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GORBACHEV'S REVERSAL ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
BUSH
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on October 5 made what may
tam out to be the most important statement on strategic defense by
a world leader since Ronald Reagan's March 23, 1983 sp eech propos-
ing the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI. In the midst of an
otherwise disappointing response to George Bush's September 27
unilateral nuclear cutbacks, Gorbachev made an astonishing
proposal: "We are prepared to consider proposals from t h e United
States of America on non-nuclear anti-missile defense systems."
This reverses nearly a decade of intense Soviet opposition to SDI
and paves the way for the fulfillment of Reagan's vision of
cooperative U.S.-Soviet defense deployments. It also dep r iveff
U.S. SDI opponents of a key ally. Bush quickly should seize this
opportunity to present Moscow with a detailed plan for revising the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to permit the limited
deploy- ment of strategic defenses. Bush also should p ress
Congress to approve a 1996 deployment target for America's first
SDI interceptors. Since Reagan's 1983 speech, Moscow until last
weekend had taken a hard-line against strategic de- fenses. At the
Defense and Space Talks (DST), which opened in 1985 to discuss
SDI-related issues, Moscow consistently has opposed any casing of
restrictions on the testing and deployment of anti-mis- sile
defense systems. The U.S., meanwhile, has urged Moscow to explore a
"cooperative transition" ftom the existing nuclear " b alance of
terror`!--in which both sides remain completely vulnerable to at-
tack-to a more stable balance that includes defenses capable of
protecting against an accidental or lim- ited strike. With nuclear
weapons and missile technology now spreading to m any Third World
countries, and with the Soviet Union unsure it will retain control
over its own arsenal, defenses make ever more sense for both sides.
Now Gorbachev has recognized this new reality. Not Unexpected. To
close observers of the Soviet scene, G o rbachev's reversal was not
entirely un- expectrA In a July 16 letter to the leaders of the
seven major industrial nations; Gorbachev signaled So- viet
willingness to develop "joint ABM early warning systems to prevent
unauthorized or terrorist oper- ated l aunches of ballistic
missiles." In recent years, moreover, Soviet officials and
academicians have en- gaged in an increasingly public debate over
strategic defense. In June 1990, Keith Payne, President of the
National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfa x , Virginia,
documented this debate, concluding that a change in Soviet policy
might be in the offing. Among the evidence, a quote from Mikhail
Al- eksandrov, a Senior Expert in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Assessment and Planning Department, who wrote i n December 1989
that: "the only way to a new strategic structure is- that of
gradual mutually agreed and coordinated steps, which might include
phased deployment of ABM components ...... While Gorbachev's
statement is a reversal in official Soviet diploma t ic policy, it
does not represent any change in Soviet military thinking on
strategic defense. Today, as throughout the 1980s, the Soviet
military spends about half its strategic budget on defense,
including the construction of massive deep un- derground b unkers
for Soviet leaders, an extensive civil defense network for the
Soviet population, and a completely modernized anti-ballistic
missile system for Moscow. As late as last year the Soviet
mili-
tary-industri al complex continued to increase the produc tion of
missile defense interceptors, despite cut- backs in virtually every
other weapon system. The Soviet Union's military emphasis on
defense and its diplomatic opposition to SDI were complementary
policies. Together they were designed to put as many c o nstraints
as possible on America's SDI system while maximizing Soviet
protection within (and some- times outside) ABM Treaty limits. Now
Moscow has recognized that these limits, at least as they now
stand, serve neither side's interests. SDI Critics Refut e d. SDI
opponents in Washington consistently portrayed Soviet opposition to
SDI as 'immutable, and used it to bolster their case against
defenses. Matthew Bunn, Associate Director of the Arms 6ntrol
Association, argued in a debate last November 7 at The He r itage
Foundation that "just about the weakest, of the many weak links, in
the chain of pro-SDI arguments [is] the idea that the Soviets may
be reconsidering, and may soon agree to joint deployment of,
strategic ballistic missile de- fenses." Only two mont h s ago,
Arms Control Association President Spurgeon Keeny wrote in Arro
Con- trol Today that Soviet military leaders are "entering the
START [Strategic Arms Reduction] treaty only on the condition that
the ABM Treaty remains in effect ... A U.S. decision t o initiate a
major ABM de- ployment would be the one action that could still
derail the START agreement. And without question, it would preclude
the negotiation of deeper cuts in START U." Gorbachev seems to have
other ideas. His proposal to discuss mutual defensive deployments
came in the same speech in which he announced a unilateral
reduction in Soviet warheads to 1,000 below the number permitted by
START, and proposed that both sides cut their post-START arsenals
by half. Growing MomentunL Bush's announ c ement of his Global
Protection Against Limited Strikes (G- PALS) plan for SDI in
January, the Senate's endorsement in August of limited strategic
defense deploy- ments by mid-decade, and now Gorbachev's
announcement, make the deployment of strategic defen s es by the
U.S., and perhaps the Soviet Union, a near certainty. Bush should
encourage the growing momen- tum in favor of strategic defense by
advancing a concrete proposal at the Defense and Space Talks in Ge-
neva for the mutual deployment of up to 800 g r ound and 1,000
space-based SDI interceptors along the lines of his G-PALS
proposal. This also is the time for Bush to state unequivocally the
need for Con- gress, which now is hammering out the final version
of the 1992 Defense Authorization Bill, to set a firm date of 1996
for imi-tial SDI deployments. If Gorbachev's announcement
ultimately paves the way for anti-missile defenses, it will be
appropri- ate that opposition to SDI finally was buried in Moscow
at the hands of perhaps the last "Sovief 'presi- dent. There could
be no more fitting ending for the drama Ronald Reagan set in motion
eight years ago.
Jay P. Kosminsky Deputy Director of Defense Policy Studies
Baker Spring Policy Analyst
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For further information. Baker Spring, "The Defense and Space
Talks- ne Pwspects for a Breakthmugh," Heritage Lecture No. 275,
July 10, 1990. Keith B. Payne, with Willis Stanley, "Soviet
Statements Sympat4etic to Mutual BMD Deployment" National Institute
for Public Policy Information Series No. 182, June 1990.
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