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258 March 30, 1983 WHY REAGAN SHOULD KEEP HIS WORD AND SHUT DOWN
D.O.E INTRODUCTION Every American voter knew what to expect of
presidential candidate Ronald Reagan. During the 1980 election
campaign, he often used the cry "Abolish the Department of Energy
to symbolize his pledge to curb Washington's burgeoning
bureaucracy. Time and again he scored DOE programs as signal
examples of the sort of government interventionism and excess he
felt w ere at the heart of America's economic ills. For good reason
did voters expect that DOE'S abolition would be a top priority
during the opening days of the Reagan Administration. Initial
indications seemed to confirm this view.
Soon after taking office, Rea gan appointed James B. Edwards a
former South Carolina governor, as Secretary of Energy. At an early
press conference, Edwards vowed he had come to Washington to !'work
myself out of a job." On another occasion he even stated that once
he succeeded in eli m inating the energy agency he would "spread
salt on the earth to make sure it never rose again. Yet it soon
became evident that abolishing DOE would be easier-said than done.
While the President continued to assert that the energy unit's
demise remained a priority, suspicions grew within the energy
industry that the effort to abolish DOE enjoyed only half-hearted
support from the White House.
Some of the President's own appointees at DOE were openly hostile
to the notion of closing the department. Though th ey opposed the
agency's regulatory activities, they wanted the research and
development activities maintained. Some even defended DOE'S
subsidies for the commercialization of energy technologies--a
practice sharply at odds with the President's free market
philosophy As a result, a form of guerrilla warfare developed, with
top-level DOE officials pitted against the Office of Management and
Budget.
Whenever OMB tried to cut a program, the officials fought the 2
cuts through appeals and leaks of information t o congressional
committee staffs hostile to the Reagan philosophy. The situation
was aggravated by the White House's delay in filling key slots at
the department. As a result, Secretary Edwards was, for a time the
only Reagan appointee at DOE and had to r ely on bureaucrats--a
group hardly committed to the agency's demise-for advice and
information.
There even was opposition to dismantling DOE within the energy
industry were loathe to see the federal spigot turned off. Other
firms benefiting from special advantage through DOE regulation,
were anxious to maintain their privileged position: Still other s
fearing a proliferation of state energy agencies and an accompany
ing morass of contradictory state rules and regulations, took a
better a devil you know than one you don'tt1 attitude, and lobbied
for continuation of DOE'S regulatory regime Firms heavily involved
in government contracts The strongest opposition to abolishing the
Department however, came from the Congress. While the agency had
existed for only four years when Reagan took'office, it had managed
to develop a powerful clique of congressional p atrons. To no small
degree, this was the product of pork barrel projects carefully
distributed in the home states of key legislators. Synthetic fuels
plants, alternate energy projects, and research and develop ment
facilities became powerful arguments on behalf of the agency's
continued existence.
Even more important to the Congress, however, was the question of
who would have jurisdiction over the department's programs if the
department were to be abolished. A number of tasks would be
performed by governm ent (such as the maintenanc.e of a Strategic
Petroleum Reserve, or the production of nuclear weapons whether or
not a Department of Energy existed. Congress would continue to
exercise a role in these areas through its appropriations and
oversight function s . At present, the Energy and Commerce
Committee in the House, and the Energy and Natural Resources
Committee in the Senate, have primary jurisdiction over DOE If DOE
were eliminated, however, there would be no guarantee, particularly
in the Senate, that t hese committees would retain jurisdiction
over energy issues. Should jurisdictional boundaries change, some
programs, their advocates fear, could be jeopardized.
This all has obscured the fact that the rationale for eliminat ing
the Department of Energy.remains as strong today as it was in 19
80. As long as there is a Department of Energy, federal policy
makers will continue to view energy issues in isolation and will
continue to interfere in the market to the detriment of the
nation's energy consumers. Th e urge to regulate where no regula
tion is warranted, to subsidize where no subsidy is needed, and to
send false signals to the energy market is simply too strong to
resist. This is history's sad lesson. The only way to ensure 3 that
there are no DOE prog rams and bureaucracies destabilizing the
energy economy is to ensure that there is no DOE.
THE INHERENT DEFECTS OF DOE The Heritage Foundation's 1980 Mandate
for Leadership energy task force report concluded that the central
problem is not found in any spe cific deficiency of the agency, but
rather in the concept that such an agency is needed in the first
place. This concept has its basis in the contention that the
government can and should play a major, if not dominant role in the
manage ment of the energy market; a contention we flatly reject The
major deficiency of the Department of Energy is found in the fact
of its existence.
The creation of a cabinet-level department with energy as its sole
concern implies that government can manage energy resources mo re
efficiently than the market can. History has shown this assumption
to be fallacious. Recent experience with oil decontrol has
demonstrated clearly that the market allocates energy resources far
more efficiently than the government ever could and thereb y
maximizes benefits for energy consumers. DOE thus suffers from
serious inherent defects Spiraling Intervention DOE has a distorted
view of the energy market. It sees energy issues in isolation,
rather than as part of the economic whole. Problems thus ten d to
be exaggerated and there is a temptation to overreact. But because
energy has such a pervasive effect throughout the economy, even
small interventions have major consequences As these become
apparent, they are used to justify further Ifcorrective inte
rvention, setting off an ever increasing regulatory spiral that
never acknowledges that it was intervention and regulation that
caused the problems in the first place.
Make-work Regulation The department seems to intervene in some
cases merely to justify its own existence. This reflects the
bureaucratic urge to tinker.
Typical was the department's response to the 1979 Iranian oil
boycott. By coercing refiners into producing far more heating oil
and diesel fuel than they would have otherwise, DOE caused a r
eduction in gasoline production just before the summer peak-driving
season. This distortion 'in the production cycle, together with the
gross misallocation of supplies caused by.DOE rules, is widely
recognized as the cause of the gasoline lines during sum mer 19
79. The agency's policies magnified the nominal 5 4 Had the market
been allowed to function properly, supplies would have moved
quickly to where they were needed, while refiners would have
adjusted their product mix to meet customer demands.
The ma rket's efficiency was demonstrated in 1980, at the start of
the war between Iraq and Iran, when a similar drop in world crude
oil supplies was hardly noticed by consumers. The key difference
function, free' of panic buying inspired by regulation. was that
during this Iloil crisis'l the market was allowed to I Distortinq
Research The Department of Energy impedes the energy market by
subsi dizing some technologies while penalizing others to support
one line of research rather than another. stem from politica l
rather than efficiency considerations, DOE'S actions cause a
further misallocation of resources Since decisions In some
instances, the agency's efforts even undermine the viability of
those technologies that they seek to aid case of alcohol fuels, for
ex a mple, a DOE loan guarantee program which carried with it a
requirement that subsidized plants have an annual capacity of 5
million gallons or less, virtually ensured that the program would
fail. Private firms engaged in power alcohol production had discov
e red already that a minimum annual capacity of 20 million gallons
is necessary for efficient and profitable operation only to smaller
plants, and investment bankers insisted on such guarantees before
granting a loan, producers with viable projects were eff e ctively
barred from private capital markets by the very program intended to
help them In the But because DOE offered loan guarantees THE CASE
FOR LIMITED FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT Although government intervention
in.the energy market is unwarranted in most case s , there may be a
need for the federal presence in two specific areas: energy
emergency preparedness and long-term research and development
R&D In both cases, the perceived need arises from what
economists call llexternalities.ll These are costs that must b e
accounted for, but that no individual or group of individuals, can
or will pay for. The classic example of an externality is national
defense group has an incentive to assume responsibility for
his'share of defense, since the same total level of defense is
needed, irrespec tive of what any individual chooses to pay
provided for somehow. It therefore falls on government to assume
the chore and to assign costs to each taxpayer. To some extent
energy emergency preparedness, long-term R&D, and the nuclear
fu e l cycle carry external costs and benefits I No one individual
or But it must be Enerqy Preparedness In the case of energy
security, the externalities arise from the government's broad duty
to provide for national defense. To the general public and Congres
s, energy security has been synonymous with protection from the
effects of an oil supply interruption.
Consequently, most energy security programs aim at assuring
adequate oil supplies, domestically and among the nations who have
signed the International Energy Agency's shortage-sharing
agreement.
Under the Carter Administration, the principal programs of energy
preparedness included the expansion of the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve (initiated in the Ford Administration), the development of
a rationing plan for times of severe interruption of oil imports,
creating the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, and the development of a
plan, in close cooperation with the International Energy Agency,
for the international allocation of crude oil supplies in the event
of an other oil embargo.
These measures ignored the supply side-of the oil equation.
Senior officials of the Carter Administration, it seems, did not
believe that much new oil remained to be discovered mean s of
ensuring energy security therefore seemed to be to share the
shortage." To ensure that the burden of the anticipated shortfall
was equitably distributed, it was necessary, from the Carter
viewpoint, for the government to manage the burden. This ratio nale
provided much of the justification for the creation of a Department
of Energy The only Such thinking was repudiated by incoming Reagan
officials.
For them, long-term energy security was to be achieved in the words
of Interior Secretary James Watt, by Ilconserve and conserve and
produce and produce.!l This was the role of the market. In their
view, the Department of Ener.gy was a barrier to this.
DOE'S conservation programs had achieved few real energy savings.
Worse still, the department's controls on crude oil prices
encouraged overconsumption. Although major strides in energy
conservation had been achieved, noted Reagan Administration
officials, such progress could be attributed mainly to market
forces--that operated in spite of, rather than because of, DOE'S
regulations.
International agreements to share shortages on the world oil
market, moreover, were of little value since experience indicated
that few nations would abide by them, should an embargo occur.
Real security lay therefore in developing domestic energy resources
which only the private sector, through the market system, could
accomplish. Until domestic resources were developed, the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve would furnish ample protection against a
catastro- phic shortfall 1 6 Energy se curity thus is no Though the
federal government m reason for aht be neec a Department ed to
mainta of Energy n the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, existing
agencies, such as the Interior Department could do this.
Research and Development There is relatively w idespread support
for the argument that the government can play a useful role in
sponsoring scientific research. 'lPurell scientific research will
ultimately yield significant benefits to society even though it is
impossible at the outset to determine jus t what those benefits
will be or to whom they will accrue. Perhaps the most familiar
example of this process is the space program, which gave society
products ranging from Tang Breakfast Drink and Teflon to the
sophisticated cardiac monitors now used in ho spital intensive care
units In addition to so-called pure research, however, many
Americans accept the notion that there is value in federal
sponsorship of llappliedll research, that undertaken toward a
specific end.
Unlike pure research, applied research leaves little doubt as to
its beneficiaries' identities and this often raises the question
Why should they not bear the costs?11 In answer to such questions,
advocates of a federal role in applied research argue that, in
today's economy, such projects con stitute part of the
"infrastructure of commerce.'I As such, the support--of applied
science, as of ports and highways, is said to be within the
legitimate scope of government.
While it is true that technology lies at the heart of the modern
economy, even i f some federal involvement is therefore appropriate
the degree of that involvement must be justified and the limits
clearly set. The danger that federal research will become
politicized, as has happened so often in the past, would suggest
that the direct fe'deral role be minimized to the greatest extent
possible. Where should these limits be placed?
Recently, the notion has gained currency that direct federal
research and development projects should be restricted to those
that can be categorized as "high risk, high potential payoff."
The basis of this is the assumption that a private firm would be
hesitant to undertake projects of this kind because they lack
near-term commercial potential--even though their long-term
prospects might be significant. Fusion energy is an example of
this. While promising virtually limitless energy, the most
optimistic time frame for fusion still puts commercial plants well
into the next century. Given the billions of dollars needed to
conduct the experiments, no private sector firm would likely
proceed on its own. But the potential benefits to society may well
be enormous. Like national defense, fusion research is
characterized by significant "externalities If 7 Only under
extraordinary circumstances, however, can external itie s provide
justification for government involvement. The crucial factors are
their magnititude and how they relate to other factors in the
economy.
At the other end of the spectrum are so-called commercial
demonstration projects. these projects are most oft en aimed at
building "first of a kind plants to test the commercial feasibility
of a new process. The synthetic fuels projects proposed under
Carter's Energy Security Act, and possibly the Clinch River Breeder
Reactor, fall into this category Popular duri n g the Carter
Administration In these cases, the rationale for federal
involvement is weak at best. It is based on a faulty notion that
the government can demonstrate commercial feasibility of a
technology. Yet, a technology is commercially feasible only w h en
the market provides it. If government subsidies are necessary for a
technology to compete, then it clearly is not commercially
feasible. Attempts to force a technology into the market
prematurely are destined to fail, no matter how large its federal
su bsidy.
On rare occasions, however, national security reasons or similar
purposes require the development of technologies even though they
may not yet be economically viable be accomplished through the
construction of small bench-scale or prototype plants s ized plant
(as proponents of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor claim their
project to be) may be required in some cases, it would never be
necessary to construct a full-size commercial plant This can
usually Although the construction of an intermediate The
Nuclear-Fuel Cycle In one area of energy, the government
unquestionably has a role: the nuclear fuel cycle. The term "fuel
cycle" refers to the process whereby uranium or some other
fissionable material is mined and enriched to make it suitable as a
fuel, burned in a reactor, and finally processed to dispose of the
radioactive wastes.
The main reason for a federal role here is the concern over nuclear
proliferation. The U.S. government is the only body with the
stability and longevity needed to oversee.the long-term management
of nuclear waste facilities where several centuries may be needed
to effect disposal dominant in the field ever since nuclear power
emerged as a viable energy source future. Nuclear weapons
production will remain the sole responsi bi l ity of the federal
government, as will uranium enrichment, the control of nuclear
exports, and a host of other nuclear related matters The federal
presence has been That presence will not diminish in the This is
insufficient, however, to justify the exist ence of a cabinet-level
agency.
DISMANTLING THE ENERGY DEPARTMENT There is no convincing rationale
for the existence of a federal energy agency. Where the federal
government should or might play an energy role, the functions could
easily be assigned to other cabinet departments or performed by a
lesser agency.
More important, the orderly dispersal o'f the government's legiti
mate energy related functions could lead to a more realistic view
of how energy issues relate to the greater economic whole, and a
more rational policymaking environment.
Three options have been suggested for abolition of the Department
of Energy. These are Outright abolition Merger Downsizing Each has
its own advantages and disadvantages, but each ,must be co nsidered
in terms of its political feasibility. Indeed, political
considerations, more than any other factor, must determine which
option should be employed.
Outriqht Abolition Outright abolition would mean the total
elimination of the Department of Energ y and the transfer of its
legitimate functions to other cabinet agencies. Management of the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve, for example, may be assigned to the
Interior Department and the nuclear weapons program to the
Department of Defense while the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission again could become independent. In the early days of the
Administration, outright abolition was the option given the
closest.consideration. Outright abolition, however, appears
politically infeasible. It ignites jurisdictional concerns within
the Senate. And abolition would eliminate the focus for energy
programs which Congress seems to want A Merqer Another approach is
merging DOE'S continuing functions with another cabinet department
the Department of the Interior and the Dep artment of Commerce.
The course of U.S. energy policy wouldlbe quite different under
each agency.
Interior, DOE'S programs would likely focus on resource management
and development. If Commerce were selected, trade and technolog-
ical development undoubte dly would dominate There would seem to be
two candidates If the merger were with the Department of the 9 Some
proponents of a merger have suggested that DOE'S func tions be
divided more or less equally between Commerce and Interior.
Functions most concern ed with resource management, such as coal
leasing and maintenance of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, plus
fossil fuel research would go to Interior; the nuclear, solar
conservation, and international functions would be transferred to
Commerce. Most of DO E'S statistical programs also would go to
Commerce.
Merger could save money by eliminating redundant programs.
For example, the Energy Information Agency currently collects a
wide variety of statistics on oil imports. But these data are
largely duplicated by statistics collected by the Customs Service.
Such information gathering could be unified easily at Commerce with
the Customs Service providing the data and Commerce provid ing the
computer capability and statistical analysis.
Merger also would lead to the better coordination'of policies.
For example, although responsibility for promoting U.S. coal
exports rests with the Department of Commerce, the Department of
Energy sets coal targets and is responsible for coal research.
The Interior Department, on the other hand, oversees coal leasing.
While the Reagan Administration's use of a Cabinet Council on
Energy and Natural Resources has improved coordination to a degree,
there still is considerable bureaucratic inefficiency.
Most important, a merger with one or more agencies would allow
energy issues to be considered.within a broader context Downsizinq
This final option would eliminate most of DOE'S regulatory
functions, while retaining research and development, plus some sta
t istical capability, within the department. The new agency which
would be below cabinet rank, would be much like the Veteran's
Administration or NASA and resemble the Energy Research and
Development Administration (ERDA) of the Ford years. This would
reduc e unnecessary personnel and could realize real savings to the
taxpayer. There is still the danger that it would become a vehicle
for. pork barrel projects It is less attractive, there fore, than
the merger option, but still politically feasible.
CONCLUSION No option for dismantling DOE, no matter how sensible or
carefully constructed, will succeed if the political will to make
it succeed is lacking It is not clear that Congress or the White
House has summoned that will. During the early days of the Reagan
Administration, when officials were asked about abolishing DOE, the
answer was always "after the budget and tax bills."
Reagan Administration officials now admit privately that "aboli-
tion is not a priority.Il 10 For the energy. industry too,
eliminating the Department of The fear of a proliferation of state
Energy is not a priority energy agencies remains strong, and Reagan
inspired reforms of regulatory programs have eliminated many of
DOE'S points of conflict with energy companies. With the general
slo wdown of economic activity, some of the same firms that were
criticizing DOE'S largesse a few years ago are now eagerly
competing for their share of the federal pie.
Yet the original reasons for the agency's termination remain as
valid today as they were t wo years ago. The DOE still promotes a
distorted picture of energy issues of the market to function. It
still sends false and confusing signals through the economy. In
short, it still has no reason to exist It still hinders the ability
I Milton R. Copulos Policy Analyst