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562 February 10, 1987 SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER GORBACHEV
INTRODUCTION Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev has been seeking to project an image of ccopennesslc and
flexibility on He has taken some d ramatic steps to demonstrate
that the Soviet regime's policies on'these matters are changing has
released Dr. Andrei Sakharov and his wife Elena Bonner from their
nearly seven years of internal exile. He has released the
dissidents Anatoly Shcharansky and Yuri Orlov from prison.and
internal exile and sent them to the West in exchange for Soviet
spies held here. He has released the poet Irina Ratushinskaya from
prison and allowed her to leave the Soviet Union. human rights
issues.
He Freeing a couple of int ernationally known Soviet human
rights activists guarantees worldwide headlines for most Soviet
citizens, there has been no general improvement in Soviet human
rights practices under Gorbachev It also masks the fact that
Consistent and widespread violatio ns of human rights by the
Kremlin have been a major reason for Western mistrust of the
Soviets.
Moscow has ignored its commitment, under the 1975 Helsinki Final
Act on security and cooperation in Europe, to respect human rights
and fundamental freedoms, in cluding freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion, as well as the free flow of ideas and
people across state borders.
While Gorbachev's policy of Glasnost, the Russian word for ills
in the Soviet Union, the Kremlin continues to harass, imprison and
eve n torture human rights activists, independent peace activists
religious believers; would-be emigrants, and free thinkers. Indeed
shortly before Sakharovls release, Anatoly Marchenko, a prominent
human rights activist, died in prison after a long hunger st rike
has allowed the Soviet mass media to write about social And the
flow of emigres from the Soviet Union practically has be'en
stopped.
At the same time, Gorbachev's regime is using new public
relations tactics to shield itself from international censure . In
the past, high-ranking Soviet officials shunned any discussion of
human rights abuses. Now these oeficiafs, including Gorbachev,
distort and lie about these issues to Western audiences; Example:
In an interview with the French communist daily L'Human i te in
February 1986 Gorbachev stated that Andrei Sakharov was exiled to
Gorky "in accordance with Soviet law" and that Sakharov was
Illiving in normal conditions and "was conducting scientific
work.11 This was untrue Sakharov was never tried, and there is no
law in the Soviet criminal code permitting internal exile of
indefinite duration and isolation from practically all human
contacts. Sakharov could not really engage in scientific work
because he was largely isolated from his calleaves, and his life
und er the KGB cameras was anything but normal tough stance toward
the Soviet Union has helped Soviet dissi,dents.
The Reagan Administration thus should continue its policy on
human rights: openly criticize Soviet human rights abuses; demand
that the Soviets f ulfill the human rights provisions contained in
the 1975 Helsinki Final Act; deny the Soviets the most favored
nation treatment MFN) in trade relations until they permit free
emigration; insist on including human rights issues in the agenda
of high-level S oviet-American meetings; and retain the issue of
human rights as the centerpiece of the Helsinki process. It is only
continuing and unremitting pressure by the U.S. and,the West on
human rights that may lead to improvements in individual situations
and th e possibility of long-term systemic change After his release
from exile, Sakharov said that Ronald Reagapls HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Observance of human rights is not only a
moral issue, but a crucial indicator of a nation's intention s .
According to Reagan: 'la government that will break faith with its
own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers.113
This has been underscored for 1. For detailed information on the
conditions of Sakharov's exile, see the recent book by Elena
Bonner, Alone Together (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1986 2. Gary Lee,
"Sakharov Wearied By Exile Years," The Washineton Po& December
28,, 1986 3. "Transcript of President's Broadcast on Talks with
Gorbachev in Iceland," The New York Time& October 14, 19 8 6.
years by such Soviet human rights activists as Sakharov, who said
that as'long as a country has no civil liberty, no freedom of
information and no independent press, then there exists no
effective body of public opinion to control the conduct of the go v
ernment Such a situation. is a menace to international security.
114 of internal exile in the city of Gorky is a welcome
humanitarian action. But Sakharov himself has noted that this
should be viewed in the context of the long-term Kremlin repression
of h uman rights and the continuing imprisonment of thousands of
prisoners of conscience.
Whether, as Sakharov mused, his inlproved treatment is a
llpropaganda ployll or whether it marks a potential change in
MOSCOW~S overall human rights policies remains to be seen
Sakharovls release on December 19, 1986, after nearly seven years
CONTINUED SOVIET REPRESSION Soviet There has been no reduction
during Gorbachevls nearly 23 months in power in the number of
political prisoners incarcerated for their political or re ligious
beliefs or attempts to leave the Soviet Union.
Natan (Anatoly) Shcharansky, using the data he collected while
in Soviet prisons and forced labor camps, has estimgted the number
of these prisoners to be between 10,000 and 20,0
00. No international organization, such as the Red Cross or
Amnesty Internationa1,'is permitted to collect data on the
condition of Soviet prisoners of conscience The KGB has cut off
many possible channels for passing information on human rights
violation s from the Soviet Union to the information within the
USSR West and has virtually destrfyed the network for gathering
such Persecution of Human Rishts Advocates Gorbachevls regime has
continued persecuting human rights advocates. After the signing of
the H elsinki Final Act in 1975 nongovernmental 81Helsinki groupsll
were established in Moscow (the Russian Federation), the Ukraine,
Lithuania, Georgia, and Armenia to monitor Soviet adherence to the
principles.of human rights.
Helsinki groups no longer function because of state
persecution.
These 4. Cited by Secretary of State George Shultz in his
address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on October 31,
1986 5. Cited in Radio Libertv Research Bulletin, 1986, No. 188,
pp.1-4 6 USSR News Brief, 1985, No. 21, p. 2 3Though a few members
of these groups have left the Soviet Union (the last to leave was
Yuri Orlov, released last October 37 Helsinki monitors remain in
prison or in internal exile to power, two Helsinki monitors,
Anatoly Marchenko of Moscow and V asyl Stus of the Ukrainian
Helsinki group have died'in prison; three Helsinki monitors from
Georgia (Eduard Gudava, Tenghiz Gudava, and Emmanuel Tvaladze) and
two monitors from the Ukraine (Mykola Horbal and Iosif Zisels) have
been arrested and sentenced to prison ZQzsum Since Gorbachev came
Gorbachev is making wide use of a law first introduced by General
Secretary Yuri Andropov in 1983, under which political prisoners
can be kept behind bars indefinitely by resentencing them for
%alicious disobedience1
to prison administration. And on August 6, 1985, the USSR
Council of Ministers issued secret dpcree No. 736, banning former
political prisoners from visiting Moscow.
Amnesty International, along with the Helsinki Watch, a New York
City-based organization monitoring compliance with the Helsinki
Final Act, recently complained about the numerous cases of torture
of political prisoners in the Soviet Union. Torture takes place
especially frequently during the pre-trial period, when a pr,isoner
who refuses to c ooperate with the investigation, is beaten by
specially selected criminal convicts or by prison officials.
While Soviet officials in the West deny that there is any
torture in their country, Soviet newspapers, given a little bit
m0r.e leeway by Gorbachev t o criticize Itbureaucratic abuses have
revGaled that prisoners are9sometimes beaten and exposed to the
cold to force them to %onf ess It.
RESTRICTIONS ON EMIGRATION Gorbachev has cut the flow of emigres
from the Soviet Union to a trickle,. Only 1,140 Jews were allowed
to leave in 1985, compared to the'peak of 51,320 in 1979 year in
1985, compared to 7,226 in 19
79. Those who have expressed their Even fewer
Jews--914--emigrated last The emigration of ethnic Germans to West
Germany is down to 460 7. Radio L ibertv Research Bulletin, 1986,
No. 181 8. Amn estv Internationai ReDort 1986 (London: Amnesty
International Publications, 1986 p. 310; "A Helsinki Report
Criticizes Soviet," The New York Time$, November 6, 1986 9. G.
Tselms, "Chastnoe opredelenie, kotoro g o ne bylo," Literaturnava
pa zeta, January 15, 1986; Ye. Zhbanov Krivoe zerkalo," Jzvestiva,
July 21, 1986 4desire to leave the Soviet Unionlobut are not
allowed to do so now comprise a suffering underclass. Many of those
who seek an exit visa lose their j obs; their children are harassed
in schools and expelled from colleges. Those who dare to protest
are punished more severely. Last year, Roald Zelichonok of
Leningrad was sentenced to threellyears of forced labor for writing
appeals for help to the West O n November 6, 1986, to coincide with
the opening of the Helsinki review conference in Vienna, Moscow
published new regulations on emigration, typeted by Soviet
officials as a major liberalization. In reality, the new
regulations severely reduce the grounds for emigration, limiting it
to reunification of husbands and wives, parents and children,
brothers and sisters. The regulations spell out the government's
right to deny em-igration not only for reasons of "state security a
pretext much abused in the past) , but also "in the interest of
insuring the protection of social order, health or the morals of
the population.t413 This enables the government to deny emigration
visas without any specific reason.
PERSECUTION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS Gorbachev has taken som e
tentative steps toward a less repressive religious policy. Until
recently, religious education of children had children over age ten
believers continues. On September 27, 1986, the Russian
Orthodox.
Deacon Vladimir Rusak was sentenced to seven years of forced
labor and five years of internal exile for a letter he wrote to the
World Council of Churches aeploring the condition of the Orthodox
believers in the Soviet Union been banned. There arfi signs,
however, that this has been lifted for Yet harsh pers e cution of
religious 10. Cited by Secretary of State George Shultz in his
address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, October 31, 1986
11. USSR News Brief, 1985 No. 15/16, pp. 1, 2 12. Until now, there
have been no published regulations on emigration from the Soviet
Union 13. Serge Schmemann Soviet Union Lists Formal New Rules on
Who May Leave," The New York Times November 9, 1986 14. Radio
Libertv Research Bullctin, 1986, No. 359 15. Radio Libe rtv
Research Bulletiq 1986, No. 408, p. 6 5- Soviet Jews have continued
to be persecuted for 'observing their religion and culture
sentenced to.three years of hard labor for, among other things
teaching Hebrew to other Jews the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Elie
Wiesel who was visiting the Soviet Union, she was as s aulted on
the street-a frequent KGB punishment for Jewish activists. Another
teacher of.Hebrew, Alexey Magarik, was sentenced 1bst year to
imprisonment on trumped-up charges of drug possession In October
1985, Leonid Volvovsky of Gorky was After his wife talked by
telephone with Perhaps the most persecuted religious group is the
llunofficiallv Baptists. llOfficialln Baptists accept government
regulation of religious life, but '
unofficialt
Baptists insist on religious freedom from government
interference . Throughout 1985 and 1986, many lwunofficialtf
Baptists have been arrested and sentenced to prison; a Baptist
prayer house in the Black Sealport city of Odessa was destroyed by
police in April of 1986 NEW SOVIET TACTICS While the reality of the
Soviet's systematic,violations.of human rights remains unchanged,
Gorbachev has launched a public relations drive to improve the
Soviet image.
Selective Releases of Prisoners and Refuseniks An important
element of the public relations campaign is the highly publicized
release of some prisoners. In the past, the Soviets occasionally
released prisoners of conscience from prison and granted exit vi s
as to Jewish refuseniks (Soviet Jews whose visa applications
previously had been turned down) in response to requests from
American politicians, but Moscow never acknowledged doing this.
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told a New York
audience last September 30, however, that the Soviet Union
Ilsometimes takes into consideration requests of the U.S.
Administration, some appealsl$y members of Congress on behalf of
dissidents and refuseniks. This statement signals that Moscow seeks
to score publi c relations points with American policy makers and
mass media by resolving selected cases of human rights violations.
The Soviets also apparently hope to reap political dividends by
exchanging some of their political prisoners 16. Natan (Anatoly)
Shcharans k y Human Rights, Arms Talks Must Be Linked," The Wall
Street Journal," November 4, 1986 17. Radio Libertv Research
Bulletin, 1986, No. 405 18. "Press-konferentsiya .A. Shevardnadze,"
Izvestiva, October 2, 1986 6for Soviet spies imprisoned in the
West. Thes e actions then are trumpeted as goodwill gestures. This
was the case with the exchanges of Natan (Anatoly).Shcharansky and
Yuri Orlov for Soviet and East European spies.
Feiunina llOr>ennessll on Human -Riuhts Until very -recently,
any attempt to raise hum an rights concerns publicly with Soviet
officials triggered shrill warnings against llinterferingll in
Soviet domestic affairs. Now Soviet officials confront the issue
calmly-with 'falsehoods and half-truths.
Example: In his interview to the French communist daily I
L1Humaniste1
in February 1986, Gorbachev stated that those- imprisoned for
political offenses in the Soviet Union had called for Ilsubversion
or destruction1
of the Soviet state human rights abuses, exercising religious
freedom, or attempt ing to leave the Soviet Union-the sights
guaranteed in the Helsinki Final Act-are acts of subversion This is
true only if criticizing The Soviets employed their new
nonconfrontational approach during a Soviet-press conference in
Vienna at the beginning of the Helsinki review c.onference.
Traditionally, Soviet officials have staged dramatic walk-outs when
confronted with questions of Soviet abuses of human rights. But in
Vienna, the Soviet spokesmen responded by citing the Soviet policy
of facilitating emig r ation and the absence of censorship in the
Soviet Union. In truth, of course, Moscow blocks most emigration
and censors everything traditional combative response to questions
about human rights, the Soviets disarmed their critics. Wrote the
New York Ti me s : "With no one to fight with, the little band of
protesters folded up their posters and left. llZo By abandoning
their Goinu on 'the Offensive At the same time, Moscow has taken a
tough stand on changing the definition of fundamental human rights.
Instead of addressing such traditional rights as freedoms of
speech, religion, and movement Moscow stresses that what is truly
important are 'lhumanitarian issues.lI families and cultural
exchanges. Gorbachev here apparently is This Moscow defines
nagrowly as pro b lems affecting divided 19. Kommunist 1986 No. 3,
p. 18 20. James M. Markham, "Soviet Spokesmen Joust with Critics,"
The New York Times November 11, 1986 21. See the speech of Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the opening of the Vienna
conference, in Pravda, November 6, 1986 7attempting to lure the
West into protracted haggling'over family reunification.
established within the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is
headed by Yuri Kashlev, who led the Soviet delegation to an
international conference on human contacts in Bern, Switzerland, in
spring 1986 espionage charges and is believed to be a KGB
officer.
Department apparently will be responsible for masking Soviet
human rights abuses with nonconfrontational rhetoric and for
diverting Western atten tion away from fundamental human rights
toward humanitarianIg issues Last June, a Depa,rtment for
Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs was Fifteen years earlier, he had
been oustefi fromiBritain on This SOVIET GOALS 1) Divertinu th e
Helsinki Pr ocess from H u man R iuhts The Soviets' only interest
in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act was that document's recognition of
the post-World War I1 division of Europe. According to former
Soviet Ambassador Arkady Shevchenko, who defected to the U.S. in
1978, Westeq resolve to hold the Soviets accountable for violating
the human rights provision of the Helsinki Final Ac& came as an
unpleasant and embarrassing surprise to the Kremlin Now the Soviets
are trying to make the Helsinki process more to their liking.
First, the Soviets are striving to downgrade fundamental human
rights to the lwhumanitarianll issues. Speaking at the Vienna
conference opening, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze proposed
convening a special conference on humanitarian affairs in
Moscow.
Soviets' extremely limited interpretation of human rights and to
keep Western nongovernmental human rights organizations away from
the review process, since their activity would be impossible or
severely restricted in Moscow.
Second, the Soviets hope to decouple the linkage, enunciated by
the Helsinki Final Act, between human rights and European
security.
With review of human rights performance effectively delayed
until the proposed humanitarian conference in Moscow, the Soviets
would find it easier to tilt the Vienna con ference toward
exclusive preoccupation The Kremlin obviously hopes to win Western
recognition of the 22. Radio Libertv Research Bulletin, 1986, No.
248 23. Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Alfred
Knopf, 1985 pp 264-267 a- with Soviet pla n s for new arms control
schemes in. Europe 2 Quiet DirdomacV The Soviets strive to create
an impression of a I1dialoguet1 with the United States on human
rights and thus foster a climate for "quiet diplomacy." This would
make human rights exclusively the i s sue of private discussions
between Soviet .and Western diplomats and would spare the Kremlin
from public criticism for human rights abuses 3) Blaminu the U.S.
for Soviet Abuses The Soviets would like shift the blame for their
abuses of human rights onto t h e Reagan Administration by linking
the lack of progress in this area to the American refusal to give
up the Strategic Defense Initiative For instance, after no arms
control agreement was reached at Reykjavik, the Soviets hinted to
Western reporters that n o progress on human rights could be
reached without an arms control deal eliminating the SDI 4) E a sis
0 The Soviets want to allow Gorbachev to concentrate on arms
control in his meetings with the U.S. by relegating
11humanitarian18 discussions to routine mid-level working groups of
professional diplomats. In such discussions the pressure to reach
any progress would be lower than at top-level talks.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS To maintain U.S. and Western pressure on
Moscow to improve its human rights practices , the U.S. should 0 0
0 Keep the issues of human rights high on the Soviet-American
negotiating agenda. Raising individual cases with the Soviet
leaders is necessary and can bring positive results. More
important, the Soviets should be reminded constantly that they must
fulfill the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act
Protect the integrity of the Helsinki process, which realistically
links relaxation of international tensions to strict observance of
human rights.
Emphasize human rights in thei r entirety as a key subject of
U.S.-Soviet discussions, since the Soviet definition of
Inhumanitarian affairs is limited to family reunification problems
9Reject the Soviet invitation to hold a Moscow conference on
humanitarian affairs within the Helsinki framework until all Soviet
prisoners of conscience are released; large-scale emigration from
the Soviet Union is renewed; and guarantees are received for
freedom of activities for nongovernmental organizations in Moscow,
freedom of contacts between. Weste rn delegations and nongovernment
organizations, and full uncensored coverage of the conference in
the Soviet mass media.
Avoid the trap of quiet diplomacy on human rights diplomacy
might be appropriate to gain the release of specific prisoners of
conscienc e or to increase emigration, Washington should continue
to insist that the Soviets fulfill completely the human rights
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and publicly criticize Soviet
violations of human rights. Otherwise, it would appear that the
press u re on the Soviets to correct their human rights abuses had
been turned off I While quiet CONCLUSION Human rights are
systematically violated in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. There
has been almost no improvement since the KGB campaign to eradicate
all dissent was begun in 1979 Gorbachev and his advisors are using
new public relations tactics to reduce the damage to the Soviet
world image over their poor human rights record of conscience and
refuseniks; narrowing the issue of human rights to such
humanitarian issues as family reunification; removing human
rights from the agenda of top-level Soviet-American discussions by
creating mid-level working groups on humanitarian affairs; having
high-ranking Soviet officials, even including Gorbachev, prese n t
a false picture of Soviet human rights abuses, rather than shunning
questions about them as before; and diverting the Helsinki process
away from human rights issues At the same time This 'new strategy
includes releasing select prisoners The U.S. should r espond to the
new Soviet tactics with its own strict agenda: conducting all human
rights discussions at top-level U.S.-Soviet meetings; linking
security issues with human rights within the Helsinki process:
criticizing Soviet human rights violations publi cly; and insisting
that strict implementation of human rights provisions of the
Helsinki Final Act is central to East-West relations.
Mikhail Tsypkin, Ph D Salvatori Fellow in Soviet Studies I
10