American security policies must be
formulated on firm principles that support freedom, protect the
American people, and resist coercion. Policies toward the
democratic Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan should be framed in
the broader context of the most fundamental American values of
freedom, democracy, free enterprise, and a strong national
defense.
I
argue here that the most important factors influencing United
States-Taiwan relations, and relations between the U.S. and the
People's Republic of China (PRC), are China's proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery; its
military buildup; its expansive claims to territory in the
Asia-Pacific, including Taiwan; and its threats to use force to
resolve territorial disputes. Even without the question of the
sovereignty of Taiwan, unless there is a change in China's
behavior, American interests are threatened. A change in China's
threatening behavior, however, from relying primarily on military
means and coercion to solve problems to using other inducements,
would make a resolution of the tension between the Republic of
China and the People's Republic more likely. The resolution of the
differences between the PRC and the ROC would be less difficult if
Beijing were not a totalitarian Leninist dictatorship, and it seems
to me that it is up to Beijing to make it attractive to the ROC to
associate itself in one way or another with the PRC.
When
it comes to the sensitive matter of American relations with the
Republic of China, it is imperative to formulate and execute a
consistent strategy that enhances American alliances and relations
in Asia while protecting U.S. national interests.
It
is easy, however, to be captured by one aspect of relations across
the Taiwan Strait, which can skew American policy and even
intimidate those who make or influence policy: China's population.
The fact that the People's Republic of China has a population of
1.3 billion people has two principal effects. Some Americans focus
on population size as a justification for policies that lean toward
meeting or accommodating the policy demands of Beijing, perhaps
reasoning that size alone justifies tilting policies in favor of
Beijing. The desire on the part of some Americans to take advantage
of the vast "China market" also influences policy.
It
is important to keep in mind that Taiwan is the eighth-largest
trading partner of the United States. In 2000 Taiwan had about $3
billion in Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S., $30 billion in
exports to the U.S., and $18 billion in imports from the U.S. The
PRC is America's fourth-largest trade partner; but in 2000 it
imported only about $13 billion in U.S. goods while it exported
about $85 billion to the United States. Therefore, while trade with
China has increased economic freedom there, a clear goal of
American policy, American exports have yet to penetrate the market
controlled by the Chinese state. With China a member of the World
Trade Organization, bilateral U.S.-China trade should be more
balanced as implementation of WTO rules improves the climate there.
Moreover, a middle class is forming in China, making people less
dependent on the Leninist state and more aware of the costs of war.
This outcome satisfies a long-term goal of U.S. policy. It should
also be apparent to Beijing that in the event of a PRC attack on
Taiwan, American investment in China and China's ability to export
goods to the U.S. would be affected. Politico-military factors have
economic components. There is also the matter of Taiwan's
investment in China, which is at least $40 billion and could be as
high as $100 billion.
The
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means for
their delivery by the People's Republic of China creates a direct
threat to the American people. China's proliferation partners
include the worst rogue states in the world, all of which have
interests inimical to the United States and its allies. China's own
ballistic missile buildup threatens the American people. One PRC
5-megaton warhead on Los Angeles, for instance, would kill about 6
million Americans. Therefore, it is important that the United
States deploy an effective ballistic missile defense system to make
Beijing's coercive threats to target a single American city less
menacing. The purchasers of China's WMD systems, however, are less
likely to be deterred, making it all the more critical that
American policies address Beijing's proliferation behavior.
The
PRC is also important as a major power and a permanent member of
the United Nations Security Council, which makes the
politico-military aspects of U.S. policy toward the ROC sensitive.
The United States must reassure Beijing that the presence of U.S.
forces in Central Asia is a necessary response to the attack on the
United States by an organization that was based in Afghanistan. The
American presence in Central Asia is not part of some U.S. plan to
surround and contain China. Washington should also make it clear to
Beijing that improved relations with Russia and India are based on
a commonality of interests with those countries. India and Russia
are democracies and are trying to reform and privatize what were
Stalinist state ownership systems. American relations with India
and Russia are not part of a "zero-sum" power triangle meant to tip
the balance of "comprehensive power" against China. It is also
critical that the U.S. government make it clear to China that
Washington welcomes and appreciates whatever support China provides
in the war against terror.
THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE
The
United States has no fundamental interest in how the two "Republics
of China" resolve their differences over sovereignty. It is in the
American interest to insist that the resolution of those
differences be freely agreed to by the people on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait, without force or coercion. Of course, we must
understand that today only citizens on one side of the Taiwan
Strait, Taiwan, where people vote, can freely express their will.
Policies that help Taiwan defend itself from coercion, and keep the
United States with sufficient military strength to ensure the
security and stability of the Western Pacific, are in America's
interest. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 perhaps says it most
elegantly:
We will regard any attempt to determine
the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including
boycott or embargo, as a threat to the peace and security of the
Western Pacific and a matter of grave concern to the United
States.
In
Taiwan today the people have the freedom to express their will
about relations across the Taiwan Strait, either through a
referendum or through support for a candidate from a political
party that runs on a platform supporting one means of resolution or
another. Unfortunately, Beijing threatens to turn the Taiwan Strait
into a "sea of fire" if the ROC's citizens attempt a referendum. In
China, a totalitarian state run by a communist party that insists
on the Leninist principle of "democratic centralism," no such free
expression of will is possible. The political system in China may
allow "village elections," but the Chinese Communist Party does not
allow the free articulation of political interest by the people.
There is no free press through which ideas can be debated, there is
no freedom to associate, and there is no means to support
candidates for office from other parties, including political
parties that may seek alternative ways of resolving problems across
the Taiwan Strait.
It
is in the interest of the United States to provide the ROC the
necessary defensive goods and services to deter China from using
force. It is in the interest of the United States to ensure that
Taiwan's armed forces can effectively operate the military
equipment it procures, including through military exchanges and
training. And it is in the interest of the United States to treat
the democratically elected leaders of the Republic of China with
dignity when they visit or pass through our country.
The
leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and their diplomats often
counsel American leaders that certain behaviors on the part of the
United States toward Taiwan constitute "red lines" beyond which the
U.S. must not cross. China's leaders must understand that the "red
lines" for American policy are not drawn in Beijing; they are drawn
here in Washington--in the Congress through law, in the Supreme
Court, by the elected President of the United States, and by the
American people. U.S. programs of contact with China must ensure
that Beijing understands that elected American leaders have built
the guidelines for U.S. relations with the Republic of China on
Taiwan into the Taiwan Relations Act and other relevant laws. The
three bilateral "Shanghai Communiqués" between the United
States and the PRC provide guidelines for the conduct of U.S.
policies, as do the "Six Assurances" that President Reagan gave to
Taiwan in 1982.
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS
China's recent harassment of the U.S. Navy
oceanographic ship U.S.S. Bowditch in the Yellow Sea is an example
of how Beijing's expansive claims to territory and belligerent
action can lead to conflict. The PLA Navy's harassment of that
ship, operating in international waters, is reminiscent of the way
that the PLA Navy conducted the intercept of the U.S. EP-3 aircraft
in April 2001. Therefore it is imperative that a continued
military-to-military dialogue takes place between the United States
and the People's Republic of China. A major goal of this dialogue
should be to establish "rules of the road" based on international
norms and law for the conduct of safe operations at sea and in the
air when U.S. and Chinese forces operate in close proximity.
Beijing's use of force and coercion cannot be permitted to prevent
the United States from exercising its right of free navigation of
the seas or airways.
There must also be a military dialogue
with Taiwan. The armed forces of the Republic of China have a
number of ground, air, and naval systems that are better than those
of the PRC. However, I think the People's Liberation Army has the
better grasp of how to operate its armed forces in an integrated
way in modern war. Beijing may be incapable of manufacturing
uniformly high-quality modern military equipment, but China's
military leaders and planners have grasped the doctrines of modern
joint warfare. The PLA's acquisition program is also putting
together a combination of sensor systems, command and control
equipment, precision weapons, and modern weapons platforms that can
translate the intellectual grasp of warfare into the ability to
wage war more effectively.
Military-to-military contacts with the PRC
should have clear goals to increase strategic understanding and
cooperation where possible while lowering the likelihood of
conflict. U.S. military contacts with China should not make the PLA
a more effective fighting force and should not make the PLA a more
effective tool for the Chinese Communist government to intimidate
or repress the Chinese people. Finally, U.S. military and political
contacts with Beijing should hammer home the message that American
arms sales to Taiwan are controlled in Beijing. By this I mean that
if there is no threat against Taiwan by the PRC, then there is no
need to provide more defensive goods and services to Taiwan under
the Taiwan Relations Act.
With
respect to Taiwan, I am not certain that either military leaders or
the elected representatives of the people on Taiwan have a full
grasp of why to acquire certain defensive systems and how to use
modern weaponry effectively. Therefore, U.S. contacts with the ROC
military should emphasize these things.
Military-to-military contacts with Taiwan
should be designed to produce an armed force that can deter Chinese
aggression, effectively defend that island, and ensure that in the
event the PRC uses force America can meet its obligations under the
Taiwan Relations Act.
CONCLUSION
China's propensity to settle disputes by the use of
force threatens American interests in Asia. China's policies on
proliferation, that is, supplying missiles, weapons of mass
destruction, and the technology to make such deadly instruments of
war, to dangerous rogue states that support terror threaten
American security and vital U.S. foreign policy interests. China's
twenty-plus nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles
threaten the United States. And China's threats against Taiwan
could embroil U.S. forces in a military conflict. Therefore, it is
important that the United States maintain a strong military edge
while it engages Beijing economically and politically.
Larry M.
Wortzel, Ph.D. is the director of the Asian Studies Center
at The Heritage Foundation. He spoke at a panel on "Taiwan and U.S.
Policy: Toward Stability or Crisis," hosted by Senator Joseph R.
Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at the
Russell Senate Office Building on October 9, 2002. The panel was
organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the
Asia/Pacific Research Center of Stanford University, the National
Committee on United States-China Relations, and the Center for
Strategic and International Studies.