(Archived document, may contain errors)
490 February 25, 1986 MOSCOW EYES GUYANA IN TRODUCTION I The
restoration of orur an1 democracy to Grenada in October 1983 should
not lull the United States int2 overlooking growing Soviet and
Cuban influence in another strategic Caribbean nation. The
Communist I bloc's loss of Grenada has spurred M oscow and Havana
to focus on Guyana. This English-speaking country on South
America's northeastern shoulder is a strategic bridge betwee:i
Latin America and the Caribbean.
Guyana's threat to the security of the U.S. and its Western
Hemisphere neighbors may prove far grsater than Grenada's. Guyana
is a mainland country whose borders adjoin mineral rich Venezuela
and Brazil, allowing easy infiltration for subversives and drug
traffickers. triangle" with Cuba and Nicaragua. There, pro-Soviet
tactical airpower could be based in time of crisis.
Soviet Union with a base for operations against U.S. strategic
missile submarines and for interdicting the Mid- and South Atlantic
sea lines of communication.
Because of Guyana's potential threat to U.S. security,
Washington must make it clear to Soviet boss Mikhail Gorbachev and
Cuban dictator Fidel Castro that it will not tolerate another
Soviet/Cuban base in this hemisphere repression a nd socialist
economic policies of Guyana's People's National Congress (PNC)
government by renewing U.S. economic aid. The struggle for true
democracy in Guyana should be encouraged by strong U.S. support for
the moderate political opposition A tough stanc e now on Guyana by
Washington could preempt a new Grenada Guyana forms the new third
point of a "strategic Guyana also could provide the I At the same
time, the U.S. must not condone the GUYANA S CURRENT ECONOMIC
PL-IGHT First sighted by Christopher Columb us in 1498, the
territory comprising present-day Guyana alternated between Dutch,
French, and British rule until 1831, when it became the colony of
British Guiana until independence in 19
66. Guyana's 83,000 square miles border Brazil, Venezuela, and
Surin ame. More than half of its population of nearly 800,000 is of
East Indian descent with the remainder largely of African ancestry
economy go into a tailspin diamonds, hardwood, bauxite, and
agricultural possibilities, the PNC's socialist mismanagement has
resulted in a negative growth rate averaging 10 percent since
19
82. Many domestic industries produce only intermittently or have
ceased production altogether because of import restrictions and
lack of foreign exchange. The decline in productive activity h as
created unemployment averaging about 35 percent unemployment has
come growing social discontent, which the government addresses by
intimidation and other repressive measures.
The U.S. has given Guyana more than $150 million in bilateral
and multilatera l assistance in the past 30 years. Last June,
however, the U.S. suspended aid to Guyana because the country was
$9,million in arrears in repaying development assistance loans to
the U.S. Only one month earlier, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) had de c lared Guyana ineligible for further loans, while the
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) confirmed that it would continue
its 1983 freeze on loans to Guyana. The World Bank Countrv Report
called Guyana not worthy of credit, and said that its economic
malaise derived from a lack of investment and a large and
inefficient public sector Under PNC rule since independence, Guyana
has witnessed its Although the country is rich in gold With
GUYANA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE Guyana's military capabilities have
been upgrad ed by the Soviet bloc in recent years.
Defense Force currently number 7,000 personnel. Some 400 Cuban
military advisors provide training andztechnical support to all
branches of the Guyanese armed forces. On February 12, 1983, two
The ground, air, and seal units of the Guyana 1. The Militarv
Balance 1985-1986 (London: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1985 p. 150 2. SDotliPht Georgetown, November 15, 1981
2ships, flying no national flags, unloaded artillery pieces and
small arms at the Linden A l umina Plant wharf on Guyana's Demarara
River. The unloading was at night by soldiers who cordoned off both
sides of the river--a tactic similar to that employed o unload
Soviet arms shipments to Grenada. One of the vessels, $he Como VI,
was of Cuban regis try. The arms came from North Koree,.
The military hardware sent to Guyana has become increasingly
sophisticated. In addition to Soviet artillery pieces, mortars, and
SAM-7 anti-aircraft pissiles, Guyana has received several armed
North Korean patrol boats . In October 1985, three Soviet Mi-8
IlHipIl helicopters were unloaded in the capital city of Georgetown
for use by the Guyana Defense Force, making Guyana the fourth
country in the Western Hemisphere tp receive such aircraft, along
with Cuba Nicaragua, a n d Peru. Last year, too, Bucharest signed
an agreement with Guyana to send Romanian air force personnel to
Guyana to train Ilcivilian as well as Army pilots 116 Guyana is
reportedly negotiating with Moscow for MiG aircraft and with Brazil
for Bandeirante p atrol aircraft.
Operating a Soviet-built Tupolev Tu-154B leased from Romania and
has purchased thFee Tu-154s from the Soviet Union and Romania in
exchange for bauxite troop-carrying capability The state-owned
Guyana Airways Corporation is currently Such ai rcraft provide
Guyz.na with a significant Recent aerial reconnaissance photographs
reveal new airfields under construction in the Essequibo region of
Guyana. Eleven all-weather fields have been identified, the
shortest of which measures 2,000 meters.
VOR and DME aircraft navigational equipment.
At several airfioldssare towers designed for This discovery
raises the disturbing possibility that the strategic triangle"
formerly formed by Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada could become a
reality with Guyana substitu ting for Grenada. Soviet MiGs and
Backfire bombers operating from airfields in Guyana could 3. The
Mirror, Georgetown, February 27, 1983, p 1 4. Gregory R. Copley, ed
9 (Washington, D.C Copley and Associates, 1985), p. 274 5. CANA,
October 19, 1985; FBIS Latin America, October 22, 1985, p. T1 6.
CANA, July 20, 1985; FBIS Latin America, July 23, 1985, p. V1 7 A
November 11, 1984, p. 1 8 Caracas: 1982 3destroy vital oil
refineries and supply routes in the southern Caribbean or harass
Atlantic.shipping.
A nea r-term scenario would see the use of Guyanals airfields as
bases or refueling stops for Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
and reconnaissance aircraft such as the Tu-142s.and Tu-95~ now
operating from Cuba U.S. strategic ballistic missile submarines
woul d be threatened by this deployment, as would vital sea lines
of communication passing through the Mid- and South Atlantic
Ocean.
Neighboring Venezuela, meanwhile, has already expresfed concern
about Guyanese espionage operations inside its territory has cl ose
relations with Libya, Nicaragua, Cuba, Bulgaria, and other known
supporters of international revolutionary and terrorist movements
terrorism in Central America, so could Guyana serve in South
America Guyana Just as Nicaragua serves as a base for subve r sion
and GUYANA'S MARXIST POLITICS Guyana has had a Marxist-oriented
political system for over three decades. The pro-Moscow People's
Popular Party (PPP), formed in 1946 by Cheddi Jagan (party leader)
and Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham chairman won control of what was
then British Guiaaals colonial legislature in the elections of
19
53. A 1954 report of an investigation by the British
Constitutional Commission concluded that Cheddi Jagan and other PPP
members "accepted unreservedly the classicall doctrines of Marx and
Lenin, were enthusiastic supporters of the policies and practices o
f modern communist movements, and were contemptuous of social
democratic parties The report placed Burnham and other party
leaders in a more moderate cat,egory classifying them as
Itsocialists llrl In 1955 the PPP split. The smaller faction, led
by Burnha m formed a new party called the People's National
Congress (PNC With covert British and U.S. help, Burnham's PNC came
to power in a coalition government with the more conservative
United Front party following the 1964 elections. Believing that a
communist r egime had been preempted, Great Britain granted Guyana
independence in 1966 9. FBIS. Latin Americk May 19, 1983, p. 21-22
10. Kenneth M Glazier Guyana in Wilton S. Sworakowski, ed World
Communism: A Handbook. 1918-1965 (Stanford: Hoover Institution
Press, 1973 p. 180. 1
1. Robert H. Manley, Guvana Emergent (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Schenkman Publishing Co 1979 p. 6 4As opposition leader, Jagan lost
no time in fostering close relations with the Soviet Union. During
the International Conference of Communis t and Workers Parties held
in Moscow in June 1969, he formally aligned the PPP with the USSR.
The Kremlin, in turn recognized the PPP as a bona fide communist
party following year, the PPP was reorgani&ed on the pattern of
the Soviet and East European com m unist parties The As tha PNCIs
power grew through successive fraudulent elections, Burnham's
Marxist leanings became more evident. In 1970, Guyana was
proclaimed a I1cooperative republic" based on socialist principles.
Over the next six years, most major f oreign economic holdings were
nationalized, bringing more than 80 percent of Guyana's goods and
services under government control. Burnham adopted a militant
stance on Third World issues. This included funding SWAP0 Southwest
Africa Peoples Organization) "freedom fighters" in southern Africa
and providing milihary training and indoctrination to Southwest
African youths in Guyana.
RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST WORLD After 1970, the Burnham
regime sought close relations with the Communist bloc. By 1979,
Guyan a had diplomatic ties with the Sovj.et Union, Cuba, the
People's Republic of China, and six other communist countries
bloc's economic community association with the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union despite these overtures and his visits to Moscow,
Burn h am never seems to have been trusted by the Kremlin. He
seemed to be viewed as an erratic opportunist who flirted with
Beijing and the U.S Burnham even applied for membership in
COMECON-the Soviet And the PNC tried to forge fopal Yet 12. Richard
F. Staar, e d Hoover Institution Press 13. Ibid Yearbook on
International Communist Affairs 1971 (Stanford 1971 pp. 446-447 14.
Cedric Lynch Guyana Charged With Election Fraud by Neighbors The
Times of the America$ January 22, 1986, p. 11 15. CANA, September
14, 1984 ; FBIS. Latin Americk September 17, 1984, p. V1 16. Cole
Blasier, The Giant's Rival: The USS R and Latin America
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh press, 1983 p. 48 5-
Cuban-Guyanese Ties With one brief hiatus, Guyana has maintained
close ties with Cub a since diplomatic relations between the two
were established in 1972.
Fidel Castro visited Georgetown the following year. After
Burnham's first official visit to Havana in 1975, Guyana allowed
Cuban aircraft transporting troops to Angola to refuel at Geor
getown's Timehri airport; the Burnham government also gave strong
diplomatic support at the Uniked Nations and elsewhere to Castro's
interventions in Africa The PNC's relations with Cuba have been
encouraged by the PPP. In 1976, Cheddi Jagan called upon t he
Burnham government to invite suban soldiers to Guyana to guard
against "aggression1' from Venezuela.
Following the Kremlin's policy line, the PPP has been critical
of Guyana's relations with Beijing. Burnham became the first
elected chief of state from the Commonwealth Caribbean to visit
China when he went there in 19
75. He has received aid from Beijing throughout his
administration. In 1981, the PNC's fourth party congress was
attended by Zhu Liang, a high-ranking member of China's
International Liaison Department. The meeting also was attended by
a Soviet delegate.
By 1978, up to 200 Cuban technicians, advisors, and medical
personnel were stationed in Guyana. In March, Cuban General Senen
Casas Regueiro met with Brigadier Clarence Price, Chief ofzoSt aff
of the Guyana Defense Force, to discuss military cooperation. This
was followed by a visit'to Georgetown in March by Cuban Foreign
Minister Isidoro Malmierca for a series of unpublished talks with
Burnham and Guyanese Foreign Minister Rashleigh Jackso n.
Intelligence agents based in the Cuban embassy in Georgetown
maintained contact with a variety of Guyanese opposition
groups.
Cuban diplomats were expelled for involvement in illegal
a~tivities The Cuban agents had been recruiting Guyanans for
guerrilla training in Cuba In August 1978, five 17. Ronald E. Jones
Cuba and the English-speaking Caribbean," in Cole Blasier and
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, eds Cuba in the World (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press 1979), p. 23 18. The Washineton Post March 13, 19
7 6 19. Staar, OD. cit, p. 115 20. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
Cuban Chronolorrv 1978-80 (Washington, D.C National Foreign
Assessment Center, 1981 p. 109 6- Cuba has attemphed to unite the
PNC and PPP into a single party hut with no success. Nonetheles s,
Cuba has trusted agents in every Guyanese political party, union,
and key government ministry.
Pedro Silvio Gonzalez Perez, a senior official in the Americas
Department of the Cuban intelligence service, operates under the
diplomatic cover of minister c ounselor at the Cuban embassy in
Georgetown. He has increased CubanJnfluence in the Guyana Defense
Force and other government bodies.
After the eighth meeting of the Guyana-Cuba Joint Commission in
March 1983, the Cuban delegation was assured that "Guyana will
continue on its present socialist policies.112s The following
month, the Guyana Teachers Association pledged "unqualified support
for government efforts to develop a socialist society";-a task made
easier by the growing number of Cuban teachers in G u yana 1984,
Cuba and Guyana issued a joint communique stating agreement on all
major foreign policy issues, including solidarity with Nicaragua
the guerrilla forces in El Salgador, and the South West Africa
People s Organization (SWAPO In November Relation s With Grenada
Following the rise to power in Grenada of the Marxist People's
Revolutionary Government (PRG), Guyana became one of Grenada's
closest Caribbean allies.
Revolutionary Military Council to the impending arrival of U.S.
and Caribbean forces in October 19
83. He had learned of the plans during a CARICOM (Caribbean
Community) heads of government meeting in Trinidad Burnham was
responsible for alerting Grenada's 21. Staar, OD. cit, p. 97 22.
Jay Mallin Cuban Intelligence Elite Pushes Subversion in Americas,"
The Washinpton Times, August 25, 1983, p. 7A. Further information
from Sridatt Lakhan and Mobarak Ali of the Conservative Liberal
Party of Guyana 23. Guvana Chronicle, Georgetown, March 22, 1983,
p. 3 24. Guvana Chronicle, Georgetown, April 7, 1 983, p. 1 i I I 1
i I i I I 25. Bohemia, Havana, No. 48, pp. 76-77 7-and wa,ss also
probably responsible for alerting Cuba and the Soviet Union
militant Marxhts Later, Guyana offered haven to several of
Grenada's most The Sovio,t Presence Increasingly ost r acized by
the English-speaking Caribbean after the Grenada rescue mission,
Guyana has moved closer to the Soviet Union and its allies in the
past three years. Cooperation with Nicaragua and Libya has grown,
while various forms of military technical, and e ducational
assistance are now provided by the gSSR East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Cuba, and North Korea the Soviet news
agency Tass as well as the Iraa News Aaencv.
Also as with Grenada, Guyanese students are now being sent to
the Soviet Union for "postgraduate training" while a number of
"Soviet tutor&" are scheduled to begin teaching duties in
Guyana this year As was its Marxist predecessor Grenada, Guyana is
now ssrved by GUYANA'S RELZITIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS Guyana has had
a serious territori al dispute with Venezuela since 19
66. Venezuela claims all of Guyana west of the Essequibo
River--a vast, oil-rich region comprising 62 percent of Guyana's
total land area . This unresolved claim has blocked Guyana's
application for membership in the Organization of American States
and has strained its relations with most other Latin American
nations except Brazil. The Soviet Union and Cuba support Guyana's
claim to the ter ritory as does Brazil, which has threatened to
provide military assistance to Guyana should Venezuela occupy any
Guyanese territory.
Guyana's relations with its English-speaking Caribbean neighbors
have been strained by meddling in their internal affairs.
Dominica's national elections last year, Guyana, Libya, North
Korea Prior to 26. Based on interviews with Prime Minister Eugenia
Charles of Dominica, Ambassador Albert Xavier, and Grenada Advisory
Council Chairman Nicholas Braithwaite 27. Geoffrey Wagner, "Guyana:
The Basket Case Economy," The Grenadian Voice, November 30, 1985,
p. 13 28. The New York Times July 6, 1984, p. A5 29. CANA, April
19, 1984 FBIS. Latin America, April 20, 1984, p. V1 30. CANA,
January 15, 1986; FBIS. Latin America, January 17, 1 9 86, p. T1
aand Cuba were implicated in a plot to provide covert financial
assistance to the Marxist Dgminican Labour Party (DLP). Dominica
Prime Minister Eugenia Charles has been joined by the leaders of
Grenada St. Lucia, and other Caribtean nations in c alling for the
Secretariat of the 13-member Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to be
removed from Guyana because Itits Rresence there was a handicap" to
democratic Caribbean countries.
GUYANA'S FUTURE President Burnham died last August 6, whkle
undergoing surge ry by a team of Cuban doctors for a throat
ailment. His successors President Desmond Hoyte and Prime Minister
Hamilton Green, continue Guyana's growing involvement with the
Soviet bloc that he would "continue working faithfully to maintain
the fundamental policies and programs of our late, great comrade
leader," adding that he was tlpersonally a socialisttt and would
Itwork to advance the socialist objectives of our party and
government 113s Green has said The PNC's sixth party congress, held
three.weeks a f ter Burnham's death, attracted considerable
attention from Moscow. It was covered by Pravda and attended by an
official Soviet Communist Party delegation stressed the need to
ensuie IIGuyanals continued progress along the road of socialist
restructuring.. . and noted the importance of strengthening party
ties between the PNC, the CPSU, and the Communist Parties of Cuba
and the other socialist countries.ln3' In February the
Soviet-trained Chandisingh, formerly the chief Marxist ideologue of
the opposition in P PP, was named deputy prime minister as well as
deputy leader of the PNC PNC General Secretary Chandisinghls
keynote speech Guyana's moves toward a Soviet-style economic system
parallel Nicaragua's. Cuban advisors share office space with
Guyanese bureaucra t s in the Ministries of Finance, Agriculture,
Planning Manpower, and Cooperatives. Cubans also helped establish a
Soviet-style hard currency shop in Georgetown which is Ilrun in a
manner somewhat similar to foreign currency shops in a number of
31. CANA, J u ly 11, 1985; FBIS. Latin America, July 12, 1985, p.
S1 32. Paris AFP, August 6, 1985; FBIS. Latin America, August 7,
1985, p. T1 33. CANA, August 12, 1985; FBIS. Latin America, August
13, 1985, p. T1 34. Ptavdk August 27, 1985, p. 4; FBIS. Soviet
Union, A ugust 29, 1985, p. K1 9socialist countries I and which
sells gclods obtained through an arrangement with a similar
business in c!uba 11s5 Guyanese government during the December 9,
1985, general elections.
Once the PNC's continuing control of t?re Guyanese government
was assured, Burnham's successors announced policies moving even
closer to the Soviet bloc. Last December, Guyana's Foreign Minister
Rashleigh Jackson announced that it was necessary for his country
to expand and consolidate its relations with the Soviet Union.
Jackson also announced Soviet plan8 to exploit Guyana's extensive
bauxite, gold and diamond reserves. Given Guyana's willingness to
open its doors to the Soviet bloc, there is a strong possibility
that Moscow will choose to exploit what p romises to,be a major
strategic foothold on the South American continent Through
intimidation and fraud, the PNC again won control of the POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS The growing militarization of Guyana, coupled with
the Hoyte regime's open advocacy of closer t ies with the Soviet
bloc, indicates the potential for another major threat to U.S.
security interests in the Caribbean region into another Grenada or
Nicaragua, the U.S. should adopt the following measures To halt
this process before Guyana develops o War n Moscow that the U.S.
will not tolerate the establishment of another potential
Soviet/Cuban base in the Western Hemisphere.
Ronald Reagan should place Guyana on the agenda for this year's
summit with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to demonstrate to th
e Kremlin that the Monroe Doctrine still forms the cornerstone of
U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere o Withhold economic
assistance for development projects and financial support until
substantive political and economic reforms are made by the Guyana g
o vernment 0 Support efforts by such Caribbean leaders as Prime
Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica to isolate Guyana from
regional organizations such as CARICOM until Guyana moves away from
the Soviet bloc and back toward the Western Hemisphere democracie s
truly democratic political groups such as the Conservative Party o
Support the legitimate political opposition in Guyana. Aid to 35.
Guvana Chronicle, December 5, 1984, pp. 1-8 36. CANA, December 19,
1985; FBIS. Latin America, December 23, 1985, p. T1 10 -independent
labor unions like the Democratic Labmr Movement, and nongovernment
news sources such as The Catholic .Standard could maintain the fire
of democracy among the Guyanese people o Encourage international
human rights organizations to investigate and report on abuses in
Guyana. Documented and reliable reports should be publicized by
international organizations to inform the world of Guyana's true
social and political situation.
CONCLUSION The lessons of Cuba, Grenada, and Nicaragua make it
clear th at the U.S. must never tolerate another Soviet client
state in the Western Hemisphere. Guyana already has larger,
Cuban-trained armed forces, and more sophisticated Soviet military
hardware than Grenada did at the time of the 1983 rescue mission.
Steps mu st be taken now to prevent the Soviet Empire from
acquiring one more colony.
The people of Guyana deserve the opportunity to build democracy
as much as do their neighbors in South America. Given U.S. help to
set it on the road to personal freedom and unfet tered economic
development, Guyana, too, can join the growing family of
democracies in the Western Hemisphere 1 Timothy Ashby, Ph.D.
Policy Analyst 11