The
world can fairly easily be divided into areas of wealth and
poverty. This has always been true, but only in recent decades has
there been a concerted attempt by wealthier nations to assist
poorer nations in becoming more prosperous. Starting with the
Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank) and extending to the subsequent creation of regional
development banks and national development agencies, the developed
world began to undertake this effort in the 1940s.
Several years ago Congress created the
International Financial Institution Advisory Commission (IFIAC) to
assess the impact of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
World Bank, and other international financial institutions (IFIs)
in achieving their stated goals--of which one of the most important
is helping poor nations increase economic growth. The final report
of the Commission concluded that the IFIs were not providing
positive contributions toward development. It offered a number of
fundamental recommendations to improve those institutions, most of
which remains unadopted.
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
No
region of the world is in more dire need of development than
sub-Saharan Africa. The 700 million people in this region face
tremendous challenges, including the world's highest incidence of
HIV/AIDS, deep poverty, unemployment, political instability, and a
host of related problems. If the IFIs are to be measured,
sub-Saharan Africa should be a key factor in that judgement.
The
decades since the 1940s have seen an evolution in strategies to
achieve the overriding goal of increasing economic growth in poor
nations. With the support of the World Bank and other development
institutions, most African nations embraced development strategies
involving heavy state intervention, including nationalization of
industries, property, banks, and control over key utilities and
commodities. These policies proved disastrous, leading to poor
growth, rampant corruption, and poor services. Despite a general
rejection of state-led development beginning in the early 1980s,
many countries in sub-Saharan Africa are still burdened with heavy
state intervention.
Between 1980 and 2002, the World Bank's
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
International Development Association, along with the African
Development Bank, have provided $77.5 billion (in 1995 dollars) in
development assistance to the 48 countries in sub-Saharan
Africa--nearly $1.5 billion per country--to spur development in the
region. This is a huge investment, particularly when the relatively
small sizes of the recipient countries' economies are taken into
account. To put this into perspective, the total gross domestic
product (GDP) in constant 1995 U.S. dollars for those 48 countries
in 2002 was $296.6 billion (approximately the same GDP as
Michigan). Using constant dollars, multilateral development
assistance to the region from 1980 to 2002 was over 26 percent of
the region's total GDP in 2002.
Despite this development investment (often
at extremely subsidized interest rates and generous repayment
schedules), sub-Saharan Africa has performed dismally. Of the 45
sub-Saharan African countries for which per capita GDP data are
available from 1980 to 2002:
- Twenty-three experienced negative compound
annual growth in real per capita GDP (constant 1995 U.S.
dollars);
- Seven experienced marginal compound annual
growth between 0 percent and 1 percent in real per capita GDP;
and
- Fifteen experienced compound annual growth
of more than 1 percent in real per capita GDP, but only three
achieved per capita growth over 4 percent. The best performer was
Equatorial Guinea, which experienced real growth of over 12 percent
due to the recent discovery and export of oil.
Why
is this important? According to the World Bank, the average 2002
per capita GDP in sub-Saharan Africa was $577. To become as wealthy as the United
States in per capita GDP, the average country in sub-Saharan
African must experience real compound growth in per capita GDP of 5
percent per year for over 80 years. To reach upper-middle-income
status (per capita income of $2,976), it would have to experience
real compound growth in per capita income of over 5 percent for
more than 34 years.
Instead of desperately needed economic growth, sub-Saharan African
saw a decline in per capita GDP from $660 in 1980 to $577 in 2002
(in constant terms).
Despite the modest gains in areas such as
literacy and infant mortality, which should be encouraged, improvement
of human development indicators in sub-Saharan Africa has lagged
far behind other regions of the world. For instance, sub-Saharan
Africa is the only region of the world that is not on track to meet
a single target of the Millennium Development Goals--including the
goals to reduce poverty, hunger, and infant mortality or to improve
secondary school enrollment for girls, immunization for measles,
and access to potable water.
Unfortunately, even the few gains made by
African countries may be short lived because without increases in
economic growth, they are not sustainable. Without economic growth,
countries lack the resources to support efforts to improve the
lives of their citizens. Indeed, the World Bank estimated that
halving severe poverty in sub-Saharan Africa by 2015 (a target of
the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals [MDG]) would require annual
growth of at least 7 percent. Meeting the other MDG--and more
importantly, creating the ability for countries to continue
progress made toward those goals--depends in great part on
increasing economic growth. Foreign assistance by itself is not
sufficient.
The Need for Economic Freedom
Achieving high per capita economic growth
is possible, even in low-income countries. No doubt everyone is
familiar with the respective histories of sub-Saharan Africa and
East Asia. Per capita GDP in East Asia and the Pacific was lower
than in sub-Saharan Africa in 1960, but has since far eclipsed
sub-Saharan Africa. Most have heard about the dramatic success of
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Yet even troubled nations like
Indonesia have outpaced similar nations in Africa. In 1960,
Indonesia had a per capita GDP of $249 and Nigeria had a per capita
GDP of $224 (in constant terms). Nigeria has seen a $24 increase in
per capita GDP--despite enormous oil resources--while Indonesia's
per capita GDP climbed to over $1,000. This disparity in growth occurred
despite similarities between the countries, including oil
resources, multi-ethnic populations, religious tensions, large
populations, proximity to developed markets, large geographical
size, and extensive corruption.
Perhaps one reason for the different
development paths is these countries' respective approach to
economic policy. While neither nation is a paragon of economic
freedom, Indonesia generally has had a freer economy.
Research at The Heritage Foundation
indicates that the best way for countries to increase economic
growth is to adopt policies that promote economic freedom and the
rule of law, which are measured in the Index of Economic Freedom.
The Index analyzes 50 economic indicators in 10 independent
factors: trade policy, fiscal burden of government, government
intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and
foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property
rights, regulation, and informal market activity. Those 10 factors
are graded from 1 to 5, with 1 being the best score and 5 being the
worst score. Those scores are then averaged to give an overall
score for economic freedom. Countries are designated "free,"
"mostly free," "mostly unfree," or "repressed" based on these
overall scores.
As
shown in the Index, "free" countries, on average, have a per capita
income twice that of "mostly free" countries. "Mostly free"
countries have a per capita income more than three times that of
"mostly unfree" and "repressed" countries. (See Chart 1.) This
relationship exists because countries that maintain policies that
promote economic freedom provide an environment that facilitates
trade and encourages entrepreneurial activity, which in turn
generates economic growth.
Not
only is a higher level of economic freedom clearly associated with
a higher level of per capita GDP, but higher GDP growth rates are
associated with improvements in a country's economic freedom
score. Chart 2 ranks
the graded countries according to the improvement in economic
freedom between 1997 and 2004. The countries represented in the
left-hand bar were most improved, and those in the right-hand bar
were least improved. Average growth rates across the eight years of
changes were then computed for the countries in each bar or group.
Across the spectrum, the more a country improved its economic
freedom, the higher the average economic growth it experienced.
Countries that consistently march toward improved economic freedom
enjoy the most progress towards prosperity.
This
relationship holds, in general, for sub-Saharan Africa. As
illustrated in Chart 3, "mostly free" economies in sub-Saharan
Africa graded in the 2004 Index averaged a per capita GDP of more
than three times that of "mostly unfree" economies, which in turn
averaged a per capita GDP nearly 20 percent greater than
"repressed" economies.
Similar to the trend for all countries,
Chart 4 illustrates that sub-Saharan African countries that
improved their economic freedom scores the most were associated
with higher GDP growth rates. The relationship is not as linear in
the African countries as it is among all countries, but clearly the
countries improving the most saw the greatest improvement in GDP
growth rates and the countries improving the least experienced the
least GDP growth.
Why
would economic freedom contribute to economic growth? Rigid labor
policies, high regulation and bureaucratic red tape, high official
taxation, corruption, and trade barriers are obstacles that create
a drag on economic growth. The greater the level of government
intervention in the economy, the lower probability that
individuals, investors, and businesses will be able to prosper
because costs of private economic activity become higher. This
leads talented people to leave the country for more advantageous
opportunities or to engage in activities that do not contribute to
GDP (such as government service) and enrich themselves through rent
seeking and corruption. It has also created a permanent informal
economy in many countries that, while operating less inefficiently
than it would if economic impediments were removed, fills demands
left unmet because of the government's anti-market policies. The
practical result is that economically unfree countries are more
likely to be poor and find it more difficult to escape that
poverty.
The
evidence from the Index is that increasing economic freedom is a
key element in creating a positive environment for foreign and
domestic investment. Botswana and Mauritius are good examples of
how, even in sub-Saharan Africa, countries that embrace economic
freedom can reap rewards in higher economic growth. From 1980 to
2002, both countries achieved a compound average growth in per
capita GDP of 4.42 percent and 4.44 percent, respectively. Not
surprisingly, these countries adopted economic freedom early and
reaped the rewards. Both nations have been rated "mostly free"
economies for most of the time that the Index of Economic Freedom
has graded them.
Do International Financial Institutions
Help Promote Economic Freedom?
The
idea that economic freedom or economic liberalization is necessary
for development is not a radical proposal. It is generally accepted
by economists, even at the World Bank. A 1997 World Bank analysis of foreign
aid found that, while assistance has a positive impact on growth in
countries with good economic policies (free market policies, fiscal
discipline, and the rule of law), countries with poor economic
policies did not experience sustained economic growth regardless of
the amount of assistance they received. Another World Bank study found that
increased integration into the world economy from the late 1970s to
the late 1990s led to higher income growth. These countries
achieved average per capita income growth of 5 percent per year in
the 1990s.
By
contrast, non-globalizing nations have seen poor economic growth of
only 1.4 percent (on average) during the 1990s, and many saw
negative growth. Moreover, a related World Bank study found that
increased growth resulting from expanded trade "leads to
proportionate increases in incomes of the poor...[;] globalization
leads to faster growth and poverty reduction in poor countries." These studies simply
confirm the "Washington consensus" of market-driven development
that has supposedly guided IFI development policy during the past
two decades.
In
many ways, the policies upon which the Washington consensus is
founded are consistent with free markets. Key features of that
consensus include fiscal discipline, lower marginal tax rates,
liberalization of interest rates, trade liberalization,
privatization, deregulation, and secure property rights. Indeed, IFIs make
many rhetorical gestures toward a commitment to market
liberalization. The problem is that this rhetoric is rarely adhered
to in practice, and recipients often violate policy commitments
made to IFIs without fear of repercussion. This situation is why
the IFI strategy of "conditionality"--providing money to fund
promises of economic reform--has failed. The assistance is
provided, but reforms seldom materialize.
Take, for instance, the World Bank's
record in encouraging recipients to adopt liberal economic policies
in sub-Saharan Africa. Analysis of the correlation between changes
in Index scores on economic freedom from year to year for
sub-Saharan African countries and changes in disbursements of World
Bank year-on-year assistance per capita for those countries reveals
that the relationship between aid disbursement and improvements in
economic freedom is not significant. Moreover, to the extent that
there is a relationship, the World Bank has more often increased
lending to countries that are retreating from economic
liberalization.
While the World Bank often states that
lending is based on a commitment to policy change, it seldom ties
lending to policy improvements. This lends credibility to charges
that the Bank is more interested in processing loans than being a
tough advocate of policies that would contribute to economic
growth. This situation may serve the bureaucratic impulses of the
Bank and the vested interests in recipient countries that profit
from anti-market policies, but it clearly does not serve the
interests of the people in poor nations whose governments routinely
resist economic reforms more likely to result in economic
growth--and who are ultimately responsible for repaying ineffective
Bank loans.
How to Increase Economic Freedom Among
Poor Nations
The
failure of development assistance in facilitating economic growth
has left many poor nations with a large debt burden. It is the
small return on development assistance over the years and the
justifiable belief that new loans were often approved to finance
existing debt (creating a rising spiral of debt that does not
contribute to growth) that fuels criticism of foreign assistance
and lies at the heart of calls for debt forgiveness.
Many
people recommend debt forgiveness and argue that payments on this
debt would be better used if they were dedicated to domestic
development needs. This may be true for some countries, but
countries beset by poor policies, corruption, heavy state
intervention, and other characteristics that retard growth will not
benefit from the debt relief. It is not debt that is preventing
these countries from addressing their problems, it is anti-market
economic policies, corruption, and the absence of the rule of law.
Debt relief cannot help the worst-governed developing nations, such
as Zimbabwe, Sudan, and the Congo. In such countries, additional
funds gleaned from debt forgiveness will be used to prop up bad
governments or simply provide more resources for kleptocrats to
pocket. Debt can be a carrot and a stick: We should use forgiveness
to reward good performers, encourage policy change--and withhold
forgiveness from countries that refuse to change.
An
interesting recent development is the creation of the Millennium
Challenge Account (MCA) in the United States. The MCA takes a new
approach to foreign assistance by making assistance available only
to countries "that govern justly, invest in their people and
encourage economic freedom" as determined by their performance on
16 specific indicators. If a country bests the average in at
least half the indicators in three general categories, it becomes
eligible to receive MCA grants. Failure to meet that standard
excludes the country from aid consideration for that year.
The
idea of establishing preconditions in order to receive foreign
assistance--rewarding good policies already in place, rather than
providing money in hope of encouraging reform--was a central tenant
of the IFIAC. The
evidence thus far bolsters this Commission recommendation. Although
the MCA has not provided a grant to date, it has spurred reform
among candidate countries. For instance, governments in some
African countries have mentioned how they were reducing the time
needed to register a business--one MCA measure. They were also very
interested in how the Index measures trade policy (another MCA
measure) and how they could improve their score.
By
creating incentives for reform, the MCA has led to policy changes
even before the first grant has been extended. Its willingness to
differentiate among potential recipients and deny aid to countries
that fail to demonstrate a commitment to good policies has great
potential for improving the effectiveness of foreign assistance.
Hopefully, the Millennium Challenge Corporation will demonstrate
success once it begins disbursing MCA grants and make further IFI
reform easier.
The
economic futures of developing countries lie predominantly in their
own hands through the policies that they choose to adopt and
enforce. If countries want to increase per capita GDP, they should
adopt policies that are most likely to achieve that result. IFIs
can contribute to this goal, but they must change their approach to
foreign assistance.
Conclusion
Development assistance is not necessary
for poor nations to develop. Experience demonstrates that simply
providing assistance will not magically spur economic growth. It is
policies and institutions that matter for development. Foreign
assistance, through an international financial institution or
otherwise, has the potential to help poor countries achieve
specific goals, but it cannot replace the political will to
implement policy change. The challenge is to create opportunities
for growth and remove barriers to growth.
As
noted in The Road to Prosperity: The 21st Century Approach to
Economic Development:
In technical terms it is not the level of
poverty that is most vicious, but rather the absence of change or
opportunity to escape that poverty. Where the 20th century approach
produced a vicious cycle of aid, default, and dependency on foreign
governments, the IMF, or the World Bank, the 21st century holds out
the prospect that countries can generate growth and prosperity
themselves, without foreign interference.
The
challenge is to make these countries' efforts positive rather than
negative.
Developing countries must make their own
internal reforms by implementing policies that promote economic
freedom, which, in turn, are known to be associated with higher
levels of economic growth. Unfortunately, in many cases foreign
assistance has made development more difficult by encouraging
corruption, abdication of responsibility for bad policies,
perpetuation of bad policies, and by many years of recommending
counter-productive policies.
The
IFIs enjoy considerable support from both donor and recipient
nations and are not going to be eliminated. However, the U.S should
strive to reform these institutions along the lines of the IFIAC.
Only then will developing countries be on the path to economic
development and only then will multilateral assistance find fertile
soil to aid development.
Brett D. Schaefer is the Jay Kingham
Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the Center for
International Trade and Economics at The Heritage Foundation. This
lecture was originally presented November 6, 2004, to the American
Institute for Economic Research in Great Barrington, Massachusetts.
The author would like to thank Anthony Kim, Research Assistant in
the Center for International Trade and Economics, for his valuable
assistance.