(Archived document, may contain errors)
794 October 5,1990 Fn7E n!llLEmY LESSONS OF THE IRAQ CRISIS
INTRODUCTION When Iraqs Saddam Hussein ordered his forces into
Kuwait on August 2, he triggered an American response that put to
the test years of United States militaq prepara tion for just such
an emergency. Although shots have not been fired -yet the dispatch
of American troops to the Persian Gulf already has taught the U.S a
number of lessons that apply to the defense budget and to the
longer-term debate over the missions, o rganization, and arming of
Americas armed forces in a post-Cold War world.
So far Operation Desert Shield justifies many of the crucial
military decisions made over the past decade or so: bolstering
airlift capabilities; expanding realistic training; stati oning
floating bases stocked with military equipment around the world;
and equipping American forces with modem and technologically
sophisti cated equipment.These and other dividends of the U.S.
defense investment of the 1980s enable America to confront S addam
With overwhelming military force, stop ping further aggression.
Only America, the worlds remaining superpower, can carry out such
an extensive and sophisticated military operation.
Shortcomings in Preparedness. Operation Desert Shield also reveals
so me shortcomings in Americas military preparedness. Despite the
purchase of eight fast sealift cargo ships over the past decade,
the U.S. came up-short on the ships needed to move such heavy
weapons as tanks and artillery quickly to the Middle East. The U. S
. finds, meanwhile, that a failure to resolve nagging issues like
whether or not to field a new light tank can have serious
consequences when war suddenly seems imminent. And the U.S. finds
itself less than fully prepared to protect its soldiers, sailors,
and airmen against the threat of an Iraqi attack with ballistic
missiles and chemical weapons If Saddam fails to. withdraw his army
from Kuwait, and George Bush is com pelled to order into battle the
military forces now assembled in the Persian Gulf the t est of
combat undoubtedly will provide new lessons to be learned. For now
some lessons already are evident White House should go easy on
defense cuts confidence that is Bushs strongest suit in his
confrontation with Saddam.
Precipitous cuts in the defense budget will threaten the military
capabilities that have allowed the U.S. to react swiftly and
decisively to Saddams aggression against Kuwait Lesson #1: The U.S.
defense investment of the 1980s paid o
Congress and the American military power, rebuilt during the 198Os,
undergirds the ~tional self Lesson #2: America has a leading
military role in a post-Cold War world.
Only the U.S. has the military force and global stature to lead the
international coalition now opposing Iraqi aggression. American
milita ry power will be essential to maintaining regional and
global stability even if the Soviet military threat con tinues to
recede.
Lesson #3: Power projection should be Americas top military
priority in the 1990s.
Americas heavy investment in power projection -forces that allow
the U.S. to respond quickly to military crises around the globe,
including aircraft carriers, the Marine Corps, and airlift -proved
its value during Operation Desert Shield.
Serious deficiencies in U.S. power projection, however, ha ve
become apparent particularly the shortage of fast sealift ships to
move such heavy military equip ment as tanks, armored personnel
carriers, and artillery quickly into combat. As the U.S. reduces
its reliance on forward bases in Europe, the Philippines and else
where, the importance of power projection will grow, and with it
the importance of sealift, airlift, and such programs as the V-22
Osprq, a new aircraft needed to transport Marines from ship to
shore.
Lesson #4: Technology matters, even against Third World foes.
Outnumbered in men and equipment, as they are on the Saudi
peninsula American forces still can be confident of victory,
largely because of their tech nological edge. This should prompt a
recons ideration of several advanced weapons that either the
Pentagon or Congress has considered cancelling in light of the
decreasing Soviet threat. Some of these include: FOG-M, an
anti-tank missile in development; J-STARS, an new airborne radar
that sees deep into enemy ter ritory; and ATACMS, a deadly-accurate
Army missile with a range of over 100 miles.
Lesson #5: The U.S. must be better prepared to meet a worldwide
nuclear biological, chemical, and ballistic missile threat.
U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia find themselves less prepared than they
ought to be to meet Iraqs formidable chemical weapon and ballistic
missile threat. These Iraqi weapons, as well as Iraqs advanced
nuclear weapons program, highlight the need 2 for the U.S..and its
allies to: maintain cr e dible retaliatory forces; build defenses
against ballistic missiles; stop exports that could be used to
create mass destruc tion weapons; and take preemptive militaq
action if necessary to eliminate poten tial nuclear, biological,
chemical, or ballistic m i ssile threats from such unstable leaders
as Saddam or Libyas Muammar Qadhafi LEARNING FROM THE PAST From its
military successes, like 1st years Panama operation, and its
failures like the death of 240 Marines in Lebanon in 1983, America
invariably has lea rned lessons. A key lesson learned tom these
past crises is that once a decision is made to challenge an
aggressor, halfway measures will not do. If force is to be used or
threatened, overwhelming power must be brought to bear swiftly and
decisively.
Alrea dy, this lesson has been confirmed in the Persian Gulf.
Saddams forces still are in Kuwait, but he has not sent them to
Saudi Arabia. Americas first objective stopping Saddam in his
tracks, has been achieved through a massive deployment of U.S.
military f orces.
Some have immediate implications, such as putting more money in
this years defense budget for sealift and airlift. Others have
longer-term implications, such as emuring that the U.S. and its
allies act more forcefully to stop the spread of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons. Among the lessons of Iraq Lesson
#1: The U.S. defense investment of the 1980s paid off; Congress and
the White House thus should go easy on defense cuts.
Saddam is a tough foe. As of late September, he had 430,000 troops
within strik ing distance of Kuwait, alyng with more than 3,500
tanks, 1,800 armored vehicles and 1,450 artillery pieces.
Challenging Saddams forces is requiring the most rapid deployment
of major military forces in history. The U.S. has been able to ac c
omplish this buildup in the Persian Gulf because of its defense
investment of the 1980s. Precipitous cuts in the defense budget
will jeopardize the gains that made this possible.
In late July, the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf area
consisted o f a handful of cruisers, guided missile frigates, and a
single destroyer. By the end of August, one month after Saddam sent
his armies into Kuwait, the U.S. had amassed tremendous firepower
in the region, including: three aircraft carrier bat tle groups a n
d the battleship Wisconsh at sea; about five tactical aircraft
wings on the Saudi peninsula, including F-15 and F-16 Fighting
F&on fighters, A-10 Thunderbolt ground-attack aircraft, and
F-117 Stealrh fighter-bombers; nearly a In the course of the
American deployment, new lessons are becoming apparent 1 Figures
provided by Pentagon spokesman on September 25.The figures
represent troop in Kuwait and southern Iraq, and supplement the
testimony of Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney to the Senate
Armed Service s Committee, September ll, 19
90. Cheney gave the following mes for forces actually in Kuwait:
174,W troops; over lJ00 tanks and l,m other armored vehicles; 778
artillery pieces 3 full Marine Expeditionary Force of 50,OOO
troops; most of an Army mechanized division with its complement of
300 tanks and 300 armored fighting vehicles; and elements of two
Army infantry divisions, one with tank-killingApache helicopters.
Many of the capabilities that are making this buildup possible were
attained during the 198 0s. Combat readiness was improved; Navy
aircraft "mission capable" rates were raised by 66 percent. Airlift
was beefed-up with the addition of 19 C-5B GaIary and 51 KC-10
&e&r aircraft, which along with others already on older
nearly doubled U.S. airlift capacity to about 47 million ton-miles
per day. Eight fast sealift ships were purchased from a private
shipping company.
Modem M-1 tanks and fighter aircraft such as Air Force F-15 Eizgh
and Navy F 18 Home& entirely replaced older generations of
equipment throughout the active force. Maritime Prepositioning
Forces (MPF or "floating bases" were dispatched to the Atlantic,
Pacific, and Indian Oceans, each with 30 days of supplies for a
Marine Expeditionary Brigade of 15,OOO troops; these supplied the
equipme n t for the first Marines to arrive in the Persian Gulf.
Moreover, U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia are ready to fight: every
Army division there has been through the Nation al Training Center
(NTC) within the past eighteen months.The NTC, established at Fort
Ir win California in 1981, provides realistic desert training for
U.S. forces against mock divisions armed with Soviet weapons and
trained in Soviet tactics just like the Iraqis.
Threat of Budget Cuts. To be sure, some things could have been done
better.
The U.S still is critically short of fast sealift -ships to
transport troops and equip ment quickly to combat. U.S. forces
still lack a light tank that can be moved in large numbers by The
military is not as ready as it should be to face chemical weapons.
Bu t by and large, the U.S. has provided the training and equipment
that its soldiers need to protect their lives and to defeat such
foes as the Iraqis.This is more than could have been said a decade
ago. The defense spending increases that made this buildup p
ossible peaked in the mid-1980s. Since 1986, U.S. defense spending
has dropped by 7.6 percent, and further cuts are coming.The Iraqi
crisis ly. But such cuts still are on the table. Example: The House
of Representatives ver sion of this year's Defense Aut h orization
Bill would reduce the size of the Army by 68,500 next year, meaning
that nearly one in ten GIs would lose their jobs in a single year.
I If these cuts had been made in 1990, the 24th Mechanized Infantry
Division, the first Army heavy division to reach the Gulf, would
have arrived significantly short on manpower and commensurately low
on morale. Despite the crisis in the Per sian Gulf, a declining
Soviet military threat will pennit the U.S. over the next five
years to reduce the size of its armed f orces perhaps as much as 25
percent and to cut as much as $170 billion or so from the defense
budget, excluding the costs of I highlights what the U.S. could
lose if these cuts are made precipitously or unwise- I 2 Ton-miles
per day is the accepted measur e of airlilt capaaty, arrived at by
multiplying the number of tons moved by the number of miles they
were transported 4 .the Persian Gulf operation or other unexpected
crises. But Operation Desert Shield should serve as a reminder that
ill-considered cuts in Pentagon spending will threaten the gains
that make possible Bushs decisive military response to Iraqi
aggression.
Lesson #2: America has a leading military role in a postlCold War
world.
Given the Soviet Unions deteriorating political and economic
situation, the U.S. may soon by default find itself the worlds only
superpower. Even if the Soviet Union holds together and retains
much of its formidable military power, it is not likely to eng a ge
in open aggression itself in the next few years, or to con tinue
providing as much overt diplomatic and military support as it has
in the past to such aggressive client states as Iraq. Less
concerned about finding themselves at war with Moscow, America and
its allies will have greater freedom of action in confronting
aggressors who threaten to upset the global or regional stability
sup porting such Western interests as freedom of the seas, access
to resources, and the suMval of democracy.
Ultimately, th e Iraqi crisis is not likely to stand as a paradigm
for most security threats that America will face in coming years:
countering terrorism and narcotics traffic, protecting Americans
abroad, or intervention with relatively small and lightly-armed
forces a s in Grenada or Panama. The U.S. likely will address these
threats unilaterally or in cooperation with a few other states
directly involved. But for the rare, major military operation like
Operation Desert Shield, Bush has set an important precedent in dem
anding that Western allies and regional partners contribute their
fair share.
Limits of Cooperation. At Bushs urging, 25 nations now are involved
militarily in the effort to reign in Saddam. Bush also is making
effective political use of the United Nations , taking the lead in
organizing an international embargo against Iraq under Chapter 7 of
the United Nations Charter. Bush also has shown that he understands
the limits of effective international cooperation, carefully
avoiding so far the creation of a Uni t ed Nations command in the
Persian Gulf. A U.N. com mand would tie Americas hands if military
action were required, particularly if the command included Soviet
forces. Moscow still cannot be counted upon as an ally against
Iraq. In fact, at least 1,OOO Sov iet military and intelligence
advisors remain in Iraq supporting the Iraqi war effort against the
U.S. and its allies, along with another 6,000 Sovjet technical
advisors, many of whom are involved in the Iraqi defense industry.
Regional military cooperatio n with the U.S. is particularly
impressive. Saudi Arabia is making U.S. forces welcome on its
territory, committing its own forces to the front, shutting down
Saddams pipeline across the Arabian peninsula, supply ing U.S.
forces in the Gulf with all the f u el they need, and increasing
oil supplies 3 House Republican Research cOmmittee,Task Force
OnTerrorism and Unconventional Warfar h Smer Unions Suppi for the
Iroqi Invasion, September 6,1990 5 to make up for the loss of Iraqi
and Kuwaiti oil on world marke t s. Other Arab states, including
Egypt and Syria, are sending divisions to Saudi Arabia. Israel also
is playing a critical role through its implicit commitment to
attack Iraqi forces if they cross into Jordan, obviating the need
to station U.S. forces on I raqs western front.
Prompt Response. NATO allies Britain and Turkey supported the U.S.
effort against Iraq from the start. A week after the
Iraqi,invasion,Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal agreed to shut
down Iraqi oil pipelines throughTurkey. Britain als o needed no
prodding, providing warships and squadrons of Tonzado and Jaguar at
tack aircraft within the first weeks of the crisis, to which it
added in mid-Septem ber a ground force of 6,000 elite
desert-fighting troops and 120 tanks.
In the face of heav y U.S. diplomatic pressure, loud complaints in
Congress, and continued Iraqi belligerence, other Western allies
gradually are expanding their commitments. France, which sent seven
warships including the carrier CZemn cetw early in the crisis,
decided on S e ptember 16 to send a 4,OOO-man light ar mored
brigade to Saudi Arabia. Perhaps most significantly, West Germany
and Japan are breaking with their non-interventionist post-war
policies to pledge sig nificant contributions to the American-led
effort to oust Saddam. After a Septem ber 16 visit to BOM by
Secretary of State James Baker, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
promised $2 billion and the use of German transport planes and
ships for U.S. forces.The money will go to the U.S. and to such
countries as Eg y pt Jordan, and Turkey that are hard hit
economically by the worldwide embargo of Iraq. Japanese Prime
MinisterToshiki Kaifu on September 14 added $3 billion to Tokyos
initial pledge of $1 billion to support the Gulf effort. Japan also
plans to send milita ry support personnel to help U.S. and
international forces in Saudi Arabia.
Lesson #3: Power projection will be Americas top military priority
in the postlCold War world.
With the U.S. thinning its forces based in Europe, the Pacific Rim,
and else where around the globe, America will become ever more
reliant on the capability to project military force rapidly into
trouble spots to deter wars or to fight them.
The Gulf operation demonstrates the value of such power projection
forces as Navy aircraft carrie rs, Marines, rapidly-deployable Army
divisions, and Air Force F-11 1 bombers. A Navy aircraft carrier
was on the scene in the Persian Gulf, ready to provide air cover
for the deployment of ground forces, even as Secretary of Defense
Richard Cheney travele d to Saudi Arabia one week after the Iraqi
in vasion of Kuwait. By August 8, a day after the U.S. decision to
send forces to Saudi Arabia, troops from the 82nd Airborne Division
the armys fast response force were on the ground at the Saudi port
of Al Jubay l . A brigade of about 15,000 Marines quickly moved
into the port, where they matched up with tanks and other equipment
unloaded from maritime prepositioning ships sent from the U.S. base
on Britains Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. Meanwhile, Air
Force bombers and fighters moved into position in Egypt, Turkey,
and prepared bases in Saudi Arabia. The operation validated years
of planning and preparation by the U.S.
Central Command, which was created in 1983 to defend U.S. Middle
East inter 6 ests, and now is led by General Norman SchwarkkopE,
the top U.S. commander in the Persian Gulf.
Too often, however, efforts to improve "power proje&on" have
focussed on so called "light" forces, like the 82nd Airborne
Division, lacking M-l tanks or power ful artiller y. But an army
the size of Saddam's cannot be countered by light forces alone.
During the first weeks of the U.S. deployment, light U.S. forces in
Saudi Arabia were highly vulnerable. While superior U.S. air power
would have helped blunt an Iraqi advance d uring this time, Air
Force and Navy fighters would first have had to gain control of the
air, and even then might not have been able to stop Iraqi armor on
the ground.To ensure the defeat of Iraq's ground forces, the U.S
needs its own "heavy" forces -"ann o red" and "mechanized"
divisions contain ing M-1 Abmms main battle tanks, Bmdley infantry
fightinglehicles, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS and other
heavy artillery. But the first Army heavy forces elements of the
24th Mechanized Division did not arr ive until August 25, or 24
days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and still were not fully
deployed by mid-September.
Sealift Crisis. It makes little sense to move heavy divisions by
air; even the huge C-5 Galary airlifter can carry only two M-1
These di visions must be moved by sea. The 24th Mechanized Division
was sent to Saudi Arabia aboard eight "fast sealift" ships known as
SG7s, one of which broke down and had to be towed across the
Atlantic. Few other heavy forces yet have made it to Iraq, largely
because of a lack of sealift.This inability to move heavy forces
quickly is the most serious deficiency in U.S. force posture
exposed by the Iraqi crisis.
The Navy's eight fast sealift ships were purchased in 1981 and 1982
from a com mercial shipping company.These ships can travel at 33
knots, compared to 20 knots for most modem cargo ships, and as
little as 10 to 15 knots for older ships.
The result: the f ast sealift ships can steam to the Middle East
from the U.S. in about eleven days. Seventeen other modem cargo
ships capable of about 20 knots were supposed to have been
available from what is known as the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF only
three were readied o n time. As a result, tanks and other equip
ment of the 1st Armored Cavahy Division have been waiting in
Houston, Texas since the end of August without transport. Because
of a lack of sealift, the 1st Ar mored Cavalry's equipment will
have to wait for SG7s returning from their first trip to the
Persian Gulf before moving out.
Bargain Ships. The U.S. needs more fast sealift, perhaps up to
three times the curtent eight ships. Congress authorized $600
million last year for fast sealift, but Bush shifted $217 m illion
of this into other accounts used to pay military person nel costs.
This money should be reinstated in the fiscal 1991 budget, as well
as money for further procurement. Fast sealift is a bargain. A fast
sealift ship costs be tween $100 million and $ 2 00 million
depending on design? Its cost is comparable 4 A typical "rnechanbd
division contains 290 tanks, an "armored" division contains 348
tanks 5 See "Saudi Deployment H-ts Fast Sea-lift Funding Debate
Dqfmse Duify, August 10,1990, p. 232 7 1 to the $ 174 million cost
of a single C-17 cargo plane, now in development.The fast sealift
ship carries 20,000 tons of cargo to the C-17s 86 tons.
As a short-term measure, the U.S. should purchase available modem
sealift ships (fast sealift ships have to be commissioned since
none are available on the open market) for the Ready Reserve Fleet
(RRF Also, the fiscal 19
91. Pentagon budget should include at a minimum the $225 million
requested by the White House for the RRF, to modernize the fleet
and boost readiness. In 1990, Congress neglected the RFW, cutting
its budget to $89 billion from the $239 billion re quested by the
President.
The Pentagon also should look into shifting responsibility for the
RRF from the Maritime Administration to the Navy, which may bette r
ensure that modem cargo ships are kept ready to go in the event of
a crisis. Over the longer-term, the U.S should join research forces
with Japan, which has done extensive development work on ultra fast
sealift, ships that would travel at speeds in exce ss of 35 knots
enabling them to outrun most attack submarines.
Importance of Airlift. The Iraqi crisis demonstrates U.S. forces
heavy reliance on airlift. U.S. C-5 Gaky and C-141 Starl
er, operating at surge levels that saw a cargo plane landing in
Saudi Arabia every ten minutes, brought 75,080 troops and 65,000
tons of equipment to Saudi Arabia in just over one month. The U.S
also relied, as planned, on chartered commercial airliners to ferry
troops to the Middle East. This included 38 of the Boeing 747s and
other wide-body civilian aircraft of the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet
(CRAF) that have been modified to meet military requirements vice
life. No plans exist to extend the life of the C-141 through what
is known as a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP or to re-open
production lines for the C 5 Gdiq. In the absence of these plans,
the only option for preserving or expand ing U.S. airlift is to
procure the C-17, which should have its first flight next year.
The Pentagons Major Aircraft Review in April cut the size of the
planned C-17 fleet from 210 to 120, bringing its cost down from
$41.8 billion to about $30 billion.
The size of the fleet may have to be revised upward again, however,
as a result of what has been learned through Operation Desert
Shield.
Expanding Marine Capabilities. Over the past decade, the U.S. has
invested heavily in Marine power projection capabilities, buying
new cargo and troop transport ships, maritime prepositioning ships,
and new landing craft that travel at high speeds on a cu shion of
air. The importance of the Marines is demonstrated today in the
Persian Gulf- Marines were the first troops to arrive with heavy
tanks (albeit older M-60~ rather than M-1s) to match Saddams.The
only major Marine modernization program that has not been carried
out is procurement of The problem is that the (2-141s are beginning
to reach the end of their useful ser 6 See testimony of General
Colin L. Powel, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Senate Armed
Services Committee, September 11,1990 8 th e V-22 Osprey.The
Osprey, a small transport plane that takes off like a helicopter
and tilts its rotors forward to fly like an airplane, would extend
the speed, range and safety with which Marines could move troops
and equipment from ship to shore and withi n a combat theater.The
Pentagon tried to kill the program in 1990 and 1991, but both
houses of Congress have kept Osprey research and develop ment
funding alive. In addition to funding the Ospmy, the U.S. should
deploy another Maritime Repositioning Squadr o n, the floating
bases that proved so successful in getting equipment quickly to the
Marines heading for the Persian Gulf.These bases should be stocked
with modem M-1A1 tanks rather than older Deploying a Light Tank
Critical power projection needs like sea l ift often are not met
because they do not have a strong constituency within the military
ser vices; the Navy brass simply doesnt like to spend its money on
cargo ships that will carry Army equipment and be piloted by
Merchant Marine captains. A light tank for the Army is another
power projection requirement that has suffered from lack of support
within the military services.
In its last two operations, in Panama and now in Saudi Arabia, the
Army deployed the 82nd Airborne Division armed with its 77 Sherida
n light tanks, the only light tanks in service with the Army.The
Sheridan, which was built in the 1960s, is smaller and about
one-third the weight of the 65-ton M-
1. It is not as sur vivable as a heavy tank because it is lightly
armored. But unlike heavy tanks, it can be transported in large
numbers by air, eight or so might be carried in the hold of a C-5
Galuy, compared to two M-1s. Despite its age, the Sheridan proved
its worth against the lightly armed Panamanians. It is not the
ideal weapon for chal lenging IraqsT-72 heavy tanks, but until
heavy M-1s arrived by sea two weeks after the decision to move U.S.
forces into Saudi Arabia, the light Sheridans were the only Army
tanks on the ground.
The Army rejected the deployment of a new light tank in the 198Os,
perhaps be cause it feared jeopardizing funding for the M-l, or for
its ongoing research pro gram to design a new light tank that will
be nearly as survivable as a heavy tank.
Despite the Armys best efforts, however, the technology to build a
survivable light tank remains years away. As an interim measure,
the Army should modernize and overhaul some of the 1,OOO Sheridans
now in storage to boost the firepower of its light divisions, or
pur chase a version of the Rapid Deployment tank developed but
never purchased during the 1980s.
Lesson #4: Technology matters, even against Third World foes.
As the Iraqi crisis has shown, U.S. forces may face the prospect of
fighting out numbered, particula rly during the early stages of a
conflict. Advanced technology is a force-multiplier that helps
better the odds for U.S. forces by allowing them to shoot at
greater distances, fire with more accuracy, and gather more
intelligence information than an adver s ary. This technology
includes missiles that allow a gun ner to fie at a tank or plane
and immediately seek cover; munitions that use sen sors to seek out
targets actively and strike with precision; and airborne radars
capable of looking deep behind enemy lines to track moving
targets.The bottom M-60s 9 line: advanced technology in the hands
of U.S. forces helps protect the lives of American GIs.
Some of these new technologies are available today; others still
are in develop ment. The decreasing risk of war with the Soviet
Union will allow the U.S. to slow the development of some advanced
weapons needed specifically to counter Soviet weapons. Example: the
Air Forces Advanced Tactical Fighter. But the Iraqi crisis
demonstrates the advantages of technological superiority even
against Third World foes. One of the first steps the U.S. took
after Saddam invaded Kuwait was to increase its production of
advanced PcrtriOt missiles, the only weapon with even a limited
capability to shoot down Iraqi Scud ballistic mis s iles, and the
Army Tacti cal Missile System (ATACMS able to strike such targets
as command posts with precision up to 100 miles behind Iraqi lines.
The Iraqi crisis illustrates the need for a number of weapons that
the Pentagon, or Congress, has considere d cancelling in light of
the decreasing Soviet threat.These include: FOG-M, a long-range
anti tank missile guided by a fiber optic cable, now in
development, that would be the ideal weapon against Iraqi armor;
J-STARS, an airborne radar system used to trac k ground targets
over great distances -it would have been so valuable for tracking
Iraqi tanks in Kuwait that the Army and Air Force considered
sending one to Saudi Arabia last month even though the system has
just begun testing; and ATACMS, the Armys new long-range missile
which the House of Repre sentatives recommends cancelling.
Another system that would have proved extremely valuable had it
been avail able to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia is the Israeli Harpy
drone, designed to home in on the signals emit ted by radar to
destroy anti-aircraft missile sites and command posts. The U.S. did
not purchase Hiupy, which is deployed with Israeli forces, be cause
it preferred to continue research on its own system, known as
ground launched Twit Rainbow. Ground-laun c hed Twit Rainbow still
is in development and its projected cost is about four times that
of Hm, if it ever is developed and deployed. The U.S. has no system
equivalent to Harpy for suppressing Iraqs modem, mobile
Surface-to-Air missile network, including SA-6 and SA-8 missiles.
Lesson #5: The U.S. must be better prepared to meet a worldwide
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon threat.
In Iraq, the U.S. finds itself on the brink of war with an
adversary possessing chemical and perhaps biological weapon s,
ballistic missiles, and an extensive nuclear weapons research
program. Washington must assume that American troops may face
weapons of mass destruction, once associated only with super powers
or other advanced industrialized nations, anywhere in the wo rld.
The Iraqi nuclear, biological and chemical threat already is out of
hand. Iraq produces three kinds of chemical weapons, including
mustard gas; which causes severe skin irritation and lung damage,
and sarin and tabun, two forms of nerve agents which c ause
convulsions leading to heart failure or asphyxiation. It developed
these capabilities with the help of West European firms as well as
the Soviet Union. It has artillery systems, aircraft, and ballistic
missiles which might be used to deliver these we apons against U.S.
troops, bases, and ships in the Middle 10 East, yd could be used in
coming years to deliver them against American ter ritory.
Scramble to Update. America has come up short in its preparations
to fight on chemically-contamhated battlefiel d. The U.S. is
scrambling to update its out moded chemical detection capabilities,
borrowing 60 German Far chemical-recon naissance vehicles.These use
an instrument known as a mass spectrometer to detect chemicals
while operators remain inside the vehicle . The U.S. has nothing
comparable. Only some of the U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia are
equipped with the latest in chemical alarm units, a British-made
hand-held device; the rest will have to rely on
chemically-sensitive paper tied to a stick and dragged on th e
ground.
Before the next crisis, modem European equipment should be
purchased for all U.S. forces.
U.S. chemical protective clothing provides basic protection if wom
properly, but can be oversaturated by a nearby attack. It was
designed, moreover, for us e in Europe and meant to provide some
extra warmth in a cool climate -just the op posite of what is
needed in the Saudi desert. Marines in the Persian Gulf are being
issued new British-made suits and gas masks, which are considered
more effective than U.S . equipment. Increased research and
development into light-weight chemical protection suits, designed
specifically for desert warfare, is a U.S priority The U.S. also
must ensure that it maintains its ability to retaliate in kind
against a chemical attack. T his capability, essential to deterring
attacks in the first place may be in jeopardy in coming years. The
U.S. began in 1987 to produce a new generation of binary chemical
weapons; these contain two inert chemicals that become lethal only
when mixed after firing. They thus are safer to store and hand le
than older unitaryw weapons containing deadly chemicals. Some
binary artil lery shells have been produced, but binary chemical
warheads for the armys multi ple launch rocket system, and binary
chemical bomb known as bigeye have not yet entered production.
Destroying Chemical Weapons. By the terms of this years June 1
Bush-Gor bachev summit agreement, the U.S. and Soviet Union will
cease producing chemi cal weapons as soon as the agreement enters
into force, which could be later this year. Since the U.S.
temporarily stopped production last spring due to a shortage of
chemicals, no more U.S. chemical weapons will be produced if the
agreement goes into effect. At the same time, the 1986 National
Defense Authori zation Act requires the Pentagon to destroy all of
its older unitary chemical weapons by April 30,19
97. If this schedule is carried out, the U.S. will be left with
only the binary ar 7 See Baker Spring, Americas Options If Iraq
Uses Chemical Weapons, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No 785,
August 24,1990 11 tillery shells produced so far as its entire
chemical stockpile. While the precise size of this residual
stockpile is a secret, its total capability will be measured in
hundreds of tons, perhaps less than Iraq's yearly estimated output
of 700 tons.
Bush would be wise to forego a chemical weapons prod uction ban
until the US has produced a sufficiently diverse chemical
stockpile, and until such countries as Iraq and Libya, not 'ust the
Soviet Union, are placed under verifiable chemical 43 weapon
constraints.
Limited Effixtiveness. Iraqi ballistic missi les create another,
related, headache for U.S. forces in the Middle East. Iraq
possesses Soviet-built Scud B missiles some of which it has
modified to extend their range from 185 miles to as much as 550
miles. It is not known whether Iraq yet has produced chemical
warheads for these missiles. The U.S. has available a limited
number of Patriat surface-to-air missiles which have been modified
to shoot down missiles as well as aircraft, but their effectiveness
is limited against chemical attack Patriot may no t do enough
damage to chemical warheads, or destroy them at a high enough
altitude to prevent deadly chemicals from reaching the ground.
A top U.S. priority should be theAmw project, a joint U.S-Israeli
program to develop a defense against ballistic missil es. Because
of its unique warhead and the high altitude at which it destroys
incoming missiles, Amw will protect a wider area than P&t and
will be able to protect against chemically-armed ballistic
missiles.
The U.S. should sign a new Memorandum of Unders tanding with Israel
which would speed Amw development. Research also should begin into
a mobile Amw which could be used to protect U.S. troops in the
field as well as fixed targets, such as airbases or cities.
But evenAmw is effective only against missile s with ranges of up
to about 650 miles or so. The U.S. also needs protection for its
own territory against intercon tinental-range missiles, which in
coming years could be developed by Iraq or some of the fifteen to
twentyThird World countries with ballis tic missile programs.
Noting that Iraq tested a space-launch rocket in 1989, the
Pentagon's Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)
Director Henry Cooper told The Heritage Foundation on August 29
that "once an ability to place satellites in orbit is achieved by
any nation, it is not an extraordinary technical challenge to
deliver weapons of mass destruction to essentially any place on
earth."
Need for Strategic Defenses. While it would be unconscionable for a
U.S. Presi dent to permit Iraq or other hostile states to gain the
ability to strike America with nuclear weapons, the U.S. must be
prepared to defend itself against the possibility.
The most effective defense against intercontinental nuclear
missiles is a layered strategic defense system. A system along the
lines now being planned by SDIO 8 See U.S. Congress, Senate,
National Defense Authorization Act for Fd Year 1991 pp. 81-86, and
US.
Congress, House, National Defense Authorbation Act for Fd Year
1991, for discussions of chemical weapons p roduction and arms
control 12 would provide complete protection against any
feasibleThird World missile force for decades to come cal (NBC)
weapons should be coupled with effective efforts to stop the spread
of NBC technology. Iraqi nuclear and chemical w e apons programs
have been sup ported panies. Creation of a serioys NBC control
regime that imposes tight restrictions on the export of this
technology should be the first order of business for Western allies
and the Soviet Union. In cases where the control regime fails, the
U.S should be prepared to use covert military action to prevent the
proliferation of mass destruction weapons. Action should include
preemptive strikes on NBC facilities abroad when necessary to
protect vital U.S. interests I Worts to de f end U.S. forces and
territory against nuclear, biological, and chemi- I I technical
assistance from Western, particularly West German, com I I
CONCLUSION The dispatch of American troops to Saudi Arabia has
deterred further Iraqi ag gression. Whether these forces will have
to go to war to push Saddam Hussein's ar mies out of Kuwait is
still unclear. If so, new lessons undoubtedly will become ap parent
through the test of combat. Already, however, Operation Desert
Shield reveals much about what the U.S. has done well, and what it
has neglected, in ar ming and organizing its armed forces over the
past decade.
On the plus side, in mere weeks following Saddam's aggression,
America rushed enough forces to the Persian Gulf to stop an Iraqi
invasion of Saudi Arabia . This would not have been possible
without the U.S. defense investment of the 198Os, in cluding the
purchase of airlift, sealift maritime prepositioning "floating
bases stepped up training and readiness programs, and modernized
military equipment for all three services. If the U.S. cuts its
defense budget precipitously in coming years, it is likely to lose
the military capabilities that allow Bush to challenge Sad dam
decisively. One clear lesson of Iraq: military power matters, even
in a post Cold War wo rld. No country but America can provide the
international military and political leadership needed to stop
Saddam, or future Saddams.
On the minus side, the U.S. finds itself short on sealift,
particularly "fast" sealift ships needed to transport heavy U.S .
forces tanks, artillery, and armored fighting vehicles -quickly to
the Middle East. Six weeks after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the
U.S. still had only one heavy division on the ground in Saudi
Arabia, while another waited on the docks inTexas for sea t
ransport. Sealift and airlift capabilities should be improved in
coming years through the acquisition of two to three times the
current inventory of fast sealift ships and purchase of the C-17
air lifter since no plans exist to upgrade or'expand the prese n t
fleet of military air cargo planes.The U.S. also has found that the
Army's failure to procure a light 9 See, for example, Gary Thatcher
and Timothy Aeppel 7'heTrail to Samarra The QlrisriM Science
Monitor December 3,1988, for background on Western invol vement in
the Iraqi chehcal weapons program 13 .tank, transportable in large
numbers by air, added to U.S. VulneGbility during the early days of
the crisis when heavy tanks, which must travel by sea, were not yet
available.
American forces arriving in the Persian Gulf remain outnumbered in
troops and equipment.Their combat edge, in addition to superior
trainin& is provided by weapons that are more capable than
those of their adversaries. George Bush and the Congress will have
to reconsider proposals to can cel or discontinue such ad vanced
weapons as: FOG-M, a long-range anti-tank weapon, and J-STARS, an
air borne radar capable of tracking tanks and other vehicles behind
enemy lines.
The U.S. also has found that there is a price to be paid for years
of ignoring Iraqs expanding nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) and
ballistic missile capabilities. U.S. forces have had to scramble to
prepare themselves for possible chemical attack by o b taining an
emergency loan of Fax chemical reconnaissance vehicles from West
Germany and advanced chemical protective clothing from Britain.
Meanwhile, the U.S. stopped production of its own chemical weapons
this year and will destroy most of its chemical arsenal by 1997.
Salutary Effects of Crises. The Iraqi experience reinforces the
importance of new efforts to: maintain credible retaliatory forces
against weapons of mass destruction; build defenses against
ballistic missiles; stop exports of technology u sed in NBC
weapons; and take preemptive military action if necessary to
eliminate nuclear, biological, chemical or ballistic missile
threats from such un stable leaders as Saddam or Libyas Qadhafi.
Crises can have a salutary effect if lessons are learned and
incorporated into policy; after the U.S. fiigate Roberts hit a mine
in the Persian Gulf during reflag ging operations in 1988, the U.S.
decided to add ten minesweepers to its inventory by 1994, and
another ten by 19
98. If America learns the lessons o f Iraq, deficien cies in
Americas defense posture can be corrected, even in an era of
declining defense budgets. If not, America will find itself
increasingly unprepared to meet the inevitable crises to come
Another lesson learned from the Iraqi crisis is that technology
matters.
Jay P. Kosminsky Deputy Director of Defense Policy Studies 14