Delivered on April 11, 2007
One of the questions sometimes posed is whether we should expect
a bilateral or trilateral future for the United States, China, and
India. I believe it is more likely that we will see a
triangular future evolve among the three countries as they
pursue one another on a bilateral basis.
Three Bilateral Relationships
The U.S. wants a closer partnership with India because it
believes that the two share common values and interests and that
India can play an important stabilizing role in Asia. India is
pursuing relations with the U.S. to support its own global
ambitions and, more specifically, to gain access to advanced and
sensitive technologies to fuel its economic growth and military
prowess. India and China seem to have reached the conclusion that
they need peaceful borders with each other in order to expand
themselves internally, pursue their regional interests, and fulfill
their own global aspirations. The two countries also realize that
their global images are boosted by adopting a cooperative approach
toward one another, thereby furthering the phenomenon referred to
as "Chindia" (the idea that the combined rapid economic growth of
the two most populous countries in the world will make Asia the new
center of global economic and political activity).
Each of the three bilateral relationships (U.S.-India,
India-China, and China-U.S.) is mutually reinforcing in that an
expansion or improvement in one relationship will likely lead the
third country to pursue better relations with the other two. We
have already seen this with regard to the impact of improved
U.S.-India relations on China's calculations vis-à-visits
ties with India. Beijing was caught off guard by the Bush
Administration's July 2005 announcement that it would extend civil
nuclear cooperation to India and viewed the new U.S. policy as
aimed at checking Chinese power in the region. It now seems to
believe, however, that its best defense against any possible U.S.
attempt to use New Delhi to contain it is through its own pursuit
of better relations with India. For its part, India has long valued
its strategic autonomy in international affairs and chafes at any
assertion that it would play such a role at the behest of the
U.S.
At the same time, India and the U.S. share similar concerns
regarding China's future strategic direction. The Indian military
and security establishment-with lingering memories of the
China-India 1962 border war that led to a humiliating defeat for
the Indians-are particularly suspicious about China's long-term
intentions. These suspicions are the main impetus behind India's
nuclear and advanced missile programs.
The U.S. should guard against the potential for India and China
to cooperate in promoting a "multi-polar" world order, i.e.
countering perceived "U.S. hegemony." Each country, of course,
would have to weigh the cost of any such efforts to its relations
with the U.S. and the potential impact on other important goals
that it might share with the U.S. in the region. India's
hosting of a meeting of the foreign ministers of India, China, and
Russia in February marks the first time that it has hosted such a
high-level trilateral meeting. The fact that this meeting followed
closely on the heels of Russian President Vladimir Putin's tirade
against the U.S. at the Munich Conference on Security Policy raised
some eyebrows in Washington. In a February 14, 2007, joint
communiqué, the three ministers said their trilateral
cooperation was not directed against any other country.[1] Still, the U.S.
should watch closely for any potential signs that the grouping
seeks to undermine U.S. objectives of supporting democracy, free
trade, economic prosperity, and nuclear nonproliferation in
Asia.
U.S.-India Relations
The U.S. and India have been rapidly expanding ties during the
last seven years. President George W. Bush's signing of the Henry
J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act
of 2006 on December 18, 2006, was a milestone for the relationship.
The civil nuclear accord signals a new era of trust and cooperation
and removes a long-standing source of tension between Washington
and New Delhi.
There are still hurdles to cross before civil nuclear
cooperation can take effect. Talks to establish a "1-2-3 agreement"
to govern the terms of civil nuclear trade have stalled. These
negotiations are proving more time-consuming than was originally
expected. However, there is still hope that with continued
cooperation and good-faith negotiations, language for the text of
the agreement can be hammered out in a way that satisfies both
countries' core concerns. India is worried that the language in the
Hyde Act could be used by a future U.S. administration to place
restrictions on its nuclear program. New Delhi's concerns stem from
its past experience in dealing with Washington on the U.S.-supplied
Tarapur nuclear power reactor. India lost access to U.S. nuclear
fuel supplies for the Tarapur reactor following its 1974 nuclear
test and resulting U.S. legislation that imposed new requirements
on U.S. nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapon states.
Although the civil nuclear initiative has consumed relations
between the U.S. and India over the last two years, there are
numerous other areas where ties are expanding. In June 2005, the
U.S. and India signed an historic defense framework agreement that
calls for expanded joint military exercises, increased
defense-related trade, and the establishment of a defense and
procurement production group. The U.S.-India Knowledge Initiative
on Agriculture, launched in July 2005, aims at establishing
cooperation in agriculture-related science and technology to help
reduce poverty and hunger. A CEOs Forum between the two countries
meets regularly to look at ways to expand economic and trade
ties.
The U.S. views India's growing economic and political influence
as a positive development for the balance of power in the region.
As Asia increasingly takes center stage in global affairs,
Washington should seek ways to work with New Delhi and to build
partnerships in this vital region. India is expanding its strategic
vision in Asia and has already begun to broaden its engagement
throughout the region. Broadening Indian engagement across the
globe, especially in Asia, is in the U.S. interest and should be
encouraged. As a fellow democracy without hegemonic interests,
India's increased economic and political involvement in Asia will
help to ensure that one country does not dominate the area and will
encourage stability in a region that accounts for one-quarter of
U.S. trade and investment and almost half of the world's
population.
That said, Washington and New Delhi will not always see
eye-to-eye. One issue on which Washington and New Delhi find their
policies diverging is about how to prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. Although India voted against Iran at meetings of
the International Atomic Energy Agency in September 2005, and again
in February 2006, it continues to view Iran as a major source for
its growing oil and gas needs and pursues such deals accordingly.
India also wants to maintain good relations with Iran for
geo-political reasons involving its need to keep distance between
Islamabad and Tehran and to ensure Iran does not create
disturbances among its own large Muslim minority population.
India-China Relations
India and China are in the midst of a rapprochement that has led
to an upsurge in bilateral trade during the last five years and a
series of high-level visits aimed at increasing cooperation. In
just four years, China and India have quadrupled the volume of
their annual bilateral trade to almost $20 billion. The increasing
U.S. attention to India over the past several years-especially
Washington's decision to extend civil nuclear cooperation to New
Delhi-has contributed to Chinese interest in developing closer ties
to India and to its acknowledgement that India is a rising major
Asian power.
China and India face many hurdles in improving ties, such as
continuing Indian suspicions about China's special ties and
military and nuclear transfers to Pakistan. Lingering border
disputes between the two Asian giants also continue to hinder
relations. The diplomatic dynamics that preceded Chinese President
Hu Jintao's visit to India in November 2006 were a reminder that
New Delhi and Beijing face serious obstacles to establishing a
genuine partnership. Days before Hu's arrival in New Delhi, the
Chinese Ambassador to India proclaimed the Chinese government's
position that the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese
territory. Although the remarks were downplayed in New Delhi, the
diplomatic outburst points to continuing tensions between the two
countries.
Energy has been both a source of cooperation and competition
between China and India in recent years. They are two of the
world's fastest-growing energy consumers, with China importing
about 40 percent of its energy needs and India importing 70
percent. Bidding wars over energy resources have inflated prices
for energy assets and prompted the two countries to agree to joint
bidding in third countries. Their energy competition is also
reflected in their assertions of naval power. As India reaches into
the Malacca Straits, Beijing is creating a "string of pearls"
surrounding India by developing strategic port facilities in
Sittwe, Burma; Chittagong, Bangladesh; and Gwadar, Pakistan to
protect sea lanes and ensure uninterrupted energy supplies.
While China is developing closer ties to South Asian nations Sri
Lanka and Bangladesh, India also is becoming more integrated into
the multilateral institutional structures of Southeast Asia. New
Delhi became a full dialogue partner of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995, joined the ASEAN Regional
Forum in 1996, and became a member of the East Asia Summit in
December 2005. India's trade with ASEAN countries has risen from
$2.4 billion in 1990 to $23 billion in 2005.
Conclusion
There is a broad logic to the pursuit of closer U.S.-India
strategic ties. Although Washington and New Delhi share some of the
same questions and concerns regarding China's rise, Washington
respects that New Delhi is unwilling to allow itself to be used as
part of a China containment policy. Given India's more active
involvement in shaping the political and economic environment in
Asia, the U.S. will need to begin factoring India into its broader
Asian policies and seek multiple forms of engagement in the region
that include India's participation.
Lisa Curtis is Senior
Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The
Heritage Foundation. These remarks were delivered April 11,
2007, at the Forum for American/Chinese Exchange Conference at
Stanford University.