Introduction
Israel long has sought a comprehensive peace with its Arab
neighbors, and has made great progress since the landmark 1991
peace conference in Madrid. It signed a peace accord with the
Palestine Liberation Organization in 1993 and concluded a peace
treaty with Jordan in 1994. But negotiations with Syria have
proceeded at a glacial pace. One of the major obstacles in the
Syrian-Israeli negotiations has been Syrian insistence on
recovering the strategic Golan Heights, occupied by Israel since
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, without ironclad security guarantees
that Syria would not use the Golan as a staging area for aggression
against Israel.
The Clinton Administration has tried to bridge the negotiating
gap by offering U.S. peacekeeping forces to monitor compliance with
any agreement, but it has resisted congressional calls to examine
the wisdom of such a commitment, claiming that a public debate
would be premature. Administration officials contend that the
details of a peacekeeping presence on the Golan Heights have not
been worked out and a final commitment has not been made. However,
Defense Secretary William Perry, after meeting with Israeli Prime
Minister Shimon Peres on January 8, confirmed the Clinton
Administration's long-standing offer to provide U.S. peacekeeping
forces to monitor the Golan Heights. Although Perry had said last
September that the U.S. "should be willing" to contribute forces
that would facilitate a peace accord, he recently firmed up the
U.S. offer by proclaiming, "we are prepared to do
that."1
Congress Should Hold Hearings
Now that Secretary Perry has explicitly made this offer,
Congress should hold hearings to examine the potential costs and
benefits of this commitment. It also should press the
Administration to reconsider its risky plans to enter such an
open-ended peacekeeping operation.
The Administration has resisted congressional scrutiny of the
Golan peacekeeping question, arguing that it could complicate
efforts to negotiate a peace agreement. While this may be true, the
Administration would be wise to gauge congressional support for a
possible Golan peacekeeping operation now, rather than risk having
an agreement unravel later due to congressional disapproval.
Congress has its own reasons for debating a Golan peacekeeping
commitment sooner rather than later, as underscored by the recent
experience in Bosnia. The rapid pace of developments in the Bosnian
peace negotiations greatly limited congressional debate, with U.S.
troops being deployed to Bosnia only 11 days after the November 21,
1995, signing of the Dayton peace accords. While the pace of
Syrian-Israeli negotiations is likely to be slower, Congress must
address the Golan peacekeeping issue before, not after, the
Israelis and Syrians negotiate a deal if it wants to avoid being
presented with another diplomatic fait accompli by the
Clinton Administration.
Israel is a sovereign state, and it is Israel's prerogative to
negotiate whatever diplomatic arrangements it finds necessary to
assure its security and promote peace. Washington should actively
support efforts to build a just and lasting Arab-Israeli
peace.2 But when America is asked to ensure the
implementation of an agreement which entails obvious risks to
American peacekeepers, the U.S. Congress has a right and duty to
examine the risks and benefits of such a commitment, as it would do
with any other peacekeeping commitment.
As Congress examines the Golan Heights peacekeeping issue, it
should bear in mind that American troops should not be involved in
such a mission. There are five reasons for this conclusion.
REASON #1: The Golan Heights present a more formidable
peacekeeping challenge than the existing U.S. peacekeeping mission
on the Sinai Peninsula. Unlike the American troops assigned to the
multinational peacekeeping force on the Egyptian-Israeli border in
the Sinai since 1982, peacekeeping forces in the Golan will be
sandwiched between two large armored forces in a much smaller area.
Moreover, Syria historically has been much more hostile to the U.S.
than has Egypt, which is now a U.S. ally. Thus, a Golan
peacekeeping operation would be much riskier.
REASON #2: Terrorism would pose a threat to U.S. troops.
U.S. peacekeeping forces in the Golan will be close to southern
Lebanon, which is a major staging area for numerous terrorist
groups that oppose Arab-Israeli peace.
REASON #3: It could adversely affect U.S.-Israel
relations. An American presence on the Golan will constrain
Israel's military options more than Syria's and will sap Israel's
self-reliance. In the long run, this could strain U.S.-Israel
relations.
REASON #4: It could be too costly and too much of a drain
on U.S. forces. A small force will be unable to defend itself
against possible terrorist or Syrian military attacks, while a
large force will be a major drain on active U.S. Army forces.
REASON #5: Americans are not needed. Other countries can
play the same peacekeeping role. The United Nations Disengagement
Observer Force, comprised of troops from Austria, Canada, Finland,
and Poland, has been deployed on the Golan for almost 22 years to
monitor the 1974 Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement.
Under no circumstances should the U.S. promise foreign aid to
Syria as a sweetener for a peace agreement. The prospective
recovery of the Golan Heights and peace itself are Syria's peace
dividends. Moreover, the U.S. should remember that it has important
national interests to advance regarding Syria that go beyond
brokering a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement. Congress must prevent
the Administration's preoccupation with the peace process from
obscuring American interests in halting Syrian support of
terrorism, promoting Lebanon's independence from Syrian domination,
ending Syrian subversion of Turkey, halting drug smuggling in
Syrian-controlled Lebanon, and isolating Syria's ally Iran.
The Strategic Importance of the Golan
Heights
The Golan Heights comprise some of the most strategically
significant terrain in the world. Occupying its high forward slopes
gives Israel line-of-sight surveillance of Syrian military
movements and electronic communications. Electronic
intelligence-gathering facilities in the Golan provide early
warning of threatening developments in the plains southwest of the
Syrian capital of Damascus, or in south Lebanon. Control of the
Golan also provides Israel, a small country, with something it
badly needs: a buffer zone to give it strategic depth. Before
losing the Heights in 1967, Syria used its commanding position on
the Golan to bombard the Israeli settlements in the nearby Galilee
region. Highly lucrative agricultural and tourist sites around the
shores of Lake Kinneret (Sea of Galilee) now are safe. Finally, the
Golan highlands form a watershed that supplies approximately 30
percent of Israel's water. Dominating the Golan watershed means
potential control of this vital freshwater resource.
For these strategic reasons, most past Israeli governments,
whether led by the Labor or Likud parties, have not been willing to
withdraw from the Golan, which the Israel Defense Force (IDF)
captured in a bold and courageous operation in 1967. Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin began direct negotiations with Syria under American
auspices after his June 1992 election, but declined to specify how
far Israel would withdraw on the Golan until Damascus made clear
what kind of peace and security arrangements it was willing to
make. Syria's Hafez al-Assad broke off the talks in July 1995,
insisting on the unconditional return of the Golan Heights. After
Rabin's November 4 assassination, his successor, former Foreign
Minister Shimon Peres, dropped Rabin's insistence that security
arrangements be dealt with first.
Peres used his December 12, 1995, speech before a joint session
of the U.S. Congress to appeal to Assad to resume the talks. Assad
agreed and the talks were revived on December 27. Two rounds of
Syrian-Israeli talks already have been held at the Wye Plantation
in eastern Maryland, and a third round began on January 23.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher has offered to undertake
open-ended shuttle diplomacy between the two countries to bridge
the still-wide gaps.
Even though Israel is eager to make peace and maintain the
momentum generated by the diplomatic breakthrough with the
Palestinians reached in Oslo in 1993, many Israelis are deeply
concerned about the potential threat to their security if the IDF
withdraws and the Syrian army moves back onto the Golan. The
position of the Peres government is that the benefits of a deal
with Syria outweigh the risks and that Israel must deal now, while
the opportunity exists, and while Israel is in a position of
strength. But most Israelis nevertheless believe that only
extraordinary security guarantees can make the return of the Golan
to Syria acceptable.
Five Reasons to Reject U.S.
Peacekeeping in the Golan
One possible guarantee is the deployment of U.S. troops on the
Golan, either as part of a multinational operation or alone, and
either in a pure "peacekeeping" role or as a kind of tripwire to
hedge against renewed hostilities from Syria. This possibility has
been a matter of speculation in Washington for over two years. The
Clinton Administration has aggressively discouraged congressional
consideration of the issue, maintaining that it is premature to
address the issue of an American peacekeeping force on the
Golan.
Secretary Perry's January 8 statement indicating that the U.S.
is prepared to deploy a Golan peacekeeping force has considerably
undermined this argument. Congress soon must consider the
implications of a U.S. peacekeeping deployment on the Golan, or it
will find itself reacting to a diplomatic fait accompli, as
in Bosnia. While examining the Golan peacekeeping issue, Congress
should bear in mind five reasons that the U.S. should reject a U.S.
peacekeeping presence on the Golan Heights.
REASON #1: The Golan Heights present a more formidable
peacekeeping challenge than the existing mission on the Sinai
Peninsula. U.S. and Israeli officials often cite the Multinational
Force and Observers (MFO), which monitors compliance with the
security arrangements in the Sinai peninsula, as a model for an
American peacekeeping presence on the Golan. The MFO, created in
1982 to monitor compliance with the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace
treaty, is composed of three battalions of troops from Colombia,
Fiji, and the U.S. and a Civilian Observer Unit staffed with
American personnel.
The U.S. peacekeepers in the Golan Heights, however, would
operate in a markedly different geographic, military, and political
environment. Rather than being deployed in a vast, empty desert far
from the main bodies of the opposing military forces, Golan
peacekeepers would be stationed in a constricted area, sandwiched
between large armored forces in positions that would quickly become
important military objectives if fighting were to break out. Unlike
the remote, sparsely populated Sinai, the Golan also would be a
more hospitable operating theater for terrorists based in
neighboring Lebanon or among civilians living in the Golan Heights.
Finally, Hafez al-Assad's Syria today is a far cry from Anwar
Sadat's Egypt. Not only has Syria supported terrorists that have
killed Americans and provoked military clashes with the U.S. in
Lebanon in 1983, but Assad is extremely unlikely to become a
reliable U.S. ally in the future, unlike Sadat's Egypt.
Much depends on the details of an Israel-Syrian treaty. If an
agreement leads to the removal of a standing Syrian mechanized army
within 40 kilometers of the Golan, then U.S. troops, as in the
Sinai MFO, might play a useful role in monitoring or verifying
compliance with the treaty. But if large Syrian forces remain
deployed close by and a significant potential security threat
remains, then a mere monitoring mission makes little sense. In
essence, the U.S. force would be serving as a deterrent or tripwire
to prevent Syria reverting to the use of arms.
There also are major questions about size, composition, mission,
and command and control of the Golan force. An MFO-like monitoring
force would be small and lightly armed. But a small, light force
would have difficulty protecting itself from terror attacks
emanating from Lebanon, let alone a Syrian military offensive.
Therefore, a U.S. peacekeeping force in the Golan would have to be
large enough to deter attacks from any source and defend itself. In
other words, it must be a large combat formation, configured for
possible combat, with appropriate rules of engagement. But a large
force, such as an armored or mechanized infantry brigade, would be
costly and a drain on the U.S. military presence in more important
regions such as Europe or South Korea.
REASON #2: Terrorism would pose a threat to U.S. troops.
Unlike the Sinai MFO, Golan peacekeepers would be vulnerable to
significant terrorist threats. They would be stationed close to
southern and eastern Lebanon, the staging area for some of the
world's most dangerous terrorists, including Hezbollah, the
militant pro-Iranian terrorist group responsible for the 1983
bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. Hezbollah and other
terrorist groups operating in Lebanon have a history of attacking
Americans. They will have even more reason to use terrorism to
disrupt an American-brokered peace agreement that they violently
oppose.
Syria itself is one of the chief exporters of international
terrorism.3 Assad repeatedly has used terrorism as an
adjunct of foreign policy in inter-Arab politics, in Lebanon, and
against Israel. He also supported Hezbollah's terrorist campaign
against American peacekeeping forces in Lebanon in 1983-1984. Given
his success in helping Hezbollah to drive U.S. peacekeepers out of
Lebanon in 1984, Assad may try a similar strategy in the Golan if
he decides to seek their removal. Even if Syria cooperates in
restraining terrorism, however, Iran, Iraq, and Libya could support
Lebanon-based terrorist proxies against U.S. forces in the Golan.
Since U.S. troops will be a lightning rod for terrorism,
particularly due to American brokering of a Syrian-Israel peace
accord, a Golan peacekeeping operation should not be manned by
Americans.
REASON #3: It could adversely affect U.S.-Israel
relations. A peacekeeping force is supposed to be a neutral, honest
broker, but maintaining a neutral stance is likely to have a
negative political, military, and psychological impact on
U.S.-Israeli relations. This would be particularly true if the U.S.
maintains strict neutrality with respect to Israel and Syria in the
implementation of any agreement. At a minimum, sharp differences of
opinion are likely to arise concerning compliance issues and the
interpretation of Syrian activities along the border. Deeper
strains in the bilateral relationship could occur if Israel
concluded that the peacekeeping forces were turning a blind eye to
Syrian violations of the peace treaty or if Washington concluded
that Israel was overreacting to minor or ambiguous Syrian
violations. It should be remembered that American participation in
the 1982-1984 multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon led to
considerable friction with Israel and at one point an American
Marine officer brandished a pistol to halt the advance of an
Israeli tank.
A U.S. presence on the Golan also will sap Israeli
self-reliance. Because Syria adamantly rejects allowing Israel to
maintain early warning facilities in the Golan as an infringement
on its sovereignty, Israel is likely to become more dependent on
U.S. spy satellites and aircraft. The U.S. presence also will put a
brake on Israeli military operations in the event of conflict with
Syria or terrorists in Lebanon. Their presence will constrain
Israel's military options, possibly depriving Israel of the
opportunity to launch a preemptive military strike if a Syrian
attack was imminent. Ironically, the U.S. presence could prove to
be more of a deterrent to Israel than to Syria.
American forces on the Golan will be inadequate to defend Israel
if it is attacked. They are likely to constitute only a marginal
military deterrent to Syria and they will be unable to provide
adequate early warning to Israel.4 The real rationale
for the U.S. presence is not military, but political -- to reassure
a nervous Israeli public about security concerns that the U.S. will
be in no position to remedy if conflict erupts. This is dangerous
because it could engender a false sense of security that could lead
Israelis to take more risks in peace negotiations with Syria than
they otherwise would take.
REASON #4: It could be too costly and too much of a drain
on U.S. forces. The U.S. cannot afford to commit an ever-larger
proportion of its declining active duty forces to worldwide
peacekeeping operations. Sending U.S. troops to Haiti and Bosnia
already has depleted America's strategic reserve and could
jeopardize American interests by stretching U.S. forces thin around
the world. It should be remembered that the peacekeeping
commitments to Haiti and Bosnia, and now possibly on the Golan as
well, were made in addition to the existing military alliance
commitments in Europe and Asia -- and even as the Clinton
Administration is trying to cut the defense budget even
further.
For a Golan peacekeeping mission to be credible, it would
require the commitment of a large force consisting of at least a
heavy brigade, roughly 5,000 troops. To maintain a long term
deployment of this force, three brigades would have to be dedicated
to the mission: one on deployment, one recovering and retraining
after returning from the mission, and one training and preparing to
deploy on the mission. This is roughly 10 percent of the U.S.
Army's active duty combat strength, a prohibitively high burden for
an open-ended peacekeeping mission. If the U.S. is suddenly faced
with conflict in other regions of the world, such as the Persian
Gulf or the Korean peninsula, the forces on the Golan could be
sorely needed to protect vital U.S. national interests.
In addition to diverting troops from other, more important
missions, an open-ended peacekeeping mission on the Golan will
reduce the military effectiveness of troops available for other
missions. Troops returning from the Golan will need many months of
retraining to regain the warfighting skills that atrophied during
their peacekeeping deployment.5
An American Golan peacekeeping commitment also would entail
considerable financial costs, and could drain away hundreds of
millions of dollars from the defense budget. Congress already has
scaled back the U.S. contribution to the Sinai MFO budget, cutting
it from $80 million to $74 million in fiscal year 1988. Similar
budgetary pressures could undercut a Golan MFO, even if other
nations contribute to the costs of the operation.
REASON #5: Americans are not needed. If peacekeepers are
needed to monitor a Syrian-Israeli peace treaty, they should not be
Americans. An American peacekeeping presence would be a lightning
rod for terrorism, would drain the U.S. defense budget
unnecessarily, and would strain Israeli-American relations. Other
countries are willing and fully able to contribute neutral
peacekeeping forces. After all, the United Nations Disengagement
Observer Force has deployed peacekeepers from Austria, Canada,
Finland, and Poland on the Golan Heights for over two decades to
monitor compliance with the 1974 Israeli-Syrian Disengagement
Agreement.
In addition to blocking an American peacekeeping presence on the
Golan Heights, Congress should press the Clinton Administration
to:
Rule out foreign aid to Syria as a sweetener for a peace
agreement. To make it clear that no U.S. aid will be forthcoming to
sweeten a Syrian-Israeli deal, Congress should pass a resolution
opposing U.S. foreign aid to Syria. The reward for peace is peace,
not billions of dollars of bribery. America's aid to Egypt, a
country which did not launch terrorist attacks against Americans,
came after the 1978 Camp David accords and in the context of the
Cold War. Egypt switched sides and left the Soviet orbit to become
a reliable American ally. Syria has no Soviet card to play. The
U.S. must allocate its increasingly scarce foreign aid resources to
long-term friends and not use foreign aid as a reward to Syria, a
long-standing adversary.
Maintain pressure on Syria to halt its support of terrorism.
Damascus supports over one dozen terrorist groups, including many
Palestinian groups opposed to the Israeli-Palestinian peace
negotiations. The U.S. should push Syria relentlessly to expel
these Palestinians from Syrian territory and Syrian-controlled
Lebanese territory, crack down on Hezbollah in Syrian-controlled
areas of Lebanon, and cooperate with the U.S. in breaking the back
of international terrorist groups. There can be no genuine peace as
long as Syria maintains ties with terrorists. Congress should
ensure that the war against terrorism remains a high priority of
U.S. foreign policy. Therefore, Syria should not be removed from
the State Department's list of states that sponsor terrorism unless
Damascus halts its support for terrorism. Syria should not be
removed from the list merely as a reward for signing a peace treaty
with Israel.
Conclusion
An American peacekeeping presence on the Golan Heights is not
needed. It would not significantly reduce the military risks that
Israel would run in returning the Golan to Syrian control. The U.S.
cannot afford an open-ended deployment of first echelon combat
troops in support of what is essentially a diplomatic gambit. Nor
should it seek to downplay the significant military risks attendant
on returning the Golan Heights to Syria. If Israel decides to do
so, that is its prerogative, but it should do so without the
implied commitment represented by a U.S. tripwire on the Golan.
There are many other nations that would be willing to provide
peacekeeping forces, if that is necessary.
Congress must open debate on the Golan peacekeeping issue before
it is presented with another fait accompli like Haiti or
Bosnia. Now that Secretary of Defense Perry has confirmed that a
U.S. commitment of some sort exists, it can no longer be deemed
"premature" for Congress to discuss the issue.
The bottom line: Syria gets more out of a peace agreement with
Israel than does the U.S. and therefore should be willing to pay
more for it. Washington should push Assad to acquiesce to America's
agenda and not get bogged down in more narrow peace negotiating
issues. The U.S. must not jeopardize important national interests
by committing U.S. troops to seal an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement
that is potentially fragile and cosmetic.
Endnotes:
- Barton Gellman, "Perry Firms U.S. Commitment to Golan Force,"
The Washington Post, January 9, 1996, p. A12.
- See James Phillips, "Beyond the Israeli-PLO Peace Agreement:
The U.S. Role in Consolidating Peace," Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 963, October 13, 1993.
- See James Phillips, "The Changing Face of Middle Eastern
Terrorism," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder
No. 1005, October 6, 1994.
- For a more detailed analysis of the likely military
shortcomings of a U.S. peacekeeping force, see Dore Gold, "US
Forces on the Golan Heights and Israeli-Syrian Security
Arrangements," Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Memorandum No.
44, August 1994. See also Douglas Feith, General John Foss, Frank
Gaffney, and Admiral Carl Trost, "Mission Impossible: The Case
Against Deploying U.S. Forces on the Golan Heights," Washington,
D.C., Center for Security Policy, October 12, 1994.
- See U.S. General Accounting Office, "Peace Operations: Effect
of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability,"
GAO/NSIAD-96-14, October 1995.