(Archived document, may contain errors)
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THE 'NUCLEAR TEST.. RESOLUTION: UNDERMINING - THE PRESIDENT AT
THE SUMMIT
The arms control lobby has come up with a way of attempting to
undermine Ronald Reagan before his summit meeting with Soviet ruler
Mikhail Gorbachev. An effort is expected this week in the House of
Representatives to bring House Joint Resolution 3 to the floor for
a vote. H.J. Res. 3 was introduced last January by Reps. Berkley
Bedell (D-IA), Jim Leach (R-IA) and Edward Markey (D-MA). This
resolution calls on the President to submit to'the Senate for
ratification the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), and the
1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). Both limit the size
of underground nuclear tests to 150 kilotons of explosive power.
Part two of the resolution calls on the President to begin
negotiating with the Soviets toward a comprehensive U.S.-Soviet
test ban (CTB), which would prohibit all further nuclear
testing.
This effort is currently the focus of attention of the arms
control lobby, which has been encouraged by Gor bachev's July 29
announcement of a unilateral five-month moratorium on Soviet
nuclear testing. Yet that Gorbachev announcement was a
patently,political effort to take advantage of the fortieth
anniversary of Hiroshima to embarrass the United States with a
time-limited Soviet suspension of testing only after completion of
its own nuclear testing program for 1985.
The TTBT and PNET are not adequately verifiable with current
technology and the Soviets have refused to discuss improved
verification procedures. A CTBI however, would be contrary to the
security interests of the United States and should not-be
pursued.
In 1954 when nuclear testing limits were first urged, it was
hoped that limiting nuclear testing would slow the development of
nuclear weapons and eliminate nuclear fallout. But testing is no
longer required for nations to develop a nuclear weapons
capability. And the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, limiting
signatories to underground nuclear tests, has virtually eliminated
nuclear fallout from tes ts by the signatory countries.
Underground nuclear tests of less than 150 kilotons, which would
be prohibited under a CTB, have become increasingly important to
U.S. security
and to achieving real reductions in nuclear arms, for the following
reasons: . 1) Nuclear testing of relatively low-yield explosions k,
s necessary to develop and maintain command, control and
communications (c ) systems that are survivable enough so that
Moscow would not think it could incapacitate them in a first
strike. Undergro und testing also is critical to the development of
C systems for the 1990s that are less vulnerable than present
systems to electromagnetic disturbances caused by nuclear
explosions.
2) The testing of warheads is necessary to assure the reliability
of the warheads in the U.S. strategic deterrent.
3) Improvements in the accuracy of missiles and the reliability of
warheads have permitted the development of smaller and fewer
warheads. As a result, the U.S. has unilaterally reduced its
megatonnage by 75 percent and the total number of U.S. warheads by
25 percent since 1960. Continued underground testing is necessary
to assure the development of even more discriminating and effective
weapo ns, which are safer, smaller, lower-yield, and more
tamper-proof.
4) After three decades of testing and debate, it is clear that
limits on underground tests cannot be verified with accuracy. A
comprehensive - test ban, in particular, would require far grea ter
on-site monitoring than the Soviets have been willing to consider.
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which allows continued testing but
limits each test to no more than 150 kilotons would not necessarily
be harmful to U.S. security. The problem is that i t cannot now be
verified with accuracy. The Soviets appear to have violated the
test limit many times and the Administration says that U.S.
monitoring of Soviet tests has a 200 percent margin of error.
Either the Soviets are extensively violating the TTBT , or U.S.
technical ability to verify Soviet compliance is just not adequate
to justify U.S. testing constraints, or both.
In an effoe,; to improve U.S. ability to monitor Soviet testing,
the U.S. has unsuccessfully sought to engage the USSR in
discussions on verification improvements to the TTBT and PNET. They
have refused. If Congress wishes to support the President when he
goes to meet Gorbachev in .Geneva, it should call on Moscow to
discuss verification improvements with the U.S. Otherwise, H.J.
Res. 3 will be seen for what it is--an effort by the arms control
lobby to embarrass and undermine the President on the eve of a
meeting with the leader of the Soviet Union.
James T. Hackett Editor, National Security Record
For further information:
Rep. Henry J. Hyde, "Test Ban Fevcr," The Washington Post
September 25, 1985.
Brian Green, "A Flawed Test Ban Treaty," Heritage Foundation
Backgroundir- No. 340, March 27, 1984.
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