The
aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the Pentagon and
the World Trade Center illustrates the high vulnerability of
America's infrastructure to terrorist attacks and the massive
consequences of not protecting it. While the terrorists were able
to utilize deficiencies in America's overall approach to
intelligence sharing and aviation security, similar vulnerabilities
exist in every infrastructure vital to the security, economy, and
survival of the nation, such as computer networks, energy supplies,
and transportation systems.
Today, the federal government and most
Americans recognize that responsibility for protecting critical
infrastructure from terrorism does not rest solely with any one
level of government. While the new Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) will take the lead in many of these efforts, the level of
security required demands unprecedented levels of cooperation and
coordination across government and private-sector boundaries.
Adequate protection of America's critical infrastructures and key
assets will rest on the ability of the federal, state, and local
governments to cooperate with each other and the private
sector.
STRATEGIC APPROACH TO PROTECTING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURES
Securing the nation's critical
infrastructure has rightly become an increasingly vital component
of a post-September 11 homeland security strategy. The USA PATRIOT
Act defines critical infrastructure as "systems and assets, whether
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a
debilitating impact on security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or any combination of those
matters."
As a
result of the increased attention to this issue since September 11,
the Administration has recognized the importance of establishing a
national strategy to protect and defend America's critical
infrastructure components while placing an increased reliance on
the private sector to assist and guide this process. The release of
the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets in February of this year was a very
important step in advancing this mission and ensuring nationwide
coordination and cooperation.
As
evidenced by September 11, terrorists are flexible, creative, and
resourceful, and have learned to target areas of particular
vulnerability while avoiding those that are more protected and
predictable. By targeting America's critical infrastructures, these
terrorists seek to advance their goal of disrupting and imposing
financial consequences on the government, society, and the economy.
Our technology and sophisticated society are therefore excellent
targets for terrorists and must rise to this unprecedented
challenge with security improvements and infrastructure protection
in a way not currently being done.
Meeting this challenge will require
cooperation and coordination across government and commercial
boundaries. Yet the nature of the threat also requires a degree of
decentralization since the task of homeland defense is too large,
complex, and expensive for one isolated federal department to
control.
While homeland security and traditional
national security issues have much in common, there are some
important differences that greatly vary the process by which they
are implemented. National security has traditionally been
recognized as the responsibility of the federal government, relying
on the collective efforts of the military, the foreign policy
establishment, and the intelligence community. Homeland security,
however, is a shared responsibility that cannot be accomplished by
the federal government alone. During the Cold War era, many
government and private-sector operations isolated themselves and
their infrastructures as a matter of security.
This
antiquated approach to the safety of the American public is no
longer appropriate or acceptable. The current culture and increased
threats facing our nation require unprecedented levels of trust and
collaboration between public and private stakeholders. They require
coordinated action on the part of federal, state, and local
governments, with increasing reliance on the private sector as well
as concerned citizens all across the country. This is especially
important in the context of protecting our nation's critical
infrastructures and key assets.
Private industry owns and operates
approximately 85 percent of our critical infrastructures and key
assets. Therefore, much of the expertise and many of the resources
required for planning and taking better protective measures lie
outside the federal government. The new front line of defense for
America's critical infrastructure has become the communities and
individual institutions that make up our critical infrastructure
sector.
More
can and must be done to ensure that this remains a priority in the
long term within homeland security planning. The nation's critical
infrastructures must be more clearly defined and identified,
followed by a comprehensive assessment of how best to protect them
and eliminate vulnerabilities.
The
federal government is responsible for issuing standards and "best
practices" to ensure a coordinated approach among all aspects of
critical infrastructure protection. In addition, we must focus more
attention on the interconnectivity of infrastructure and its
ability to operate effectively in emergency situations. A
successful critical infrastructure protection strategy also depends
on clearly defined and attainable expectations, as well as
cooperation and coordination across all levels of government and
all business sectors.
DEFINING GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE-SECTOR
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Since the creation of the new Department
of Homeland Security, many lawmakers and policymakers have begun to
question the roles that the private sector should play in helping
to secure America's critical infrastructure. Some of these people
have falsely assumed that placing more responsibility on the
private sector--or allowing it to take more responsibility--is the
wrong approach.
In
fact, the opposite is likely true. Permitted enough flexibility,
the private sector can respond much more quickly and effectively to
many homeland security threats than government agencies can.
Historically, many barriers have impeded
the public-private partner relationship. Many of these barriers are
attitudes from a bygone era of mistrust and bad interactions
between the government and businesses. Today's fluid marketplace
and vulnerability to terrorism in a post-9/11 world demand a new,
more cooperative set of attitudes and relationships.
There remain many challenges to overcome
in ensuring cooperation, but it is important to recognize that
these challenges and roles are often different for industry and the
government. Because most of America's critical infrastructure is
owned or operated by the private sector, these businesses and
companies face a greater degree of threat than the government and
should therefore feel a greater incentive to engage in increased
protection and security.
The
private sector is driven by bottom lines, consumer and shareholder
confidence, and market forces, which are strong incentives for
increased security. But a change in focus is necessary for this
process to succeed. Businesses around the nation should view the
government's demands on their expertise not just as a cost, but
also as an opportunity.
The
government can assist to some degree in this process and, in fact,
has the obligation to do so. The government should not inhibit any
industry's efforts to protect itself; instead, it should ensure
that businesses have the tools necessary to do so. However, it will
be impossible for the government to pay for all of the necessary
security improvements to the level required by the current threat.
The assessment of who will foot the bill must be done on a
case-by-case basis.
If
industry fails to implement the appropriate levels of protection,
then the government will likely have to intervene and enforce
stricter regulations. The airline industry after 9/11 is a recent
example of the government intervention required because of the
private sector's failure to respond to the threat. This should not
be the case with America's critical infrastructures and key
assets.
This
process could become a slippery slope only if industry chooses not
to fulfill its responsibilities to meet the current threat. The
ball is in the court of each of our nation's key industries and
companies, and responsibility ultimately lies with them to
implement their own security improvements, using the federal
government as a guiding and motivating source.
FACILITATING THE COMMUNICATION OF SECURITY
INFORMATION
Since most of America's critical
infrastructure is owned or operated by the private sector, it is
important to ensure that industry is willing to engage the
government in cooperating to implement the appropriate levels of
protection and security. However, legal concerns and a lack of
detailed information can limit the extent to which the private
sector is willing to be involved in federal efforts.
The
Administration and Congress should work together to allow federal
agencies that rely on the private sector for infrastructure
information to maintain Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
exemptions. Many private firms are reluctant to provide extensive
information on vulnerability because they fear that this
information could become public and therefore adversely affect
public or shareholder confidence. Such fears are major roadblocks
to a dialogue with the private sector and could severely diminish
levels of cooperation.
Public accountability must be preserved,
but access to sensitive information must be restricted. For
example, information on the weak areas of a chemical plant should
not be posted on the Web for a terrorist to download and then use
to attack that chemical plant. Instead, a cleansed vulnerability
assessment should be made available to those who live or do
business around that particular area.
Congress should provide narrowed antitrust
exemptions for companies that share information on infrastructure
protection. When corporations work together, concerns inevitably
arise that they are trying to subvert the market. Antitrust laws,
which try to prevent such practices, also inhibit companies from
sharing information on the vulnerability of the infrastructure or
the means to protect it.
Cooperation on protecting critical
infrastructure and information sharing should be exempt from
antitrust laws in order to protect companies from unjust lawsuits.
Similarly, independent private-sector mechanisms for sharing
information, known as Information Sharing and Analysis Centers
(ISACs), should also be exempt from these antitrust laws. Any
legislation to accomplish this goal will have to be carefully
crafted in order to prevent it from being used to achieve
anti-competitive objectives.
Congress should also seek to reduce the
liability for service providers who adopt best-practice security
measures. Such a move would allow additional incentives for
businesses to adopt new standards of security and participate in
information sharing.
Congress should further assist in this
process by removing tax penalties that make it more difficult for
the private sector to invest in security. They should instead enact
a reform that would allow infrastructure owners to deduct the full
cost of security-related spending in the year such expenses are
incurred. Allowing industries to write off security spending all at
once will reduce the significant costs, thereby improving the
all-important bottom line for companies investing in security.
Lead
federal agencies should work with companies and businesses to
develop new and improved security standards for industry. Federal
agencies should also assist in creating risk assessment programs
for the private-sector companies involved in infrastructure
protection. Though the government can advise owners and operators
of infrastructure of a suspected threat, it cannot assess the risk,
vulnerability, or survivability of each asset.
Lead
agencies should use a best-practices model for the private sector
that enables them to conduct more accurate assessments. Such a
model would allow industry to address security necessities by
meeting a set of performance standards instead of firm government
specifications. The Defense Department's internal assessment
program would be a useful guide for beginning this process.
WORKING WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
While the private sector should play a
leading role in securing America's critical infrastructures, the
burden will also rest heavily on the new Department of Homeland
Security. The DHS's organization and structure will serve as a
critical vehicle in ensuring and initiating communication across
all levels of government and between federal agencies while also
greatly improving the opportunities for government-industry
cooperation.
DHS
also provides a streamlined and consolidated approach to homeland
security, which will be especially important in working with the
private sector to secure America's critical infrastructure. The
integration of critical infrastructure protection and intelligence
analysts under a single Undersecretary within DHS should provide
for a more focused agenda than the disjointed and inefficient
organization previously spread throughout the federal
government.
As
time passes and DHS gains the experience and authority it needs to
better guide the nation's security and protection efforts, this
process is likely to become much more efficient. It is important to
remember that improving security to the level that this new
post-9/11 world requires is a process. This cannot happen overnight
and will likely result in two steps forward and one step back along
the way. It took fifty years for the United States to develop our
national security program to its current level. Unfortunately,
terrorists will not wait for us to get our government in order
before attacking us again, so homeland security must be
accomplished as quickly and efficiently as possible.
The
efforts of DHS are already helping to make our nation's critical
infrastructures safer from the many unconventional threats of
terrorism. They are engaged in several important functions such as
serving as the primary liaison and facilitator for coordination
among other federal departments, state and local governments, and
the private sector.
DHS
is also beginning to build and maintain a complete, current, and
accurate assessment of national-level critical assets, systems, and
functions while also beginning to assess vulnerabilities and
protective postures across the critical infrastructure sectors.
These assessments are vital to evaluating threats, providing timely
warnings to threatened infrastructures, and building capabilities
to evaluate preparedness across government jurisdictions. In
addition, DHS plays an important role in collaborating with other
federal agencies, state and local governments, and private-sector
businesses to define and implement complementary structures and
coordination processes.
In
order to fulfill these missions, DHS should rely on the valuable
models for cooperation that already exist within their structure.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is now part
of the new Department, has extensive experience coordinating and
working with multiple federal agencies, the private sector, and
local authorities in responding to natural disasters. The
government's efforts to secure and prepare the cyber-sector for the
Y2K issue should also provide valuable "lessons learned" for doing
similar efforts on a much larger and more significant scale. These
and other successful models of cooperation will serve as important
starting points for DHS in working to incorporate the private
sector in securing our nation's homeland from the threat of
terrorism.
As
noted above, companies interested in working with DHS should
consider this an opportunity, not a cost. The new threat
environment demands unprecedented levels of partnership and
cooperation, so businesses should be more willing than ever before
to bring their experience and expertise to the table as requested.
They should view the creation of DHS as a more streamlined and
direct opportunity to engage with the government. This shift in the
government's organizational culture can help to eliminate many of
the prior complications and frustrations felt by the private sector
when working with the government.
In
particular, DHS has created the Office of Private Sector Liaison,
which will provide America's business community with a direct line
of communication to DHS and help foster dialogue on the full range
of issues and challenges faced by America's business sector in the
post-9/11 world. This office will deal specifically with America's
critical industry sectors as outlined in the President's National
Strategy for Homeland Security, as well general business matters
and concerns related to the DHS.
Perhaps most important, DHS will give the
private sector one primary contact instead of many different ones
for coordinating protection activities with the federal government,
including vulnerability assessments, strategic planning efforts,
and exercises. Such changes will help to ensure that DHS
establishes a long-term working relationship with the private
sector that will help to eliminate vulnerabilities and secure
America's critical infrastructures and key assets.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO CLARIFY PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE-SECTOR ROLES
While progress has certainly been made in
securing and identifying America's critical infrastructure, this
process is far from complete. A critical step is for the federal
government to issue a set of guiding principles or "best practices"
to ensure that a coordinated and efficient approach is taken by
critical infrastructure sectors. Leadership and guidance at the
federal level will provide an increased incentive for the private
sector to come on board and cooperate in protecting America's
critical infrastructures. To be effective, these best practices
must be reinforced by incentives to encourage maximum and
responsive cooperation by the private sector.
Another vital component of critical
infrastructure protection is information sharing. DHS should
expedite its development of a "threat integration
center"--something that The Heritage Foundation began calling for
immediately after September 11--that will communicate and
disseminate important intelligence information regarding terrorist
threats quickly and efficiently across all levels of government as
well as to the relevant private-sector entities. The critical
infrastructure components of DHS must then be linked to this threat
integration center, which will greatly improve the government's
ability to conduct adequate threat analysis and make the
appropriate security enhancements at the nation's most vulnerable
and critical locations.
Ultimately, responsibility for securing an
element of critical infrastructure belongs to the operator or owner
of the technology. In business environments, market forces are
typically much more effective than government regulation in
effecting timely, efficient, and effective change. Through tax
relief, reduced liability, and a framework of business-friendly
regulation, Congress can use market forces to enhance the private
sector's inherent sense of self-preservation and encourage the
private sector to address homeland security needs.
However, as the process of securing the
homeland proceeds, Congress and the Administration must be willing
to step in to fill the gaps that the private sector cannot address.
Acting in the best interests of homeland security is in the
economic, political, and regulatory interests of both individual
companies and government agencies.
Larry M. Wortzel,
Ph.D., is Vice President and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage
Foundation. He spoke at a conference on Critical Infrastructure and
Homeland Security: Public Policy Implications for Business,
sponsored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, on April 23,
2003.