It's a
privilege to be back with my very good friends at The Heritage
Foundation. And I am pleased to see Ken Simon, who through his
generosity is making sure that the 500 interns who come to Heritage
each year have a real introduction to our constitutional order. We
used to say that people are policy. It takes good men and women to
make policy, and the interns are the policymakers of the future.
I
have known of Heritage for a long time. Heritage has been, from the
outset, a powerful beacon. When I moved into the Reagan
Administration and a Justice Department destined to be headed by
General Edwin Meese, I really came to appreciate the substantive
work of Heritage at a close, analytical level.
As
the Reagan Administration was taking office, there were a lot of
uncertainties on the part of the American people about various
policies, both domestic and international. What I found, from the
perspective of being in the attorney general's office, was that
Heritage came forward with extraordinarily incisive and thoughtful
analysis and with remarkable speed.
It's
one thing to have ten or fifteen years to get a project done, but
you could count on high-quality analysis from Heritage in a very
short period of time. And so, to Ed Feulner, I want to say publicly
that I kept those analyses close at hand when I served during
President Reagan's first term. My colleagues at the Justice
Department and I were really taken with the fact that the
recommendations were not only comprehensive but also very specific.
They had wonderful data to buttress them and were backed up with
practical, common sense.
And
each year Heritage followed up with those annual score cards and
Mandate for Leadership, which I still find these many years
later to be wonderful resources. Those recommendations were rooted
quite soundly with a fundamental moral vision of freedom--freedom
with responsibility.
Of
course, that is exactly what the founding generation envisioned,
and what James Madison envisioned so as to achieve a balanced
government. Mr. Madison spent a good part of his young life
studying, quite systematically, the rise and fall of ancient
republics. I think that Mr. Madison would have done well at The
Heritage Foundation and that, if here today, he would approve of
what it is doing.
Balance, both in the new central
government being proposed in Philadelphia and in the maintenance of
the "federal structure," as we came to call it, with the states
providing what Mr. Madison so aptly called dual security.
This
is a great heritage that the founding generation gave to us, a free
people. A grand tradition of liberty, but liberty within a federal
republic where we look with pride to the role of the states, and of
which Justice Louis Brandeis early in the last century (depending
on how one counts) referred to as the laboratory of the states.
This is a gracious and a good heritage. And how appropriate it is
in a system of ordered liberty to have an institution that bears
that great name proudly.
But
these days the air is filled with talk of reform. There's little
being said, other than at The Heritage Foundation, about our
nation's heritage. Candidates at different levels are vying for the
reform mantle. There's a rather eclectic political party of sorts
that bears the name, and candidates are asking rhetorically, who is
truly the reform candidate.
It
brings to mind the reaction of the old crusty member of Parliament
when debate was underway in the House of Commons. The debate turned
to some new reform initiative and the old member got up and said,
"Reform. Don't speak to us of reform. Things are bad enough as they
are."
Now,
don't get me wrong. We are--as people with God-given talent,
intelligence, the ability to reason, and the capacity to hope--duty
bound to work to make things better. Reform can be not only good
but also vital for preserving heritage. This is, of course, the
classic vision of Edmund Burke, whose message was this: Reform
should take place, but it should take place within a structure of
respect for tradition and existing institutions. Improve the human
condition, but be mindful of the wisdom of past generations.
Families want to do well by their
children, and political leaders, at their best, want to do what is
good for their constituency, to live up to the public's trust, and
to serve the well-being of what the Constitution describes with
such simple majesty as "We, the people."
But
reform that's undertaken without regard to our traditions can be
not only rootless but also counterproductive. It can actually disserve commonly shared goals of
practical, sensible government that genuinely serve the public
interest. So in this season of reform, let me offer just a few
modest reflections on this large subject.
You
will no doubt be reminded of the old saw that applies fully to my
ruminations, "Ah yes, he's a modest man and he has much to be
modest about." So with that forewarning let me, without the
slightest apology, say that at a very personal as well as
professional level my wife, Alice, and I had occasion to live
through what was seen as one of the great reforms of the
post-Watergate era. It was a reform by a Congress--not the present
Congress, let me be absolutely clear--but a Congress that in 1978
fashioned the Independent Counsel provisions.
My
thesis is very simple: In an age when we worry, quite rightly,
about cultural illiteracy, about large gaps in rudimentary
knowledge of our history--our history as a nation--and about our
lack of understanding of our constitutional traditions--indeed, of
our very system of government--we would do well to pause and focus
on the issue of constitutional literacy with respect to the
structures of government that have served us so well.
Whether through ignorance or some other
reason, the lack of understanding of our constitutional order and
its emphasis on structure is disquieting to the point of alarm. And
the story of the Independent Counsel Law is in large measure a saga
of not paying heed to the issue of "structure."
The
background need not be rehearsed here. You know it. You either
lived through it or you know about it through your own reading. But
the burden of Watergate generally, and the Saturday Night Massacre
more specifically, hung very heavily over the country. The reform
ushered in by the new law in 1978, urged by the then newly elected
reform president, would strip the attorney general of discretion in
the conduct of sensitive investigations of high-level,
executive-branch officials. It would take away, as former Attorney
General Meese said in his gracious introduction, the attorney
general's appointment power and give it to a special division of
judges.
Now
this approach is entirely understandable given the exigencies of
the time. The intent was for no more Saturday Night Massacres.
What's more, wrongdoing in the executive branch would be
aggressively ferreted out through the use of the criminal justice
system as opposed to a heavy reliance on congressional
oversight.
Though well intended--no doubt, the
sentiments were noble--the approach, however, was quite
wrong-headed as a matter of policy, and it turned its back on a
tradition of muddling through in a classic representative democracy
sort of way. That is to say, the spirit of reform at the time
demanded that there be a law that addressed, with particularity,
each aspect of whether, when, and how to manage an investigation of
a senior executive-branch official. Now as a point of history, our
nation had worked its way over time through some pretty rough
patches, going all the way back to the less-than-immaculate
administration of Ulysses S. Grant.
It
had done so by summoning, on an ad hoc basis, an outside
prosecutor, typically someone from the opposing political party of
the incumbent administration. Now this historic method, for all of
its faults and for all of its shortcomings, did rely on the
discretion of the attorney general, and it worked reasonably well.
But that history of practical wisdom and practical experience was
overborne by Watergate and the Saturday Night Massacre.
This
new Independent Counsel Law, upon its passage, was immediately
mocked. With its dragnet approach grabbing, of all things, the
rather undignified issue of whether President Carter's chief of
staff, Hamilton Jordan, sniffed cocaine at Studio 54 in New York
City. Now this is not desirable conduct, indeed, it is criminal in
nature, but in all, the allegations seemed to lack the dignity, the
gravitas , of a matter that should
trigger a law enforcement equivalent of a nuclear war.
The
"triggering" of this hair-trigger was seen as not a good thing. So
Congress began over the years addressing this aspect of the problem
by coming in after the fact to make curative amendments.
But
the reactions over time were entirely instrumentalist, never
returning to first principles or the founding generation's vision
of the structural integrity of our government. We saw solutions
such as: Let's cut back on the scope of offenses and let's cut back
on the range of persons who are covered by the statute. The debate
winded its way through a very contentious 21-year history with many
of the persons in this room urging that it not be
re-authorized.
Now,
as I suggested, much of this exercise was aimed at controlling the
attorney general's discretion. But it was a cruel illusion as the
controversy in recent years over the campaign finance investigation
has so clearly shown. As this audience knows, the distinguished
director of the FBI recommended, based on his assessment of the
facts and his understanding of the law, that an independent counsel
be appointed in that matter. So too did the attorney general's own
designated head of the campaign task force, Charles LaBella. Both,
of course, had been very experienced federal prosecutors. Judge
Freeh had been an assistant U.S. attorney as well as an FBI special
agent before he was elevated to the bench a number of years ago.
And seconding these impressive recommendations came a variety of
other voices, including some respected and thoughtful voices in
Congress.
Even
editorial pages weighed in, but the attorney general would not and
did not. The result was that the Independent Counsel Law, on close
examination, actually embodied a false promise to the American
people by purporting to control the attorney general's discretion,
but when push came to shove the promise was an empty one, and so it
had to be in order to accommodate what the reformers in 1978 tried
largely to ignore.
The
structure of our Constitution and its firm insistence on the
decidedly non-parliamentary separation of powers intended for the
legislative power to be important. It was to be Article I, it was
to be the voice of the people, but it was not to be supreme. It
was, rather, to be coordinate and balanced, as Mr. Madison had
urged.
In
the early 1980s, one of my great friends and General Meese's
predecessor, the late Bill Smith, made a careful study of the
statute. He came to the view, supported by the Office of Legal
Counsel and others, that the Independent Counsel provisions, which
at the time were up for re-authorization--the initial five-year
period was about to expire--are unconstitutional and bad policy.
And this view was shared fully by the White House under President
Reagan and by the President himself.
For
our very brief reflections, the pivotal point of Attorney General
Smith's analysis was that the statute represented an
unconstitutional intrusion by Congress into the domain of the
executive branch, a violation of our heritage--our heritage of
separated powers. This foreshadowed the great dissent by Justice
Scalia, in the case upholding the statute's constitutionality ( Morrison v. Olson ).
Attorney General Smith's view was that
this was, in effect, a power grab by one branch tearing at the
fabric of another branch and thus affecting and compromising our
constitutional order. In his view, the reformers of 1978 had
ignored structure. It therefore bears repeating, as I bring these
reflections to a close, that at this nation's founding structure
was seen as the fundamental safeguard of liberty. It was for that
reason that at the Constitutional Convention Mr. Madison objected
to George Mason's proposal for a Bill of Rights. Mr. Madison
greatly admired Colonel Mason, who had drafted for his beloved
Virginia the much admired Virginia Declaration of Rights. Mr.
Madison had nothing against Colonel Mason or the Declaration or the
proposed Bill of Rights, save for the fact that he viewed it as
unnecessary because "structure" would provide protection for the
liberties of the people.
Reformers tend not to admire structure. To
a true and bold reformer structure seems at best irrelevant, and at
worse it stands in the way. Let us get at the problem by asking
should not the felt necessities of the present age trump 18th
century formalistic notions of structure? As to the Independent
Counsel provisions as well as the role of the executive branch in
general this has to be said: In the 1970s, voice after voice urged
the reformers to proceed with caution and with attention to
structure.
Even
that elegant centrist, the late Elliott Richardson, warned the
reformers that the thick of Watergate should not blind them to the
fundamental structure of our government. Mr. Richardson insisted in
his testimony that structure demanded the preservation, along with
political accountability, of the prerogatives of the executive
branch, of the president, and of the attorney general. If they fail
to live up to their solemn obligations, hold them accountable, but
don't rob them of the power rightly vested in them.
To
be sure, significant reforms did get achieved under the reform
system, and the investigation, which I was privileged to lead for
longer than I had anticipated, did secure 14 convictions, including
those of the sitting governor of the state of Arkansas, the former
associate attorney general of the United States, chief justice for
a period of the Arkansas Supreme Court, and the co-owners of
Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan in Little Rock, Arkansas. We were
also called on to, in the exercise of our judgment, put before the
House of Representatives and, in particular, before the committee
chaired so ably by Congressman Hyde, the referral that concluded,
sadly for the presidency, and sadly really for the country, that
the President had engaged in serious misconduct. This same
conclusion was soon reached in a matter of a very few months by
Chief Judge Susan Webber Wright of the United State District Court
in Arkansas, Eastern District.
The
mechanism of the statutory independent counsel was indeed a
powerful engine for engaging in thorough fact finding. But upon
reflection this could have been done, and in fact was done, under
that tried-and-true system of allowing the attorney general to make
a decision whether to appoint an independent counsel or a "special
prosecutor" but then being held accountable to Congress and
ultimately the American people under that system of Attorney
General appointment. We saw this in the 1970s with the
investigation of President Carter's finances by an appointee of
Attorney General Griffin Bell, a close confidant of President
Carter.
And
so the American people will go to the polls this year, and the
debate in the meantime will swirl. Who is the true reformer? Who's
more like Teddy Roosevelt or FDR or Ronald Reagan? You choose your
favorite reformer. I think I know who might win the balloting.
And
yet I recall so vividly Attorney General Smith's judgment about a
favorite deregulatory device of that time--a legislative veto that
enabled a single House or, indeed, a single committee of Congress
to declare invalid any set of regulatory regulations--that this
device, sensible and practical though it was, was nonetheless
unconstitutional in so far as it flew in the face of structure.
This
was a venerable device in terms of gaining control of the
bureaucracy. It was in the Republican platform in 1980, its
supporters in both political parties were legion, and it had the
delicious smell of a sagebrush rebellion about it. But President
Reagan didn't flinch when presented with his duties as our Chief
Magistrate. To his credit, he listened with respect to the solemn
judgment that this device he had championed was, upon reflection,
unconstitutional.
President Reagan did not take the matter
under advisement, there were no focus groups, there were no polls.
It was quite simple. The Constitution trumped policy, even good and
sensible policy. And happily, in short order, the Supreme Court
ratified the President's somber judgment that the device he had
personally championed suffered from a fatal defect under our
structure, that it violated the fundamental structural requirement
of bi-cameralism and the presentment of a bill to the president.
Good idea, bad law--inconsistent with our constitutional
heritage.
At
the close of the Constitutional Convention, that wise octogenarian,
Benjamin Franklin, appeared on the streets of his beloved
Philadelphia. He had said very little inside; he was deferring
really to the 30-something crowd led by Mr. Madison. General
Washington, presiding with dignity, had said virtually nothing. But
those 30-something folks, those policy wonks, had done their
homework, and all was well. Dr. Franklin was pleased with the
product of the deliberations. So, as he was leaving the hall,
suffering uncomfortably, we are told, from gout, he was confronted
by one of the leading matrons of the city. She was curious about
what had been wrought inside. "What kind of government have you
given us, Dr. Franklin?" she inquired. His reply came quickly: "A
Republic, madame, if you can keep it."
This
is our heritage.
Judge Kenneth W. Starr
served as Independent Counsel from August 1994 to October 1999.
Currently, he is an adjunct professor at New York University School
of Law and a distinguished visiting professor at George Mason
University School of Law while on leave of absence from the firm of
Kirkland & Ellis, P.C., where he is a partner. Judge Starr
spoke at a meeting of The Heritage Foundation's President's Club on
May 15, 2000.