The elections to the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian
parliament, on December 17 demonstrated that democratic politics
are beginning to take root in Russia. A healthy majority of
eligible voters participated, and the political elites are learning
that they must appeal to them. However, many voters clearly are
frustrated with the hardships of economic transition, crime, and
corruption. The impressive performance by Gennady Zyuganov's
communists at the polls, and the high public opinion ratings of
ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky as a presidential candidate,
indicate that the pro-market forces may lose control of the
executive branch in the June 1996 presidential elections. If this
occurs, there is a danger that the 1995 elections will be the first
and the last free and "clean" parliamentary elections in Russia for
a long time.
More Hardline Duma
Half of the Duma (225 seats) is elected by party lists. To win
seats in this half, parties had to gain more than five percent of
the popular vote. Only four parties met this test. The Russian
voters gave the communists 22 percent and Zhirinovsky's "Liberal
Democratic" Party of Russia (LDPR) 11 percent. The centrist Our
Home is Russia, headed by Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin,
received 10 percent of the vote, and the reformist Yabloko
Party led by economist Grigory Yavlinsky just over 7 percent. This
means that the communists, together with their allies, now have
about 30 percent of the votes, and the nationalists, over 17
percent.
The other half of the Duma is made up of single-seat
constituencies, in which the candidate with the majority of votes
in the district takes the parliamentary post. In these
single-mandate districts, the voters elected 77 independent
(unaffiliated) candidates, 58 communists, 20 deputies from the
Agrarian Party (which is closely tied to the communists), 14 from
Yabloko, and 10 from Our Home is Russia. Former Russian
Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar's reformist Democratic Choice of Russia
and the communist-nationalist Power to the People party, led by
former USSR Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, won 9 seats each.
Zhirinovsky's LDPR took only one seat. A few seats in the
single-mandate districts were gained by members of smaller parties
which did not clear the five percent barrier.
Out of the total of 450 Duma seats, the communists lead with 150
seats, while LDPR, Our Home is Russia, and Yabloko all have
approximately 50 each. Given these figures, the communists most
probably will manage to appoint a chairman and take control of
several key committees. The leadership of the Duma will consist of
the chairman and leaders of the factions which will be formed.
Given its composition, the Duma is likely to prove confrontational
toward the executive branch.
Achievement for Russian Democracy
The 1995 democratic process was more transparent and fair than
in 1993: this Duma was elected for a full four-year term; no
parties were banned from running, and a total of 42 parties and
movements participated in the race. The 1993 Duma was elected for
two years only, and several parties were banned from running after
the Russian Supreme Soviet was disbanded by Boris Yeltsin.
The Russian public showed maturity by heeding the call to
participate in the voting process. The voting rate was a
respectable 65 percent, 15 percentage points higher than in 1993.
The lowest voting rate was among the young, who tended to cast
their ballots for democrats, Zhirinovsky, or centrists, but not for
the communists. Older voters leaned more heavily toward the
communists.
The elections were "clean" by Russian standards. This is the
assessment of foreign and Russian observers and of the generally
free mass media. There were very few reports of minor tampering
with the process; three candidates, however, were killed or died in
suspicious traffic accidents.
There were quite a few surprises in the elections. A number of
parties had been expected to do better. Among these were Gaidar's
Democratic Choice of Russia (4.1 percent), Women of Russia (4.6
percent), and the Congress of Russian Communities led by the
charismatic General Alexander Lebed (4.3 percent).
The poor performance of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's Our Home
is Russia suggests that the voters do not trust the government's
execution of reforms, and they are tired of the ubiquitous crime
and corruption. Our Home is Russia won the most votes in Moscow (20
percent), where the country's capital is most heavily concentrated,
and where the reforms already have produced wealth and opportunity.
(Almost all of Moscow's single-mandate districts returned
democratic candidates.) Voters in the provinces, where the reforms
have not yet generated jobs and have weakened the social safety
net, gave the communists and nationalists their heaviest gains.
The Presidency: Yeltsin Still in the Running
Many Russians believe that the Duma elections were but a dress
rehearsal for the real political fight that will take place in the
presidential elections next summer. The Duma elections highlighted
Communist Party chief Zyuganov and his ability to command the
still-formidable Party machine. They also showcased Zhirinovsky's
shrewd political instincts, setting him up as the other
presidential front-runner in June. On the other hand, Alexander
Lebed, whose ads featured the General shooting an arsenal of
infantry weapons, has shown that he is a better soldier than a
politician.
According to public opinion polls, both Chernomyrdin and
President Boris Yeltsin are not favored to do well if they run for
president. Both men are in their sixties in a country where the
average male life expectancy is only 57. Yeltsin's ill health
remains a central theme in Russian politics. Nevertheless,
well-informed sources in Moscow predict that he will still run in
June, even though he trails Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky, Lebed, and
Yavlinsky in the presidential election ratings.
Yegor Gaidar's poor showing eliminated him as the presidential
hopeful of the Russian center-right. Grigory Yavlinsky, who
consistently has distanced himself from the Yeltsin administration
and won high personal approval rating among the voters, remains the
only democratic presidential hopeful. However, he will need to work
hard to win the first round of presidential elections by becoming a
consensus candidate of the reformers -- not a very likely
development.
Conclusion
The fight for Russia's democratic future is far from over. The
democrats and reformers are split and hardly capable of resisting
the dual nationalist and communist threat. While the elections
showed that Russians can behave like good democrats, they showed
also that voters do not necessarily elect good democrats. The
reformers have to increase their popular appeal, and do it very
fast. If these had been presidential elections, Gennady Zyuganov
would now be the leader of Russia and working to turn back the
clock, with disastrous consequences for his own country and her
neighbors near and far. Come June, this may be a very real scenario
if democrats do not unite.
Endnotes:
1. The author spent three weeks
in Russia observing the preparations for the elections and the
election process.