Introduction
Subsidies for drug treatment are by far the fastest-growing
major component of federal spending on drug abuse. Advanced by many
policy makers as the key to curbing drug use, federal expenditures
for drug treatment have risen by 341 percent since 1986 -- 20
percent faster than the total drug budget, 30 percent faster than
spending for drug law enforcement and 700 percent faster than
overall federal spending. This year, the federal government will
spend more than $1.1 billion on treatment. (These figures exclude
spending for drug treatment by the Department of Veterans Affairs.
Owing in part to the extraordinary success of drug testing and
other drug prevention programs in the military, spending has grown
much more slowly in the VA than the overall rate of government
spending.) And Drug Czar Bob Martinez is calling for more spending
on education and treatment.
Despite this explosive growth in spending, there is actually
little evidence that drug treatment, federally subsidized or
otherwise, ever can be more than a Band-Aid on America's drug
crisis. To the contrary, the evidence shows that treatment programs
generally fail to get and keep people off drugs. The evidence
available on federally-subsidized treatment programs, moreover,
suggests that they are often poorly run, fail to follow standard
treatment practices, and function as "revolving doors" for addicts
seeking respite from the criminal justice system or other
problems.
In some cases, drug treatment can help individuals escape drug
addiction and return to productive lives. And even for the majority
for whom treatment is not completely successful, it may reduce drug
use and the pathologies with which it is associated. For pregnant
women, treatment may make the difference between life and death for
their unborn children. Thus for humanitarian as well as utilitarian
reasons, some public commitment to treatment appears justified.
What is not justified by the evidence is the explosive growth of
federal spending on drug treatment in recent years. It is
particularly not justified when such spending siphons away
resources from more pressing needs in drug law enforcement and
corrections. There is no excuse for continued funding of programs
that ignore sound treatment practices, waste taxpayer dollars and
contribute little, if anything, to winning the war on drugs.
The Burgeoning Drug Treatment Industry
(The material in this section relies heavily on Dean R. Gerstein
and Henrick J. Harwood, eds., Treating Drug Problems (Washington,
D.C.: National Academy Press, 1990); Robert L. Hubbard, et al, Drug
Abuse Treatment: A National Study of Effectiveness (Chapel Hill,
N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1989); and Office of
National Drug Control Policy, Understanding Drug Treatment
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1990).
Data on the number and cost of drug programs, summarized in all
three sources, are based on the most recent National Drug and
Alcoholism Treatment Survey, conducted by the National Institute on
Drug Abuse in 1987.)
In 1987, the last date for which comprehensive data are
available, there were 5,100 facilities providing drug treatment in
the United States. These were treating 263,000 people, at an annual
cost of approximately $1.3 billion. While the recent explosion in
drug treatment funding no doubt has increased all these figures,
the major methods of treatment and the general distribution of
funding almost surely have not changed significantly.
There are three major types of drug treatment programs currently
operating in the United States: 1) outpatient (non-methadone)
treatment and counseling programs; 2) outpatient methadone
maintenance programs; and 3) residential programs.
Outpatient Treatment
Outpatient treatment and counseling is the dominant form of drug
treatment in America, in terms of number of patients, number of
providers and spending. In 1987 there were 2,765 outpatient drug
treatment facilities in America, serving 144,000 people at an
average cost of $2,400 per patient per year. Nearly twice as many
patients were treated in outpatient clinics in 1987 as in 1982.
These programs vary widely in approach, quality and success
rates. At one end of the spectrum are programs consisting of little
more than rap sessions, in which former addicts discuss drug abuse
with current users, offer assistance with daily problems and serve
as points of entry for other types of social services. At the other
end of the spectrum are rigorous outpatient programs that maintain
regular contact with patients, encourage (or require) participation
in self- help groups such as Narcotics Anonymous and insist on
abstinence from drugs, policed by regular urinalysis. In most
cases, these outpatient programs treat patients who abuse several
types of drugs; cocaine, heroin, marijuana, amphetamines, sedatives
and alcohol are among the most prevalent.
Methadone Maintenance
Originating in the late 1960s, these programs require heroin
patients to show up daily at clinics to receive an
orally-administered dose of methadone, a synthetic narcotic drug.
Methadone produces little if any high, yet relieves temporarily the
addict's withdrawal symptoms and cravings for heroin. It also
prevents addicts from feeling the effects of heroin should they
take the drug while on methadone. Like heroin, methadone is
addictive, although withdrawal is said to be less painful than
withdrawal from heroin. Most methadone clinics mainly treat heroin
addiction, although most patients also abuse other drugs.
The 330 methadone maintenance programs operating in 1987 treated
about 80,000 heroin addicts, or nearly one-third of the total drug
treatment population, at a cost of roughly $2,500 per patient per
year. The methadone maintenance population has remained nearly
unchanged since the mid-1970s.
Residential Treatment
Various residential treatment programs range from very expensive
private programs (like The Hazelden Foundation in Minnesota and the
Betty Ford Clinic in California) to publicly-funded programs like
Phoenix House in New York City and similar programs operated by
many urban hospitals. The widely varying treatment methods include
short- term detoxification programs (helping addicts withdraw from
drugs), "chemical dependency" approaches (three-to-six week
programs using the twelve-step Alcoholics Anonymous model) and
"therapeutic community" approaches (involving six-to-fifteen months
of residence, communal living, peer pressure and extensive
counseling). These programs treat all types of drug abuse, although
many specialize.
There were about 2,000 residential programs in 1987, treating
approximately 37,000 resident patients. Annual costs of these
programs vary widely, from as little as $15,000 per patient-year to
as much as $30,000 for a hospital stay of just a few weeks.
Public vs. Private Drug Treatment
The growth of drug use among the middle - and upper-middle
classes during the 1970s and 1980s was followed, not surprisingly,
by the expansion of private-sector drug treatment programs designed
to treat those who could afford to pay. As of 1987, nearly 1,300 of
the 5,100 drug treatment facilities in the U.S. were privately
operated and financed primarily by insurance reimbursements and
direct client payments. Of these, 801 were hospital-based programs;
more than 331 were outpatient programs; 76 were non-hospital
residential programs; and 67 were methadone-based. Client and
insurance payments for drug treatment rose from $79 million in 1982
to $505 million in 1987, equal to 38 percent of all drug treatment
revenues.
The cost of outpatient treatment is virtually identical in the
private and public sector programs. The average for all patients,
however, is higher in private programs ($2,450 per admission versus
$1,240 for public sector programs), owing in large measure to the
higher proportion of private patients in hospital-based residential
programs, which is the most expensive type of treatment.
The Disheartening Realities of Drug
Treatment
Press and congressional advocates of more federal spending on
drug treatment extol its benefits. The New York Times editorialized
last November that "vastly" expanding funding for drug treatment
would "shrink crime rates, save hundreds of millions in prison
costs and rescue lives by the thousands." ("A Surer Way to Control
Crime," New York Times, November 17, 1990.) Senator Joseph Biden,
the Delaware Democrat, proposing to double current spending on drug
treatment, is equally insistent, stating that "the nation will mark
the time until we provide treatment on demand in cocaine-damaged
babies, abused children, crime, violence and human tragedy."
(Joseph R. Biden, National Drug Strategy, January 25, 1990.)
This enthusiasm for drug treatment finds some support among drug
policy experts. The authors of the most recent and extensive study
of drug treatment programs ever conducted, the Treatment Outcome
Prospective Study (TOPS), for example, conclude "that
publicly-funded treatment programs are effective in reducing drug
abuse and that long- term treatment helps addicts to become more
productive members of society" (Hubbard, et al, p. 163.) and that
"treatment can and does work." (Ibid., p. xvi.)
Yet an objective analysis of the evidence on drug treatment is
far less encouraging than those rosy assessments would suggest.
While drug treatment certainly helps some people some of the time,
the majority of those who enter treatment drop out, and the
majority who stay in treatment later relapse into drug use. An
examination of the most extensive data base on drug treatment
effectiveness (which forms the basis for the TOPS study) exposes
very disheartening realities about drug treatment programs. (The
TOPS study, reported in Hubbard, et al, examines drug treatment
outcomes for nearly 10,000 patients who entered 37 different
treatment programs (including all three major types of programs)
between 1979 and 1981. Researchers followed all patients through
the course of their treatment, conducting regular follow-up
interviews for as long as five years after patients first entered
treatment.)
Reality No. 1:
People in the final stages of drug abuse are not receptive to
easy cures.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the TOPS data lies in the
characteristics of the patients entering treatment: Seventy percent
of the patients in the outpatient programs and 81 percent of the
patients in residential programs abused more than one drug.
Thirty-three percent of those in outpatient programs and 75
percent of those in methadone maintenance programs had been in
treatment before.
Eleven percent of those in residential programs and 24 percent
of those in methadone maintenance received most of their income
from public assistance.
Forty-one percent of all patients (60 percent in residential
treatment programs) admitted to having engaged in predatory
criminal activity during the previous year. ("Predatory" activity
was defined as aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, and so forth,
but did not include "drug defined" acts such as drunk driving or
drug dealing or "consensual" acts such as gambling and
prostitution. Ibid., p. 83.) Indeed, approximately as many patients
reported crime as their primary source of income as reported
full-time work.
More than anything else, these statistics paint a picture of the
terrible social costs of drug abuse. Those seeking treatment
represent the end of a drug abuse pipeline, which takes in healthy,
productive (or potentially productive) individuals and spits out
people who are largely incapable of participating in mainstream
society, prey regularly on law-abiding citizens and are unlikely
ever to recover fully. The terrible plight of those who enter drug
treatment is a powerful argument for efforts to deter people from
ever using drugs, or if they have started, to stop before they
reach the end of the drug abuse pipeline.
Reality No. 2:
Most people who enter drug treatment programs do not complete
them.
Virtually all experts agree that the longer individuals stay in
treatment, the more likely the program will succeed. The amount of
time in treatment is so important to success that the TOPS study
does not even discuss outcomes for those who are treated for less
than three months. (See, for example, Ibid., p. 94-97. Though not
discussed in the text of the report, some data on those who dropped
out of treatment are included in summary tables in an appendix to
the report.) Analysis of the TOPS data base suggests that the
critical threshold for successful treatment may be six months to a
year. (Gerstein and Harwood, p. 168.)
The trouble is that the vast majority of patients do not stay in
treatment for six months, or even for three months. In fact, only
36 percent of those entering outpatient programs and 45 percent of
those entering residential programs complete three months of
treatment. Even among those who stay three months, only 50 percent
in outpatient programs and 38 percent in residential programs
actually complete treatment. (Methadone maintenance programs,
perhaps because few of them insist on or even encourage abstinence
from drug use, have lower drop-out rates. Still, nearly one-third
of all methadone patients drop out within three months.)
Reality No. 3 :
Most people who complete treatment relapse into drug use and
associated behaviors.
The most daunting reality of drug treatment is that most
individuals who participate in treatment programs, even for three
months or longer, do not stop using drugs.
The TOPS data base contains information on post-treatment drug
use of the same drugs used regularly before treatment. For
psychotherapeutic drugs (like sedatives and amphetamines) and
heroin, the data show that slightly more than half of all regular
users who spent three months or more in treatment return to drug
use within one year. For cocaine, the relapse rate within one year
is between 53 percent and 60 percent, depending on type of
treatment. For marijuana, the success rate is even lower: More than
80 percent of all regular marijuana users return to marijuana use
within a year of leaving treatment.
Predatory Crime.
The TOPS data do show some reductions in drug- associated
behavioral problems. Example: two-thirds of those who completed
three months or more of treatment and who admitted to engaging in
predatory crime prior to treatment told post-treatment interviewers
they were no longer criminally active. (The credibility of these
reports is, of course, questionable). Graduates of outpatient and
residential programs also showed significant improvements in
employability, with the proportion working increasing from a range
of 15-27 percent before treatment to a range of 35-38 percent after
treatment. Yet participants in methadone programs actually are less
likely to hold jobs after treatment than before, perhaps reflecting
the long-run debilitating effects of continued heroin use.
If anything, the TOPS findings may present an unduly rosy
picture of drug treatment since other studies have found even less
encouraging results. For example, analysis of the only other large
data base on treatment outcomes (the Drug Abuse Reporting Program,
based on 1969-1972 data) found no significant impact of outpatient
treatment on crime and little impact on drug use. (Ibid., p. 107,
127; see also Gerstein and Harwood, p. 168.) Similarly, data from
the client-Oriented Data Acquisition Process (ODAP) show that
dropout rates in therapeutic community programs average 90 percent,
with some programs exceeding 95 percent. (The CODAP data were
compiled by the National Institute on Drug Abuse from 1976-1981
based on reports from treatment programs in 54 cities. See
discussion in Gerstein and Harwood, p. 164.) And an independent
analysis of the TOPS data base strongly challenges the
crime-related benefits of outpatient treatment, finding no
improvement at all. (Ibid., p. 170.)
A possible explanation for the surprisingly positive conclusions
of the TOPS authors is that the 37 programs selected for study
intentionally were chosen from among "stable, established programs"
that were "believed to have effective programs of treatment."
(Hubbard, et al, p. 19.) The programs also tended to be larger than
the typical program and, at least for outpatient programs,
admittedly "were more oriented towards intense professional
treatment than the typical outpatient drug-free program." (Ibid.,
p. 20. For a more realistic, and current, assessment of drug
treatment programs in a large city, see Joseph S. Drew and Anne O.
Hughes, Evaluation of Publicly Funded Drug Programs in the District
of Columbia (Washington, D.C.: Mayor's Advisory Committee on Drug
Abuse, September 1990). This study finds that "figures for budget,
terms of contract, length of contract, opening and closing dates
and program capacity are either not existent or not comparable,"
that "quality of publicly funded drug abuse programs... would
appear to vary widely," and, ultimately, that the best that could
be said was that "the citizens are receiving at least some services
for the monies allocated." (p. 106).) It is little wonder that the
data base resulting from such a selection could lead the authors to
conclude that treatment is reasonably effective.
The Benefits of Drug Treatment
There are, of course, some benefits from drug treatment. There
is strong evidence that drug use and its associated behavior
declines significantly for patients while they are being treated
and that treatment often results in reduced drug use, even if it
does not lead to abstinence. (There is considerable debate,
however, about the long- run benefits of reducing drug use in
contrast to achieving abstinence.
Dr. Mark S. Gold, a dry treatment specialist, for example,
argues that "there is no hope for effective treatment so long as
the patient continues to use drugs. Personality problems, emotional
difficulties and psychiatric disorders need to be addressed as they
arise, but the chances of success are virtually nil unless the
patient is drug-free."
See Mark S. Gold, "Successful Treatment Programs for Cocaine and
Crack," in Jeffrey A. Eisenach, ed., Winning the Drug War: New
Challenges for the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation,
1990), p. 34.)
It appears, moreover, that some forms of treatment produce much
better results than others. A growing body of research suggests
that treatment works best when it includes drug testing, the threat
of criminal penalties for relapse and when the twelve-step
Alcoholics Anonymous method is used. The Importance of Testing
One finding that now appears beyond serious dispute is that
regular testing for drug use during and after treatment contributes
dramatically to the success of drug treatment programs. Drug
treatment practitioners are especially firm in their conviction on
this point. Dr. Mark S. Gold, Director of Research at Fair Oaks
Hospital in New Jersey, reports that 85 percent of those completing
the hospital's treatment program for cocaine use, which includes
regular drug testing, remain drug free after six months. (Ibid., p.
35.) Dr. Richard Rawson, Director of the Matrix Center (an
outpatient drug program in southern California which has treated
over 1,800 cocaine abusers since 1983), explains: "Just the
knowledge that he may be tested can help the patient stay straight,
and it gives his counselors a good indication of how well treatment
is working." (Richard A. Rawson, "Cut the Crack: The Policymakers
Guide to Cocaine Treatment," Policy Review (Washington, D.C.: The
Heritage Foundation, Winter 1990), p. 17.)
The National Institute of Medicine's recent study, Treating Drug
Problems, mentioned drug testing only briefly, but suggests that
urinalysis is one key component for "rigorous" drug programs
"implemented according to best clinical practice." (Gerstein and
Harwood, p. 125.)
The Importance of Court Referral
Drug treatment patients referred by criminal courts are more
likely to be cured than those who enter without legal pressure.
The TOPS study finds:
Consistent with the findings of prior research, the criminal
justice client... stayed in treatment longer than the client with
no criminal justice involvement.... Clients referred from the
criminal justice system were significantly less likely to report
weekly or daily use of their primary problem drug in the year after
treatment. (Hubbard, et al, pp. 132-133.)
The TOPS study finds such results even more pronounced for
participants in the Treatment Alternatives to Street Crimes (TASC)
Program. This identifies drug abusing criminals entering the
criminal justice system, refers them to drug treatment and monitors
their progress, often using drug testing. (L. Foster Cook, Beth A
Weinman, et. al. "Street Crime," in Karl Leukfield and Frank M.
Tims, Compulsory Treatment of Drug Abuse: Research and Clinical
Practice, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988)
pp. 99- 105.) The TOPS results are corroborated by research on
programs in Arizona, California, Georgia and other states. (On the
program in Maricopa County, Arizona, see Thomas Agnos, "Mandatory
Drug Treatment for Drug Users," in Eisenach, ed., Winning the Drug
War, pp. 21-25. On the California Civil Addict Commitment Program,
see Office of National Drug Policy, National Drug Control Strategy
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), pp.
42-43. On Georgia's Intensive Probation Supervision Program, see
Billie S. Erwin and Lawrence A. Bennett, "New Dimensions in
Probation: Georgia's Intensive Probation Supervision," National
Institute of Justice, 1987. For a general review, see Leukfield and
Tims; and Gerstein and Harwood. Because most of these programs
involve drug testing, it is not entirely clear whether the
involvement of the criminal justice system, the testing, or a
combination of the two is responsible for the resulting improvement
in outcomes.)
The Importance of the "AA" Approach
So-called "twelve-step" programs, based on the now-famous
Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) model, are an essential component of
successful drug treatment programs. There is, of course, almost no
systematic research on the benefits of these programs because the
participants are anonymous. The one study available, however, shows
dramatic results. This study examines the post-treatment drug use
of over 1,000 patients at fifty different residential treatment
locations. It finds that the strongest single determinant of
long-term success is regular attendance in self-help groups modeled
on AA. In these, nearly 80 percent of regular attendees recover,
compared with only 49 percent for those not attending such groups.
(Comprehensive Care Corporation, Evaluation of Treatment Outcome
(Irvine, California: Comprehensive Care Corporation, 1988), cited
in Gerstein and Harwood, p. 173.)
Robert DuPont, former Director of the National Institute on Drug
Abuse and currently a drug treatment practitioner in Maryland,
calls AA and related programs a "modern miracle" and attributes to
them much of the success of other forms of drug treatment. Writes
DuPont:
Today these [residential] programs that do work educate
and link individuals and families to the twelve-step programs....
People get well and stay well by going to meetings that are free to
everyone, rich and poor alike.
My richest chemically dependent clients in Montgomery County,
Maryland, who often want to buy recovery, find that it is not for
sale at any price. They cannot send their assistants. They cannot
hire therapists to cure them. They do not get well from chemical
dependence unless they go to twelve-step programs in a community of
recovering people, day after day after day. (Robert L. DuPont,
"Should Welfare Mothers Be Tested for Drugs?" in Eisenach, ed.,
Winning the Drug War, p. 88. DuPont's enthusiasm is shared his
fellow practitioners. See Gold, p. 35: "Any treatment program that
does not embrace the Twelve Step approach and encourage patients to
participate stands little chance of success"; and Rawson, p. 17:
"Every successful treatment program also encourages participation
in a 12-Step or AA type program.")
The most effective drug treatment programs in America, in other
words, are not run by government, and do not receive public or
private money.
Treatment Availability: Shortage or
Surplus?
Calling in late 1990 for another $40 million for drug treatment
programs, Representative Henry Waxman, the California Democrat who
chairs the Health and Environment Subcommittee of the House Energy
and Commerce Committee, argued:
Every day there are thousands of people in this country
who come to terms with their drug addiction and decide to seek
treatment, but cannot get it... Because when they finally get to
the clinic doors, they are turned away; they are told there are no
slots; they are told to come back in six weeks or six months, or
maybe a year. ("Drug Treatment Gets a Boost," Congressional
Quarterly August 11, 1990, p. 2593.)
The facts show otherwise. Indeed, the best available evidence
suggests that there is no shortage of treatment facilities in
America. On the contrary, there may well be a surplus.
A 1990 report by the General Accounting Office (GAO), for
example, shows that in New York, one of the states most often said
to lack adequate treatment capacity, there is no wait for treatment
at all. The study, which focuses on treatment availability for
intravenous drug users at methadone clinics, finds that while some
treatment programs are filled, these programs regularly refer
applicants to other programs that offer similar services but are
operating below capacity.
The GAO also surveyed treatment programs in California and
Oregon, finding that although the centers in these states usually
do not follow New York's referral practices, intravenous drug users
are seldom turned away because of a lack of space. Moreover,
high-priority patients (like pregnant women and HIV-infected
addicts) are admitted promptly. (United States General Accounting
Office, Drug Treatment: Some Clinics Not Meeting Goal of Prompt
Treatment for Intravenous Drug Users, GAO/HRD-90-98BR, 1990.)
According to the most recent nationwide survey of drug treatment
programs, conducted before the huge increases in federal drug
treatment funding in 1989, 1990 and 1991, publicly-funded methadone
programs in 1987 were operating at 95 percent of capacity.
Publicly- funded programs in general, however, were operating at
only 84 percent of capacity, and private programs were operating at
66 percent of capacity. Indeed, the study finds that private
programs have additional capacity available equal to 40 percent to
80 percent of current caseloads. (Gerstein and Harwood, pp.
204-208. The authors assert that despite this evidence of
nationwide excess capacity, there are long waiting lists in some
cities and some states. This assertion, however, does not appear to
be consistent with the GAO's findings. For further anecdotal
information, see Drew and Hughes, whose survey of treatment
programs in the District of Columbia found few with waiting
lists.)
Why, then, the constant drumbeat for more funding? For two
reasons:
Low Demand
First, some of the evidence used to argue for greater
treatment capacity is based on counting all the drug abusers with
serious drug problems who are presumed to need treatment. (For the
best example, see Gerstein and Harwood, Chapter 3.) No attempt is
made to differentiate between those who need treatment and those
who do not want treatment. In fact, recent research shows that very
few addicts demand treatment. Instead, roughly 90 percent go into
treatment only after significant pressure from family, the law, an
employer or a combination of the three. (Office of National Drug
Policy, Understanding Drug Treatment, 1990 p. 9.)
Second, waiting lists are typically the basis upon which the
claims of Waxman and others often rest. Such lists are a poor
measure of the demand for drug treatment. Advises Mitchell S.
Rosenthal, director of Phoenix House: "Waiting lists are soft.
You've got one guy on four lists for two weeks and he's not waiting
anymore anyway. Addicts by nature call for help one moment and an
hour later they're far away, emotionally or geographically. It's a
motivation built on sand." (Quoted in Andrew H. Malcolm, "In Making
Drug Strategy, No Accord on Treatment," New York Times, November
19, 1989.)
What Needs to be Done
The main benefits of drug treatment may be political. Demanding
federally-subsidized drug treatment allows politicians to appear to
be doing something about drug use. Extra federal funds spent on
drug treatment facilities in the home state or district then allow
the politician to bring home pork. Since 1986, Congress has, with
the full cooperation of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, more
than quadrupled spending on drug treatment programs.
The available evidence nevertheless casts considerable doubt on
the wisdom of this vast commitment of federal dollars, for several
reasons.
First, while drug treatment may help a small number of Americans
to end their dependence on drugs, it cannot stop others from
following them down the same path. By contrast, a greater emphasis
on law enforcement, prevention and education approaches would deter
drug use before it started or encourage people to stop drug abuse
before reaching its final, terribly destructive stages.
Ignoring Success Level
Second, there is virtually no evidence that
government-funded treatment programs observe the principles of
effective treatment such as drug testing and the twelve-step
method. One reason for this is that Administration efforts to
insist on increased accountability for drug treatment programs have
been rejected by Congress, apparently on the grounds that such a
requirement would be too burdensome. In fact, there is no
requirement today for federally-subsidized treatment programs to
demonstrate any level of success, let alone require drug testing or
any other approach shown to succeed.
Third, there is no convincing evidence that the demand for drug
treatment exceeds the supply. There is excess supply in virtually
every segment of the drug treatment industry. And allegations of
shortages and long waiting lists in some specific areas do not
appear to hold up under careful examination.
For these reasons, further increases in federal funding for drug
treatment should be strongly opposed. Indeed, federal spending on
drug treatment should be reduced, with the savings in the anti-drug
budget used for more effective anti-drug strategies, such as law
enforcement, teaching students to avoid drug use and increased use
of drug testing in the criminal justice system and elsewhere.
Better use should be made of the funding that remains.
Such a strategy would have four basic central elements:
1) The criminal justice and drug treatment systems should be
combined into a single system in which drug abuse is recognized as
a crime as well as a medical problem.
In the current system, predatory criminals regularly walk into
government-funded offices, admit to criminal use of drugs and
receive, in effect, the reward of public assistance. The criminals
make no commitments to obtain this assistance, and these criminals
at any time can drop out of treatment and return to crime. Instead,
those who wish to benefit from publicly-funded drug treatment
should be required to admit to illegal drug use and agree, in
return for suspended prosecution or summary probation, to
participate successfully in treatment. Those who fail (for
instance, by repeatedly failing drug tests) should be returned to
the criminal justice system for full prosecution. To make clear
that drug treatment is an alternative to prosecution only if
treatment is pursued successfully, federal funding for drug
treatment programs should be transferred from the Alcohol, Drug
Abuse and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) block grant program
to the Bureau of Justice Assistance, which is part of the
Department of Justice. ADAMHA should retain responsibility only for
research.
2) The federal government should fund only those programs that
require drug testing for patients, with clear and significant
consequences for those who continue to use drugs.
The evidence shows that drug testing is a necessary condition
for successful treatment. Federally funded programs thus should
require drug testing of all patients as a condition of probation or
suspended prosecution. This should be monitored by the courts.
3) Drug treatment funding should be privatized, and
private-sector providers should be encouraged to seek drug abusers
in need of treatment.
While there is little evidence of excess demand for drug
treatment, there is strong evidence that many Americans who might
benefit from treatment fail to apply. The private sector should be
recruited to seek out these individuals and encourage them to
obtain treatment, with the understanding that eligible patients
must admit to illegal activity and demonstrate a willingness to
participate in a rigorous program that includes drug testing.
Public funds for drug treatment should be diverted into a "fee for
success" arrangement with private providers, who should be paid on
the basis of the number of patients who successfully complete
treatment and continue to test negative for drug use for at least
six months after treatment. The fees should be set high enough to
compensate for the fact that some patients will fail to complete
even the best programs, and should reflect the differing costs of
treating differing types of drug problems. Fees should be adjusted
to give private providers an extra incentive to seek out pregnant
women who abuse drugs and recruit them into residential treatment
programs for the duration of their pregnancies.
4) The success of twelve-step programs should be recognized.
Regular participation in a twelve-step or similar program
modeled on the Alcoholics Anonymous formula should be made
mandatory for participants in publicly-funded outpatient programs
and for those completing residential programs. Equally important,
George Bush publicly should recognize Alcoholics Anonymous and its
associated programs through his "Thousand Points of Light"
program.
Conclusion
Liberals and conservatives agree that drug use and abuse is a
serious national problem. For liberals, the answer to this mainly
seems to be increased federal funding for drug treatment. But drug
treatment will make only a minor contribution to curing America's
drug ills. There is, moreover, virtually no credible evidence that
there is a pervasive shortage of drug treatment, even in major
cities where the problem is said to be most acute.
To be sure, some government funding of drug treatment programs
makes sense. The current level of funding, however, is more than
adequate. What is needed is not more treatment but more effective
organization of treatment programs. To do this, drug treatment
should be incorporated into the criminal justice system and
publicly-funded drug-treatment programs should use drug testing,
the twelve-step method and enforce a penalty for relapse.
Liberal Bandwagon
With federal spending on drug treatment already soaring
and the Bush Administration apparently unwisely jumping on the
liberal bandwagon for still more funding, reform of drug treatment
ought to be high on the conservative agenda for drug abuse
policy.
These recommendations if adopted would create a drug treatment
system significantly more successful and cost-effective than
today's. It will be a system that helps far more people escape from
drugs, has a far greater impact in reducing crime and other
pathologies associated with drug use and, in the final analysis,
costs far less than the current morass of federally-subsidized drug
treatment programs.
Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Former Visiting Fellow
Andrew J. Cowin, Former Research Associate