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I 447 August 7, 1985 IN AFRICA'S ANGUISH F,ORElGN AID IS A
CULPRIT INTRODUCTION Africa is visibly deteriorating. Though major
forecasts from the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID)
show consistently positive net marginal social benefits, hunger and
human suffering c ontinue to spread, deepening compassion and
whetting the administrative appetite for new responsibilities.
Yet foreign aid is not the answer to Africa's troubles; in fact
aid may be a major culprit contributing to Africa's anguish.
Financial, technical, a nd intellectual aid excuses and
therefore helps to support and sustain those African domestic
economic policies which are the root of Africa's problems the
self-interest of many of those whose present and future careers are
dependent on foreign aid This s ituation is perpetuated by In the
long run, foreign developmental aid to Africa should be ended. More
immediately, it should be restructured substantially so that it no
longer reinforces those phenomena causing Africa's horrible
suffering.
THE STATE OF AFRICA It is tempting to document the decline of
Africa in statistical terms. But these do not tell a full or
accurate story.
In Africa, accurate data are hard to discover and the collection
and analysis skills are scarce there is great divergence between re
ports from different sources about the same measured phenomenon
Hence data are crude at best, while The international aid agencies
classify their client nations, in regressing .order, as "Newly
Industrialized I Middle Income, I' or Least Industrialized" o n the
basis of per capita income. It would be anticipated that with the
growth and decline of economies, nations would move up or down on
the list. Mysteriously, however, on paper African countries only
move up on the scale of progress, despite visible evi d ence of
decline. Obviously, political rather than scientific considerations
determine the numbers which form many statistics about African
nations. But whatever the official statistics say, the more
reliable evidence is unequivocal. The productive agricul tural
economies of most African nations are in shambles. Where previously
there was an abundance of food, countries no longer can even feed
themselves.
Though causality can never be proved, the implications are hard
to avoid: countries which have had forei gn aid in the most basic
form for an extended period of time have regressed economically
more often than they have developed the aid was insufficient or did
not continue long enough basis for the aid distribution process
must be questioned It is no longer acceptable to argue that The
very PARALYZING RATIONALIZATIONS What is the reality of Africa? How
can perceptions differ so much from what is actually happening? It
seems that an elaborate ruse has been created which posits excuses
for Africa's economic st agnation and decline.
Africa's control for Africa's problems. As such, the
rationalizations paralyze Africa, preventing it from taking the
steps required for restoring its economic health These
rationalizations blame non-Africans or forces beyond The most
common and dangerous rationalizations are Population It is asserted
that rapid or rising rates of population growth or some particular
level of population density, precludes the possibility of African
economic progress popular because they give the appear a nce of
concerned objectivity is easy to assume that those unresponsive to
Western advice on population must be either ill-informed or
ill-intentioned Population explanations are It The 2concept of the
abject and mindless poor, knowing nothing of the proce ss of
procreation and giving nolthought to the morrow, is inherent in all
population policies.
A disproportionate amount of foreign aid to Africa goes directly
or indirectly into population policies policies can be demonstrated
to be the cause of subsequen t changes in the rate of population
increase or in population density does nothing to deter the
proponents The fact that none of these In reality, foreign aid
directed at population policies has at least three major negative
effects. First, it creates a p reoccupation with something which
may be totally irrelevant to the development process, and justifies
doing nothing about those factors (such as the pattern of ownership
and incentives) which are known to be important.
Second, foreign aid used for populati on activities gives
enormous resources and control apparatus to the local
administrative elite and thus sustains the authoritarian attitudes
corrosive to the development process. Third, money used for
population policies, as with all foreign aid, is taken from other
activities that could contribute positively to global prosperity
Tribalism Blame for the present African situation is often directed
at tribalism. But tribalism is inevitable when law is no longer
evenly enforced, detailed economic controls mak e'corruption a way
of life and the right to own one's possessions is subject to
political whim.
Who can one turn to but one's fellow tribesmen and one's
family?
Foreign aid sustains tribalism as long as it supports
excessively centralized government, the administrative elite,2and
the favored groups which have access to the political system. But
mainly the answer to tribalism lies in the hands of today's African
r ulers is not an exogenous factor.
It 1. Economic development is a long-run process. There is
little, if any, evidence that high rates, or even increasing rates,
of population growth have in the long run led to poverty more often
than to prosperity the avai lable empirical data--the
cross-sections and time series of nations presented by Kuznets and
Easterlin, together with the historical allusions of Sauvy and
Clark--did not confirm that theory Julian L.
Simon, The Economics of Pornlation Growth (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. xxi 2. Alan R.
Waters, "Interregional Development and Urban Tribalism in Africa
Growth and Change, Vol. 4, No. 2, April 1975, pp. 30-37 3 I The
Past Historical determinism, or blaming the past, is a means o f
escaping responsibility for the present past approach can work only
so long as its basic premise is faithfully respected: that those in
control. of Africa for the last two decades somehow have been
prevented from initiating change without foundation Yet this
Ilprisoners of the This is In any society, practices and
institutions from the past must be changed if they inhibit
successful economic development. If foreign aid enables African
leaders to postpone the inevitable pain of change it does the
people o f Africa a deep disservice. Because foreign aid goes
directly to governments, it is given first to the officials who
control the state. These officials are not those most likely to
begin the desperately needed process of dismantling the state
apparatus.
Si nce foreign aid is fungible, it merely replaces a country's
own funds, which can then be used to support other activities I
Education Systems African education systems are frequently accused
of producing inappropriate skills and interests. Example: Africa n
secondary schools and colleges produce too many clerks, it is said,
and not enough technicians. If this is true, it is much less the
fault of the education system than of the reward structure that
offers a more attractive combination of workload, securit y, and
salary to clerks than it does to other workers.
Admittedly in many cases, African education systems are highly
inappropriate education system. A reason for this may be the way
foreign aid is made available. The educational systems of Africa
are almo st totally state-controlled ,and almost all patterned
after the state systems of Europe. Nowhere has Africa emulated the
Land Grant University of the United States. Private.education is
centrally controlled through curriculum requirements and state
examin a tions. The whole'apparatus has the support of the foreign
aid agencies. Innovative and private alternatives are simply not
funded by foreign aid no consumer choice in education for the
children of any but the urban elite Yft African rulers do little if
an y thing to change the There is little or 3. For the argument
that the higher education systems which the Africans have chosen
are indeed reactionary and ultimately dangerous see: Alan Rufus
Waters, "A Behavioral Model of Pan African Disintegration The Afric
a n Studies Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, December 1971 pp. 299-303
4National Boundaries It is argued that the political boundaries
inherited from the past, drawn by West European colonists,
contribute to African governmental excesses and economic
stagnation. His t ory, however, does not support this hypothesis.
To be sure, the current map of Africa was largely set at the Berlin
Congress .of 188401885, and African politicians have chosen not to
alter it since independence. Yet arbitrary nationa1,boundaries that
igno r e ethnic or geographical distinctions need not be a barrier
to economic success. Nations are prospering despite arbitrary
boundary changes which divide ethnic communities. Examples: the
Koreas, the Germanies, the Republic of China on Taiwan. If African
ru l ers and foreign aid donors, moreover accept the argument that
present African national boundaries are an impediment to prosperity
and development, why then do foreign aid agencies continue giving
money to political units formed by those boundaries? By the ir own
definition, foreign aid is merely perpetuating the past.
Commoditv Fluctuations I Third World ideologues frequently argue
that the global terms of trade have shifted against the primary
products which are the major exports of African and other devel
oping nations evidence of a secular or long-term decline in basic
commodity prices.
It is true, of course, that commodities.have fluctuated in
prices and quantities traded. This could create short run problems
for economies dependent to a large degree on a few commodities
prices have fluctuated throughout world history. The art of good
management and sound leadership is to develop a system to
compensate for and take advantage of fluctuations. Buffer stocks,
insurance cash reserves, and forward trading are all standard
techniques readily available to African officials. And Africans are
as capable of good management as any other officials Yet there is
no But commodity Foreign aid has been a source of lladjustmentll
financing to offset It also has directly fi n anced schemes to pass
The effect of such financing commodity fluctuations the cost of
management back to the producers or forward to the consumers in.the
more developed nations is detrimental to economic development. It
distorts market signals and reduces the value of the learning
procfss which African managers must experience to compete in world
trade 4. See: Alan R. Waters, "The Economic Reason for
International Commodity Agreements,"
Kvkklos, Vol. XXVII, Fax. 4, 1974, pp. 777-791 5Natural
Disasters Bad weather and other natural disasters certainly affect
national economies. Yet they are similar to commodity fluctuations.
The droughts or locust infestations that plague parts of Africa may
not recur at fixed intervals, but it is certain that they recur is
s ue then, again, is appropriate management. Where events cannot be
anticipated (and are not ignored by local officials) there is a
case for disaster relief question of foreign aid for economic
development. The broader problem is that foreign aid helps remo v e
the incentive for efficient management the social welfare systems
The Such relief is a separate issue from the Indeed in somf African
nations, foreign aid takes over Foreiun Exchanue The problems of
Africa also are blamed on a shortage of foreign hard c u rrency
with which to purchase the imported equipment necessary for
economic development necessary for economic development, this
argument would not stand close scrutiny. The reason: Africa has
chosen not to use its foreign exchange for industrial and agri c
ultural equipment imports are food, petroleum products for
transportation, automobiles and consumer goods which are surely
classified as luxuries Even were imported equipment absolutely
Major African Foreign exchange rate manipulation also provides a
usef u l example of how the aid process transfers wealth from the
poor to the rich in Africa. Foreign exchange markets exist for the
purpose of coordinating the supply and demand for desirable foreign
currencies high exchange rates reduce the amount of foreign c u
rrency available by making exports more costly to the foreign
buyer; but they also subsidize the standard of living of the
import-consuming and foreign-travelling elite, making imports
cheaper than they otherwise would be Artificially The cost of
exchange manipulation falls on those who produce and sell exports,
and on those who consume domestic products rather than imported
ones. Africa exports commodities such as coffee and cocoa produced
by small fanners. The poor and the productive pay for the cheap im
p orts which the new administrative class consumes in the cities.
As long as foreign assistance helps to sustain manipulated exchange
rates, there exists no pressing incentive to cease subsidizing the
upper classes in Africa 5. The extended period (over a d e cade for
a number of African nations) during which foreign food and disaster
aid has been maintained has resulted in the complete cooption of
their welfare systems 6- THE DESTRUCTIVE SOLUTION: FOREIGN AID
Strange though it may seem, foreign aid per'se has been blamed for
Africa's failures. Some contend that there has been insufficient
foreign aid. As such, there are attempts to Vequire" the
industrialized nations to make foreign aid payments as a moral
obligation A smaller group argues that the problem is that too much
aid has been given in the wrong way and for the wrong purposes.
Neither of these arguments has merit, but their target has. 0
real culprit in forcing Africa deeper into poverty is foreign
aid.
Foreign aid is inevitably destructive in its effect. Its
existence retards the organic process of economic growth and
development which comes from motivated people acting in their own
best interests.
It is essential in the criticism of foreign aid to go beyond.the
inevitable scandals that emerge occasi onally. Foreign aid is not
bad because it is sometimes corrupt and often appears to go into
unjustifiable activities. Foreign aid is inherently bad. It retards
the process of economic growth and the accumulation of wealth (the
only means of escape from po v erty and degradation it weakens the
coordinating effect of the market process; it pulls
entrepreneurship and intellectual capital into non-productive and
administrative activities; it creates a moral ethical tone which
denies the hard task of wealth creat ion. Foreign aid makes it
possible for African societies to transfer wealth from the poor to
the rich.
In general foreign aid permits and finances the maintenance of
failed economic policies destroy domestic agriculture. Large
capital projects (particularl y those only partially financed by
foreign aid) suck domestic funds away from more profitable
commercial needs. Furthermore, the purveyors of foreign aid have
tended to be people of generally collectivist faith.
They have encouraged the establishment in Africa of such
institutions as state monopolies and economic development planning
boards which would not have been permitted at home Food aid permits
price controls which Perhaps the greatest condemnation of forei gn
aid is that it has engendered and now justifies the bloated
bureaucracies of Africa.
Enticing Africa's most potentially productive citizens to pass
up the commercial and market sectors for government work is a
terrible disservice. Worse, these talented Africans now in
government service justify their positions and their perquisites by
continual 6. P. T. Bauer's writings on the subject of foreign aid
are well known. His latest book on the subject has an excellent
summary of the argument: "Foreign Aid: Is s ues and Implications,"
Chapter 3, in Realitv and Rhetoric: Studies in the Economics of
DeveloDmen t (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1984 I 1 I i I I 7manipulation and regulation of their economies
justified (and partly funded) by fore ign aid.
All of this has been RECOGNIZING RESPONSIBILITY 0 Almost any
transitory event can be the fashionable excuse for economic failure
in Africa. The welter of arguments merely postpones the search for
serious answers to current problems been easier to blame the
foreigner and the outsider than to accept responsibility and
undertake change foreigners, moreover, has been a reliable source
of foreign support for activities which would otherwise be harshly
questioned And it always has Assignment of guilt to To progress,
there must be an acceptance of the .fact that domestic policies are
Africa's fundamental problem. To be sure in recent years, there has
been inserted somewhere in every document about Africa's economic
situation, like a SEC-mandated disclosur e statement, a small
apission that domestic policies are at least a part of the problem
admission, the policy paper writers revert immediately to classic
form, blaming external factors and calling for external solutions
Then, having made the required small print Recognizing
responsibility is the vital first step to any rationalization of
domestic policies by those who control Africa's nations. now
operate no service to the Africans by pretending otherwise The
Africans currently in power have set up the syst e ms they They are
perfectly capable of altering these systems if they see it as being
in their own interests to do so. The West does I Real reform of
Africa's economic systems is impossible without strong incentives
necessary conditions; the sufficient con d ition is the incentive
to change. In Africa, rewards and penalties are obscured by
collective responsibility. corrupts individual initiatives The
ability and capacity to change are only Foreign aid merely dilutes
those incentives and As long as the U.S. p r ovides food, without
questioning the policies that have brought about agricultural
stagnation and 7. To show that the exculpatory approach is alive
and well, one only need look at a relatively recent article by
Carol Lancaster in Foreign Policv. Only once , near the end of the
article, is there a gentle mention of unwise domestic policies as
one of many secondary factors contributing to Africa's economic
failures; the reader is still left with the impression that the
root cause of African poverty lies in th e indecent prosperity of
the more successful nations. Foreign Policy, No. 52, Fall 1983, pp.
149-166 8-widesprfad hunger, those in power will offer no more than
cosmetic change. And, if the U.S. continues to condone and fund the
operation of state entities (thus supporting powerful and
overrewarded African bureaucracies) the results will be equally
superficial.
CONCLUSION If Americans truly want to help Third World countries
grow economically, then the U.S. foreign aid program should be
ended.
Short of thi s, the U.S. much change the nature of its foreign
aid programs Two decisive policy changes must occur quickly. The
U.S. must Contract awards could then be tied to specific and
privatize its foreign aid program by contracting with the
competitive private s e ctor quantitative results negotiate the
details of aid programs with private contractors who have no vested
career interest in large foreign staffs or the maintenance of
missions abroad Foreign government bureaucrats should have to
Foreign aid to any coun t ry must be contracted for a set period of
time and made strictly-conditional upon selected actions by the
government requiring the aid. Existing aid programs, meanwhile be
siven a clear termination date. This would allow evaluation must
and renegotiation where necessary without the pressure of ongoing
commitments.
If the U.S. gives money to the rulers of Africa, it is by
definition interfering in their domestic policies morality demand
that aid and assistance.be offered only to those who request it and
vol untarily accept our terms for its use though it does not is
outright deception. AID administrators have an Decency and To
behave as obligation to demand major policy changes or polite
observance of the niceties of diplomatic rigmarole will suffice No
timi d nnpolicy dialoguen Prepared for The Heritage Foundation by
Alan Rufus Waters Babcock Graduate School of Management Wake Forest
University I 8. For a clear exposition of this and other aspects of
food dumping programs see: Clifton B. Lutterell Good Intent ions,
Cheap Food and Counterpart Funds Review, The Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis, Vol. 64, No. 9, November 1982 Professor Waters was
Chief Economist at the U.S. Agency for International Development
(AID) during the first Reagan term 9-