(Archived document, may contain errors)
8/3/84 61
A PROPER U. S. RESPONSE TO. POLAND'S AMNESTY';
With extraordinary fanfare, Polish strongman Wojciech-Jaruzelski
announced last month the amnesty of 652 p olitical prisoners and up
to 35,000 common criminals charged with minor offenses. This was to
mark the 40th anniversary of Communist rule. It was also aimed at
prodding the Reagan Administration to lift the sanctions imposed by
the President in 1981 to re t aliate against the imposition of
martial law in Poland and the crushing of the Solidarity movement
for democratic reforms. The White House and State Department have
responded precisely in the appro- priate manner. They have decided
to resume scientific an d cultural ex- changes with Poland and to
allow the country's airline LOT to resume scheduled flights to the
United States. While'the recent amnestyls to be welcomed as a
positive step toward normalization of political condi- tions, it
does not justify a w holesale lifting of the U.S. economic sanc-
tions. -The amnesty fails to fulfill the conditions set by the U.S.
government. It is premature, moreover, to judge the amnesty's
actual scope. There are legitimate doubts that it is truly
unconditional.
The econ omic sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its NATO allies
included a freeze on government togovernment lending, cancellation
of Ekport-Import Bank credits to curb trade, suspension of landing
rights of the Polish airline LOT, suspension of Polish fishing rig
h ts in U.S. waters, tighter restrictions'on high technology trade,
restrictions of scientific exchanges, suspension of most-favored
nation status to cur- tail Polish exports to the U.S., and U.S.
opposition to-Polish member- ship in the International Monet ary
Fund (IMF). Western allies also suspended negotiations
onrescheduling of $15 billion government-backed .loans of Poland's
almost $27 billion foreign debt.
At the time, Washington announced three specific conditions that
would bring about normalization of commercial relations: the
freeing of all political prisoners, an end to martial law, and
the'resumption of a dialogue with the Catholic Church and the now
outlawed Solidarity move- ment. Over the past two years, the Polish
government'has met some of th e se demands and., each time, the
U.S. responded favorably. In the aftermath of Pope John Paul II's
visit to Poland in June 1983 and the subsequent partial amnesty of
political prisoners and termination of martial law in July, the
U.S. reinstated some Polis h fishing rights, agreed to reopen
negotiations of the country's debt together with some Western
governments and opened U.S. airports 'to some 88 charter flights of
Poland's airline. This step-by-step approach to lifting economic
2
s anctions thus has been vindicated by the recent amnesty
legislation. While the@Polish government's claimthat the sanctions
cost the country some $13 billion in export revenue is clearly
inflated and was meant to divert domestic attention from regime's
in e pt economic policies, the sanctions had a significant impact
on Poland's economy. As such, the case for further relaxing of the
repressive measures became more compel- ling. Despite official
denials that economic considerations figured in the recent amnes
ty, the continuing costs of the economic sanctions were a powerful
incentive.
The full scope of the amnesty is yet unclear because the crimes of
treason, sabotage, and espionage with which numerous political
prisoners are charged are explicitly excluded. F urthermore,
when'martial law was rescinded, the Polish parliament passed very
restrictive laws on "anti- state" activities which can be invoked
to.stifle political expression and pluralism. Finally, the amnesty
appears more like a release on pro- bation a s the political
prisoners are being freed on the tough condition thatthey desist
from future political activities. Existing charges, moreover, can
be reopened for up to two years. Rather than being a genuine
amnesty, the legislation can thus be used to muz zle political
activists.
More importantly, the Polish government has not yet fulfilled the
crucial U.S'. demand that the regime open a dialogue with
Solidarity. The regime thus remains unwilling to allow political
liberalization to resume. since it was the purpose of the sanctions
to bring about the restoration of the status quo ante, to lift the
sanctions entirely now would betantamount to countenancing
continued repression in Poland.
The present situation 'called for the measured response that the
White House in fact announced. But the White House prudently
recognized that it is premature to lift all sanctions. By
maintaining in place the most important sanctions--the denial of
most-favored nation status and Ex-Im Bank credits as well as U.S.
opposition to Poland's membership in -the IMF--the Administration
signals continued U.S. displeasure with domestic repression and
encourages lasting political change. Any future steps toward
removing sanctions must await further internal reforms in Poland.
Manfred R. Hamm Senior Policy Analyst
}}