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NIS Aid: A View from the Hill By Senator Mitch McConnell
Support for Russia on Capitol Hill, like Russia itself, is in
transition. Two years ago, when I was the ranking member, not
chairman, of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, I worked closely
with the Administration to draft and pass a $2.5 billion package of
aid, two thirds of which was planned for Russia. Since then, direct
bilateral aid, loans, financing, and agricultural credits for
Russia have consumed $8.4 billion of the total $11.5 billion
provided all the re p ublics. Add to that the re- cent $6.2 billion
in loans extended by the IMF and you have a sense of the enormous
commitment that has been made to Russia. This year the
Administration is seeking a little under $800 million for the NIS.
I don't mean to overw h elm you with numbers, but as the debate
over assistance heats up this year, I think we should all keep in
mind the proportionately larger amount Russia has already re-
ceived relative to her neighbors. With the new majority, I think
you will see new U.S. p olicy and aid priorities established. In
this context, and as the new chairman of the Foreign Operations
Subcommittee, I thought I would review three issues of concern that
I have about our program-namely, the type of aid, the balance in
recipient allocat i on, and the political conditions relevant to
ad- ministering our program in Russia. When I went to Moscow in
1993, it was very clear to me that no amount of aid would change
Russia. Investment, trade, and the private sector were the keys to
success. U.S. c om- panies-large and small-were eager to develop
ties, but all the businessmen I s poke with had a common set of
problems. There was no rational tax structure, contracts were
difficult to enforce because of a lack of a commercial code or
regulatory mechan i sms, and banking and financial transactions
were nearly impossible to carry out. To respond to these concerns,
I included language which linked aid to Russia on progress in
implementing comprehensive economic reforms based on market
principles, private ow n - ership, respect for contracts, and
equitable treatment of foreign investment. The Subcommittee
strongly encouraged the Administration specifically to support
efforts to strengthen the private sector, such as providing advice
to the Duma in the drafting o f com- mercial laws. As one of your
panelists, David Rossiter, may have explained, we also encouraged
partnerships between AID and private enterprise. I think the record
of our success has been mixed. With the exception of the
large-scale pri- vatization i nitiative, the Administration was
less than enthusiastic about many of our proposals and earmarks. We
kept hearing the Russians were not interested in the kind of help
we thought would be most effective. The Administration's opposition
has taken many form s. For example, on the assumption that
corruption and crime impeded private sector expansion, Congress
earmarked $30 mil-
Senator McConnell, a Republican, represents Kentucky in the
United States Senate. He serves as Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Operation s. Subcommittee. Senator McConnell spoke at The Heritage
Foundation on April 25, 1995. ISSN 0272-1155 0 1995 by The Heritage
Foundation.
lion for a variety of law enforcement programs. With dire warnings
that 5,000 criminal organi- z ations were moving in to control
banks and industry and attempting to steal nuclear material, we
were particularly interested in beefing up FBI training and
investigation efforts in the region. Of the $30 million Congress
mandated for these purposes, Judg e Freeh had to fight the
bureaucracy to get $6 million. Although I have been disappointed by
the lethargic support for the private sector, I think it is fair to
say I have noticed a change in attitude since November. Recently,
Dick Morning- star was appoin t ed as the Coordinator for NIS
Assistance at State. He has an excellent reputation with the
business community earned in the numbet-two spot at OPIC-1 expect
his background will serve the program and our interests well. No
doubt he arrives at a crucial jun c ture. There have been some
impressive recent indica- tions of improvement in the Russian
economy. Transferring ownership of 15,000 companies to private
owners has been an important step-but it is every bit as important
to contribute to improving the legal , financial, and commercial
conditions essential to sustaining those en- terprises. So far, our
aid has been short-sighted, but perhaps he can correct that course.
In addition to the type of aid we have offered, my second concern
has been its regional dist r ibution. For three years I have argued
that we should provide meaningful support for economic and
political reform in the other republics. Our aid program should not
be an either-or proposition, either we help Russia or the other
republics. I think we can - and this year will-assure some balance
in the distribution of aid. Struggling with the same problems as
Russia, it is my view that our aid has the potential to go farther
in these smaller nations, assuming we develop country-specific
strategies. So far, p l ans for the other republics primarily are
managed by contractors in Moscow or simply spin-offs or, in AID
jargon, roll-outs of Russia programs. For example, the Russian mass
pri- vatization voucher program is being replicated in Ukraine. I
think this emph a sis may overlook more critical needs in
developing the agribusiness sector. Now, more than ever, with less
money to spend, we should tailor our resources to maximize their
impact. Turning away from specific issues about our aid program,
let me address my t hird and somewhat broader concern-political
reform and the evolving relationship between the U.S. and Russia.
Since I seem to think in groups of three, there are three issues
which currently trouble the U.S.-Russian relation ship-none of
which will surpri s e you. First, I have reservations about Russian
regional ambitions. In a surprising turnabout in early December,
Foreign Minister Kozyrev and then President Yeltsin denounced our
efforts to expand NATO. Warn- ing of a "cold peace," Yeltsin
declared Russia unwilling to participate in the Partnership for
Peace program. To date, they are still stonewalling both NATO
expansion and the Partner- ship. This tension escalates fear in
Central Europe about Russian ambitions-concerns which were
magnified last week by both Kozyrev and Yeltsin. In commenting on
events in Crimea, they both insisted on Moscow's right to use force
to protect Russian minorities. Compounding these strains is the
situation in Chechnya. Although I think there is reason to be
relieved over the d ismal performance of the military, the
brutality of the assault on ci- vilians has caused real alarm. As
one Ukrainian said to me, "If they are willing to march on
Chechnya, unplanned and unprepared, suffering tremendous casualties
both in lives lost and p ublic opinion, who knows what they would
do to Ukraine? Chechnya does not really matter to Russia. Ukraine
does." There is no doubt that events in Chechnya have rein- forced
concerns that decision making in Moscow is unpredictable, with
destabilizing cons equences.
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Finally, and of immediate interest in the aftermath of the Oklahoma
bombing, is the nu- clear agreement signed between Moscow and
Tehran. There is no question that this is a direct threat to the
national security of the United States. The Rus sians have agreed
to pro- vide technology, equipment, and technical advice to a
terrorist country with no current nuclear capability. Given this
volatile mix, I think it was extremely ill-advised for the
President to agree to a summit. I was told the Pres i dent was
going for two reasons: to show support for the Russian people on an
internationally important day and to talk tough on these three key
issues I have raised. When it comes to tough talk on these issues,
let me remind you that in February, Secre- t a ry Christopher said
the President would not go to Moscow unless Chechnya was peacefully
resolved. The war grinds on, Grozny is in ashes, the civilian death
toll continues to mount, but the President is now going to Moscow.
In fact, Russian combatants invo l ved in Chechnya will march in
the V-E Day parade. I think we squandered what credibility we may
have had on this issue by drawing a line, then immediately crossing
it. Now, with the decision made, I think it is essential that the
President produce results . It is my view that he should return
from Moscow with three concrete achievements. First, I would like
to see a real cease-fire and progress on a negotiated resolution to
Chechnya. Sec- ond, the Russians should sign their individual
agreement to participa t e in the Partnership for Peace as an
initial step in supporting NATO expansion. And, finally, I expect
the nu- clear deal with Iran to be terminated. I understand these
are very tough conditions, but I am convinced that equivocation
will only invite furth e r hardening of the line in Moscow. For the
past two years, we have accom- modated the ebb and flow of the
Russian political tide. We have paid a price for our passivity. For
our accommodating effort we now see Yeltsin surrounded by
reactionary advi- sors, some of whom view foreign investment as a
threat and Chechnya as none of the world's business. I continue to
believe that facilitating the success of the transformation
underway in the New Independent States is one of our nation's top
priorities. Today, j u st as in 1993, when we launched one of the
largest new assistance initiatives in our nation's history, we
still have a vital interest in promoting economic reforms in order
to expand our trade and market opportunities. We still have a vital
interest in pr o moting democracy, the proven antidote to
territorial aggression and ethnic unrest. We still have a vital
interest in dismantling the Rus- sian nuclear inventory. Our aid
and our policy must be more sharply focused, better designed, and,
above all, con- si stent if we are to succeed in meeting the
challenges ahead. It will not surprise you to hear me suggest the
new majority is eager to take on that task.
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