Armenia has made further peace
negotiations extremely difficult. The Armenian government now
demands that Azerbaijan recognize Karabakh's independence and deal
with the Karabakh leadership directly as a full-fledged party to
the conflict. Moreover, it refuses to promise that the territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan will be restored. Meanwhile, the government in
Baku, the Azeri capital, insists on preserving its territory.
In a
worst-case scenario, Baku expects Armenia to renew hostilities
against Azerbaijan, possibly in the region of the three borders
(those of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) near the cities of
Yevlakh and Kazakh. Such a move would cut off the route for the
East-West Caspian oil pipeline (from Baku to the Georgian port of
Supsa on the Black Sea or from Baku to the port of Ceyhan on
Turkey's Mediterranean coast) and force Azerbaijan to export oil by
way of Russia or Iran.
Baku
accuses the Armenian government of coddling the Dashnak
socialist-nationalist movement that is popular in the Armenian
diaspora, including among Armenians who settled in the United
States. Senior Azeri officials allege that the Dashnaks have
provided assistance to radical Armenian anti-Turkish terrorist
groups, which since the 1970s have maintained ties with the most
radical Arab terrorist organizations.
Russia and Iran are key supporters of
Armenia. According to the late General Lev Rokhlin, former chairman
of the Duma Defense Committee, Russia supplied Yerevan with over $1
billion in weapons from 1996 to 1998, including T-80 tanks,
large-caliber field artillery, possibly Scud-2 missiles, and other
heavy equipment. Moscow tried to claim that the weapons pipeline
was unauthorized.
Influential Moscow insiders of imperialist
persuasion were also behind Ter-Petrossian's ouster. For example, a
member of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's Presidential Council,
Andranik Migranian, called repeatedly in the Armenian media for the
ouster of President Ter-Petrossian. He castigated Ter-Petrossian as
willing to compromise too much in order to achieve peace and called
for ever-closer Russian-Armenian ties aimed against the United
States and the West.
Members of the Azerbaijani foreign policy
elite, on the other hand, see Azerbaijan as part of a pro-Western
regional bloc. This bloc, which provides a strategic nexus between
the Middle East and the Caucasus and further into Central Asia,
includes Turkey, Israel, and Georgia. It is opposed by Russia,
Iran, and Armenia. Iran is supplying part of Armenia's fuel needs
and, according to sources in Baku, pays for some Armenian arms
purchases. This makes routing Azeri oil
through Iran even more problematic, not only because of the ongoing
hostility between Tehran and Washington, but also because of the
ongoing atmosphere of suspicion between Baku and Tehran.
The
Iranian regime has been severely criticized by policymakers in the
region for its support of Armenia. One leader claimed that "the
mullahs preach morality-but practice immorality. Repression at home
undermines prestige abroad; the bad image [negatively] affects
foreign investment." Beyond the current criticism,
many in Baku have expressed long-standing resentment toward Iran as
one of Azerbaijan's former imperial masters. The administration of
Heydar Aliev has to compete at home with the rhetoric of the
National Front of Azerbaijan (NFA), the main opposition coalition
led by Abulfaz Elchibey, who was ousted by Aliev in 1993. The NFA
promotes reunification with Southern Azerbaijan, an area in
northwestern Iran populated by ethnic Azeris.
The Great Game
Continues.
Baku would prefer to export Caspian oil via Georgia to the Turkish
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. This is also the main oil route
preferred by the U.S. Government because it would benefit Georgia
and afford the United States, Western Europe, Turkey, and Israel
access to Caspian oil.
Some
American officials believe, however, that the Azeri fields in the
Caspian, although they show great promise, might not yet have the
confirmed resources to justify a full commitment by the oil
companies to develop the Baku-Ceyhan route. Azerbaijan now is
attempting to persuade its neighbors, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan,
to commit to cross-Caspian pipelines that will join the Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline, thus making it more economically efficient. If this takes
place, Azerbaijan's geostrategic importance will increase even
further.
GEORGIA: STRATEGIC GATEWAY TO THE
CAUCASUS
Georgia is located in the western part of
the Southern Caucasus. Oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan, and
perhaps eventually from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as well, are to
cross Georgia from east to west, bringing at least 5 million-and
possibly as much as 45 million--tons of oil per year to Georgian
ports. Uzbek cotton and Kazakh metal ores also are being shipped by
way of Georgia. Controlling a strategic part of the Black Sea
coast, bordering Turkey, and landlocking Armenia from the west,
Georgia is the gateway to the Caucasus and the Western bridgehead
to the Caspian and the Silk Road.
Now
staunchly pro-American, Georgia's leadership is under severe
pressure from Moscow. As Senator Sam Brownback recently stated:
[Georgia] is a NATO borderland at the
entry point to the emerging new Silk Road. It is a key ally of our
partner Turkey and is important in many ways: strategically,
militarily, commercially. If Georgia were to become unstable, the
entire region would be put in jeopardy.... An ambitious project,
[the Silk Road ] will eventually encompass pipelines, roads and
railroads, airports, and communications networks that stretch from
Central Europe to China. This corridor will completely alter the
economics and the politics of Eurasia in ways that we cannot
foresee, but which are certain to intersect U.S. strategic
interests in Eurasia in many places.... For the corridor to
function, stability in these states is essential.
Georgia is undergoing a difficult period
of securing its national identity and sovereignty. The fallout from
the February 1998 assassination attempt against President Eduard
Shevardnadze and the May 1998 fighting in the breakaway republic of
Abkhazia have led to increased instability in this strategic
region. This benefits Russia and Iran, both of which are interested
in undermining the Western route for Caspian oil.
Crisis in Abkhazia. In
1993, separatist Abkhaz, members of a small ethnic group of 90,000,
fought a war of secession against Georgia. Russian, Chechen,
Cossack, and Muslim fighters from the North Caucasus supported the
Abkhaz against Georgia. In the aftermath of the war, over 300,000
Georgian refugees were exiled from their homes in areas controlled
by Abkhaz allies.
Boris Yeltsin then offered Shevardnadze a
deal: In return for allowing the placement of four Russian military
bases in Georgian territory and 1,000 Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) peacekeepers in Abkhazia, Moscow would ensure
Georgia's reunification. Shevardnadze was forced to accept, but
Russia has not kept its part of the bargain. Instead, Russia has
provided continuous support to the separatist regime of Vladislav
Ardzinba in Sukhumi, the Abkhaz capital.
On
May 19, 1998, after hostilities involving Georgian guerrillas,
Abkhazia poured heavy artillery and tanks into the district of
Gali, a Georgian-populated area of Abkhazia, and exiled another
30,000 Georgians from their villages, burning and looting their
homes. Russian peacekeepers under the CIS flag stood by and did
nothing. Moreover, widespread reports in the Georgian media
suggested that these Russian peacekeepers actually supplied the
Abkhaz with heavy weapons. The Georgian government, lacking
a credible military force and anxious about possible Russian
military support of the Abkhaz as well as the Russian bases on
Georgian territory, did not intervene militarily.
In a
recent letter to Shevardnadze, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) declared
himself to be
appalled by the failure of the so-called
Russian "peace-keepers" in Georgia to avert...the crisis in
Abkhazia. Further, I am greatly concerned by indications of an
active, ongoing Russian covert action aimed at using the recent
crisis to erode public confidence and destabilize your government.
This behavior must not be tolerated, and cannot go unchallenged....
I also foresee, in the wake of the recent armed insurrection in
Abkhazia, the need for further measures to provide additional types
of United States assistance to strengthen Georgia's stability and
security.
The
United Nations has proved to be of little assistance in Abkhazia,
despite its ongoing involvement in the peace talks since 1994. The
U.N. Mission for Georgia (UNOMIG), which is active in Abkhazia, has
been unable to resolve the conflict and bring about the
re-integration of Abkhazia into Georgia. Former U.N. Secretary
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in a slip of the tongue, in 1993
actually informed the Georgian delegation that "the key to the
Abkhaz problem lies in the USSR."
Tbilisi has offered the widest possible
autonomy to the Abkhaz, but so far they have rejected the
overtures. Despite Russia's support, the Abkhaz nationalists no
longer are satisfied with Moscow's position. They are now looking
for allies among the Abkhaz residing in Turkey and would like to
ignite a balance-of-power conflict between Russia and Turkey.
Without a credible military deterrent, all
of Georgia's diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation may be
fruitless. The Abkhaz are not interested in matters that concern a
modern nation-state, like foreign investment or developing a market
infrastructure; in fact, the nationalist leaders of Abkhazia would
rather be poor, proud, and independent from Georgia. Thus,
conventional economic and diplomatic incentives may not work,
especially as long as support from Russia and revenues from
cigarette smuggling and bootleg liquor continue to pour into the
region.
Trouble in the Autonomous
Regions. Friction continues between the central government
in Tbilisi and the local pro-Russian leader, Aslan Abashidze, in
the Georgian region of Ajara near the Black Sea, encouraged by
Russian military personnel based there. Tbilisi also questions the
loyalty of the Armenian population in the region of Djavakheti near
the Armenian border, where a Russian military base is located near
the town of Akhalkalaki.
Meanwhile, terrorism continues in the
autonomous Georgian province of South Ossetia. The Deputy Prime
Minister of that province, Valerii Khubulov, was murdered on May
31, 1998, across the border in Northern Ossetia, which is a Russian
autonomous territory. Some of the Ossetians residing
in Georgia are interested in reuniting with co-ethnics in
Russia.
Moscow's Footprints. The
common denominator of these secessionist movements--as in the case
of Karabakh--is Moscow's support. Russia is still suffering
"phantom pains" over the loss of territories it once controlled.
Even as the Kremlin is undergoing an extreme fiscal crisis, the
Russian government somehow manages to find the money to pay its
troops stationed in the Caucasus.
According to Georgian Foreign Ministry
sources, Moscow finances the local governments in Abkhazia and
Ajara, while other subversive activities are funded by cigarette
smuggling and drug trafficking. The president and senior
officials in Georgia have accused hard-liners in Russia of
masterminding the February 1998 assassination attempt against
Shevardnadze, despite the fact that Chechen guerrilla leader Salman
Raduev has claimed responsibility for the attack. Russia still
hopes that a weak Georgia will scare off Western investors in oil
and gas pipeline projects, forcing Tbilisi to capitulate and ask
for Moscow's protection against separatism.
Civic and Economic
Recovery. If not for Russian intervention, Georgia might
well have recovered much more rapidly from the post-communist
crisis. As things stand today, however, most of the Georgian
government's attention remains dedicated to fighting
insurgency.
Nevertheless, even in these difficult
conditions, the country is undergoing a promising economic
transition. The privatization of most small enterprises has been
accomplished, and large concerns are scheduled for privatization in
1998-1999. Market-oriented economic legislation has been adopted by
the Parliament, although its implementation will be difficult.
Corruption is so widespread that many Georgians, according to
recent opinion polls, think it is the government's number-one
problem.
Despite these challenges, President
Shevardnadze and his government have made significant progress. The
government has disbanded the armed militias headed by convicted
criminals such as Djaba Yoseliani and former Defense Minister
Tengiz Kitovani, and has jailed their leaders. The level of
political stability is higher than at any time since 1991.
Democratic parliamentary and presidential elections took place in
1995 and 1996 with far fewer electoral irregularities than in
neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Eduard Shevardnadze presides over an
unprecedented transfer of power to the Georgian "yuppie"
generation: The chairman of the Parliament, Zurab Zhvania, a
biologist by training and a free marketeer, is 33. The architect of
legal reform and the leader of the coalition in the Parliament,
Misha Saakashvili, is a 30-year-old Columbia University and George
Washington Law School graduate who worked for a New York law firm.
The newly appointed Finance Minister, Michael Chkuaseli, is only 28
years old, and the chairman of the national bank, Iraklii
Managadze, is 30. The new Prime Minister, Vazha Lortkipanidze,
appointed by President Shevardnadze on July 27, 1998, will focus
the government's efforts on furthering economic reforms.
In
addition to the peaceful and progressive changes in government,
there is a small construction boom going on in Tbilisi. Subtropical
Georgia boasts good wineries, citrus groves, and tea plantations.
The absence of an agricultural bank credit system has prevented
these enterprises from thriving, but economic reform and the famed
entrepreneurship of the Georgian people hold great promise for
these agricultural sectors.
A
religious revival also is underway. Shevardnadze and Patriarch Ilya
II of the Georgian Orthodox Church are personal friends and
political allies. Culturally, Christian Georgia sees itself as part
of the West; both European and American cultures are understood and
deeply appreciated among the elite. Georgia shows real promise as a
pivotal pro-American democracy in the Caucasus.
DAGHESTAN AND CHECHNYA: THE CLOCK IS
TICKING
Over
the past two years, Russia has been aggressively promoting the
"northern" oil pipeline route from Baku to Novorossiysk on the
Black Sea by way of Grozny (the capital of Chechnya). This route
now presents problems for two reasons: because of the increasing
instability in and around Chechnya, and because of the growing
inter-ethnic and religious tensions in the Russian-controlled but
Muslim-populated autonomous republic of Daghestan, located between
the Caspian Sea and Chechnya. Ethnic groups in Daghestan are
becoming increasingly anti-Russian. Both the likelihood of violence
and the possibility of another large-scale Russian military
operation in the Northern Caucasus are growing.
Since the end of the war in Chechnya, a
number of Russian and North Caucasian officers, government
officials, and civilians have been killed in Chechnya or close to
its borders, and others have been kidnapped. Six Western Red Cross
workers were brutally murdered in Chechnya in September 1997.
General Viktor Prokopenko of the Russian General Staff and several
officers and enlisted men were killed during an inspection in April
1998.
Since the autumn of 1997, some Russian
border guards in the area have been kidnapped. This spring, Russian
government officials were taken hostage in and around Chechnya,
apparently by forces not controlled by the government of President
Aslan Maskhadov in Grozny. The victims included Yeltsin's personal
special representative to Chechnya, Valentin Vlasov, kidnapped on
May 1, 1998, by unidentified assailants, and the head of the security
service of the neighboring Republic of Ingushetia. A helicopter
carrying Russian Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin came under
sniper fire during a flight near the Chechen border, and its fuel
tanks were punctured.
These terrorist acts cannot be blamed on
the government of President Maskhadov. Even Russians consider the
president, a former Soviet army colonel and the hero of the Chechen
independence war, to be a responsible leader and respect him,
albeit grudgingly. But violent and uncontrollable gangs, as well as
bandits in and outside Chechnya, have become a real threat to both
Grozny and Moscow. President Maskhadov himself was almost killed in
a car-bomb explosion on July 23. His would-be assassins are still
at large.
Chechnya's future is also hampered by
Moscow's reluctance to grant it full independence. Even after its
bitter defeat in the Chechen war, Russia still cannot come to terms
with Chechen independence. According to the Nazran agreements
signed by Russian General Alexander Lebed and the Russo-Chechen
peace treaty signed by Presidents Yeltsin and Maskhadov on May 12,
1997, the question of the Chechen Republic's status must be
resolved by the year 2001.
With
Russian parliamentary elections due in 1999 and a presidential race
scheduled for the year 2000, the Russian political elite will be
reluctant to face the inevitable: Moscow should grant the Chechens
their freedom. This course has been advocated by sources as diverse
as the great Russian writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Moscow mayor
Yurii Luzhkov (who is also a moderate-nationalist presidential
aspirant). In a recent joint declaration, former Prime Minister
Viktor Chernomyrdin, General Lebed, CIS Executive Secretary Boris
Berezovsky, and President of Tatarstan Minitmer Shaimiev called for
peace and warned against a new war in the Caucasus.
Russian observers are split regarding the
future of Chechnya, some fearing further disintegration and some
seeing the moral imperative of "letting the Chechens go." In the
meantime, Russia is keeping Chechnya under a virtual blockade.
Besides its border with Russia, the only
other border Chechnya shares is with Georgia. The Chechens
apparently are interested in gaining access to the Georgian Black
Sea port of Poti and the future terminal of the Baku-Supsa oil
pipeline. Thus, Chechnya is building a road across the Caucasus
mountain range into Georgia at a cost of over $100 million in order
to bypass the Russian railroad and highway network. While
officially calm about the Chechen plans, at least some Georgian
observers privately express fear that the Chechens will attempt to
control not only the projected highway, but eventually the port of
Poti and its trade.
Adding to these tensions is the fact that
radical Islamic forces are spreading in the region. These include
guerrillas under the command of Khattab, a Jordanian "field
commander" who fought during the Chechen war on the rebel side and
reportedly is running three terrorist training camps inside
Chechnya.
Members of the Wahabbi (a Sunni Muslim
fundamentalist sect based in Saudi Arabia) also are infiltrating
into the area. They are accused of the murder of the Mufti
Sayedmuhammed-haji Abubakarov, the supreme Islamic leader of
Daghestan, on August 21. Friction is growing between the
traditional North Caucasus Islamic establishment, which is
comfortable with the Russian presence, and the Wahabbi, who espouse
driving out the Russians.
Ethnically diverse (some 100 ethnic groups
live in Daghestan) and abysmally poor (the rate of unemployment
among the young is 70 percent), Daghestan is a time bomb waiting to
explode. These tensions could lead to a massive conflict, similar
to that in the Balkans, on the edge of the world's most important
remaining oil reserves.
A
political struggle among the largest local nations--Avars, Lezgins,
and Laks as well as Chechens--could easily deteriorate into a
full-scale war. If that happens, the Russians and Chechens will no
doubt intervene, in which case the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline might
be shut down by bombing or other sabotage. Massive thefts of oil
from the current pipeline for bootleg refining already have been
reported.
If
war breaks out, the Daghestanis can count at least on moral support
south of the border in Azerbaijan: A senior Azeri policymaker has
described the Russian presence in the Northern Caucasus as that of
"an occupying power, which has nothing to offer the peoples of the
region but its weapons," adding that "Azerbaijan wants to see its
neighbors in Daghestan free...."
SECURING U.S. INTERESTS IN THE
CAUCASUS
Recent foreign policy setbacks in the
Indian subcontinent, combined with the failure to prevent Russia
from selling strategic technology to Iran, have dealt a serious
blow to U.S. credibility and authority as a superpower. Vital
American interests and U.S. prestige in Eurasia are at stake. These
vital interests include keeping Russia and Iran from expanding into
the strategic Caucasus region, ensuring the transportation of
energy resources to global markets, maintaining access to the
Caspian Sea and Central Asia for American companies, and securing
the independence and territorial integrity of Georgia, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan.
A
prudent policy toward the Caucasus also helps to ensure American
influence in Central Asia, a crucial area in which China, Russia,
Iran, Pakistan, and India already are competing.
Specifically, the United States
should:
- Increase its political and security
support for the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. The United
States should use its influence with the governments of Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan to ensure construction of cross-Caspian oil and
gas pipelines to follow the more secure Baku-Supsa-Ceyhan
route.
Gaining access to growing Mediterranean
markets also makes sense economically. In addition to reaching the
quickly growing Turkish markets, the Caspian oil can easily be
exported from Ceyhan to the United States and Western Europe. Oil
from the Georgian port of Supsa can be shipped to Bulgarian,
Romanian, and Ukrainian refineries on the Black Sea coast, and by
barge up the Danube river to the heart of Europe.
- Foster security cooperation with
Georgia. Georgia is the most pro-Western and pro-American
country in the region, and has progressed much farther with
democratic and economic reforms than its neighbors. But it also is
under the greatest pressure, both from local separatists and from
hard-line elements in the Russian military and political
establishments.
To sustain its sovereignty, Georgia needs
the ability to protect itself from Russia, enforce its territorial
integrity, and defend its borders. The recent assassination attempt
against President Shevardnadze and the outbreak of fighting in
Abkhazia in May 1998 prove that Georgia needs more political and
military support. Diplomacy, of course, is always preferable to
military action, but as long as Tbilisi is viewed as powerless, the
challenge of separatism and terrorism will continue.
Washington is offering Tbilisi important
help in building border controls, and patrol boats for the Georgian
Coast Guard have been donated by the United States, Ukraine, and
Turkey. U.S. assistance totaling some $20 million in 1998 is
allowing Georgia to get rid of its Russian border guards and set up
maritime and land border controls. But the real challenge lies
elsewhere: Georgia needs to build a modern, mobile force capable of
defending its territory in the forbidding mountainous terrain.
The nascent Georgian military forces need
total restructuring, including officer training at home and
abroad--preferably in the United States. Further help is needed in
creating a corps of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and building
military education institutions for NCOs and officers. The Georgian
Foreign Minister wants language training for the army, and Tbilisi
could also benefit from the creation of command, control,
communications, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities and special
forces training. These programs are not prohibitively expensive and
can be accomplished either within the current U.S. assistance and
Partnership for Peace budgets or with moderate increases in the
level of aid.
- Lift sanctions against
Azerbaijan. At the height of the war between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, the U.S. Congress imposed sanctions on Azerbaijan as an
incentive to stop the fighting. The sanctions were outlined in
Article 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act. They remain in
force--even though hostilities subsided in 1994 and a cease-fire is
in place.
Thus, while Moscow is reinforcing Armenia
and Armenia is reinforcing Karabakh, Washington is weakening
Azerbaijan. One million Azeris became refugees as a result of the
fighting, and 20 percent of Azeri soil is now occupied by Armenia
and Karabakh. As co-chairman of the "Minsk Group," a forum created
by the OSCE to settle the Karabakh issue, the United States has a
responsibility to function as an honest broker. Neither of the
other two co-chairmen, France and Russia, imposes sanctions against
Azerbaijan.
The Clinton Administration has stated
repeatedly that Article 907 runs counter to U.S. national interests
and has called for its repeal. Both Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs Marc Grossman and Special Advisor
to the Secretary of State for the New Independent States Stephen
Sestanovich, for example, stated this position recently in
testimony before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy,
Export, and Trade Promotion of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
Lifting the sanctions is also endorsed
strongly by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former U.S. National Security
Advisor and an expert on the region. The House Appropriations
Committee voted to repeal Section 907 on September 10, 1998, but
the measure failed to win approval by the full House.
President Clinton could lift the sanctions
by issuing a "finding" that the conditions stipulated in the
sanctions no longer apply. It does not make sense to maintain
sanctions on a friendly country that desperately needs American
assistance to preserve its independence, especially when U.S.
companies are about to invest billions of dollars in its
economy.
- Make it clear to Moscow that continued
support for ethnic separatism in the South Caucasus will ensure an
end to U.S. assistance. Preservation of the independence
and territorial integrity of the New Independent States is a
proclaimed principle of the Clinton Administration, but more must
be done to reconcile words with deeds. Moscow has supported the
Abkhaz separatists and is encouraging the pro-Russian forces in
Ajara against the central government in Georgia as well as the
Karabakh Armenians against Azerbaijan.
The Kremlin is trying to undermine two
statesmen it perceives as pro-Western and pro-American: Eduard
Shevardnadze of Georgia and Heydar Aliev of Azerbaijan.
Washington's leverage with Moscow is the Kremlin's need for a broad
range of business and financial assistance from the United States
and international financial organizations. Washington should make
it clear to Moscow that both Western economic assistance and
Russia's membership in the G-8 organization of industrialized
nations are incompatible with Russian policies of destabilization
in the Caucasus.
- Begin a dialogue with ethnic leaders
of the Northern Caucasus. The political situation in the
North Caucasus remains tenuous. Russian control is waning;
separatism and radical Islam are on the rise. A war in the North
Caucasus could destabilize Russia as well as the countries of the
Southern Caucasus. Massive conflict would create a wide-ranging
refugee problem and increase ethnic strife and terrorist
activity.
A new Caucasus war with religious
overtones could also strengthen the influence of transnational
radical Islamic organizations and master terrorists, such as Usama
bin Ladin, a Saudi Arabian living in Afghanistan who is a fiercely
anti-American sponsor of international terrorism and is accused of
masterminding the terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania.
There are numerous reports that a new spiral of low-intensity
conflict in the Caucasus is imminent.
The United States needs to get a clearer
picture of the developments in the region and become better
acquainted with the players. Without violating the sovereignty of
the Russian Federation or in any way fostering separatism,
secession, or rebellion, the United States must increase its
information gathering and initiate a dialogue with the leaders of
ethnic regions in the Northern Caucasus.
This can be effected through the U.S.
Embassy and USIS (U.S. Information Service) in Moscow. For example,
seminars and conferences can be conducted both in Moscow and in
Washington, D.C., with participation of the North Caucasian and
Russian leaders involved in ethnic politics and policy. Such
activities are necessary to communicate the U.S. call for
stability, ethnic and religious tolerance, and peace in the region,
and to help Washington develop a better understanding of the
situation, which is often filtered through the biased Moscow
media.
CONCLUSION
The
United States cannot afford to neglect its commitments in
economically and strategically important regions of the world. The
Caucasus has emerged as one such pivotal geopolitical region.
Supporting its friends in the Caucasus will allow the United States
to protect its future multibillion-dollar investments in energy
resources, which will be vital for many years to come. It will
allow American companies to participate in building the new Silk
Road into Central Asia and the Far East, generating jobs at home
and markets abroad for billions of dollars of American goods and
services. Infrastructure projects in the region are especially
lucrative for the U.S. heavy equipment, aircraft, transportation,
petrochemical, and telecommunications industries.
Such
U.S. involvement in the region's economy will deter Russia and Iran
from dominating their smaller pro-Western neighbors. Congress is
showing the way with the Silk Road Strategy Act. The Clinton
Administration should follow suit by supporting security,
free-market reforms, and democracy in the Caucasus and by
preventing Russia and Iran from dominating the region.
Dr. Ariel
Cohen is Senior Policy Analyst in Russian and
Eurasian Studies in The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
International Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.