one of the last and most
striking examples of this general trend the withholding of
obligatory contributions to the budgets of international
organizations, es pecially of the United Nations.
The question is asked: What is the future of the concept of
world order envisioned in the Charter of the United Nations if the
main architect, founder, and guarantor of the Charter moves away
from it? This is a question fund amental for the future of the
United Nations. Is the United States really moving away from the
Charter? It is, I think, important to distinguish between the
Charter and the reality of the United Nations as an organization.
Maybe the problem is that the or g anization itself has turned away
from the ideal concept of world order as laid down in the
Charter--if you consider human rights, civil liberties,
self-determination of peoples, nonuse of force, peaceful resolution
of conflict. Maybe it has even moved awa y from important basics of
international life reflected in the Charter as an instrument not
only of idealism, but also of Realvoliti
The special status of the permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council is a case in point. This status is not o
nly codified in the Chapter dealing with the Security Council, but
it has been taken account of in the operation of the United Nations
organization as a whole. While I do not think that the original
selection and limitation of the special status powers ha s to be
maintained for all time, the realities of international life
require that the major powers in the world be included in
international decisions on matters in which they exercise influence
and, at least, that they do not feel compelled to oppose them .
Therefore, the first prerequisite of an appropriately
functioning United Nations is to seek participation or acquiescence
in a certain course of action by the major powers. While third
parties, including the Secretary-General of the United Nations, can
p lay an important role in preparing the ground for the major
powers to move toward consensus--express or tacit--it is a
political fact of life that direct diplomacy between the major
powers leading to basic bilateral understandings between them on
problem r esolution remains necessary in our present world. The
routine of co-membership in the Security Council or other bodies
can be useful in maintaining a generally cooperative relationship
between the major powers to facilitate bargaining in concrete
cases. B ut the basic political impulse has to come from the
leadership level.
My first suggestion, therefore would be to include in the agendas
of high-level contacts between major powers an item concerning the
improvement of bilateral cooperation on matters of common interest
before the United Nations. The special responsibilities of major
powers as regards the proper functioning of the United Nations--or,
for that matter, of other international organizations--extend
beyond the right of veto in such prescribed c ircumstances as the
U.N. Security Council. Members who do not realistically accept a
middle course between the idealistic principle of one country, one
vote, all votes being equal and the special responsibilities, not
only financially, of the major countr ies, undermine the
effectiveness of the organization. This has the tragic result that
those who need the organization most for the realistic pursuit of
their interests weaken that same organization.
There have been similar discussions in the European commu nity,
although the Treaty of Rome and subsequent instruments make special
provisions for major countries. While it would be impractical to
try to amend the Charter of the United Nations to better define
this middle course between idealism and realism, the re are many
possibilities in the United Nations to proceed thus in actual
practice.
My second suggestion, therefore, would be to develop an informal
consultation procedure among U.N. members of all sizes to develop a
course of responsibility toward the eff ectiveness of the
organization and a course of reason and realism vis-a-vis the
crucial role of the major countries. The objective would be to
reduce the processes of confrontational voting, to avoid the
overriding of essential positions of major countrie s by automatic
bloc voting, and to facilitate consensus. This would be
particularly important in decisions on conflict resolution and
codification of international law as well as on work programs and
the finances of the organization.
This informal consulta tion procedure would be strongly enhanced by
more active participation of general, regional operative systems in
the U.N. framework. The Charter devotes an entire chapter to the
role of regional organizations in the U.N. system. Throughout the
four decade s of the U.N., such groupings as the organization of
American States, the Arab League, and the Organization of African
Unity have established formal links with the U.N. But their
contributions to the creation of a world order of peace,
international securi t y, economic and social development,
self-determination of peoples, and human rights as envisaged in the
Charter has remained unsatisfactory. In the course of increasing
antagonism in the United Nations between West and East, North and
South, and in partic u lar as a consequence of Third World
militancy, the groupings in the U.N. have become more and more
ideologized. The rationale was not the integration of regional
systems of security, stability, conflict resol'ution, and economic
and social'development int o a worldwide order as envisioned in the
U.N.
9
Charter, but the mobilization and confrontation of opposing
ideological camps with bloc voting on resolutions, which failed to
have much impact on real life. But it did increasingly spoil the
atmosphere in the organization and contribute to the crises in
which the U.N. has found itself since the 1970s.
Parallel to this unfortunate course of events lining up interest
groups against each other in contests of pressure and
counterpressure, reveling in extreme r esolution rhetoric without
practical significance, parallel to this and outside the U.N., new
regional initiatives were spreading in Europe, Asia, Latin America,
and Africa. Some have reached important stages of structuring
regional security .and stabilit y, political cooperation, economic
and social development. Some, such as the European Community and
ASEAN,, have become active in the United Nations and have exerted a
moderating influence.
My third suggestion would be to encourage the Secretary-General and
other organs of the United Nations to make more use of genuine,
regional cooperative systems with their political and economic
weight, drawing upon their diplomatic resources for promoting U.N.
initiatives toward reason able compromise, realistic assessment of
the role of the major powers, and consensus.
I believe the U.N. budget process should be at the heart of the
deliberations about reform at the present time because of its
urgency. The U.N. Secretary-General has defi ned the problem
precisely: "Since 1979 member states accounting for 70 to 80
percent of assessed contributions either voted against or abstained
on the regular program budget. Clearly, we need to restore a
broader basis of agreement on central budgetary q u estions ... not
only on ... the size of the budget [but] also [on] the question of
priorities and the allocation of resources." I understand that
members of the European Community are still debating concepts of
reform in this field. Efforts to reach budge t decisions by
consensus would be welcome, but the formalization of the consensus
principle would give every single member state of the U.N. a right
of veto.
Weighted voting for budget decisions as proposed by the Kassebaum
Amendment is incompatible with t he one country, one vote system
and would require a Charter revision that would open a "Pandora's
Box." Equalizing assessed contributions to mirror the equality of
the voting system would limit the budget to 159 times what the
weakest member could afford to pay--obviously an impractical
solution and one that would never attract a majority. In other
words, the principle of assessing contributions on the basis of
ability to pay must be maintainoid.
One interesting idea, but one which has not yet been submitted
formally by any nation, would be the creation of a body consisting
of the main contributors, which would vote in advance on all
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appropriations. The normal scale of assessments would apply to all
expenditures decided by consensus or by majority v ote of the body
of main contributors and the General Assembly. This would be the
core budget. Budget decisions that found a majority in the General
Assembly but not in the body of the main contributors would still
be effective as a supplementary budget, b u t an adjusted scale of
assessments would be applied in such cases to ensure that the
majority felt the financial pinch of such a supplementary budget,
while the outvoted main contributors would be relieved of part of
the cost of unwanted programs. I do no t know how viable this idea
is, but it may be worth considering.
These four suggestions that I have contributed to the discussion
here today are of a broad and general nature. They give rise to
many questions of details. But to me, after 35 years in the fo
reign service of my country--three years as Permanent
Representative to the U.N.,, now two years here in
Washington--these four points seem to address the problem areas
that lie at the center of the crisis of the U.N.,- which must be
dealt with in any eff ort at reform for a U.N. of the future.
The goals of 1945 were those of American idealism and
internationalism. They were in philosophical terms the courageoust
optimistic antithesis of an old-fashioned European realism and
nationalism, which appeared bank rupt at the and of the war. It was
important to be shown a way out of the Hobbesian world-at that
time. I think there.is a rather emphatic desire in today's Germany
to retain as much American idealism in international affairs as
possible, which is why we have an instinctive preference for
leaving the U.N. Charter intact and working within that framework
to improve its functioning. Thank you very much.
AMBASSADOR LICHENSTEIN: It is a great pleasure and privilege to
introduce Ambassador Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore.
AMBASSADOR TOMMY KOH: Can the United Nations be reformed? I would
answer the question in the affirmative but with two major caveats.
My first caveat is that no amount of reforming can effect the
realization of the two central goals of 1945 enshrin ed in the U.N.
Charter, i.e.1 that disputes between states be settled by peaceful
means and that international peace and security maintained by the
Security council. The fact that more than 20 million persons have
been killed in armed conflicts since 1945 is a horrible but
irrefutable evidence of the failure of those goals. The reality of
international politics leads me to the conclusion that those goals
cannot realistically be achieved in the future. My second caveat is
that we should have no illusions ab o ut the formidable vested
interests, both in the Secretariat and in the delegations of member
states, which will oppose any reform that impinges on their
interests. This unholy alliance has succeeded in defeating all
previous attempts at reforming the Unit ed Nations.
The following is a highly subjective and selective agenda of
reforms that I would like to see implemented at the U.N.
.Personnel Polipy and Management
The strength of the U.N. depends upon two factors. Fir st, it
can only be as strong as its member states will allow it to be.
Second, its strength and effectiveness depend upon the competence
and integrity of the men and women who make up the Secretariat. My
first .cluster of suggestions relates to the reform of personnel
policy and management. Over the past 41 years, the concept of the
international civil service has been progressively eroded. No
region or group can be exempt from blame. However, the worst
offenders are the communist countries who have never a ccepted the
concept. Their nationals are not permitted to become career
international civil servants. They are seconded to the Secretariat,
and a portion of their salaries is siphoned off by their
governments. I support Ambassador Charles Lichenstein's pr o posal
that'not more than 50 percent of the nationals of any communist
country should be allowed to serve in the U.N. Secretariat on
secondment. I object equally to the practice of communist countries
in siphoning off a portion of the salaries of their nat ionals in
the Secretariat and to the practice of some Western countries of
paying a supplement to their nationals in the Secretariat.
The process of recruitment and promotion has become highly
politicized. This has two deleterious consequences. First, the U.N.
does not always recruit the best and brightest. Second, it has a
demoralizing effect on the staff. Both the delegations and the
Secretariat are to be blamed for this deplorable state of affairs.
The Secretary-General must insulate his personal office from
pressure from the delegations. He should let the missions know that
he is not prepared to receive any ambassador if the purpose of his
visit is to lobby for the recruitment or promotion of a national
from his country or region. The Secretary-General s hould back the
substantive heads of the various departments and the Office of
Personnel Services. My third suggestion is that a Search Committee
should be established to assist the Secretary-General in
shortlisting qualified candidates for each vacancy at the level of
D2 and above. The members of the Search Committee should be
recruited from outside the U.N. system. The purpose of the Search
Committee is not to take away the Secretary-General's prerogative
of selecting his senior staff. It is to assist him by presenting
him with the most qualified candidates. My fourth suggestion is to
stop the wasteful duplication of resources in the Secretariat. Let
me give you one simple example. At present, there are two offices
within the Secretariat working in the fie ld of the Law of the Sea.
They are the Office of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Law of the Sea and the Office of ocean
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Economics and Technology, which belongs to the Department of
International Economic and Social Affairs. In order to.maximize
economy and efficiency, the two offices should be merged. My fifth
suggestion is that the Secretary-General should redeploy staff from
.sunset departments of the Secretariat,, for example, the
Department of Decolonization, to sunrise departments. My sixth
suggestion is that the Secretary-General should improve the morals
of his staff by rewarding good work and by punishing incompetence.
The Secretary-General should be given enhanced power to get rid of
deadwood in the Secretariat.
The Budget
The U.N. budget, like the U.S. federal budget, has a lot of fat
in it that can be cut. one way to do this is to strengthen the
powers of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions (ACABQ), which ha's a good track record of fis cal
responsibility. My second suggestion is to bring Secretariat
salaries into line with those of the U.S. federal civil service.
This is in accordance with the Noblemaire principle, which states
that an international organization must be prepared to pay e nough
to attract the citizens of the countries with the best paid
national civil service. At present, U.N. salaries are about 20
percent higher than U.S. salaries. My third suggestion is to stop,
or at least to reduce substantially, the junkets and needle s s
conferences that the U.N. has become addicted to. Let me give you
two examples. I see no justification for allowing members of the
U.N. Council on Namibia to go on junkets to preach the gospel of a
free Namibia to those who are already converted to the c ause. I
also see no justification for allowing the members of the Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC) to hold their summer meetings in Geneva
just because the weather is more pleasant in Geneva during the
summer than it is in New York. My fourth suggesti o n is to create
a procedure to discourage the creation of new committees. Very
often, when a delegation runs-out of ideas on an item that it has
inscribed on the agenda, it resorts to the expedient of proposing
the creation of a committee to examine the qu e stion. The U.N. has
literally hundreds of such committees, many of which have
overlapping jurisdictions. My suggestion is that, before any
resolution that contains a proposal to create a new committee is
adopted, the Secretary-General should be required t o submit a
report containing his observations on whether there are existing
committees which could look into the question and on the usefulness
of creating a new committee.
The Nonaligned Movement and the GrOuR of 77
. The key to the revitalization of the United Nations lies not
in amending its Charter, its institutions, and its procedures, but
in the attitudes and policies which its members adopt toward the
organization and toward the subjects and questions that appear on
the global agenda. In the politi cal field,,the member states of
the U.N. which belong to the nonaligned movement, now numbering 99,
can play a vital
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role in the revitalization of the U.N. However, if the movement
is to play such a role, it must first set its house in order. If
the nonaligned movement can act objectively and impartially between
the two superpowers and their respective alliances,, if the
movement will uphold and apply its principles uniformly and not on
a selective basis, if it will exercise its majoritarian power i n
the General Assembly with wisdom and with prudence and if it will
put forward realistic and imaginative proposals on the whole range
of subjects and issues on the global agenda, then the nonaligned
movement will have made an important contribution toward the
revitalization of the U.N.
In the economic field, the Group of 77 must alter its agenda,
its posture, and its-rhetoric if it is to be taken seriously and if
the U.N. is to become an important forum for the North-South
dialogue. The Group of 77, like t he nonaligned movement, has come
to be dominated by a hard core of unrepresentative and radical
countries. Economically speaking, most of the leaders of the Group
of 77 are countries that have failed to make economic progress.
Their attitude is therefore t o blame the "inequitable
international economic order" for their own failures. They are
basically hostile to free enterprise and to multinational
corporations. They seek confrontation instead of accommodation.
They demand the transfer of resources from th e rich to the poor
instead of seeking mutual benefits. If'the Group of 77 is to
@he__:haken seriously by the industrialized countries, a change of
attitude, of tone, and of rhetoric would be helpful. The Group
should put forward proposals that are economic ally sound and will
bring about mutual benefits to the developed as well as the
developing countries.
The Responsibility of the West
Al; present, the West tends to play a defensive and reactive
role at the United Nations. One of my good friends from a Wes tern
delegation has told me that his objective at the U.N. is damage
limitation. This is a very negative and defeatist attitude. The
West should play a more active and positive role at the U.N. It
should have an agenda of problems and questions, which it i s
willing to discuss or negotiate with the developing countries at
the U.N. The West should learn how to play the game at the U.N. and
adopt a more skillful and muscular strategy in furthering its
foreign policy objectives through the U.N. When the West h a s
nothing to offer, the moderate leadership in the Third World is
weakened and the radical leadership is strengthened. The West
should not abandon the U.N. because of a mistaken perception that
the U.N. has already been captured by the Soviets and.is ther e
fore a forum in which the West cannot win. The defeat of the Soviet
Union on Afghanistan, the defeat of Vietnam on Cambodia, and the
victories of the U.S. on the status of Puerto Rico and the right of
Israel to remain in the U.N. are ample proof of my ass ertion that
the U.N. is a forum in which the West can win. The
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U.N. is an important forum for winning the hearts and minds of
the - peoples of the world. Through a combination of skillful
diplomacy and a positive agenda, the West can beat its principal
ideological adversary at the U.N.
I cannot leave the subject of t he responsibility of the West
without commenting on two recent actions of the United States.
First, after years of condemning the Soviet UnionAnd others for
illegally withholding their assessed contributions to the U.N., the
United States, has, in recent y ears, joined the delinquents.
Second, the U.S. Congress has unilaterally decided to reduce the
assessed contributions of this country to the U.N. budget, in clear
violation of the U.S. treaty obligations and of the due process of
law. Actions such as thes e not only undermine the financial
integrity of the U.N. but they also cause many friends of the U.S.
to wonder whether its real intention is to reform the U.N. or to
emasculate it.
Conclusion
Let me conclude by asking the two questions which are in the m
inds of many people. First, will the U.N. survive? Second, what
kind of a U.N. will it be? I think the U.N. will survive. Although
it has many flaws and shortcomings, on balance, it does more good
than harm. If the U.N. does not exist, the imperative of g l obal
interdependence will compel us to create an organization very much
like the U.N. The U.N. is particularly important for small
countries such as Singapore because, in spite of all its
inadequacies, the U.N. does provide us with some protection against
the law of the jungle. Whether the U.N. of the future will become a
stronger and effective organization will depend primarily on the
policies and practices of its member states. The answer does not
lie in tinkering with the Charter or in institutional ref orm.
AMBASSADOR LICHENSTEIN: Thank you very much. As always, Tommy,
you were as good as your word. You have offended everyone. I am
going to exercise the privilege of the moderator. We have very few
minutes, unfortunately, left for questions. I will turn t o you and
ask questions, but first, I would like to call on, in exercise of
right of reply, one of the most nondefensive--some in fact would
say one of the most "offensive" members of the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations in recent years--the distinguish ed Assistant
Secretary of State Alan Keyes. I wonder, Ambassador Keyes, whether
you would like to rise and speak to any of the extraordinarily
imaginative suggestions that we have heard this morning.
AMBASSADOR ALAN KEYES: I would like to say that Ambassad or Koh
may have been striving mightily to offend everybody. But I
discovered when I was at the U.N. that in spite of all if Tommy was
saying it, it was very difficult to be offended but always possible
to be stimulated to a great deal of thought. I think this
presentation and the previous presentations certainly did that.
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Underlining it all, I think I would agree with the basic premise
that what is required in order to deal with the U.N.'s problems is
a change in attitude. But I am reminded of that old phrase which I
think de Tocqueville--maybe he was quoting it, I cannot
remember--but he said, "First men make the laws, then the laws make
the men," which is a way of pointing to the interconnection between
the institutions and the people, between the structures and the
attitudes. I think that the failure of the structures is in great
part due to some of the difficulties in attitudes and underlining
problems, but I think that was also related to some of the
structural deficiencies. We always talk about the Security Council
and then the American notion of democracy. We think, "the Security
Council,, that is checks and balances." We fail to realize that for
the great bulk of the U.N.'s activities, the Security Council has
no relevance whatsoever in the ar e as that now take up most of the
budget in the United Nations. There was no proper structural
discipline imposed upon the system and that lack of structural
discipline, in fact, was a basic flaw not in the democratic hopes
of the United Nations, but in the sustainability of those hopes. At
least in the United States, we have all understood that democracy
requires a certain balance of structures if it is to succeed.
I think it is in pursuit of that balance, and in the interest of
helping to create a context in which healthier attitudes will
prevail at the United Nations, that we have undertaken the kind of
strenuous efforts both in terms of our own representation and in
terms of - reforms at the United Nations over the last several
years. I sense, however, i n a lot of what I hear as
criticism--some of it at the legal level that Ambassador Koh
alluded to toward the end of his statement--I sense a certain
distrust of U.S. motives in all of this.
A final comment on that distrust. I find it-rather strange
because as I have looked around the U.N. system you can list the
kind of organizations, projects and programs, the results that have
been accounted to be the symbols of what international cooperation
can, achieve. And for all of them you will find the United Sta t es
present at the creation. You will find us there at the beginning;
you will find us with the energy, with the idealism, with the
commitment. The thing that we contributed most to the United
Nations was not our money; it was precisely the fact that of al l
the countries in the world, I would be willing to say that we were
the only ones who truly believed and who truly believe today.
It is precisely because of that belief that we are disturbed at
the betrayal of some of the basic principles and at the failu re to
live upto some of the basic ideals. And that we are willing to take
political risks and maybe step outside a little bit of the ordinary
course of action in order to try to bring the organization back to
what we know in our hearts it can be. And we n ot only know it in
our hearts, we know it in our land because we haVe seen something
like
1 6
that internation al cooperation under the rule of law with
reciprocal respect for the rights and obligations of all. We have
seen it work. It works every day in our own country. And that being
the case, our commitment is not just abstaction; it is a practical
fact. It is that practical fact which leads us to take the steps
that we have taken to try to create a sense of tremendous urgency
about the need to make the United Nations into something'that will
once again work.
It is for that, given the record, we are going to be
consistently distrusted in terms of our motives. Well I think that
is just ignoring what we are, what we have been,, and also what we
hope the international community may one day be again.
AMBASSADOR LICHENSTEIN: Thank you very much,, Alan. And thank
you, Ambassadors, and ladies and gentlemen.
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