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144 June 5, 1981 BLOCK GRANTS AND FEDERALISM DECENTRALIZING
DECISIONS I NTRODUCTION The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution
provides that "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people This is the most
important c o nstitutional statement of the uniquely American
doctrine of federalism, that is, a division of governmental powers
between different levels of government. President Reagan has for
years called for a renaissance of federalism, a doctrine much
attenuated by events of the Twentieth Century to be the financial
relationship between the different levels of government national,
state, and local. The national government is now well established
as the controlling partner in this rela- tionship Its means of
control i s the system of grants and assistance, and their
accompanying regulations, directed to individuals, private
institutions, state governments, and local governments. The
President's first major proposal in this area is his plan to
consolidate a handful of c a tegorical grants into block grants
Today, the decisive element in governmental federalism seems This
paper, the first a series of papers on federalism and block grants,
examines some of the constitutional. issues surround ing federalism
and national finan c ial assistance to .the :states presents an
outline of the current governmental grant system and evaluates the
efficacy of certain block grants already in existence Subsequent
papers will deal with the President's specific block grant
proposals I 2 A LOOK AT TWENTIETH CENTURY CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM
Marbury v. Madison 1803) and McCulloch v. Maryland (1819 are Chief
Justice John Marshall's ttutions to American government.
Court, they might better be described as additions, if not amend
ments, to the Consti tution. In Marbur Marshall invented the the
doctrine of supremacy of federal law and Congress! discretion to
pass laws under the "necessary and proper clause.'I In McCulloch,l
the Supreme Court confronted its first major controversy in the
areas of federa l ism and state sovereignty that is, the
constitutional separation of powers between the national and state
governments In 1816, Congress chartered the Second Bank of the
United States, which then proceeded to open branches in many
states. In 1818, the legi s lature of Maryland passed an act
imposing a tax on all banks not chartered by the state legislature
and imposing penalties on the officers of banks not so chartered.
The State 0.f Maryland brought suit against the Baltimore branch of
the Second Bank of th e United States for doing business without
authority of the state.
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled against the authority of
Maryland to regulate or tax a federally chartered corporation.
The power to establish a national bank or to charter a
corporation was clearly not one of 'Ithe enumerated powers" of
Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Neverthe
less, Marshall set out to justify such powers. Maryland contended
that, under the Constitution, only the states were truly sovereign
and that the powers of the national government were delegated to it
by the states. In refutation, Marshall established the sover eignty
of the'national government by pointing out that the Consti - tution
had been ratified by state conventions of the people, not by the
state legislatures. He concluded that From these conven- tions the
constitution derives its whole authority It required not the
affirmance, and could not be negated, by the State gov e rn ments.
The constitution, when thus adopted, was of complete obligation,
and bound the state sovereignties.Il2 More than decisions of the
Supreme doctrine of judicial review. In McCul och, Marshall
established Marshall continued by admitting that the po w er to
establish a corporation was not given to Congress I'expresslyl' by
the Consti tution. Nevertheless, such an act of Congress can be
justified as a means to carry out the enumerated powers reason is,
therefore, perceived, why it may not pass as incide n tal to those
powers which are expressly given, if it be a direct mode of
executing them.It3 And, he continued, it was left to Congress NO
sufficient 4 meat 316 at 403 at 411. 3 to decide what means are
appropriate "But we think the sound construction to c a rry out its
powers, of the constitution must allow to the national legislature
that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it
confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that
body to perform the high duties assigned to i t , in the manner
most beneficial to the people I4 The Constitution itself, Marshall
contended, gave this power of decision to Congress by way of the
"necessary and proper c1ause.I' For, Itto its (i.e the Congress')
enumeration of powers is added that of ma k ing all laws which
shall be necessary or proper, for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution,
in the government of the United States, or in any department
thereof.Il5 established pursuant to congressi o nal statute. "The
result is a conviction that the States have no power, by taxation
or otherwise to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control,
the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to
carry into execution the powers vested i n the general government.
This is we think, the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy
which the constitution has declared I6 Finally, the states have no
power to tax an enterprise In summary, it can be seen that the
McCulloch reasoning could be used (a n d has been used) to justify
congressional legis lation in almost any area outside of the
limited and enumerated powers given to Congress by Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitu- tion. Marshall construed the necessary
and proper clause, in what was the fir s t important construction
of that clause and what has remained the permanent construction of
the clause, to be not a power certifying the authority of Congress
to pass specific legislation to effect the enumerated powers, but
to be a separate additional, a n d general power to pass any
legislation subject only to the decision of Congress as to what is
llnecessary.Il set forth the structure by which the necessary and
proper clause has become a subject of I1endslt and not only
lImeans.'l As such the necessity a nd propriety of making laws was
severed from the connection with "the foregoing powers.
McCulloch also set down the foundation for numerous subse quent
decisions based on the supremacy of the federal to the state
governments. Sixteen years earlier, in Marb ury v. Madison,
Marshall had said It is not entirely unworthy of observation that
in declaring what shall be the su reme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned emphasis in orginal In
McCulloch, Marshall broadened the statement to say t hat "the
overnment of the United States though] limited in its.powers s
supreme; and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitu
Marshall at 421 at 411-412 at 436 1 Cranch 137, at 179 4 tion form
the supreme law of the landtt8 (emphasis added Both of these
statements can be compared to a 1958 ruling of the Supreme Court,
Cooper v. Aaron, where the Court said that Itthe federal judiciary
is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution It
follows that the interpretation of the Four teenth Am e ndment
enuriciated b this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of
the land Emphasis added It was not until well into the Twentieth
Century that the Supreme Court began to hear significant cases
regarding the extent of Congress' spending power and th e effect of
'it on the reserved powers of the states. Until the passage of the
Sixteenth Amendment (income tax) in 1913, Congress had only a
limited capacity to spend because it had only a limited capacity to
tax.
In 1921, Congress passed the Maternity Act (42 Stat. 224) which
provided for appropriations apportioned among the states "for the
purpose of cooperating with them to reduce maternal and infant
mortality and protect the health of mothers and infants States
could receive monies from the national tr easury if they complied
with the provisions of the Maternity Act and with the regulations
prescribed by the new executive branch bureau created pursuant to
the Act.
The constitutionality of the Maternity Act was challenged by the
state of Massachusetts on the Tenth Amendment grounds that the Act
induced lithe states to yield a portion of their sovereign rights,"
and by an individual taxpayer, one Mrs. Frothingham, on Fifth
Amendment grounds, that is, that the Act deprived her of her
property, under the gui se of taxation, without due process of law.
The Supreme Court combined the two cases, Frothinqham v.
Mellon and Massachusetts v. Mellon,lo and delivered its opinion
in 1923.
The Court disposed of the taxpayer challenge in an abrupt manner
and thereby disp osed of all taxpayers' suits permanent ly With a
few exceptions Flast v. Cohen (1968) being the most notable An
individual taxpayer's interest, the Court said, "is comparatively
minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation, of
any paymen t out of the funds so remote fluctuating, and uncertain,
that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of
a court of equity.llll In dismissing the claim of the state of
Massachusetts, the Court picked up the theme of McCulloch, that the
n ational govern ment has constitutional powers to bypass the
structure of state government and reach individual citizens
directly Thus inhabi at 406 358 U.S. 1, at 18 lo 262 U.S. 447 l1 at
487 I 5 tants...are within the taxing power of Congress as well as
t hat of the States where they reside It cannot be conceded that a
State, as parens patriae, may institute judicial proceedings to
protect citizens of the U.S. from the operation of the statutes
thereof It is no part of its (i.e the state's) duty or power t o
enforce their rights (i.e those of an individual citizen) in
respect of their relations with the Federal government.1112 by the
Supreme Court a statement that paved the way for judicial
acceptance of the New Deal and a'statement that has defined
federali s m in the Twentieth Century the Court refused to agree
that the Maternity Act invaded the powers reserved by the Consti
tution to the states for the simple reason that the states agreed
to the invasion Finally, in one of the most important statements
ever u ttered Nor does the statute require the states to do or
yield anything. purpose of tempting them to yield, that purpose
might be effective1 If Congress enacted it with the ultimate
frustrated by the simple expedient of not yielding T3 In fact, the
Court r e fused even to recognize the issue as one permitting.a
judicial decision or to say it in another way as one permitting a
constitutional decision: "That question is political and not
judicial in character for, with regard to the acceptance of monies
from th e national Treasury, Ilnothing is to be done without their
consent."14 This consent of the states merely establishes a system,
the Court concluded, by which the national overnment will "share
with the State the field of state In 1936, the Supreme Court ban d
ed down its decision in powers I United v. Butler,16 an odd
decision, full of contradictions and ironies.. The case concerned
the constitutionality of the Agricul tural Adjustment Act of 1933,
one of the first of-the New Deal measures of certain food comm o
dities, the revenue from the tax being used to pay farmers who
agreed to reduce their production of the same commodities. Butler,
a receiver for a bankrupt cotton mill company, refused to pay the
tax, contending that the Act was unconstitutional in that i t was
beyond Congress' power to spend for "the general welfare" (Article
I, Section 8 that it invaded the powers of the states, and that the
tax was not a bona fide general revenue exaction but, in reality, a
means of regulating local agriculture The Act p r ovided for an
excise tax on the processing l2 at 482, 485, 486 l3 at 482. l4 at
483. l5 at 483 l6 297 U.S. 1. 6 The Court began by distinguishing
the case from Massachu- setts v. Mellon by asserting that in the
earlier case the question was a simple one o f an individual
taxpayer's right to prevent government spending, while in Butler
the tax was but one "step in an unauthorized plan," and,
additionally was Itan indispensible part in the plan of
reg~lation.111 court said, was the extent of Congress' power t o
spend for 'Ithe general welfare.Il The Court pointed out that even
in the Federal- ist Papers there was a division between Madison and
Hamilton on this question. Madison claimed that the granted power
"to provide for the general welfare was not separate and distinct
from the enumerated list of powers under which Congress may
legislate.
Federalist 41, Madison asked, "For what purpose could the
enumera tion of particular powers be inserted, if these and others
were meant to be included in the preceding gene ral power?Il The
general welfare clause, Madison maintained, is ''explained and
qualified by the enumeration of particulars.
In Federalist 34, Hamilton argued for a l'generalIf power of
taxation so that Congress could provide for the equally general
pecun iary wants of the Union future purposes must be left
unrestricted admit not of calculation or limitation; and upon the
principle, more than once adverted to, the power of making
provision for them as they arise ought to be a capacity to provide
for future contingencies as they may happen; and as these are
illimitable in their nature, it is impossible to safely limit that
capacity For a more dev'eloped discussion of the disagreement
between Madison and Hamilton, see Heritage Foundation Issue
Bulletin No 59 T he Balanced Budget The great and controlling
question in the the In The power of Congress to tax for "Its future
necessities An Economic and Constitutional Review. I In the context
of the Butler case, the question whether Congress' power to spend
for the g eneral welfare was limited or unlimited was specified
into the question of whether Congress could institute a program of
transfer payments for farmers, that is to say, whe,ther Congress
could regulate agriculture such power to regulate agriculture not
bei n g one of the enumerated powers of Article I, Section 8 The
Court endorsed the Hamiltonian view as !'the correct one,111g
meaning that the discretion was left to Congress to decide when to
spend for the general welfare. Nevertheless, having proclaimed a ge
n er.al power of congressional spending, the Court struck down the
Act as an unconstitutional invasion "of the reserved rights of the
states l7 at 58 la at 62 19 at 66. 7 It is a statutory plan to
regulate and control agricul tural production, a matter beyo n d
the powers delegated to the federal government From the accepted
doctrine that the United States is a government of delegated
powers, it follows that those not expressly granted, or reasonably
to be implied from such as are conferred, are reserved to th e
states or to the people To fore stall any suggestion to the
contrary, the Tenth Amendment subjects within the states' reserved
jurisdiction, which is prohibited, the Congress could invoke the
taxing and spending power as a means to accomplish the same en d
Clause 1 of Section 8 of Article I would become the instrument for
total subversion of the governmental powers reserved to the
individual states.20 was adopted If, in lieu of compulsory
regulation of Justice Stone, writing in dissent for himself,
Justice Cardozo and Justice Brandeis, while agreeing with the
majority concerning the Hamiltonian view of spending for the
general welfare, maintained that Congress could indeed attach
regulations to spending If the expenditure is for a national public
purpose th a t purpose will not be thwarted because payment is on
condition which will advance that purpose.1121 In the spirit of
Massachu setts v. Mellon, Stone mentioned the voluntariness of the
regula- tory effect the farmer at his own option promises to
fulfill th e condition.1t22 Nevertheless, Stone did not maintain
that the power to spend for the general welfare was absolutely
unlimited. He formulated three principles of restraint on Congress'
power One restriction is that the purpose must be truly national.
Anoth e r is that it may not be used to coerce action left to state
control and the Executive I2 Another is the conscience and
patriotism of Congress The Court's overturning of the Agriculture
Adjustment Act left Roosevelt's New Deal in constitutiohal limbo To
th e rescue came Professor Edward Corwin, the most prominent
constitutional scholar of his time and among the greatest
constitutional scholars of American history. In an address
delivered to the annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools24 exac t ly one year after the Butler decision and five
months before the critical Steward and Helverinq decisions, infra,
Corwin attacked the Butler decision and, more importantly,
formulated a Twentieth Century version of constitutional
federalism, Ifcoopera tiv e federalism that he presented as a means
of getting around the Butler conclusions almost 2o at 68, 75. 21 at
86 22 at 86. 23 at 87 4 and published in 8 American Law School
Review 687, 1937. 8 After a brilliant survey of the history of
governmental federal i sm, Corwin concluded that the Tenth
Amendment's reservation of powers to the states was not an
inevitable roadblock to New Deal-type legislation providing for
federal grants to the states. The roadblock could be removed by
having the national government a n d the state governments
tlcooperatell for common objectives. This could be accomplished by
combining the taxing and spending power of the Congress, that is
the greater financial strength of the National Government,It with
the reserved powers of the states , that is Ithe wider coercive
powers of the states.1125 Summarizing the main arguments leading to
his conclusions Corwin cited contemporary political science sources
that purported to demonstrate that federal grant-in aid programs
already in effect did not "break down state initiative and
devitalize' State Corwin cited contemporary history to show that
federal grants did not "mean the growth of an immense bureau- cracy
in Washington, which in turn will threaten our dual system.'l
Instead, national-state coo p eration will !'diffuse bureaucracy in
preference to concentrat ing it at the national capitol.1127 states
may employ the simple expedient of not yielding" answers the
"contention that this type of 'legislation is coercive with respect
to the States.1128 C orwin cited with approval the Butler Courtls
endorse- ment of the Hamiltonian view of a general power to spend
for the general welfare.
Any congessional legislation can pass constitutional muster as
long as it is for the llgeneralll welfare, is based on !I the
voluntary principle,Il and provided that "the terms stipulated by
the act for state cooperation are designed to make such cooperation
better provotive of the main purpose of the act and are not
intended to foist policies upon the cooperat- ing states w hich are
not relevant to the purpose.1129 Ten months after the Butler
decision, President Franklin Roosevelt was re-elected by a
landslide. Four months later, in February of 1937, Roosevelt
precipitated a national uproar by The Massachusetts v. Mellon con c
lusion that the 25 at 700. 26 at 701 27 at 701 28 at 702 29 at
703-704. 9 proposing his Court-packing plan. Two months later, the
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in two cases challenging the
constitu- tionality of what is still the most significant pie c e
of domestic legislation ever enacted, the Social Security Act In
Steward Machine Company v. Davis and Belverinq v. Davis,30 Justice
Roberts, the author of the Butler decision, switched sides and
joined the justices who supported the New Deal; the Butler holding
itself was rendered a dead letter; Corwin, although not mentioned
by name, saw the main points of his speech promul- gated as
constitutional law; Justice Stone's dissent in Butler received
vindication; and the Social Security Act was upheldn separ a te 5-4
and 7-2 votes In Steward, a challenge was made to the unemployment
compen- sation section of the Act which provided for a federal tax
on employers that was then paid out of the Treasury to the
unemployed. The distribution of unemployment compensati o n was to
be administered by the states, provided that the states
'Ivoluntarily1l enacted their own statutes that complied with
national regulations. taxed employer in participating states could
also receive a federal tax credit for amounts paid into the s y
stem of the o d-age benefits section of the Social Security Act
which provided for payroll deductions from employees and another
tax on employers in order to pay out benefits to the aged grounds
invaded the Dowers reserved to the states bv the Tenth Amend m ent
A In Helverin the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality Both
cases were brought on essentially the same federalist the various
provisions of the Social Security Act Additionally the Court in
Steward considerGd, and rejected, the Butler-type cont ention
thatwx was not a true revenue measure but a disguised attempt to
regulate employment, an area belonging to the states.
Justice Cardozo wrote the opinion in both cases with approval
that, in both instances, Congress had not tied the Act's provisions
for taxing to the Act's provisions for spending of the revenues
raised from the taxes. Thus, in Helverin "the proceeds of both
taxes are to be paid into the Treasury +ike internal-revenue taxes,
generally, and are not earmarked in any way.1131 In this way ,
Cardozo disposed of the controlling conclu sions in Butler.
Nevertheless, one part of the Butler opinion was affirmed with
great effect by Cardozo. I1generall1 congressional power to spend
and tax for anything llgeneral,ll subject only to the discretion of
Congress, was com- plete He noted The victory of a 30 31
Consecutive decisions beginning at 301 U.S. 548 at 6
35. A similar statement appears in Steward at 592. 10 Congress
may spend money in aid of the "general wel- fare I1 There have been
great states men in our history who have stood for other views. We
will not resurrect the contest It is now settled by decision.
United States v. Butler, supra The line must still be drawn between
one welfare and another, between particular and general. Where this
sha l l be placed cannot be known through a formula in advance of
the event. There is a middle ground or certainly a penumbra in
which discre- tion is at large. The discretion, however, is not
confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless
t h e choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an
exercise of judgment. This is now familiar law Nor is the concept
of the general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or parochial
a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-b e ing of
the Nation changes with the times.32 So, with regard to spending,
the Court placed what has become a permanent discretion in the
hands of Congress. With regard to the Tenth Amendment, the reserved
powers of the states, and federalism, the Supreme C o urt seemed to
conclude that the urgent demands of the Depression had overwhelmed
them all What is critical or urgent The fact developed quickly that
the states were unable to give the requisite relief. national in
area and dimensions. There was need of he l p from the nation if
the people were not to starve.33 When money is spent to promote the
general welfare, the concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped
by Congress not the states. So the concept be not arbitrary, the
locality must yield.34 The problem h ad become With the Social
Security Act as a model, the Court seemed to regard federalism not
as a separation of powers between the national government and the
state governments, that is, a separa tion of authority to act, but,
rather, simply as a traditio n al separation of .attention the
national government having customar- ily dealt with a certain range
of public issues and the state governments having concerned
themselves with other issues. this merely customary system had to
change because of new nationa l , homoqeneous exigencies But The
subject matter of taxation open to the power of Congress is as com
rehensive as that open to 'the 'power of the states 3P 32
Helvering, at 640-641 33 Steward, at 586 34 Helvering, at 645 35
Steward, at 581 11 It is too lat e today for the argument to be
heard with tolerance that in a crisis so extreme the use of the
moneys of the nation to relieve the unemployed and their dependents
is a use for any purpose narrower than the promotion of the general
welfare.36 The purge of n a tion-wide calamity that began in 1929
has taught us many lessons. Not the least is the solidarity of
interests that may once have seemed to be divided unemployment is
an ill not particular but general the ill is all one 37 The problem
is plainly national in area and dimensions.
Moreover, the laws of the separate states cannot deal with it
effectively Only a power that is national can serve the interests
of all.38 Thus, the solution was to recognize the new common
problems and blend together the authorities of different levels of
govern ment Supporters of the statute say that its operation is not
constraint, but the creation of a larger freedom, the states and
the nation joining in a cooperative endeavor to avert a common evil
The Social Security Act is an attempt to find a method by which all
these3gublic agencies may work together to a common end.
Finally, Cardozo seemed to be acutely observant in noticing a
fact about the relationship between the states in the 1930s
individual states were reluctant to impose taxes in order to use
the revenues to create state programs of unemployment compensation
old-age benefits, etc., for fear that such taxes would drive'out
their citizens to other taxless states. In other words, the states
c o mpeted against each other to keep state taxing and spending at
a minimum. Cardozo saw that a national initiative like the Social
Security Act could break this competition of financial austerity.
The Social Security Act reordered not only federal-state rel a
tions but also the relations between states But if states have been
holding back before the passage of the federal law, reaction was
not owing, for the most part, to the lack of sympathetic interest.
Many held back through alarm lest, in laying such a tol l upon the
industries, they would place themselves in a position of economic
disadvantage as compared neighbors or competitors O 36 Steward, at
586-587 37 Helvering, at 641 38 Helvering, at 644 39 Steward. at
587-588 40 Steward; at 588.- 12 In the tender o f upon f,elds fore
this credit Congress does not intrude gn to its function. The
purpose of its intervention, as we have shown, is to safeguard its
own treasury and as an incident to that protection to place the
states upon a footing of equal ~pportunity A system of old age
pension has special dangers of its own, if put in force in one
state and rejected in another. The existence of such a system is a
bait to the needy and dependent elsewhere, encouraging them to
migrate and seek a haven of repose.42 Althou g h the federal courts
have handed down hundreds of decisions concerning the issue of
federal-state relations, the cases considered above still control
the fundamentals of Twentieth Century "cooperative federalism In
this age of aggressive re-interpretation of the Constitution by the
Supreme Court probably no other field of constitutional law has
remained so static. Since the Steward and Helvering cases, the
kinds and numbers of national programs directing monies and with
them regulation and control to the s tates have increased almost
geometrically. The effect on the finances of both the national and
the state governments has been profound. The effect on federalism
has been even more profound.
Today, there is a federal grant or entitlement program for
purpose s of only minimal public importance. Additionally, it
cannot really be said that any powers of government are reserved
exclusively to the states any more can manage now is a sharing of
certain powers with the national government. And, of course,
numerous p owers have become reserved exclusively to the national
government. For still other areas of public concern, the national
share of the power has become the controlling share whether
financially or by means of regulation The best status that the
states If a true federalism is to be resurrected, and President
Reagan has declared his determination to do so, some of the
questions that must be asked are the following Has the Corwin
prophecy for cooperative federalism been fulfilled? Corwin thought
that cooperati v e federalism would combine the greater strength"
of the national government with the "wider coercive powers" of the
state governments. But today, the coercive powers of the states,
that is their regulatory and other legal/governmental powers, have
been su pplanted by the like power in the national government so
that both the financial and coercive powers have been transplanted
to the centralized financial 41 Steward, at 591 42 Helvering, at
644. 13 government historical and constitutional arguments?
Even Ca rdozo argued that the states must Ifmaintain their
statehood without impairment.1143 In their frantic competition for
federal dollars, a competi tion that has had the additional
consequence of causing the states to vastly increase their own
taxes and spen ding, have the states preserved their constitutional
sovereignty and integrity state governments merely wards of the
Congress today?
Would Justice Stone, dissenting in Butler and arguing for the
New Deal, agree that contemporary spending programs do not If
coerce action left to state control?Il After more than fifty years
of continuing creation of imaginative, new ways for the national
government to control the states is the Massachusetts v. Mellon
formula, the Ilsimple expedient of not yielding II still me a
ningful in any way? Is it still llsimple?ll Can this be justified
by Corwin's Are the Are they merely Ifrecipient institutions?Il
What is the real constitutional status of the myriad of national
spending programs congressional spending is for the llgenera lll
welfare?
What percentage is for minute, specific, and llparti cular'l
welfares What percentage of Which is llsupremell: the national
government or the document that elaborately provides for a
federalist system of governments, the Constitution?
NATIONA L AID TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Cooperative
Federalism in the Twentieth Century The first significant law
granting funds to the states from Land the national treasury was
the Morrill Act of 1862, which instituted the system of land grant
colleges it t he first minimum federal regulations of state affairs
owned by the national government was given outright to the states
who were allowed to sell the land in order to use the proceeds for
the establishment of colleges devoted primarily to agriculture and
s c ience every college established pursuant to the Act was
required to ihstitute a program of military instruction what we
know today as the ROTC program This first law brought with State
annual reports to Congress were required and 43 Steward, at 597. 14
Th r ough the end of the Nineteenth and into the Twentieth Century,
various grant programs, including the first providing direct cash
payments to the states, were.enacted: special aid for the blind,
agricultural aid, aid' to state vete,rans' home more aid to c
olleges, and others.
With the unprecedented income derived from the new national
income tax, a result of the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment
to the Constitution in 1913, the Congress initiated a new series of
grants to the states. In 1917, the enac tment of the Smith- Hughes
Act (vocational education, still substantially unchanged today,)
began the national patronage of education curricula and programs by
Congress. As has already been mentioned, the passage of the
Maternity Act of 1921 precipitated the Massachusetts v.
Mellon case, the first modern inquiry into the constitutionality
of national grants-in-aid to the states. Having won a formidable
vindication from the Supreme Court, the effect of which continues
to this day, the Congress was emboldene d by the notion that the
American federalist system did not prohibit the enactment of a host
of new national programs The invention and mass production of the
automobile stimulated the passage of the first truly comprehensive,
nationwide assistance progra m, ald to every state for highway
construction.
Both the types of grants to states and the administrative
regulations relating to them began to grow creation of
discretionary grants, that is, grants that could be awarded solely
at the discretion of some of ficial in the executive branch; grants
that required the prior approval of state plans by the requisite
federal agency; grant fund distribution to the states based on an
apportionment formula; and various requirements such as progress
reports, prior exami n ation of proposed state pro] ects and audits
This period saw the As tax revenues and congressional spending
rose, the congres- sional power of the purse underwent a change in
kind. The numerous and aggressive initiatives of the New Deal began
another quan t um leap in the amounts and types of government
spending. The New Deal, of course, precipitated the landmark
decisions in Butler Steward, and Helvering, already considered.
Although many of the New Deal programs were temporary, they did
accustom the countr y to national intervention in what had
previously been strictly local concerns. Grant funds began to be
distributed according to mathematical formulas that took into
account such factors as demography, the financial burden and
capacity of each state, and o t her economic and business
statistics. With the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935,
funds and regulations of the national government were introduced
into the fields of old age assistance aid to the blind, aid to
dependent children, unemployment com p en sation, maternal and
child health, crippled children, and child welfare. The Act
provided for complete national funding of state unemployment
compensation programs with the national government sharing the
costs of the other programs with the states all y, this period saw
the creation of the first direct grants to Addition 15 cities and
localities, that is, grants that bypassed the political authority
of state governments.
The Great Society and its continuation to the present day was
The the last signific ant period in national grants to the states
numbers and kinds of grants increased dramatically. And the most
significant development was the new severity and inflexibility of
the regulations attached to the grants. Major new grants were
launched in 'the f ields of education, welfare, and employment. The
financial and regulatory power of the national government entered
the fields of environmentalism and consumer affairs for the first
time.
Government Finances and Federalism Expenditures of the national
gover nment are of five kinds transfer payments to individuals;
defense purchases of goods and ser vices, including the salaries of
military personnel; all non-defense purchases of goods and services
primarily the administrative costs including salaries of the c ivil
service, of operating the government; interest paid on the federal
debt and outstanding loans; and grants in-aid to state and local
governments. revenue sharing and countercyclical aid direct The
last category includes From the following table, it ca n be seen
that, over the past thirty years, defense expenditures have
substantially declined as a percentage of the total budget;
interest payments and non-defense purchases have remained roughly
the same; domestic transfer payments to individuals have inc r
eased about 250 percent; and grants to states and localities have
increased about 350 percent From Special Analysis, Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 1982, p 48. 16 The last ten
years have seen the tripling of grants to states and local i ties
Total Federal Aid to States and Localities FY 1971-1980 1971 1972
1973 1974 1975 29.8 billion 35.9 44.0 46.0 49.7 1976 1977 1978 1979
1980 59.1 billion 68.4 77.9 82.9 91.5 Includes general revenue
sharing and countercyclical aid Source: Federal Aid t o States,
Fiscal Year 1975 Federal Aid to States, Fiscal Year 1980 Department
of the Treasury When the fiscal year 1980 totals are broken down by
function it can be seen that federal aid to states is concentrated
in the fields of transportation, education, health, and other
welfare services Federal Grant-in-Aid Outlays by Function in
millions of dollars Function National defense Energy Natural
resources and environment Agriculture Commerce and housing credit
Transportation Community and regional development Education,
training, employment, and social services Health Income security
Veterans benefits and services Administration of justice General
government General purpose fiscal assistance Total outlays Actual
1980 93 49 9 5,362 569 3 13,087 6,486 21,862 15, 7 58 18,495 90 5
30 160 8,478 91,472 Source: Special Analysis, Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 1982, p 249 17 The Department of
Health and Human Services administers nearly one-third of all
grants Federal Grant-in-Aid Outlays by Agency i n millions of
dollars Agency Funds appropriated to the President Department of
Department of Department of Department of Department of Department
of Department of Department of Department of Department of
Department of Environmental Agriculture Commerce Ed u cation Energy
Health and Human Services Housing and Urban Development the
Interior Just ice Labor Transportation the Treasury Protection
Agency Community Services Administration Other Total outlays Actual
1980 7 10 6,446 1,114 7,122 390 28,553 7,847 1,210 513 9,952 12,987
7,324 4,603 1,726 974 91,472 Source: Special Analysis, Budget of
the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1982, p. 250 According to
the latest compiled figures (from Government Finances in 1978-79,
Bureau of the Census, 1980 state and lo c al governments toqether
receive 18.6 percent of their total revenue from the national
government. This is their largest sinqle source of revenue. The six
other sources of revenue for state and local governments are Sales
taxes 18.3 percent Charges and mis c ellaneous .15.5 percent Other
taxes 16.4 Insurance trust revenue 9.6 Property taxes 16.0 Utility
and liquor store revenue 5.6 By comparison, in 1960, when the total
revenues of all state and local governments were only $60.3
billion, the percentage of tha t revenue contributed by the
national government was slightly less than 10 percent. The
following table shows some financial aspects of government
federalism in 1978-
79. When state and local revenues from the national government
are separated, it can be s een that state governments receive 22.1
percent of their revenues from the national government while local
governments receive 8..8 percent of their total revenues from the
natonal government 18 In millions of dollars Revenue, Total From
Federal Governmen t Public Welfare Education General Revenue
Sharing Other Total State Local State Local Governments Governments
Governments 404,933.6 247,004.3 234,630.1 75,163.8 54,548.1
20,615.7 22,487.4 22,313.2 174.2 12,300.4 10,709.8 1,590.6 6,851.4
2,260.9 4,590.5 33 , 524.5 19,264.2 14,260.3 Source: Governmental
Finances in 1978-79, Bureau of the Census p 18. Note: The sum of
the revenues of state and local governments does not equal the
total because the net duplicative transactions between levels of
governments are e xcluded Categorical Grants There are three types
of grants to state and local govern ments: categorical grants,
block grants, and general revenue sharing.
Most federal grants are categorical. They are designed to
provide aid for very specific 'purposes. Of ten, the details of the
administration of categorical grants are designed by Congress
itself; they are written into law and not left to the executive
branch. Very little freedom is left to state and local govern ments
as to how the categorical money can b e spent. grants carry a heavy
burden of federal regulation. Categorical Categorical grants are
normally divided into two sub-types formula grants and project
grants. divided into allotted formula grants, formula-project
grants, and open-ended reimbursement grants.
Allotted formula grants are defined by the government's expert
on federalism, The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (ACIR as those Formula grants are in turn made available
automatically to eligible recipients who meet the requirements an d
conditions established by statute or regulation; the grant is
considered to be an entitlement. of a state plan that must be
approved by the responsible federal agency official. The applicable
statute or regulation issued pursuant to the legislation detai ls
provisions that are to be included in the state plan.44 One
frequent requirement is the preparation 44 Categorical Grants
governmental Relations, 1977, p. 9.
Their Role and Design, Advisory Commission on Inter19 An example
of this kind of grant is the U rban Mass Transportation Capital and
Operating Assistance Formula Grant of the Department I of
Transportation, autorized by the Urban Mass Transportation Act of
1964 (49 USC 1601 et seq.) and subject to the regulations of 49 CFR
601.2 local government ent i ties approved by the governor of the
relevant state for assistance in acquisition, construction, and
improvement of urban mass transportation systems and for expenses
to operate such systems. The payment formula is 80 percent federal
and 20 percent local f or construction projects and 50-50 for
operating projects i In fiscal year 1980, $1.375 billion was paid
to I For formula-project grants, Itlimitations are placed on the
amount available for funding project applications from potential
grantees in the stat e . For the grant programs that combine
project grants under a formula allotment grant, the formula is used
to determine the amount for any state, and part of the allotment is
used to make grants on the basis of individual applications from
potential applic a tions, while the remainder is available on a
regular basis."45 grant is the Coastal Energy Impact
Program-Formula Grant of the Department of Commerce, authorized by
the Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976 (16 U.S.C. 1451
et seq.) and subject to the regulations of 15 CFR, Part 9
31. In fiscal year 1980 33 million was allocated to state
governments of coastal states who then passed the money through to
localities who had suffered environmental damage from oil spills or
energy-related activities.
Each state's entitlement is determined by a specific Itformula
the total congressional appropriation for a year, the formula I
prescribes 2 percent of the total for the state of minimum eligi
bility and 37.5 percent for the total for the state of maximum I
eligibility. No state or local contribution is required; the An
example of this kind of which limits the number of l1projects that
a state can fund. Of federal government funds 100 percent of each
certified project i i For open-ended entitlement grants, ' Ithe
federal government matches all approved expenditures without limit
as to absolute amount; therefore, no allocation formula is
involved. However this automatic entitlement feature makes them
more akin to formula based than to project grants."46 An exa mple
of this is the Veterans' State Nursing Home Care Grant of the
Veterans' Administration, authorized by 38 U.S.C 641-6
43. Eligible beneficiaries are veterans not acutely ill who
nevertheless need nursing care or other medical care. The federal
governme nt pays .one-half the cost of care or $12.10 per diem,
whichever is less. But there is no time.limitation as to how long a
veteran may receive such care open-ended In 1980 22.4 million was
appropriated for this program Thus the grant is 45 Ibid 46 Ibid. 2
0 Project grans are 'Inon-formula grants for which potential
recipients submit specific, individual applications in the form and
at the times indicated by the grantor agency and which are not
subject to state-area formula distributions.1f47 two-thirds of a l
l federal grants are project grants, but these grants consume only
a third of all federal grant dollars An example of a project grant
is the Family Planning Project Grants of the Department of Health
and Human Services, authorized by Title X of the Public Health
Service Act 42 U.S.C. 300) and subject to the regulations of 42
CFR
59. State and local govern ments and non-profit agencies are
eligible to design and submit specific and detailed proposals for
federal funding of projects providing contraceptive goods and
services, infertility services and special services to adolescents
proposed project meet the approval of HHS, the applicant may
receive between $20,000 and $1,000,000, depending on the proposal.
In fiscal year 1979, 248 submitted projects were a p proved and
funded. the same year Nearly If the applicant and the Congress
appropriated $138 million for these grants in According to the
latest available statistics, the federal grant system had developed
in the following way by 1978 Number of Formula Gra n ts Number of
Project Grants Total Grants Cumulative through 1962 Added, 1963
Added, 1964 Added, 1965 Added, 1966 Added, 1967-1978 Total as of
1978 53 8 10 19 9 71 170 107 13 30 90 40 42 322 160 21 40 109 49
113 492 Sources: Fiscal Balance in the American F ederal System,
ACIR Volume 2, 1967, p. 151; A Catalog of Federal Grant in-Aid
Proerams to State and Local Governments: Grants Y Funded FY 1978,
ACIR, February 1979, p. 1 The following table shows that federal
grants are concentrated in the fields of educa t ion, health and
welfare, and in the fields of energy and environment. Not
coincidentally, these fields are also the ones in which most of the
new grants have been created over the past fifteen years 47 Ibid p.
103 21 Categorical Grant Programs, By Budget S ubfunction and Grant
me FY 1978 Budget Subfunction Formula Project Department of
Defense-Military General Science and Basic Research Energy Water
Resources Conservation and Land Management Recreational Resources
Pollution Control and Abatement Other Natur a l Resources
Agricultural Research and Services Mortgage Credit and Thrift
Insurance Other Advancement and Ground Transportation Water
Transportation Mass Transportation Air Transportation Other
Transportation Community Development Area and Regional Develo p
ment Disaster Relief and Insurance Elementary, Secondary, and
Higher Education Research and General Education Aids Training and
Employment Other Labor Services Social Services Health Public
Assistance and Other Hospital and Medical Care for Veterans Crimi n
al Justice Assistance General Property and Records Management Other
General Government Regulation of Commerce Vocational Education
Income SupplemCnts 3 1 3 5 9 5 25 3 4 2 2 13 7 1 5 30 9 41 4 15 8
34 69 12 1 10 1 1 Totals 170 322 Total 5 1 6 7 13 10 35 4 9 2 2 36
2 8 3 1 5 36 9 70 10 21 23 1 47 78 27 5 13 1 2 492 Adapted from:
Table 1, p. 2, A Catalog of Federal Grant-in-Aid Programs to State
and Local Governments: Grants Funded N 1978, ACIR, February 1979
Revenue Sharinq and Countercyclical Aid As part of his "new
federalism,Il President Nixon in 1972 proposed the creation of two
new programs of aid to state and local governments: sharing. The
latter proposal, a program to consolidate numerous general revenue
sharing and special revenue 22 categorical gran ts into six basic
block grants, was rejected by Congress.
Enacted into law as the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of
1972, the general revenue sharing plan included the follow ing
three fundamental purposes Each year's appropriation was allocated
to the states according to a formula taking into account each
state's population, urban population, tax collections, and private
per capita income One-third of each state's entitlement was
allocated to the state government with the remaining two-thirds
going to local governments within each state General revenue
sharing was established as a general aid program with no
restrictions as to how state governments could spend the funds.
Local governments were required to use the funds only for
Ilpriority expenditur es,Il although these expenditures were
broadly defined, e.g., transportation, public safety capital
expenditures. But local governments were prohibited from using
general revenue funds for education and welfare expenditures.
Since the inception of general revenue sharing, state and local
governments have received the following amounts 1973 $6.636 billion
1978 $6.823 billion 1976 6.243 1981 4.57 (Reagan revision 1977 6.
758 1982 4.57 Reagan proposal 1974 6.106 1979 6. 848 1975 6.130
1980 6.829 In the lame-d u ck session (1980), the 96th Congress
finally renewed the authorization for general revenue sharing, but
changed the program in an important way. Revenue sharing to state
govern ments was dropped for fiscal year 1981 to be renewed in
fiscal year 1982 at a substantially reduced level. All revenue
sharing funds in 1981 were earmarked for local governments revenue
sharing in fiscal year 19
81. President Reagan's request for a reduction of the amount to
$4.57 billion has just been passed by Congress. Additional ly, for
fiscal year 1982, he has proposed the same level of funding, $4.57
billion, and this proposal has already been endorsed by both house
of Congress in their first budget resolutions renewal of state
revenue sharing for 1982 of national aid to the st a tes, the
countercyclical program, a fund designed to help relieve the
effects of the 1975-76 recession President Carter had requested
$5.156 billion for general Reagan has also cancelled the In fiscal
years 1977-1979, there was still another program 23 on the states.
Administratively, the countercyclical assistance program was almost
identical to general revenue sharing although the primary emphasis
was on aid to distressed cities. President Carter proposed a
re-authorization of the program for fiscal year 1980, but the
Congress refused to go along. For the three-year period, states and
localities received a total of $3.17 billion.
FIVE BLOCK GRANTS The relatively recent phenomenon of block
grants falls ACIR regards somewhere between the strict requirements
of categorical grants and the permissive character of revenue
sharing five characteristics as essential to block grants 1)
Federal aid is authorized for a wide range of activities within a
broadly defined functional area 2) Recipients have substantial di s
cretion in identify- ing problems, designing programs and
allocating resources to deal with them 3) Administrative, fiscal
reporting, planning and other federally-imposed requirements are
kept to the minimum amount necessary to ensure that national goals
a re being accomplished 4) Federal aid is distributed on the basis
of a statu tory formula which results in narrowing federal
administrators' discretion and providing a sense of fiscal
certainty to recipients 5) Eligibility provisions are statutorily
specif i ed and favor general purpose governmental units as
recipients and elected officials and administrative generalists as
decisionmakers.48 Although a few categorical grants have some of
the character istics of block grants, Congress has established only
five bona fide block grants, all of them in recent years. The
following outline describes the original administrative
characteristics and subsequent changes, of each THE PARTNERSHIP FOR
HEALTH ACT In 1966, President Johnson signed into law the
Partnership for H ealth Act (PL 89-749 The Act, passed with the
purpose that it would become the major source of national
assistance for 48 Block Grants: A Comparative Analysis, ACIR, 1977,
p. 6. I 24 health services, established the system of state and
area-wide health pl a nning agencies, consolidated seven
cateqorical grants into one project grant, and created the first
modern block grant (Section 314(d The following nine health formula
grants, the first having been established in 1936 and the last in
1965, were consolidat ed into a single block grant for public
health services general health, tuberculosis control, cancer
control, heart disease control, chronic diseases and health for the
aged, radio- logical health, dental health, home health services,
and mental health.
Sp ecific provisions relating to the administration of the
Section 314(d) block grant were The states were required to submit
for HEW approval a state plan for comprehensive health services.
plan could include programs similar or identical to those of the ab
olished categorical grants plus additional programs.
At least 15 percent of the funds had to be spent by the states
on mental health programs. This, of course, was a Itcategoricaltt
element in the block grant.
Administrative authority was vested in state health and mental
health departments with no required llpass-throughll of funds to
local agencies Funds were allotted to each state based on financial
need and population. The national government paid between one-third
and two-thirds, based on state per c apita income, of the cost of
each state's public health plan The The total appropriation was not
significantly higher than the combined total of the nine abolished
programs.
Since its passage, the Partnership for Health Act has been
amended in the following significant ways 1967, PL 90-194 The Act
was amended to require that 70 percent of each state's funds be
used for services in local communities 1970, PL 91-515 A specific r
equirement that each state spend part of its funds for drug and
alcohol abuse was inserted into the law 25 1972, PL 92-255 The 1970
amendment was further specified by the requirement that states
license drug treatment facilities and expand drug abuse prog r ams
in the fields of mental health and other fields 1975, PL 94-63
After much debate about whether to require the states to use a
certain percentage of the block grant funds for hypertension
treatment programs Congress decided not to include hypertension i n
the block grant, but instead passed a separate hyperten sion
program in categorical grant form. This followed the history of the
Act since its inception in 1966 as Congress had created a number of
new health programs that could have expanded the scope o f the
block grant but instead were established as categori cal grants
Because of its determination to oversee the use of federal monies
and ensure that the priorities of the states were coincident with
those of Congress, the Congress added provisions requi r ing new
reporting and accountability procedures 1970 PL 95-626 Congress
tightened the performance requirements on the states by requiring
more detailed outlines concerning how federal monies would be spent
The formula for allotting grants to the states wa s made more
detailed also THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT Title
I of the Safe Streets Act (PL 90-351) was the first block grant to
be established as a new program No existing crime prevention
programs were consolidated to form it. Its import a nt provisions
as passed in 1968 were The Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA was established to administer the Act The
governor of each state was required to set up a state planning
agency to develop a comprehensive criminal justice plan the f
ederal money to localities.
This agency would distribute Planninq Grants. Each state agency
would receive a basic planning-fund allotment of $100,000, plus 26
another allotment based on its population percent of the planning
funds had to be passed through to local agencies.
LEAA would pay up to 90 percent of the planning costs for each
state agency The law established a program of categorical formula
grants, totally funded by LEAA, for training, research and
education Forty Action Grants Block Grants Each state was to Only
one-third of each state's receive action grants based on its
population, with 75 percent of the funds to be passed through to
local governments grant could be used for salaries of personnel
LEAA would pay up to 75 percent of the costs fo r organized crime
and riot control projects, 50 percent for construction projects,
and 60 percent for other projects At their discretion, states could
use the block grants for any or all of thirteen purposes, including
public education, methods and program s of police protection,
training of law enforcement personnel etc 1971 PL 91-644 Congress
added three new purposes for which Safe Street funds could be used
Congress increased the federal share for some projects from 60 to
75 percent States were required t o pay at least 25 percent of the
non-federal portions of local projects was done to force state
governments to give more of their own money to high-crime urban
areas This Congress altered the state-local matching requirements
for individual projects in ord e r to force the states to give more
money, rather than in-kind services, to crime-ridden cities 1973 PL
93-83 Congress added the improvement of criminal justice to the
list of law enforcement programs for which states could spend the
block grant funds; inc r eased the federal funding share to 90
percent for all projects, except for construction projects which
remained at 50-50; added new requirements for the approval of state
plans, including a requirement that each state establish a program
for juvenile just i ce; ordered the states to pay half of all
non-federal costs of local governments 27 1976 PL 94-503 Congress
allowed the states to use block grant funds for programs designed
to improve court procedure and efficiency; added numerous new
requirements for th e approval of state plans, including
requirements for additional juvenile justice and drug offender
programs anti-crime programs for the elderly, and several new
reporting, accountability, and evaluation requirements added new
formula requirements for stat e allotment of the funds to
localities 1979 PL 96-157 Instead of expanding the block grant,
Congress created still another crrant Drocrram to be administered
by LEAA controlled categorical program for state and local national
priority grants, If a strictly projects that LEAA officials have
determined to be particularly successful Additionally, Congress
established an alternative formula, based on a state's population,
crime rate criminal justice expenditures, and its tax burden. Thus,
states could qualify f or their block grant funds under the new or
the old formula Finally, Congress created a "mini-block grant"
program that specifically earmarked part of each state's block
funds directly to qualifying cities counties, and regional
combinations thereof.
THE C OMPREHENSIVE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ACT (CETA In 1973,
Congress consolidated seventeen49 manpower and employment programs,
administered by six different cabinet depart- ments and one agency
into CETA PL 93-203 a quasi-block grant with elements both of bo t
h revenue sharing.and categorical grants Title I of CETA provided
for block grants to state and local governments for comprehensive
manpower services, including employment, training, counseling 49
Vocational Rehabilitation, MDTA Institutional and On-the-J o b
Training, U.S. Employment Service, Neighborhood Youth Corps, Job
Corps, Concentrated Employment Program, Job Opportunities in the
Business Sector, Work Incen tive Program, Civilian Skill Training,
Operation Mainstream, Public Service Careers, New Career s ,
Special Impact, Opportunities Industrializa tion Centers, Work
Experience and Training, Community Work and Training, and Adult
Basic Education. I 28 placement and other services. Cities and
counties or combinations thereof, with a population of at least
100,000 became eligible to be "prime sponsors,11 that is, eligible
to receive and distribute the CETA block funds ceive and distribute
funds as sponsors to localities of less than 100,000 population.
Sponsors were required to prepare comprehensive plans w ith
detailed provisions very much like categorical grants) assuring
that funds would be directed primarily to the neediest unemployed,
underemployed, and disadvantaged.
Nevertheless, each sponsor was authorized to decide whether its
plan would include prog rams similar to or identical with, the
abolished programs, or entire ly new programs Federal funding for
each state's block grant was based on the following formula 50
percent of the funds were allotted to each state according to
previous levels of manpow e r funding under the old categorical
grants 37.5 percent based on the number of unemployed persons in
each state 12.5 percent based on the number of low-income adults in
each state State governments were authorized to re By comparison,
the other titles pro viding for manpower programs were not included
in the block grant.
Title I1 provided for public service jobs in areas of high
unemployment. Title I11 authorized manpower services to special
groups, e.g Indians, youth migrant workers, etc. Title IV continue
d the Job Corps program at the Labor Department one year later,
Congress, reacting to the 1974 recession, amended CETA with a new
Title VI, a grant program providing public service jobs (not
manpower and training services) for the unemployed Additionally 1
978, PL 95-525 Congress extended Title I of CETA (along with the
other titles) with the basic administrative structure intact.
Nevertheless, in response to reports about widespread abuse of CETA
funds by local officials Congress added a number of restrict i ons
and regulations concerning the local distribution of'CETA benefits
to eligible recipients THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT In
1974, Congress established another block grant (PL 93-383 by
consolidating six of "D's community development program s urban
renewal; model cities; open space; urban .beautification and
historic site preservation; neighborhood facilities; water and 29
sewer facilities; and public facilities loans. No housing programs
were consolidated into the block grant, Title I (of ei ght titles
of the Act I Title I bypassed state governments entirely and
authorized automatic entitlement block grants to cities, or twin
cities, with populations in excess of 50,000 and to urban counties
with populations in excess of 200,0
00. The amount o f each city's or county's grant was based on a
complex formula that factored in each community's population,
poverty and extent of housing overcrowding For the first three
years of the block grant, communi ties were guaranteed the
equivalent amounts of fu n ds that they had received under the
abolished categorical grants Eighty percent of the block funds were
allocated to urban areas, with 20 percent to rural areas. A portion
of the funds earmarked for rural areas was allocated to state
governments, who in t u rn could distribute the funds to qualified
rural communities Title I provided a list of thirteen eligible
activi ties for which block funds could be spent. In order to be
approved by HUD, state plans for community development had to
demonstrate a commitme n t to seven specific objectives, namely,
the objectives of the abolished categorical grants. Communities had
the authority to choose among the activities although they were
required to give maximum emphasis to the needs of low- and
moderate-income families and to the elimination of slums and urban
blight Communities were required to maintain development programs
that were being funded 1977, PL-95-128 In a major amendment to the
program, Congress decided to require recipient governments to
include hous'ing p r ograms in the block grant programs whereas the
original legislation had specifically excluded housing in order to
concentrate on community and neighborhood development activities.
Thus, property acquisition, rehabilitation and construction of
housing were included as eligible activities.
Recipient communities were required to report in detail on the
condition of housing before their block grants were released.
Additionally, communi ties were permitted to deposit their block
funds in a private financial ins titution in order to establish a
revolving fund for the financing of rehabilitation activies. 30
Congress created an alternative formula for the allocation of block
funds to communities. The new formula was based on age of housing,
poverty, and population growth the formula and the original
formula.
Communities could choose between A new categorical grant, urban
development action grants, was created. These grants, awarded at
the discretion of HUD, were designed for severely dis tressed
cities in order to assist them in preventing neighborhood
deterioration 1979, PL 96-153 In amendments to various housing and
community development programs, Congress concentrated on the
categorical programs, especially the action grant program.
Nevertheless, regarding the b lock grant program, Congress
earmarked more funds for smaller cities and compensated for that by
transferring monies from HUD's discretionary grants into the block
grants program 19
80. PL 96-399 Congress redistributed more funds between the
block grant and categorical programs and earmarked block funds to
communities not qualified under the basic entitlement formula.
TITLE XX OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT In 1974, Congress reformed
the largely disorganized system of federal subsidies of state
social welfare services by inaugu rating another block grant, Title
M of the Social Security Act PL 93-647), the provisions of which
have remained unchanged to the present day Title XX provided block
funds to state governments and authorized them to design their own
soc i al welfare programs aimed at five goals: 1) economic
self-support for individuals 2) personal self sufficiency 3) family
and child services; 4) reduc tion of inappropriate institutional
care; and 5 provision of appropriate institutional care. States
were r equired to offer at least one service under each of the five
goals, at least three services to those aged poor receiving social
security benefits and to offer birth control services to 'families
receiving AFDC benefits The national government would pay 90
percent of birth control services and 75 percent for all other 31
services to be designed for the benefit of welfare recipients.
The new title required the submission of prior plans and annual
reports to HEW for approval At least 50 percent of the service s
had States were barred from using the block funds for 1) medical
services; 2) construction of facilities 3) long-term room and
board; 4) education; 5) hospital and nursing home care; 6) cash
payments to individuals and 7) day-care services not meeting f e
deral standards Block funds were allocated to states according to
population SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION It can be seen from the brief
description of the five block grants of recent years that Congress
has never really !!let go of the strings attached to the p u rse.
Block grants, like all other federal grants and programs, have been
established by Congress to implement national goals. Even when
Congress has begun with the intention of providing a true form of
!lassistance,ll rather than control, to the states, i t has always
seemed to tighten the control in subsequent years as the llpurestll
block grant in existence. As has been shown, the CETA and community
development block grants have been substantial ly amended since
their inceptions. Indeed, CETA has always b e en a highly
controversial program, the object of much criticism especially from
conservatives. It has occupied the attention of Congress almost
every year since its beginning The Title XX block grant has
remained The Partnership for Health, CETA, and comm unity
development block grants consolidated small collections of
categorical programs.
The Safe Streets block grant created an entirely new
program.
Title XX provided a new source of funding for programs already
underway. Partnership for Health and S afe Streets are minor
programs and have been so since their creation. Safe Streets, a
program long criticized as being totally useless, is now being
phased out, along with its parent agency, the Law Enforcement
Assistance Agency. The community development block grant is only a
minor part of the budget and activities of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development. CETA is a major national program but
it constitutes less than 25 percent of the total budget for the
Department of Labor. Title XX, another m ajor program, still
represents only about one and a half percent of the budget for the
Department of Health and Human Services.
It can be seen that the Congress has never had a serious
commitment to providing mere financial assistance to state and
local go vernments. The financial assistance has always been a
means of implementing a public objective that had been declared
llnational!l by the Congress. Consequently, with regard to the 32
extant block grants, Congress has created them with many
categorical el e ments. Over the past fifteen years, the.irony has
been that, in the areas of the five block grants, Congress has also
created numerous categorical grants that could easily have been
made part of the block grants discerned in the five block grants
created over the past fifteen years, there are other federal
strings attached to block grants.
Indeed, these strings apply to general revenue sharing as
well.
By law, no federal program can escape the authority of some of
the most powerful of all national means o f regulating the affairs
of the states. These are civil rights laws, environmental laws
general administrative regulations of the Office of Management and
Budget, and other laws and regulations of comprehensive scope.
These laws, both prescriptive and pro s criptive, ensure the
compliance of the states with far-reaching national social goals
promulgated by Congress. The Office of Management and Budget
published the entire list of fifty-nine general policy and
administrative requirements in The Federal Regist e r of November
7, 1981 (page 74416 The list can be summarized as follows In
addition to the numerous categorical elements that can be I Nine
civil rights laws enforced by the Departments of Justice, HHS, HUD,
Labor, and the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance
Board.
Sixteen environmental protection laws enforced by the EPA, CEQ,
Departments of Interior, HUD, and Commerce, the Waters Resources
Council, and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation.
Three laws relating to industry and the economy enforced by the
Departments of Commerce and Defense and the General Services
Administration.
Three health and welfare laws enforced by the Depart ments of
Agriculture, HHS, and HUD Two Ilminority participationll laws
enforced by the Interagency Commission on Women's Business.
Three labor laws enforced by the Department of Labor.
One natural resources law enforced by the Department of Energy
Two laws relating to public employees enforced by the Office of
Personnel Management.
Twenty-one adminis trative and procedural laws and regulations
enforced by the Office of Management and Budget, the General
Accounting Office, the General Services Administration, and the
Departments of Treasury and Commerce 33 As can be seen from the
part of this paper out l ining the current scope and number of
categorical grants, the list of Ifnational goalsif prescribed by
Congress is very extensive. Since the New Deal, Congress has not
only created large-scale national goals by means of such statutes
as Social Security, M e dicaid Medicare, and the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, but has almost, especially in the past
twenty years, given every organized interest group its own federal
program formation of these programs often involves interest groups,
some large and s ome small, who initiate a campaign to transform
some social or economic problem into a public, governmental
problem.
These groups gain some kind of acceptance and logic from the
national media and from the academic community; develop the speci
fics of a go vernmental solution to the problem; make no attempt
whatsoever to ask state and local governments whether they want or
need the program; succeed in persuading the Congress to enact their
program as a Ifnational goal,If complete with the requisite
financia l inducements, that will be perpetuated on states and lo
calities; and, in the end, assume the federal and state executive
branch jobs administering the programs and, additionally, form
private groups that become the recipients of grant funds The
politics o f the The Department of Education seems to be a
particularly.good example of the results of this kind of politics
percent of the budget of the Department goes to two large-scale
national goals: Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act and the various programs of loans and grants to post-secondary
students. Much of the rest of the budget goes to programs that
together form a list of federally-approved education interest
groups and a history of their successes in Congress: 'the develop
ing insti t utions program, environmental education, consumer
education, the Women's Educational Equity Act, the PUSH program
educational television and radio, Ethnic Heritage Studies the
program for teachers' centers, metric education, population
education, Indian e ducation, bilingual education, arts education
museum services, library services, education for the public
service, lifelong learning, migrant education, the law school
clinical experience program, Model Intercultural Centers, etc.
Ronald Reagan's first pre sidential initiative resulting from
his longstanding advocacy of a renewed federalism has been his
proposal for consolidation of ninety-seven health, education, and
social services programs into six block grants. He has asked the
Congress to consolidate f o rty-five education programs into two
block grants, one directed to state education agencies and one
directed to local education agencies; twenty-five health programs
into two block grants, one for general health services and one for
preventive health serv i ces; twenty-five welfare programs of
various kinds into a social services block grant; and a consolida
tion of the low-income energy assistance and emergency assistance
programs into a hardship assistance block grant block grant
proposals are broader and m ore fundamental than those of the Nixon
era Well over fifty President Reagan's These proposals represent a
major attempt to 34 reverse the Twentieth Century's flow of power
to Washington. The specifics of these block grants will be
considered in forthcomi ng papers.
Thomas R. Ascik Policy Analyst I'