Introduction
With the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet
Union, there has been a growing chorus of cries for the United
States to lift the economic embargo on Cuba. This chorus has
included even such responsible anti-communist voices as those of
former President Richard Nixon and the editorial page of The Wall
Street Journal. Such calls are curious, coming as they are just
when it appears that the 32-year-old embargo may be bearing fruit.
Five years after losing the financial patronage of the former
Soviet Union, Fidel Castro's communist regime is facing severe
shortages and growing popular discontent. Cuba's economy has shrunk
by more than half since 1989, the black market is more dynamic than
the formal command economy controlled by the state, and Fidel
Castro's efforts to build a huge tourism industry and attract
billions of dollars in new foreign investments have proved dismal
failures.
This economic collapse has imperiled the stability of the Castro
regime. The Soviet Union's demise robbed Castro of his ideological
base and about $4.5 billion a year in direct subsidies, exposing
the complete failure of the communist revolution to improve the
lives of the Cuban people. Moreover, as the economy's collapse has
accelerated, popular discontent has increased to levels that
threaten the survival of the regime. That was made clear in August,
when thousands of Cubans rioted in Havana's Old Waterfront
district, and by the subsequent flight to sea of more than 30,000
Cubans of all ages. Another indication that Castro's grip on power
is slipping is the increased repression of organized dissident
groups by Cuban security forces.
While the embargo may finally be working, Castro remains
defiant. He refuses to allow true free-market reforms and rejects
democratic political reforms. Instead, he is conducting an
aggressive international campaign to get the embargo lifted without
making any economic or political concessions in return. Castro is
trying to force the United States to lift the embargo in order to
resuscitate his dying communist regime with billions of dollars in
trade, investment, and international aid.
Although the United States today stands virtually alone in its
insistence on maintaining the embargo, it must stand firm. Thus
far, the Clinton Administration has resisted pressure to lift the
embargo. To hasten the transition to a post-Castro Cuba, the
Administration should: Maintain the embargo until irreversible
economic and political reforms leading to democratic capitalism
take place.
Admit no more Cuban refugees into the U.S. beyond the 20,000 per
year agreed to during negotiations in September. The 32,000 Cuban
refugees now at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo and in Panama
should gradually be processed for admission to the United
States.
Demand that U.S. allies in the Western Hemisphere, including
Mexico and Canada, stop coddling Castro and start calling for real
change. Link future free trade agreements between the United States
and Latin American/Caribbean nations to redoubled efforts by these
countries to persuade Castro to liberalize Cuba's economy and
political system. Prepare for the possibility that Castro's
collapse could unleash a lengthy period of social and political
unrest, and perhaps even civil war, in Cuba. Reinforce the U.S.
Naval Base at Guantanamo in anticipation of attack by pro-Castro
forces.
Provide financial and other support to more than 150 dissident
groups within Cuba that are struggling to bring down Castro.
Increase the broadcasting activities of Radio Mart¡.
The Cuban Crisis
Cuba today is suffering its worst economic crisis since Fidel
Castro seized power in 1959. The island's gross social product
(equivalent to gross domestic product) has plunged nearly 60
percent, including this year's projected contraction of 5 percent.
Power blackouts occur daily in Havana and other major cities. Over
two-thirds of the island's industrial facilities are shut down
almost permanently due to a lack of raw materials. Gasoline is very
scarce, and automotive transportation is at a virtual standstill.
Animal power is used for heavy agricultural activities, and most
Cubans get about on bicycles or on foot. Over half of Cuba's work
force is now unemployed, although unemployment officially remains a
crime punishable by imprisonment.
Since July 1993, when the Castro regime authorized the use of
U.S. dollars, Cuba's own currency has become worthless. Although
the official exchange rate between the peso and the U.S. dollar is
one-to-one, the black market rate in August was 130 pesos to the
dollar. No one will work for pesos, since the minimum wage is now
equivalent to about three dollars a month. Productivity has dropped
45 percent since 1990, according to Cuban economists, and many
state employees no longer bother to go to work. Instead, they have
joined the fast-swelling ranks of self-employed or black market
workers whose economic activities are marked by the struggle to
survive from one day to the next without earning too much income
lest they be charged with illegal enrichment and jailed.
Many Cuban women have turned to prostitution in a desperate
effort to feed their children and families, since government
rationing provides only half of the average family's monthly
nutrition needs. In May, Cuba's minimum wage would buy "only a
two-pound chicken, or a pound of pork, or four liters of milk in
unofficial markets." Many Cuban families now survive on one daily
meal consisting of rice, beans, soy, and water. For months, Cubans
have been deprived even of bath soap. Infectious diseases once
thought to be eradicated, such as tuberculosis and malaria, are
returning as Cuba's free health care system collapses. Hospitals
lack even the most basic supplies such as bandages and surgical
thread for sutures. There are not enough pencils and ruled paper to
supply the country's school system.
Although some Cuban economists said the economy would "hit
bottom" in 1994, the poor performance of the critical sugar
industry indicates that the crisis actually will grow substantially
worse during 1995. Sugar production has dropped from an estimated
8.1 million metric tons in 1989 to barely 4.2 million metric tons
last year. This year's crop will be even lower; one reliable
estimate forecasts 4 million metric tons for 1994 and 3.5 million
metric tons for 1995.
Before Castro took power in 1959, Cuba ranked third in per
capita income in Latin America, behind only Argentina and
Venezuela. Today, after 35 years of socialism and more than $75
billion in Soviet economic and military aid, Cuba's per capita
income is one of the lowest in the Western Hemisphere, possibly
even approaching the levels of such countries as Haiti.[It is
difficult to measure GSP per capita with any accuracy for several
reasons, including the broad differential between the official and
black market exchange rates (the official rate is one peso to one
U.S. dollar, while the black market rate was 130 pesos to the
dollar in August 1994); the fact that the black market or informal
economy now accounts for over half of Cuba's GSP, but its real
dimensions are difficult to quantify; and because none of the Cuban
government's economic statistics are considered reliable. However,
studies by independent economists such as Dr. Manuel Lasaga,
director of the research and consulting firm Strategic Information
Analysis, Inc. (StratInfo), confirm that the Cuban economy and GSP
per capita have plunged precipitously. For example, in a May 1994
study on the Cuban economy, Dr. Lasaga projected that GSP, measured
in 1981 pesos, will contract 5.8 percent in 1994 to 13.77 billion
pesos, which, at the official exchange rate works out to a GSP per
capita of US$ 1,252, assuming a population of 11 million Cubans.
But measured at the August 1994 black market rate, GSP per capita
would be an impossibly low US$ 9.60. The Heritage Foundation's
forthcoming Index of Economic Freedom uses an estimated GSP per
capita of USD 750.]
The Embargo Didn't Cause Cuba's Misery
Fidel Castro blames the U.S. trade embargo for the collapse of
the Cuban economy. The truth, however, is that Cuba's economic
destruction was caused by the regime's ruinous economic policies.
Specifically, Castro's command economy, based on a 1976
constitution and laws which prohibit private enterprise and
ownership of property, completely destroyed the free market in
Cuba, hindering economic growth and prosperity.
The United States first imposed a trade embargo on Cuba on
February 3, 1962, in response to Castro's confiscation of privately
owned properties and other productive assets, as well as his
aggressive support for violent communist revolution throughout the
Western Hemisphere. The original goals of the embargo were to
compel Castro to open Cuba's economy and establish democracy, to
weaken Cuba's communist regime, and to force Castro to relinquish
power. From the beginning, however, many industrialized countries
have refused to cooperate with U.S. policy towards communist Cuba
and have continued to maintain diplomatic and trade relations with
the dictatorship. This includes such important U.S. partners as
Canada and Mexico.
Soviet patronage and subsidies in excess of $4.5 billion a year
enabled Castro to resist the U.S. trade embargo until 1989, all the
while claiming a fictitious "success" for his Marxist revolution
and building one of the most repressive and murderous regimes in
the annals of communist totalitarianism. At least 13,000 Cuban
citizens have been executed since 1959, and over 100,000 have been
jailed for opposing the Castro regime, including at least 28,000
still in prison today.
The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived Castro not only of
billions of dollars in yearly subsidies, but also of the
ideological bases which had sustained his totalitarian regime ever
since he came to power in 1959. Even before the Soviet Union fell
apart, however, Cuba's lengthy economic decline already was
accelerating. In 1989, Cuba reported a trade deficit of $2.73
billion on exports of $5.39 billion and imports of $8.12 billion.
By 1993, the trade deficit had dropped to an estimated $310
million, but exports had fallen by over 70 percent to $1.53 billion
while imports had contracted nearly 80 percent to $1.84 billion.
Moscow's refusal in 1990 to sign a new five-year trade agreement
with Cuba marked the end of the special relationship between the
two nations which had sustained Castro's tyranny for thirty
years.
When Castro lost his Soviet support, many analysts forecast the
swift collapse of his dictatorship. In November of 1991, for
example, Cuba specialists at the Soviet Academy of Sciences
predicted that the cutoff in Soviet economic assistance would
"fully paralyze" the Cuban economy within a year. Yet Castro has
survived. His endurance in the face of economic devastation and
resulting political instability has been aided by the fact that
Cuba's population totals about 11 million. This relatively small
population -- roughly similar to Ecuador's and about half the size
of Venezuela's -- has made it easier for the regime to use
repressive measures to contain the spread of dissident groups. At
the same time, it has made it easier for Castro to absorb the
impact of the loss of Cuba's Soviet patronage. Three years after
the Soviet Union's collapse, however, Castro is running out of
time.
Castro's Determination to Retain Power. Nevertheless, Castro
flatly rules out any possibility of compromise and reconciliation.
In a lengthy interview published September 25, 1994, by the
Venezuelan daily El Nacional, Castro repeated his oft-expressed
demand that the U.S. lift the embargo unilaterally without
demanding any concessions in return. Alternating between defiance
and self-pity, Castro said:
The U.S. plan is to starve Cuba into
submission, but even if [the U.S.] were to hurl an atomic bomb at
Cuba, nothing would change. There is no solution but to end the
embargo.... If [Cuba] had Venezuela's oil and other economic
resources, we wouldn't even have developed tourism.... Lifting the
embargo is fundamental.... The embargo is causing us terrible
damage today when the socialist bloc no longer exists and we have
lost 70 percent of our trade and imports.... What country in the
world would have resisted the five years that Cuba has resisted?...
The suffering hurts all of us, but we won't exchange the
independence of this nation for a plate of beans.... [U]nder no
concept can lifting the embargo be conditioned to issues that
affect our independence. The Cuban position is a worthy one: Lift
the embargo without any conditions. It's the only honorable
course.
Growing Signs of Trouble
Cuba's economic collapse has accelerated in 1994, and social
unrest has increased dramatically. On July 13, at least 30 Cubans
trying to flee the island on a hijacked tugboat drowned at sea when
four Cuban government ships swept the decks of the fleeing tugboat
with high-pressure water hoses and rammed the aged wooden vessel
until it broke up and sank. Of the 72 people believed to be aboard,
only half survived. Over a ten-day period between the last week of
July and the first week of August, three passenger ferries were
hijacked in Havana harbor by Cubans desperate to flee their
country. On August 5, thousands of Cubans rioted in the Old
Waterfront district of Havana, throwing rocks at police and
trashing dollar-only stores after the police dispersed a crowd
drawn to the harbor by rumors that boats were waiting to carry them
to freedom in the United States. At one point, hundreds of Cubans
tried to board Chinese and Canadian freighters in the port. The
rioting, which lasted over four hours and involved up to 15,000
people, was the worst Cuba has experienced in more than three
decades.
Castro responded predictably by blaming the riots on the U.S.
embargo and threatening to permit the wholesale flight of Cubans
from the island unless the embargo was lifted. A week after the
August 5 riots, he ordered his security forces to halt all
activities aimed at preventing the departure from Cuba of anyone
wishing to leave. This decision triggered the flight over a
one-month period of tens of thousands of Cubans who set sail in
rickety home-built rafts in a desperate attempt to reach the U.S.
Dozens of U.S. Coast Guard and Navy ships were sent to the Florida
Straits, where over 32,000 refugees were rescued and transported to
the U.S. military base at Guantanamo on the southeastern tip of
Cuba.
A New U.S. Policy
In response to the refugee crisis, the Clinton Administration
tightened economic sanctions on Cuba and sought negotiations with
the Castro regime to end the flight of refugees. On August 19,
President Clinton announced that Cuban refugees would not be
permitted unrestricted access to the United States, reversing a
28-year-old U.S. immigration policy. Previously, all Cuban refugees
that reached U.S. shores or were rescued at sea by the U.S. Coast
Guard were granted political asylum and permanent resident status
one year after entry into the U.S. under the provisions of the 1966
Cuban Adjustment Act.
On August 23, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno also announced
that Cuban citizens fleeing the island illegally would be denied
the opportunity to apply for political asylum in the United States.
In addition, the Clinton Administration turned up the heat by
banning some $400 million a year in cash transfers by
Cuban-Americans to their relatives in Cuba, by cutting back U.S.
charter flights to Cuba, and by increasing Radio Mart¡ and TV
Mart¡ broadcasts to Cuba.
Following a week of negotiations in New York City, U.S. and
Cuban officials announced on September 9 that an agreement had been
reached to end the refugee crisis. The Castro regime agreed to
prevent any more refugees from setting out to sea, while the United
States agreed to increase the number of visas issued annually to
Cubans to at least 20,000. Although Castro had insisted that any
talks with the United states must deal with the embargo, the
agreement was limited to immigration. U.S. Secretary of State
Warren Christopher left open the possibility that future talks
could be expanded to other issues if the Castro regime agrees to
comply with longstanding U.S. demands for economic and democratic
reforms in Cuba. "If [Cuba] take[s] steps toward democracy, if they
take steps toward the free market, if they take steps to ease the
human rights situation, the United States will respond in a
carefully calibrated way," said Christopher.
A Growing Movement to End the Embargo
The Secretary of State's remarks were not an isolated
development. They reflected growing sentiment among many U.S.
policymakers, and Americans in general, who favor lifting the trade
embargo on Cuba. Now that the Cold War is over, many Americans
appear to believe that the time has come for the United States to
remove the embargo against Cuba unilaterally without demanding any
political or economic concessions from Fidel Castro. For example,
former President Jimmy Carter has noted that "It's time for [the
United States] to begin discussions on how we can alleviate this
embargo which has caused tremendous suffering among the people of
Cuba and has distorted this hemisphere's concept of freedom and
democracy."
The list of those who favor lifting the embargo goes beyond the
United States, though. NAFTA partners Mexico and Canada, two of
Cuba's largest trading partners, also are among the most forceful
proponents of ending the embargo. Practically every country in
Latin America and the Caribbean wants it lifted. Australia, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, and Russia openly oppose it. In October, the
U.N. General Assembly, for the third consecutive year, passed a
non-binding resolution calling on Washington to end the embargo.
Among the 184 delegations at the U.N., only Israel backed the
United States, where a growing chorus of liberals and
conservatives, ranging from Jesse Jackson to William F. Buckley and
The Wall Street Journal, also are saying that it is time to end the
embargo.
"Exporting Capitalism": The Comparison with
China
Those who favor lifting the embargo often point to the examples
of Vietnam and China to justify their position, claiming that
eliminating the embargo will encourage the growth of a free-market
economy which will undermine the communist regime. Such comparisons
are not valid. Capitalism is destroying communism in China, but the
driving force is not international trade. It is a strong domestic
market economy tolerated by the communist government. China's
market economy is dominated by many millions of small entrepreneurs
who are devouring the communist command economy. Moreover, China's
market economy has been growing in depth and diversity since the
mid-1980s. Free trade is promoting faster market growth and
expanding the personal freedom of millions of Chinese, encouraged
by entrepreneurs and investors from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
elsewhere who are providing the capital, entrepreneurial skills,
and international trade contacts which are compelling China to
transform its economy. In the process, a vast and prosperous middle
class is being created.
In Cuba, however, the Castro regime is not willing to liberalize
the economy and create a free market. Cuban exile communities in
the United States, Latin America, and Europe are not willing to
work with Castro, and market initiatives by the Castro regime to
encourage them to do so are very recent, dating from 1993 for the
most part. The basic orientation of the hard-liners surrounding
Castro is to contain and restrict all initiatives that unleash
individual entrepreneurship and creativity. For example, the
government has arrested people for earning "too much" money in the
dollarized informal economy, the variety of legally permitted
"family businesses" has been restricted, and tax rates on the
income of self- employed Cubans have been increased. Moreover,
Cuba's constitution and legislation specifically prohibit all
private initiative, notwithstanding recent reforms allowing
self-employment by Cubans in approximately 140 categories of
economic activity from which all professionals (the core of any
middle class) are expressly barred. For over three decades, the
regime has operated on the basis of divide and rule. Castro's
bitter enmity toward the Cuban exile community precludes the
possibility of replicating in the Caribbean what China's exile
community has accomplished in China.
None of the alleged "market reforms" undertaken to date in Cuba
are true free-market initiatives. Free enterprise remains highly
restricted. Foreign investors doing business in Cuba today deal
mainly with Castro's regime. Cuban partners in joint ventures and
mixed companies are approved by Castro as "safe." Moreover, unlike
China, Cuba has barely started to open up its economy, and what
little has been done to date has been permitted with great official
reluctance and with the objective of assuring the communist
government's political survival. China's economic transformation
has been under way since 1978, when important agricultural reforms
were introduced, including the right of peasant farmers to grow the
crops they wished and retain some of their profit. Moreover, the
government of China has encouraged the marketization of the
country's coastal provinces, and since 1992 the Chinese
constitution has incorporated the concept of the "socialist market
economy." Although China remains a communist nation where political
freedoms are sharply restricted, the ruling regime has permitted
vigorous development of the private sector, thus laying the seeds
for its eventual demise and potential replacement by a politically
pluralist, more open society.
The Myth of Lost Opportunities for Americans. Many of those
wishing to see the embargo lifted also argue that American
businesses will lose out to competition from other countries whose
governments do not restrict trade and investment in Cuba. But this
argument is weak. Before the communist revolution, the United
States was Cuba's largest trading partner: nearly 80 percent of
Cuba's two-way volume of trade involved the U.S. Regardless of when
the embargo is lifted, the United States will quickly regain its
prominent role in the Cuban economy. Moreover, the Cuban- American
community, totaling over 1.8 million people, will be an important
source of investment capital and management experience.
CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR CHANGE IN CUBA
Castro's recent comments and actions make it clear how fruitless
it would be for the United States to make concessions now. Even
without access to U.S. markets and investments, there are many
steps Castro could take to improve economic and political
conditions within his country, but he refuses to do so. These
include:
Adopting free-market policies that include a reform of Cuba's
constitution and passage of laws to abolish all legal prohibition
of private enterprise and property ownership.
Holding democratic elections in the context of a politically
pluralist society in which the Communist Party is compelled to
compete with democratic organizations and political parties.
Freeing all political prisoners currently in Cuban jails.
Disbanding the Interior Ministry's security police and the
Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, which function as
thought-control police and as spies in every neighborhood in
Cuba.
Eliminating the Marxist political indoctrination, which is a
central feature of Cuba's education system.
Restoring all confiscated assets and properties to their
rightful owners, or agreeing to pay appropriate compensation for
what the regime has stolen from them.
Without these steps, lifting the embargo would only assure
Castro's continuing repression of the Cuban people. Those who
advocate doing so are violating their own professed commitment to
hemispheric democracy and the individual's right to
self-determination. Castro is a ruthless, charismatic dictator and
is a potential danger to all democratic, freedom-loving nations. He
is an anachronism, but a dangerous one. The embargo, however, is
not an anachronism; it is a legitimate instrument for achieving the
goal of a free and democratic Cuba.
Thus far, the Clinton Administration has been steadfast in
refusing to discuss the economic embargo. It is correct in doing
so. To hasten the collapse of the Castro regime and communism in
Cuba, the Administration should also:
Maintain the embargo until irreversible economic and political
reforms leading to democratic capitalism are in place. Tightening
the economic screws may lead to more disturbances and riots, as
well as increased repression as Castro struggles to remain in
power. However, the embargo remains the only effective instrument
available to the U.S. government in trying to force the economic
and democratic concessions it has been demanding of Castro for over
three decades. Maintaining the embargo will help to end the Castro
regime more quickly.
Admit no more Cuban refugees into the U.S. beyond the 20,000 per
year agreed to during negotiations in September. Allowing the
unrestricted entry of Cuban refugees during the Cold War was valid
and necessary while Castro's regime was still powerful and its
political control of the island was undisputed. But circumstances
have changed in the past five years, as the Clinton Administration
realized when it changed U.S. policy toward Cuba during the August
refugee crisis. Continuing to allow Cuban refugees unrestricted
entry to the United States serves only to prolong Castro's rule by
providing him a much-needed safety valve to relieve the pressure of
growing social discontent.
However, the 24,000 refugees now at the U.S. Naval Base at
Guantanamo and the 8,000 more in Panama should be processed for
admission to the United States as soon as possible. The
near-concentration camp conditions in which they are being kept are
unsustainable, and the cost of maintaining them is high. The
Clinton Administration agreed in September to process and admit up
to 20,000 Cubans a year. To clear out the bases in Guantanamo and
Panama, the Administration may be able to process the refugees
there for early admission but reduce the total number of refugees
admitted in the next three to five years by a proportional
number.
The Cuban people must understand that it is up to them to solve
the social, economic, and political crisis caused by the Castro
regime. U.S. taxpayers should no longer be compelled to finance the
costs of Castro's unremitting tyranny. The Cuban people have the
power to determine their own government. The energy and courage
invested in braving the shark- filled Florida Straits would be
spent better in Cuba, working to bring down Castro.
Demand that U.S. allies in the Western Hemisphere, including
Mexico and Canada, stop coddling Castro and start calling for real
changes. The Clinton Administration was successful in getting the
United Nations to condemn the military regime in Haiti. There is no
reason it cannot exert equally persuasive diplomatic pressure to
get similar resolutions regarding Cuba through that body. The
Administration should strive to convince the international
community not to do business with Cuba until the jails are emptied
of all political prisoners, until Castro's repressive security
forces are disbanded, all illegally confiscated properties and
assets are returned to their rightful owners or appropriate
compensation is paid, the constitution and laws of Cuba are
reformed to legalize free enterprise and private ownership of
property, free-market policies are adopted, and democratic
elections are held in a pluralist political context which allows
the Cuban people to elect the leaders they choose.
Link future free trade agreements between the United States and
Latin American/Caribbean nations to redoubled efforts by these
countries to persuade Castro to liberalize Cuba's economy and
political system. In recent years, many of the region's elected
leaders have tried unsuccessfully to persuade Castro to open Cuba's
economy and democratize its political system. Castro has rejected
all of these overtures while gaining the support of these Latin
American and Caribbean nations in pressuring the U.S. to lift the
embargo.
At the same time, Castro's intransigence has not slowed efforts
by many of these countries, including NAFTA partners Mexico and
Canada, to expand trade relations with Cuba. In June 1994, Mexico
surpassed Spain as the largest foreign investor in Cuba when a
Monterrey firm paid $1.5 billion for a 49 percent stake in the
state telephone company, Empresas Telecomunicaciones de Cuba
(ETEC).[The investment by Grupo Domos forms part of an arrangement
between the Cuban and Mexican governments, brokered by Mexico's
Export Bank (Bancomext), to swap $340 million in Cuban debts for
stakes in Cuban industries, including Varadero's Hotel Tuxpan and
the transfer of the island's largest cement plant to Cemex. In
September 1994, Mexpetrol, a consortium of private Mexican oil
companies and state-owned Pemex, announced a $200 million joint
venture with Cuba's state oil company to operate the Cienfuegos
refinery, one of three on the island, which at full capacity can
process 65,000 barrels a day of crude oil. Glassmaker Grupo Vitro,
which owns U.S. glassmaker Anchor Glass and reported total world
sales of $3.5 billion in 1993, also confirmed in September that it
may acquire a glass bottling plant in Cuba. On September 13, 1994,
UPI reported from Mexico City that Mexican construction,
transportation, and tourism firms "are poised to increase trade and
investment" in Cuba if the U.S. lifts its trade embargo, with "much
of the increase in trade probably channelled through Miami."] Spain
is Cuba's second-largest trading partner, dominating the island's
tourism industry, but Canadian companies are aggressively courting
Castro's regime, particularly in the mining and energy sectors. The
U.S. should use its leverage as the most important trading nation
in the hemisphere to correct this. For example, the NAFTA trade
relationship carries an implicit agreement with the shared goal of
building a trade zone in the Western Hemisphere based on free
markets and respect for democracy. Those principles apply to all
other countries in the Americas seeking closer trade relations with
the U.S. and U.S. investment to help develop their economies. The
Clinton Administration should not be timid in pressing its case in
this regard. Prepare for the possibility that Castro's collapse
could unleash a lengthy period of social and political unrest, and
perhaps even civil war, in Cuba. U.S. policy toward Castro long has
idealized an outcome in which Cuba makes a peaceful transition to a
free-market democracy. With Castro's collapse more likely in the
near term than ever before, however, the U.S. government does not
appear to have a policy for dealing with the likelihood that it
will take place amid bloodshed, armed conflict, and chaos. A recent
Rand study argues that the Departments of Defense and State must
conceive such a strategy "according to three general tasks:
Containment of the crisis, with the aim of damage limitation for
both the United States and Cuba. Alleviation of the crisis, for the
purpose of reducing human suffering among refugees and
noncombatants on the island. Resolution of the crisis, unilaterally
or multilaterally, by diplomatic or other nonmilitary means.... "
The study's most important conclusion is that the end of Castro's
regime could come at any time during the next 12 to 36 months, and
that the U.S. government should seek to develop flexible responses
for Castro's demise, depending on whether it takes place in a
climate of violence or peaceful transition. The Clinton
Administration should prepare now for the transition that could
begin without significant warning.
Reinforce the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo in anticipation of
attack by pro-Castro forces. The Clinton Administration should
consider the possibility that a desperate Castro might attempt to
provoke a violent U.S. military response which could galvanize
Cuban support for the regime based on old fears, nurtured for
decades by Castro's propaganda machine, of "Yanqui" imperialism and
colonialism. In this context, Cuban refugees now at Guantanamo
should be admitted to the U.S. or transported to other safe havens.
Once that is done, the Administration should reinforce the base
with tactical aircraft and at least a brigade-sized combat unit
capable of holding off a surprise attack.
Provide financial and other support to more than 150 dissident
groups within Cuba that are struggling to bring down Castro. Such
groups include the Catholic Church, which is dedicated to peaceful
change. No support should be provided to dissident groups intent on
triggering violent change, for the United States must avoid
inflaming anti-American sentiment at all costs. Dissident groups
dedicated to peaceful change will be the basis on which a civil
society will be created in a post-Castro Cuba, and their growth
should be encouraged and supported in much the same way the Reagan
Administration clandestinely supported Lech Walesa's Solidarity
labor movement in Poland after martial law was imposed in late
1981. Such support would include financing of publications and
income subsidies to permit dissidents to support themselves and
their families.
Increase the broadcasting activities of Radio Mart¡. These
broadcasts should urge the Cuban people to bring down Castro
peacefully and should specify that under no circumstances will the
U.S. interfere militarily in Cuba's domestic affairs. They should
also stress that what the U.S. wants is a stable, friendly
relationship with a democratic, free-market Cuba and that the U.S.
is willing to negotiate with the Cuban government as long as Castro
implements the comprehensive political and economic reforms he
needs to revive his stalled economy.
CONCLUSION
The 32-year-old trade embargo against Cuba may finally be
producing its intended results of destabilizing the island's
communist government and weakening Fidel Castro's control of the
Cuban people. Castro has resisted change for over five years since
losing the Soviet Union's financial support, but his final collapse
may be closer than ever before. Nevertheless, he continues his
visceral loathing of democracy and the free market, all the while
demanding the embargo be lifted without condition. It seems clear
that Castro believes his survival hinges on the embargo's
elimination. Paradoxically, just as Castro's communist government
may be close to falling, a chorus of voices in the U.S. has risen
to call for the lifting of the embargo. They cite several reasons:
to ease the suffering of the Cuban people, to capitalize on the
trade and investment opportunities other countries allegedly are
enjoying in Cuba, and to establish the bases of a free-market
economy that in time will compel democratic reforms as well. But
the greatest beneficiary would be Fidel Castro, whose 35-year-old
communist dictatorship would be fortified overnight if he were
allowed access to the billions of dollars in financial aid from
multilateral agencies, credit guarantees, and investment that would
start flowing into Cuba.
The United States must not abandon the Cuban people by relaxing
or lifting the trade embargo against the communist regime. Instead,
the U.S. government must reject all pressures to ease the embargo
until all of the objectives for which it was imposed are achieved.
Anything less would constitute an unacceptable breach of faith with
the Cuban people, who today are among the very few people left in
the world who still suffer the brutality of a communist
dictatorship.
John P. Sweeney is a former Policy Analyst at The Heritage
Foundation.