This lecture was held at The Heritage
Foundation on June 22,1998.
If I thought the politics here at home surrounding
China and the U.S.-China relationship were complex in late 1992,
when President George Bush sent me to China, I was mistaken. That
mission had two purposes: to normalize business relations and to
remove one of the sanctions the United States had placed on China
following the unfortunate happenings at Tiananmen Square in June
1989--the ban on contact at the ministerial level. The political
debates of that time pale in comparison with the controversy and
confusion surrounding China now.
We
are gathered here today on the eve of some important events:
President Bill Clinton's trip to China, the annual congressional
debate about China's most favored nation (MFN) trading status, the
investigations into charges that national security was jeopardized
by the transfer of satellite technology to China, and that China
meddled in our election process in 1996.
It
is difficult to know where to start to sort out the variety of
issues and differing interpretations of what is happening. I will
begin by taking a look at what is going on inside China
today--specifically, the reform process, the key issues that are
being hotly debated here, the future of the U.S.-China
relationship, and why renewing MFN is more crucial than usual.
A Look at China
Today
First, a quick summary of some things most
of us know about this country. China is the world's most populous
country, with 1.2 billion people. It is the fastest-growing large
economy in the world, with an average annual gross domestic product
(GDP) growth rate of nearly 10 percent over the past two decades.
Now the third-largest economy in the world, China is well on its
way toward becoming the world's largest economy in the next decade
or two even if its growth rate slows. China is strategically
positioned in Asia. It is a nuclear power, holds one of the seven
permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council, and views
itself as an emerging great power.
In
1978, after nearly 30 years of adhering to communist central
planning doctrine, Deng Xiaoping initiated the reforms that are
transforming China into a market-oriented economy and a more open
society. Progress during the past 20 years has been nothing short
of phenomenal: Per capita GDP has quadrupled; 200 million people
have been lifted out of poverty; change is touching all regions;
and the Chinese people are getting a taste of prosperity and they
want more of it. Beijing's ruling elite--as well as provincial and
local leaders--must continue to deliver or lose legitimacy and,
ultimately, lose power. As things stand now, the central government
is not all-powerful and may never be again. Provinces and locales
are expanding, growing, and exercising more clout. China is not a
monolith.
The
leadership of the central government still devolves through the
Communist Party, but the leaders are communists more in name than
in fact. They are on a clear road to capitalism; some say that, in
reality, they are "authoritarian capitalists." The increased
openness that accompanies economic reforms is allowing many new
ideas and ways of doing things to percolate in China. I believe
these new experiences and exposure one day will add up to more
political freedom.
A
key event occurred in March 1998 when changes in the leadership
were ratified, as expected, by the National People's Congress. The
most important change is that Zhu Rongji became the new Premier,
second only to President Jiang Zemin. Earlier, as Executive Vice
Premier and financial czar, Zhu Rongji led the austerity drive to
cap inflation--and it worked. He is a reformer who seems to
understand free-market economies, is not afraid to make tough
decisions and take risks, and has a human side that he allows to
show. He seems to have the respect--and even the affection--of his
colleagues as well as the person in the street. Zhu has promoted
other like-minded reformers; and with every such move, the reform
trend in China becomes more irreversible.
In
March, the National People's Congress also ratified a reform
package--the toughest one yet. I was in China six weeks ago and had
the opportunity to sense first-hand how the leadership was
approaching these reforms. A key part of that program is to reform
the inefficient state-owned enterprises, some 300,000 of them, in
three years. That is a very ambitious timetable, but this reform
must be done if China is to become a true market economy. The
downside risk is a high rate of unemployment. The numbers of
unemployed are in the millions now, and there is concern about the
"floating population"--some 80 million to 100 million workers who
have migrated from the provinces to fill jobs in the booming
cities. There already have been demonstrations in some places. All
of this could add up to social unrest.
Reforming the banking sector is also high
on the list of priorities. China's banks are technically insolvent
because of bad loans to state-owned enterprises. Although there has
been an infusion of capital, the banks still have a lot to learn
about risk-based lending. There is the need for transparency and a
cogent regulatory apparatus to clean up the corruption endemic in
the many other banking sectors throughout Asia.
Reforming government--cutting the civil
service in half and cutting the army by 500,000--is another drastic
move.
The
urban housing market will be freed up as of July 1. Residents will
have the opportunity to buy flats using their own savings, which
are believed to be substantial.
Fiscal and taxation reform is also on the
docket. So is the creation of a social security system to provide a
safety net, as state-owned enterprises withdraw from doing so.
Pushing all these reforms simultaneously
is a huge task, a task now exacerbated by the economic problems of
the region. However, I came away thinking that the leadership knows
where it wants to go and is willing to be bold in pursuing these
reforms. Yet there is realism about the risks. Counting on an
upswing in domestic consumption to counter the ill effects, the
leadership cites a public works program as well as the added demand
for construction and furnishings that will be generated by the
newly liberated housing market.
Asia's problems are just now beginning to
show plainly in China. Export growth, which was 10 percent to 12
percent in the first quarter, began to slow in April, as did
industrial production. And as the yen has continued to sink, the
probability of a further decline in the region has increased. Last
week's U.S. intervention to support the yen will be helpful, but it
is only a small first step. There is much more Japan must do to get
its economy going again. China, however, has behaved responsibly so
far by not devaluing its currency and sticking steadfastly to that
pledge. It is helpful in this case that China's currency is not
convertible, its banks are not extended all over the region, and it
has $140 billion of foreign exchange reserves. Yet we cannot
predict what will happen next year if the downward pressure in the
region continues. Will China be forced to devalue its currency?
Will it move to close markets as a way to protect itself? We hope
not, on both counts.
Finally, we should note that China
continues its interaction with and outreach to many other countries
around the world. The leadership's foreign policy moves can be
summed up as both a reflection of China's national interest, as
they see it, and the desire of an emerging great power to be
recognized as such.
The Issues
Today, Here in the United States
Many
of the issues being debated here about China are not new. Human
rights, for one, has been an issue for years. We still have vivid
memories of the forcible crushing of the democracy movement at
Tiananmen Square on June 3 and 4, 1989. We continue to be troubled
by some of the things China is accused of doing--jailing
dissidents, being intolerant of religion, using forced labor,
mandating abortions, coercing Tibet, and the like.
Nuclear proliferation is another key
issue. A body of opinion in the United States considers China to be
a proliferator, having contributed to the building of nuclear
capabilities in Pakistan and Iran. China has given assurances that
it is observing the obligations under the Treaty on
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons , but there are those here who
do not trust such assurances. Some go so far as to label China a
"rogue state."
The
trading relationship between China and the United States causes
friction. The mounting trade deficit--last year about $50
billion--is a concern. The deficit for this year is running well
ahead of last year's. We believe China should truly open her
markets and protect intellectual property. Market access has been
one of the sticking points in the up-and-down negotiations about
China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). U.S.
companies have $40 billion of contracted investment in China,
investment that needs the protection of a rule of law.
Concern about China's intentions toward
Taiwan is still on our radar screen. We wonder whether China would
use force to bring this "renegade province," as it sees Taiwan,
back into the fold. We have a legal obligation to Taiwan under the
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which we take seriously. That, in
turn, worries China, which seems to want constant reassurance that
we will adhere to our "one China" policy. Some in the United States
also fear China eventually will change Hong Kong for the worse.
And
then there are the worries about whether China's military has
expansionist plans within the region or beyond.
But
the most explosive issue now revolves around whether two U.S.
companies transferred satellite technology to China that could be
used to improve the guidance system on missiles pointed at the
United States; whether U.S. national security was thereby
jeopardized; whether China conspired to interfere in our electoral
process in 1996 through illegal donations; whether there was any
connection between donations by China or U.S. companies and the
Clinton Administration's decision to approve China's launching of a
U.S. satellite.
This
all is extremely complicated; right now, we have no definitive
answers. A Department of Justice investigation is ongoing and
congressional investigations--one in the House and one in the
Senate--will soon begin. We should not jump to conclusions but wait
until we have the final results of these investigations.
But
it becomes more clear as the political debate continues that there
are very different ways of viewing the same set of circumstances.
Those differences are worthy of illumination.
- One is
our view of "communism." We would all agree that communism is bad.
One school of thought sees it as mostly dead, defeated, and
discredited. But there are those who believe otherwise. They think
that because China's leaders still call themselves "communists,"
they are cut from the same cloth as Joseph Stalin, the evil despot
of the old Soviet Union. That reasoning leads to the inescapable
conclusion that "Communist China" must be inherently bad and is the
enemy of the United States and all we stand for. The fallacy is
that the "Communist Party" in China has turned capitalist; it is
freeing up China's markets and dismantling the old centrally
planned economy. This is the anti- thesis of communist doctrine.
China is transforming itself from within. By contrast, the old
Soviet Union decayed from within and then disintegrated in the
aftermath of President Ronald Reagan's uncompromising stance
against the "evil empire." There is another difference between the
Soviet Union and China: China is not intent on world
domination.
China today is still an authoritarian
regime, however, one that is hostile to political opposition. But
it is far more open both inside and to the outside world than the
Soviet Union ever was and not nearly as centrally controlled.
Earlier I alluded to cracks in the authoritarian structure. There
are two causes: (1) the increased openness of the society; and (2)
the elections for local leaders, which have been taking place in
nearly one million villages. These elections may not be perfect by
our standards, and China's leadership may be supporting them as a
way of keeping peace in the countryside, but they are elections
just the same, and the grassroots population is getting experience
in democracy, a process assisted by the International Republican
Institute. I believe this experience one day will make a profound
difference in the evolution of more freedom and democracy in
China.
-
Second: Is China an enemy of the
United States? How one views any national security threat depends,
at least in part, on how one sees China--as an enemy, a prickly
partner, or a potential ally. Last year at this podium, I said that
we should not assume that China is our enemy. There are no data to
support such a conclusion. But I also said that if, over time,
China were to become our enemy, it should not occur because our
government's policies or actions have pushed China in that
direction. Nothing has happened to change my point of view. We
should not assume that China is the enemy of the United States and
we should not act that way. It will become a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
-
Third: The allegations that China
conspired to influence our political process are viewed differently
depending upon whether China is viewed as the enemy. We would
probably all agree that we cannot condone illegal contributions to
a U.S. political campaign. If the Chinese did it--the People's
Liberation Army or someone else--it was naive and even stupid. For
those who believe that "Communist China" is inherently bad and that
China is our enemy, it is easy to believe that China conspired
against our electoral process. But we should not forget one very
salient fact: In 1996, for the first time ever, a presidential
election effort--the Clinton-Gore campaign and the Democratic
National Committee--devised and implemented a strategy of going
after foreign money. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
Chinese were asked to contribute. Let us not lose sight of who was
asking.
It
is difficult to say where these differing perspectives will lead
us, and we need the facts. One thing is clear, however: The future
direction of the U.S.-China relationship hangs in the balance.
The U.S.-China
Relationship
During the first four years of the Clinton
presidency, the inconsistency and ad hoc decision-making that
epitomized its approach to China was a factor in causing the
government-to-government relationship to dip to its lowest point in
years. We know that China can be very difficult, too. There was
distrust on both sides. Now, more than a year into the second
Clinton term, things have improved. President Jiang's visit here in
fall 1997 was a key step followed by President Clinton's visit to
China this year. It is unfortunate that the President's trip was
moved up to June from the fall. I would not have advised any U.S.
President to go to China in June so long as the memories of the
1989 Tiananmen Square massacre are alive here. The atmosphere is
complicated further by the many allegations and concerns filling
the airwaves.
I
continue to believe that we need a framework for our relationship
with China. This does not mean being "soft" on China. It does not
mean giving up our values. May we never lose our passion for
individual freedom; for free markets; for decency and hard work. It
does not mean lessening our national defenses; our concerns for
national security; our vigilance in assessing what is going on in
the world. This, in essence, was the philosophy of the ardent
anticommunist President Richard Nixon when he re-established
relations with the communist regime in China in 1972.
Having a framework does mean that our
government must be clear about its objectives for the relationship.
China must understand the U.S. point of view and we, in turn, must
try to understand China's. We need to identify every strand of the
relationship--human rights, nuclear proliferation, and so on--the
areas in which we agree and those in which we do not. Dialogue at
the highest levels must continue, and each strand of the
relationship must be managed for results and for the longer term.
We need to prioritize the varying strands while we manage the
relationship as a whole. Underpinning the strategy is consistency
in policy and in its implementation.
What
should we call this approach? Engagement seems a shopworn
moniker. Perhaps connectivity is a better word to describe a
policy that allows us to interact with another country to achieve
our own objectives, to neutralize the objectives of others with
which we disagree, and to cooperate for the global good. I can also
observe that a policy--any policy--may be the proper one, but if
implementation is faulty, the policy is often blamed. This may be
one of the problems critics of engagement have today. In any
case, there is no other approach that makes sense other than to
stay "connected" with China. China's sheer size makes it impossible
to ignore or to isolate. It is in our economic interest to continue
our trading relationship with the world's largest market. We want
to continue to have dialogue around a number of issues--from human
rights to North Korea's intentions to the environment to nuclear
proliferation. Connectivity is the only approach that will
bring China into the international community as a responsible
member and move it inexorably toward freedom and democracy.
I
want to digress for a moment to say a few words about U.S.
leadership in the world. We are the lone superpower; however, our
power position today is very different from years ago. During the
years after World War II, when there were fewer than 50 countries
in the world, we were the predominant economic power. Although we
still are the world's largest economy, we lack the dominance of
those earlier years. Back then, we were one of two nuclear powers.
Today, various other countries have joined the nuclear club.
Today, there are nearly 200 countries in
the world, and our power--economically, politically, and
militarily--therefore has been diluted. That means a different
brand of leadership is required. Telling other countries what to do
and how to do it no longer works. Not only does it not this work,
it causes a great deal of resentment, which, in turn erodes our
leadership position further. The United States today must lead both
by example and by building alliances and consensus. This means a
different mindset--one that seeks to understand other cultures and
the realities faced by other countries as they move toward free
markets and democracy at the same time. It means more time spent
consulting with other countries, building trust, and cultivating
the alliances we need. I fear we still have too many policymakers
who think we can order the rest of the world to do as we do.
Why MFN Renewal
is More Important than Ever
The
reasons to renew MFN for China are important and have not changed
since we had this same discussion last year. Here they are:
-
Denying, delaying, or conditioning MFN
would have negative economic consequences for the United States. At
least 200,000 U.S. manufacturing jobs were directly dependent on
U.S. exports to China last year, and thousands of service jobs are
indirectly linked.
-
Anything other than unconditional MFN
renewal would have a negative impact on China's reform process and
on our efforts to encourage China to open its markets further.
There would be a negative impact on the process of China's
accession to the WTO on acceptable terms. It is in the interest of
the United States and that of the entire world that China's reform
process moves forward successfully and that China joins the WTO. A
prosperous and stable China is more likely to be a responsible
member of the world community.
-
Denying MFN to China would hurt Hong Kong,
whose economy already is under pressure because of the problems of
the region. GDP growth turned negative in the first quarter of
1998. The handover a year ago went well. China is keeping its side
of the 1984 Joint Declaration, and the basics of Hong Kong have not
changed. It would be most unfortunate if U.S. action were to damage
Hong Kong's economy further at this precarious time.
-
Denying or conditioning MFN to punish
China because we have grievances in other areas is doomed to fail.
There now are a variety of studies that show that economic
sanctions, especially if the United States employed them
unilaterally, simply would not work to correct a plethora of other
problems.
-
But the most crucial reason that MFN is so
important this year is related to Asia's economic problems. It
probably will take another two years for the situation to stabilize
and begin to turn around. Denying or conditioning MFN for China
will add another note of instability and uncertainty to the region;
surely, this will cause the economic problems to worsen. As it is,
currencies in a variety of countries--South Korea, Indonesia,
Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines--have been considerably
devalued. Stock markets in those countries, as well as in Hong
Kong, have been badly hurt as well. Much wealth has been lost. And
Japan, the largest economy of the region, is sinking into recession
with no turnaround in sight. We here in the United States have not
been affected much so far, and our economy is performing
splendidly. However, our export growth is slowing because of Asia's
problems. The growth of corporate earnings will slow, and so will
our GDP growth. So, if we were to deny or condition China's MFN
renewal, we would hurt not only the region, but ultimately our own
economy. We cannot afford to do this. The global economy, which is
being led by the U.S. economy, cannot afford this. We here in the
United States should not wish to precipitate the global recession
that is still a possibility.
There simply can be no rationale to deny
or condition MFN for China. I have said before that I look forward
to the day in which MFN for China becomes permanent. We have
permanent MFN with most other countries, including rogue states
like Libya and Iraq, and also with what The Wall Street
Journal calls "rogue democracies," like India and Pakistan. Let
us put this annual ritual behind us and continue to move toward a
constructive relationship with China.
In
closing, it is appropriate to use the words of President Nixon as
he reflected on China long after his historic mission in 1972. In
his 1990 book In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat and
Renewal, Nixon wrote
In
four visits to the People's Republic of China from 1976 to 1985, I
saw the country evolve from one of the world's most reactionary,
doctrinaire Communist Nations into one of its most progressive in
terms of breaking free from the dead hand of Marxist ideology. One
hundred and sixty years ago, Napoleon had called China the
"sleeping giant." Today, China has become an awakened giant. It has
left behind forever its policy of self-imposed isolation of the
1960s and will for the foreseeable future represent a major
geopolitical power center in world affairs.
As
for the future of U.S.-China relations and our annual MFN debate,
Nixon advised in Beyond Peace (1994) that
We
cannot improve the political situation in China through a "scorched
earth" economic policy. Revoking China's MFN status would hurt the
free-market reformers and entrepreneurs who hold the key to China's
future. Not only would it devastate the mainland's economy, it
would lay waste to the surrounding region as well.
Some have said that if the twentieth
century was the American century, the twenty-first will be the
Asian century. The twenty-first can be a second American
century--but only if we understand that we must be as intimately
involved politically, economically, diplomatically, and culturally
in the Asian-Pacific region as we have been in Europe.
This
must be our mission if we are to shape and safeguard the U.S.-China
relationship as well as to safeguard our national interest. We
cannot do otherwise.
-- Barbara Franklin,
a former U.S. Secretary of Commerce, chairs the American Trader
Symposium at The Heritage Foundation