U.S. OBJECTIVES TOWARD NORTH KOREA
The
Bush Administration, in my view, has two main objectives
vis-à-vis North Korea.
The
first objective is to establish a new standard by which North Korea
would no longer be allowed to manipulate the international
community through extortion. Rather, this policy would force North
Korea to realize that it must play by the rules of the
international community, and not the other way around.
What
does this mean?
It
means that the burden of action and change is now on North Korea to
prove to the outside world that it would accept the most basic
principles recognized by all civilized societies:
These principles include:
- Not resorting to the use of force or the
threat to use force;
- Abandoning terrorism as a tool of foreign
policy;
- Not proliferating weapons of mass
destruction (WMD);
- Abiding by the most basic normative
principles of the international community, including the provision
of basic human rights, democracy, and an open economy.
In
other words, the U.S. policy is no longer about stopping North
Korea's bad behavior temporarily, through bribes, but by forcing
fundamental changes in its thinking and future actions.
The
second objective of the Bush policy, I believe, is to let the ROK
take the lead in the process toward peace and reconciliation on the
Korean peninsula, including, ultimately, peaceful unification.
The
world has learned from the long, frustrating years of Middle East
peace process that interim solutions do not work. What is needed is
a comprehensive peace process and solution that results in a
permanent peace between the two parties most directly involved, and
with the most to gain. In the case of Korea, this means that the
U.S. should not be the one to dictate to South Korea what the
Koreans want or need. South Koreans, with their own vibrant
democracy, are perfectly capable of forming their own goals and
visions for the peninsula.
What
this means is that the U.S. and ROK, as allies and friends, ought
to share the principles behind their respective policies toward the
North. But this does not necessarily mean that they must share
exactly the same goals and means of achieving them.
Of
course, we do share the fundamental long-term goals of peace and
stability. The immediate prioritization of goals may differ,
however. For example, for the U.S., these goals are ending North
Korea's terrorist habits and WMD proliferation.
In
the weeks following the "axis of evil" speech, it was a shock for
me to see more unity between North and South Korea than at almost
any other moment in the past 50 years. I actually heard South
Koreans agreeing with the North Korean condemnation of President
Bush's "axis of evil" statement. I even heard a South Korean
National Assemblyman call President Bush "evil."
But
much of this discontent or anger toward Americans was really a
function of misperception, or misunderstanding on the part of South
Koreans (and Americans) about who really caused the rupture in
North-South dialogue.
If
one looks carefully at the calendar of events in late 2000 and
2001, it is clear that the North was responsible. And it is clear
from recent overtures being made by North Korea that the North can
be the only one to restart the reconciliation process.
As
the presidential campaigns heat up in South Korea, this is an
opportunity for South Koreans to have meaningful dialogue and
debate over what their country's goals and policies should be
towards the North.
Some
observe this election campaign marks the time that Korean politics
is finally issue-driven rather than candidate-driven, but I
disagree. While it is true that there does seem to be a clearer
contrast between Roh Moo Hyun and Lee Hoi Chang, I believe that
ultimately the basis for this distinction is still
personality-driven. Roh has such grass-roots popularity because he
symbolizes the anti-establishment; the establishment is something
that younger Koreans chafe at but are still unable to fully
deny.
I am
now about to say something that is probably controversial. I do not
believe that ultimately it matters much who wins the election in
December, as far as it pertains to North Korea policy. While it is
worrisome to me that Roh has called for some radical policies, such
as the abolishment of national security laws, for example, or the
nationalization of newspapers, I do not think he will be able to
implement such policies. After all, Kim Dae Jung, and even Kim
Young Sam before him, similarly called for abolishment of national
security laws.
Ultimately, the South Korean public will
desire a moderate policy toward North Korea and the United States,
and this moderate sentiment will rein in the "hawkish" views of Lee
Hoi Chang, and the "radical" views of Roh.
FUTURE GOALS
Regarding our goal for North Korea: it is
no longer enough for us to focus on just "getting them to the
table." North Korea has so managed to manipulate the situation that
we (Americans and South Koreans alike) have been lulled into
setting our standards of success on just being able to meet with
the North Koreans and getting them to talk.
That
is not, and should not be, our goal.
Although getting them to the table is
certainly a necessary step in our ultimate goal, we need to be wary
of selling ourselves down the river just to meet these intermediate
steps. To echo the words of Dr. William Perry, the former U.S.
Secretary of Defense who headed an official review of U.S. policy
toward North Korea, "we ought to deal with North Korea, not as we
wish it to be, but as they are now."
This
means a realistic and pragmatic policy as articulated by the Bush
Administration, in which we deal with North Korea on our terms, not
on theirs.
Balbina
Hwang is Policy Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies
Center at The Heritage Foundation. She delivered these remarks at a
meeting of the Korea-U.S. Exchange Council in Washington,
D.C.