552 December 22, 1986 UPDATING U.S. STRATEGY FOR HELPING AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS INTRODUCTION Seven years after the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan Soviet troops remain locked in a protracted guerrilla war with no victory in sight.

December 27, 1979, almost one million Afghans have been ki lled most of them civilians. Approximately five million Afghans-one-third of the prewar population-have been driven into exile and now form the worldls single largest refugee group. Those that remain at home confront a Soviet army of occupation determined to terrorize Afghans into submission. Moscow has relied on scorched earth tactics to destroy food supplies, indiscriminate bombing of population centers illegal chemical weapons, mass executions, widespread torture, and boobytrapped toys designed to maim c hildren steadily escalated Soviet military coercion, incurring mounting casualties, but has made little progress in consolidating its grip on Afghanistan or translating military superiority into political accommodation, let 'alone support. Moscow also has made cosmetic changes in the quisling communist regime that it props up in Kabul in a vain effort to undermine the Mujahideen and defuse international criticism than it was in 1979 Since Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan on Yet the Afghan Mujahideen (H o ly Warriors) fight on. Moscow has But Moscow is no closer to winning its Afghan war today Far from giving up, however, the Soviets are settling in for the long haul of attrition, to depopulate key resistance strongholds and undercut the Mujahideenls base o f support, and compel Pakistan and Iran to choke off external assistance to the resistance. Unless the Afghan resistance improves its military effectiveness and political unity it is in danger of succumbing to exhaustion in the long run Moscow seeks to we a r down the resistance in a grinding war fi Soviet victory in Afghanistan would destabilize Southwest Asia. Fully understanding this, the United States and other nations have extended aid to the Afghan resistance related to the Iranian controversy indicate that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, for instance, each contributed $250 million in aid to the Afghans in 19

86. While it appears that the Afghans'fina1fy:may be receiving the quantity of aid to withstand the Soviet onslaught, it is not clear that the quality is adequate. What the Mujahideen need is a broader, more creative policy on Afghanistan from the U.S. This could include Recent revelations 1) Effective air defense weapons in sufficient numbers without delay 2) Military, medical, and educational training 3) Allocation of U.S. aid to Afghan resistance groups according to criteria related to military effectiveness, not political affiliations 4) Stepped-up diplomatic efforts to isolate the Kabul government by recognizing the resistance coalition as the right f ul representative of the Afghan people 5) A reaffirmation of U.S. support for Pakistan to deter Soviet military actions 6) Increased efforts to inform the Soviet people of the economic and human losses incurred by the Soviet'Union in Afghanistan 7) Focusi ng U.S. peace initiatives. on securing total and permanent Soviet withdrawal.

Until the Soviets follow up their broad hints of a political solution'with concrete proposals for total military withdrawal, the codlition of states that supports the Afghan resistance should maintain maximum pressure for a Soviet pullback.

THE MILIT~Y STALEMATE Since 1979 the Soviets gradually have expanded their Illimited contingentt1 occupying Afghanistan to 115,000 to 120,000 men 1. See James Phillips, "Afghanistan: The Sovie t Quagmire," Heritage Foundation Backprounder No. 101, October 25, 1979 2Supported by 50,000 military personnel stationed across the Soviet border, this Soviet army has waged an increasingly aggressive and brutal war of attrition. Soviet forces have maint a ined shaky control of major Afghan population centers and lines of communication, but at a steadily growing cost in terms of Soviet casualties and equipment losses. The Soviets and their Afghan puppets control only 10 to 20 percent of the country; much of that is subject to attack at night The Soviet army slowly has adapted itself to guerrilla warfare in the rugged Afghan mountains. Soviet tactics have evolved from periodic massive road-bound search and destroy sweeps to a greater reliance on a larger numb er of operations involving smaller, more mobile forces, often transported by helicopter. Soviet special forces spetsnatz) increasingly are deployed to launch commando attacks and night ambushes. The Soviets also have made greater use of air power.

Helicopter gunships have played an expanding role in providing close air support and harassing the Mujahldeen's'supply caravans.

High-level saturation bombing attacks on resistance strongholds have driven civilians into exile, eroding the Mujahideenls base of sup port and disrupting food production The war has given the Soviet army valuable combat experience and is a I1laboratory1l to develop new military doctrines and field test sophisticated weapons. Afghanistan is an ideal place, for example, to train pilots fo r the Soviet Mi-24 HIND armored helicopter gunship.

MOSCOW~S Su-25 FROGFOOT attack plane has been deployed in Afghanistan for the first time anywhere.. The Soviets also have tested chemical and toxin weapons banned by international treaty. The U.S. governm ent estimates that at leasF 3,000 Afghans died in chemical warfare attacks between 1979 and 19

81. Although chemical warfare incidents apparently decreased after 1982, probably dup to Western publicity Soviet gas attacks continue to be reported subduing the Afghan resistance. Moscow has launched its most aggressive military operations in eastern Af g hanistan, home of the fiercely independent Pushtun tribes that historically have dominated Afghanistan functions as Kabul's logistical lifeline to the Soviet Union. The region, .moreover, is criss-crossed by hundreds of supply trails used by the resistanc e to move men and supplies from sanctuaries in Phe Soviets have pursued alregionally differentiated strategy for Eastern Afghanistan also contains the highway that 2. US. Department of State, Special Report No. 98 Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afg h anistan 1982, pp. 14-17 3. See Jane's Defense Weeklv, November 22, 1986, p. 1206 4. See "The Soviets in Afghanistan: Adapting, Reappraising, and Settling In," Orkand Corporation, June 1986 3Pakistan to northern and central Afghanistan. Because they have b e en unable to interdict Afghan supply routes, the.Soviets have seeded the countryside with anti-personnel mines to inhibit movement and raise the costs of resupply. Today eastern Afghanistan is a huge free-fire zone wracked by the highest and most sustaine d combat levels of the war.

In contrast, the region,north-of the-Hindu.Kush mountains has been spared such heavy fighting favorable for guerrilla warfare. The Soviets.have accorded lower priority to controlling the mountains of central Afghanistan and the deserts of the south The flat, open terrain is not Although Moscow has made marginal progress in pacifying,the Soviet north, elsewhere it is paying a heavy price for meager results. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that since 197p the Soviet s have suffered 25,000 casualties, including 10,000 kilied sources indicate that these figures are much too low expert estimates that since 1979 the Soviet Union has lost 800 aircraft and 3,000 vehicles vhile spending at least $3 billion annually to financ e the war. Another study asserts that the annual economicscost of the Soviet war effort could run as high as $12 billion economic costs appear manageable, given the ability of the Soviet regime to hide these costs from its own people and the potential stra t egic benefits of using Afghanistan as a springboard for future One American Although the war is growing more costly, the.Sovie2 human and Soviet expansion THE MUJAHIDEEN: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES The Afghans have demonstraked indomitable courage and iron- w illed determination in blunting the Soviet invaders. Estimated to number 90,000 to 120,000 in the field. at any one time, the Mujahideen could 5. Janes Defense Weeklv, November 15, 1986, p. 1151 6. The Washinnton Post, July 12, 1986 7. Major Joseph Collin s , A Seven Years War: Reflections on the Soviet Military Experience in Afghanistan, paper presented at the Foreign Policy Research Institutes Conference on the Implications of the Soviet Presence in Afghanistan, September 1986, p. 22 8. Nake Kamrany and Le o n Poullada, The Potential of Afphanistans Societv and Institutions to Resist Soviet Penetration and Domination (Los Angeles: Modeling Research Group, 1985 p. 119 4surge to perhaps 250,O.OO with the necessary logistical backup. Using hit-and-run guerrilla tactics based on centuries of mountain warfare experience, the Mujahideen have harassed Soviet strongpoints and lines of communication and melted into the terrain to avoid Soviet attacks.

The resistance is organized along tribal, ethnic, and ideological li nes million Afghan. refugees in' Pakistan have' helped to integrate local resistance efforts into a broader struggle, but- these groups themselves have clashed due to ideological differences and personal rivalries. The seven groups-four fundamentalist gro ups working to establish some form of an Islamic state and three traditionalist groups with a more Western orientation--formed a loose coalition in May 19

85. This hps improved battlefield coordination, but political tensions persist.

A number of charisma tic regional commanders have emerged in the course of the war. Examples: Ahmad Shah Massoud, the celebrated "Lion of the Panjsher Jalaluddin of Paktia province; Ismail Khan in Herat and Abdul Haq in Kabul. They have inspired unity among diverse groups and mounted increasingly effective operations. Over time they may be able to transform tribal and regional loyalties among Afghanistan's 21 distinct ethnic groups into an overarching Afghan nationalism.

Aside from operational disunity, the chief weakness of t he resistance has been its vulnerability to Soviet air power. Until recently Mujahideen air defense consisted of a few unreliable Soviet-made SA-7 shoulder-fired missiles and heavy machine guns captured from the Afghan army or bought on the black market. The resistance is now receiving small quantities of modern air defense weapons These include some 40 20mm Oerlikonloanti-aircraft guns and British-made Blow'ipe anti-aircraft missiles.

U.S.-made Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles are now in use. By one estimate, the U.S. covertly supplied the resistance in 1986 with 150 Stinger launchers, each with two missiles. The Stingers are scoring five h\{ >s for every eight launches, and Soviet aircraft losses are rising high-flying fighter-bombers for low-f lying helicopter gunships and taking increased evasive measures emffective air defense over the long run, they will raise the Soviet Seven major resistance groups based among the more than three Most important The Soviets have reacted by substituti.ng If t he Mujahideen can maintain..an 9. See. Zalmay Khalilzad Moscow's Afghan War Problems of Communism, January-February 1986, pp. 10-13; also Nasir Shansab, Soviet ExDansion in the Third World: Afghanistan 3s a Case Studv, Bartelby Press, forthcoming 10. Jane ' s Defense Weeklv, November 29, 1986, p. 1259; Jane's Defense Weeklv November 15, 1986, p. 1151 11. Foreinn ReDort, published in London by The Economist, November 13, 1986, p. 1 b 5 I costs of the war significantly, consolidate their own control :over the countryside, halt the momentum of Soviet depopulation campaigns, and prevent the civilian population from growing despondent.

The overall effectiveness of the Mujahideen remaAns constrained by deficiencies in training; tactics, and leadership. And while th e resistance has improved its military performance, the Soviets have made even greater gains. According to7'Elie Krakowski, a Defense Department expert on the war The central factor...is not absolute but relative performanceiJ and in the latter...the Sovi ets have widened the gap in their favorOtw decade to subdue the Basmachi revolt in Central Asia in the 1920s.

Moscow is taking the same patient long-term approach in Afghanistan.

The official Afghan army has been an unreliable Soviet ally and an important barometer measuring the lack of popular support enjoyed by the Kabul regime the army remains less than half of its preinvasion size of 80,000 troops. door with some deserters being drafted--and then deserting again--as many as threel,times because of the "vacuum cleanertt approach to conscription. The Mujahideen have established informal nonaggression pacts with many Afghan army units and receive weapons ammunition, and valuable intelligence from sympathizers in the army In January 1986 four Afghan genera ls were arrested for warning resistance leaders about Soviet military plans. As a result, the Soviets now do not inform the Afghan army of its objectives until four hours before operations begin.

Moscow increasingly is using tribal militias recruited as mercenaries from disgruntled border tribes.

Mujahideen a better fight than the army, they also have little loyalty to the regime and have been known to defect en masse after being paid.

Afghan secret police. Supervised by the Soviet KGB, the XHAD has exten ded its influence throughout government and party offices. The May 1986 elevation of Major General Najibullah, former Chief of the It took the Soviet Union more than.a Despite press gangs that grab men up to age 38 The desertion rate is so high that the a r my is a revolving Dismayed by the dismal performance of the official Afghan army Although the militias give the The backbone of the Kabul regime is the 40,000-strong kD, the I 12. Richard Cronin,'"Military Effectiveness of the Afghan Resistance testimony b efore the congressional Task Force on Afghanistan, August 13, 1986, p. 12 13. Elie Krakowski Defining Success in Afghanistan Washinnton Ouarterlv, Spring 1985, p. 42 14. Louis Dupree, statement Foreign Affairs Committee before the Subcommittee on Asian an d Pacific Affairs, House May 1, 19E6, p. 2 6KHAD, to the supreme leadership of the Afghan Communist Party underscores the growing ascendancy of the KHAD.

With little hope of winning over this generation of Afghans, the Soviet Union is looking to the next generation two thousand Afghans aged 6 to 9, are sent to the Soviet Union for up to ten years of lleducation,Il sometimes without the permission of their f amilies. Up to '40,000 Afghans 'hhve. received this Soviet education Each'year at least GORBACHEV AND AFGHANISTAN Since taking power in 1985 Soviet Conguunist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has escalated the war in Afghanistan. He has appointed an aggressive new theatre commander, General Mikhail Zaitsev, formerly commander of Soviet forces in Germany, who has intensified military pressure on the Mujahideen At the same time Gorbachev has ordered changes in the Kabul regime to try to broaden its s upport the wily Najibullah, an adept practitioner of divide and rule politics, foreshadows a stepped-up effort to woo Pushtun groups on both sides of the, Pakistani,border MOSCOW~S replacement of the ineffective Babrak Karma1 by Gorbachev has sought to dr ive a wedge between the Mujahideen and I Pakistan'by steadily increasing pressure on Pakistan. He sternly warned 'Pakistani President Z,ia al-Haq when they first met in March 19

85. Since then Moscow has been waging a mounting war of nerves with Pakistan. Incidents of Soviet and Afghan warplanes violating Pakistani air sp,ace jumped from 251 in 1985 to 650 in the first ten months of 19

86. Pakistani border villages have been bombed, strafed, and shelled,-killing Pakistani civilians. Dissident Pushtun tribesmen in Pakistan's tribal belt have been showered with Soviet guns and money.

Terrorist bombings along the frontier have underscored the risks of harboring the Mujahideen. An undercurrent of Pakistani resentment of the Afghan refugees has given Pakistan's leftist opposition an opportunity to score political, points by criticizing Pakistan's failure to cut a deal with Kabul that would result in the return .of the refugees to Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union has used the United Nations-sponsored talks between Kabul and IsIamabad to defuse international criticism demoralize the Mujahideen by fanning suspicions of a Pakistani 15. Jeri Laber Afghanistan's Other War New York Review of Books, December 18,-1986 p. 3 16. The New York Tima October 30,. 1986 7sellout, a nd discourage aid to the resistance. The talks have been deadlocked since 1983 by MOSCOW'S refusal to propose a reasonable timetable for withdrawal of Soviet forces. In.any event, the talks do not include the chief belligerents--the.Soviets and the Mujahi deen.

This minimizes international pressures for Soviet withdrawal and keeps Pakistan and the Mujahideen off balance.. He also talks tantalizingly -about withdrawing the Soviet forces. In a July 28th speech at Vladivostok he promised to pull out six Soviet regiments. The.troops pulled out with maximum fanfare just before the annual U.N. General Assembly vote calling for withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger has denounced the withdrawal, most of which consiste d of useless anti-aircraft units, as a ruse masking further Soviet escalation of the war. Recent hints that. the Kremlin is searching for a way out may be timed to undercut anti-Soviet demonstrations on the upcoming anniversary of the invasion Gorbachev us es the talks to hint at flexibility.

Gorbachev was not personally associated with the 1979 decision to invade Afghanistan because he was not then a full Politburo member This gives him some .latitude'in rethinking Afghanistan policy. Yet-he is not likely t o abandon his predecessors' goal of a Sovietized Afghanistan until he concludes that the war is unwinnable at an acceptable level of cost. Given the pattern of recent Soviet escalation, this is not an immediate prospect U. So POLICY AND. AFGHANISTAN The C arter Administration reacted.to the Soviet invasion by imposing limited and mainly symbolic economic and politic'al sanctions on the Soviet Union and by initiating covert aid to the Afghans.

Ronald Reagan has expanded significantly this aid effort, making Afghanistan a key component of the Reagan Doctrine's pledge to help freedom fighters. In boosting U..S. help to the Mujahideen, Reagan has received enthusiastic bipartisan congressional backing By one estimate, U.S. aid to the free Afghans has risen from $75 million in 1983 to $1&2 million in 1984, $280 million in 1985, and 470 million in 19

86. In 1987 aid will be increased substantially once again as Congress reBortedly has pencilled in more than the Administration requested.

Mujahideen signals the Krem lin that American backing of the Afghans Broad congressional support for the 17. Foreim ReDort g cit 18 Afghanistan Seven Years Later," National Securitv Record, Heritage Foundation December 1986, p. 5 8will continue unabated after the close of the Reagan Administration.

The Need for Modern WeaBons; The quality of U.S. aid is now more important than the quantity defense weapons, accurate stand-off weapons such as 81mm mortars, and modern mine detectors to help remove an estimated 2 million Soviet mines. Ra dio communications equipment is needed to improve battlefield coordination Field.hospitals staf.fed by trained Afghan medical personnel are needed to prevent casualties from turning into fatalities. Excessivebleeding and gangrene are.the two.most frequent causes of death among the Mujahideen. Improved medical support would reduce manpower losses and raise morale, both impor6ant considerations The Mujahideen need more modern air in a grinding war of attrition Traininq: Training is needed to enhance the effe c tiveness of Afghan firepower, conserve ammunition, and improve operational planning. Afghans too often fight as an uncoordinated mass of individuals rather than as part of a team leads them to take needless risks that jeopardize the success of their opera t ions. Military instructors could be drawn from the large number of Muslim nations that support the Afghan resistance encourage the emergence of the young, battle-hardened regional leaders who hold the Mujahideen together. Washington should provide direct a ssistance in a discreet manner to these commanders according to their military effectiveness and regardless of their political affiliations. Such aid should be in addition to rather than at the expense of aid furnished to the political parties headquarter e d at Peshawar always find its way inside Afghanistan, such aid is a necessary lever to encourage military cooperation between the groups Their ferocious courage Encourauinuthe Rise of Fi eld Commanders: The U.S. should Although aid channeled to the Peshaw a r groups does not Imnrovins Stavinu Power: The U.S. must bolster the resilience of the resistance. The.free Afghans need help in restoring agricultural production in areas they control. Seeds, farm tools, and agricultural training would help them rebuild v illage economies and reduce the strain on their logistical system by reducing the amount of space allocated for foodstuffs in supply caravans too little attention to establishing social, economic, medical, and educational infrastructures to provide Afghan civilians with long-term alternatives to communist rule. All groups should be encouraged to follow the example set by Ahmad Shah Massoud in inspiring, organizing and mobilizing the population of the Panjsher valley resistance is to survive, it must rely m o re on systematic organization than on charismatic leadership that can be terminated by a KHAD assassin ImBrovinu Oraanizational Abilities: The Mujahideen have paid If the The Afghans need help in training a cadre of organizers 9capable of taking charge of the long-term sociopolitical aspects of the struggle and eventually replacing the present government in Pakistan resistance, the.Afghans could not offset the loss of the Pakistani aid conduit and sanctuary, even if Iran boosted its relatively low levels o f aid the free Afghans and continues to shoulder the brunt of the economic burden imposed by three million refugees. The U.S. should help reduce these risks and lighten the economic burden. The Administration has proposed a six-year 4 billion program of mi l itary and economic aid to Pakistan focused on the economies of those Pakistani provinces bordering Afghanistan and Pakistanis, but could blunt the appeal of pro-Soviet Pushtun and Baluchi separatists by giving these ethnic minorities.more of.Ia stake in P a kistan's future Policv Toward Pakistan: The Mujahideen's struggle can be lost If Moscow coerces Pakistan to stop helping the Pakistan ,has borne significant security.risks onibehalf of The economic development portion of this aid should be This not only w o uld ease tensions between Afghan refugees U.S. military assistance is essential to the modernization of Pakistan's armed forces. It enables Islamabad to withstand MOSCOW~S coercive diplomacy and intimidation. Washington should reaffirm its 1959 bilateral d efense agreement, reaffirmed last in 1979, to assist Islamabad in the event of aggression against it should warn Moscow that the U.S. response'to an attack on Pakistan not only would be more support for Islamabad, but also direct U.S. air supply. to the M ujahideen, among other actions Washington also To reduce.Pakistani fears of a two-front war with the USSR and India, Washington should try to help ease Pakistani-Indian tensions.

For one thing, the U.S. should'warn Islamabad not to proceed with its clandes tine nuclear weapons program. For another, the U.S. should press Pakistan to ease India's suspicions about Pakistani support for Sikh separatists in.India. In return, India should freeze its own nuclear weapons program and end its hypocrisy on the Afghan- issue by throwing its diplomatic weight behind worldwide calls for Soviet troop withdrawal condemn the Soviet invasion.

Indo-Pakistani'tensions to the extent that Pakistan neglects its Afghan forward defenses, or is tempted to strike a deal with Moscow to focus on the perceived threat from India on its eastern front India has been the only democratic nation refusing to The Afghan resistance is a victim of DiRlOmatiC Pressure: The U.S. must raise MOSCOW~S diplomatic and political costs of the war. American d iplomats should inject the Afghan issue into every multilateral conference, international forum and bilateral meeting with Soviet-bloc representatives should work with other nations to expel t.he Kabul regime from its U.N seat and replace it with represen t atives of the resistance. There is a recent precedent for this. The U.N. denied a seat to the Vietnamese puppet regime in Cambodia, recognizing in its place a coalition of resistance groups The U.S The same should be done for Afghanistan I 10 - It is occa s ionally suggested that the Mujahideen should form a government in exile to give the resistance a higher international profile. Such governments, however, seldom assume power. Preferable to a government in exile would be the establishment of a rival govern ment on Afghan territory, as Jonas Savimbi has done in Angola.

Once the Mujahideen accomplished this, the U.S. should break relations with Kabul and recognize-the--new -government .i~-"The resistance' has paid too high a price to be denied this right Media Coveracre: Washington should increase coverage of the war in Voice of America and Radio Liberty radio broadcasts to the Soviet people to make them aware of the true scale of their casualties and economic losses.

Afghanistan have staged demonstrations against the draft. Although such protests have no immediate impact on Soviet policy, the Kremlin cannot help but notice them.. A link should be'established in Soviet minds between the growing economic costs of the war and their stagnant living standards U S government officials, academic specialists, and policy makers s h ould drive home the horrifying human rights situation in Afghanistan Washington should support efforts to bring wounded Afghans and Soviet deserters before Western and Third World audiences to offer first-hand accounts of Soviet war crimes. Given the scal e of the carnage, it is curious that so little attention has been paid to.

Afghanistan by human rights activists, the media, and- international organizations Parents of Soviet draftees slated for dBty in Peace Efforts: The U.S. periodically should test Sov iet willingness to negotiate an Afghanistan political settlement. But the U.S. cannot permit Moscow to win at the negotiating table what it has been unable to gain in seven years of fighting total Soviet withdrawal on a fixed and rapid time schedule with a n unconditional public commitment against future interventions and a ban on Soviet bases should be acceptable. Substantial war reparations also would be in order. External aid to the Mujahideen should be reduced only in proportion to the reduction of Sovi e t aid to. the Kabul regime Nothing less than a The U.S. focus, therefore, should be on obtaining a Soviet withdrawal. Washington should not allow itself to be diverted into specifying the precise nature of the future Kabul government foreign government ca n speak for the resistance solution would be an internationally supervised plebiscite to No One possible determine the nature of the postwar government. The Afghans should be 19. Julia Wishnevsky The War in Afghanistan in 22, 19

85. Samizdat," Radio Libert y Research, July 11 allowed to determine for themselves their own political future. Any resistance coalition that is strong and unified enough to force the Soviets to negotiate a total withdrawal should be powerful enough to deal with,the Afghan communist s once the Soviets have departed. The key is to get Soviet troops out of Afghanistan I r CONCLUSION The Soviet Union .will continue waging its war against the Afghan people as long as it believes it can win at an acceptable cost such, the U.S. must help th e Mujahideen raise the Soviet military economic and political costs of.the war effort to the point that..they outweigh the potential gains. Moscow will contemplate a negotiated withdrawal only'when. it has been denied a military solution. An expanded U.S. strategy backed by more effective U.S aid to Afghanistan does not guarantee victory to the Mujahideen Freedom Fighters. But it will give them a much better chance As James A. Phillips Senior Policy Analyst 12