Evgeny Primakov
Evgeny Primakov, who turned 69 on October
29, is a former senior Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)
nomenklatura member with a background in espionage and
propaganda--first as Middle East correspondent for the chief
Communist daily paper Pravda, and later as director of the
Institute of International Economics and International Relations
(known by its Russian acronym of IMEMO), a foreign policy think
tank closely linked to the CPSU Central Committee's decision-making
process. He then served as the Speaker of the U.S.S.R. Supreme
Soviet (parliament) and as a foreign policy advisor to former
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Rumors persist that he
maintained close connections to the KGB, the Soviet intelligence
service, throughout his career.
During the early 1990s, Primakov was a
member of the CPSU's ruling body, the Politburo. Unlike Gorbachev's
other associates, he managed to survive when President Boris
Yeltsin took over. Yeltsin appointed Primakov as head of the
Russian foreign intelligence service (SVR) in 1991. In that
capacity, he advocated both reintegration of the former union under
Russia's aegis and a more anti-Western policy, which has been named
"the Primakov Doctrine." In January 1996, Primakov became
Foreign Minister, supplanting Andrei Kozyrev, who, in a
well-orchestrated defamation campaign, was accused of pro-Western
orientation.
As a
member of Yeltsin's government, Primakov refrained from openly
criticizing free-market reforms. However, his sympathies reflect a
quasi-socialist approach to government that advocates the
predominance of state-run property and strong government
regulation, not limited government and free enterprise.
Neither Primakov nor his government seems
ready to fight the economic crisis gripping Russia. Executive
decisions are shrouded in secrecy--a practice understandable only
within the context of the kind of intelligence operations that
Primakov used to oversee--and this has harmed Primakov's image.
Many in the media speculate that restrictions imposed on the
dissemination of official information are designed to cover up a
paucity of constructive crisis management strategies. Several
observers suspect that Primakov does not want to make any unpopular
moves before the crucial negotiations with the IMF are complete,
perhaps hiding his government's true intentions. The Russian media
even accuse him of using psychological warfare tactics, such as
those the Soviets applied against enemy regions, to deceive the
Russian people about how well the government is dealing with the
economic crisis.
Primakov's foreign policy often leans
toward supporting rogue regimes in the Middle East, and his
political career is linked to that region. In 1990, for example, he
was Gorbachev's special envoy to Iraq, charged with trying to avert
the Desert Storm operation. Today, he counts among his personal
friends such leaders as Saddam Hussein, Hafez-al-Assad, and Yassir
Arafat.
Primakov is wary of the United States and
its Western European allies. He does not hesitate to challenge U.S.
leadership by promoting the concept of "multi-polarity" and
opposing NATO enlargement. Yet he is too pragmatic to allow
Russian-U.S. relations to deteriorate dramatically. He might even
pressure the State Duma into ratifying the START II Treaty,
believing that such a move is in Russia's own interest. At the same
time, however, Russia's flirtation with anti-American regimes
across the world can be expected to continue.
Primakov's Domestic Deputies
Primakov wields enormous domestic power.
He controls Russia's financial agencies, including the Finance
Ministry, the Federal Taxation Service, the Tax Police, and the
State Customs Committee. He was able to remove from influential
positions his potential rivals, such as Security Council Secretary
Andrei Kokoshin and Presidential Spokesman and Chief Foreign Policy
Advisor Sergei Yastrzhembski. But he is not an expert on the
Russian economy, even though that normally is a qualification for a
Russian premier. Consequently, he will have to rely on his deputies
for guidance.
So
far, Primakov has appointed five new deputies:
-
Yuri Maslyukov, First
Deputy Premier responsible for macroeconomic management and the
military-industrial complex;
-
Vadim Gustov, First
Deputy Premier responsible for regional and local government
affairs;
-
Gennady Kulik, Deputy
Premier responsible for agriculture;
-
Valentina Matviyenko,
Deputy Premier for social security issues; and
-
Vladimir Bulgak,
Deputy Premier in charge of managing the fuel and energy complex,
research and development, and communications.
Most
of these deputies were high-ranking Soviet Communist Party
officials in the 1970s and 1980s, when the U.S.S.R. was suffering
an economic decline. They represent a generation of Russian history
plagued with stagnation and economic morass, and it is unlikely
that they will be able to adjust their economic
philosophies--formed decades ago within a Communist political and
ideological environment--to the realities of a developing
market.
The
Primakov government, however, is not made up solely of old
Communists. It is a collection of people with different political
orientations, ideologies, backgrounds, and goals. To understand how
this government will function, and what its policies portend for
the future of Russia, consider Primakov's principal choices:
First Deputy Premier Yuri
Maslyukov, 61, is the top Deputy Prime Minister and the
government's chief economic executive. He represents the old system
well. His career was made largely within the huge Soviet
military-industrial complex that accounted for between 60 percent
and 80 percent of the Soviet Union's GDP. He headed the U.S.S.R.'s
State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN), which monopolized all economic
planning and management, defining the type, volume, and prices of
commodities manufactured at every single plant and factory across
11 time zones.
According to the job description issued by
the Primakov government, Maslyukov will supervise the Ministries of
Economics, Trade, and Privatization; the military-industrial
complex; and the arms trade. He is Russia's chief representative
for talks with international financial organizations. This in
itself is a strange appointment, both because of his Communist
record and because he has no experience in negotiating sensitive
financial issues. Maslyukov's foreign counterparts are unlikely to
give his positions much credence.
Maslyukov is a classic Soviet
apparatchik. It is doubtful that his experience will
benefit the Russian economy in the circumstances surrounding the
current crisis. His first reported pronouncements favoring an
increased money supply and restricted ruble convertibility already
have caused concern. These policies would allow him to pour
unlimited funds into the military-industrial complex. For example,
Maslyukov has called for expanding the production of high-tech
Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by 40 units a
year and stepping up manufacturing of sea-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs) and new strategic nuclear submarines. He harbors
the erroneous notion that a revival of the Russian
military-industrial complex will lead to a general surge in
industrial output. In truth, it will require colossal funding,
which will only aggravate the country's economic depression.
Maslyukov's anti-reform views on how to
lift Russia from its crisis have disturbed many, including
Alexander Shokhin, a liberal economist appointed by Primakov as
Deputy Premier in charge of financial issues. Shokhin resigned just
ten days after assuming his post, apparently in the belief that he
could not reconcile his own economic policies with those of
Maslyukov, to whom he reported.
Finance Minister Mikhail Zadornov of the
social democratic Yabloko party also has been highly critical of
Maslyukov's economic platform, which the government finally
renounced. After little more than one month in office, Maslyukov
already is viewed as a top lobbyist for the military-industrial
complex, instead of as a politician capable of dealing with
Russia's financial crisis.
Among Maslyukov's aides are such
anti-market economists as Sergei Glaziev, head of the Federation
Council
Analytical Service and a consistent opponent of liberal reforms,
and Anton Surikov, an observer for the ultranationalist
Zavtra
weekly paper and a proponent of the restoration of the Soviet
empire by force. They can be expected to have an effect on
Maslyukov's decisions.
Head of the Central Bank Viktor
Gerashchenko. The position of Deputy Premier in charge of
financial issues was eliminated after Shokhin resigned, and its
functions were divided among the remaining Deputy Premiers and
left-leaning Central Bank Chairman Viktor Gerashchenko.
Gerashchenko's voice has become critically important in resolving
Russia's financial problems; he was the chief Russian negotiator at
the recent IMF meeting in Washington, D.C., along with Finance
Minister Zadornov.
Gerashchenko was a prominent official in
the Communist banking system. He worked in the Moscow-controlled
banks in London and Beirut in the 1960s and 1970s, during the peak
of Soviet-supported espionage and terrorist activity, and later was
chairman of the Soviet State Bank. His name is frequently
associated with the 1991 Soviet confiscatory monetary reform. He
resorted to similar strategies while serving as head of the Russian
Bank in 1993, when he illegally supplied money to the anti-reform
forces in the Supreme Soviet. And he is responsible for Black
Tuesday in October 1994, when the value of the ruble (and with it,
once again, the savings of the Russian people) fell 24 percent in
one day. Gerashchenko has been called "the worst central banker in
the world."
Gerashchenko favors ruble emission as the
principal solution to Russia's fiscal problems. Inflation does not
frighten him; in fact, he has every confidence that it will revive
the Russian economy. He may try to hide his intentions, but
Russians understand that the appointment of Gerashchenko as head of
the Central Bank means rapidly increasing inflation and further
impoverishment. It is feared, with some reason, that his practices
will ruin Russia.
First Deputy Premier Vadim
Gustov. Although Maslyukov and Gerashchenko personify the
Communist presence in the current Primakov government, Vadim
Gustov, 50, a former Communist apparatchik, represents the
regional lobby. A former governor of the Leningrad Region (not to
be confused with the mayor of its capital, St. Petersburg), Gustov
will handle federation, regional, and local government affairs.
Gustov's presence in the Cabinet is an
attempt to consolidate regional leaders under the federal
government and curb their separatist tendencies. Eight influential
governors who chair the "interregional associations" that unite
several larger regions have been invited by Primakov to join the
so-called Presidium of the government. This is the inner circle
that makes crucial executive decisions. Thus, the regional lobby's
influence within the federal government will increase
significantly.
Deputy Premier Gennady
Kulik. The appointment of Gennady Kulik, 63, as Deputy
Premier in charge of agriculture is another concession to the left.
Kulik, a Communist-allied Agrarian Party member, was a CPSU
apparatchik and agricultural minister in the early 1990s.
He is expected to preserve the current agricultural system,
which is ineffective and based on collective and state farms that
have been formally privatized.
Kulik opposes the private ownership of
land and is expected to pursue protectionist policies to shield the
agricultural sector from foreign competition. His first official
statement maintained that his chief priority was to revive Russian
poultry production--which could signal an end to chicken imports
from the United States. In light of this, the type of radical
agrarian reform that Russia so urgently needs is unlikely under
Kulik's
guidance.
Deputy Premier Valentina
Matviyenko, 49, manages the social safety net that
includes education, labor, culture, pensions, and employment. She
headed the Leningrad Young Communist League in the 1970s and later
served as a deputy chairman of the Leningrad Executive Committee
(the mayor's office). She headed the Family and Women's Issues
Committee in the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet in the late 1980s when
Primakov was the Speaker. Upon her graduation from the Diplomatic
Academy, which trains high-level diplomats, she was appointed
Ambassador to Malta. Her last diplomatic position was as Ambassador
to Greece.
Matviyenko's political sympathies also lie
with the left. In one address, she urged the Education Ministry
staff to work under the guidance of the Communist-dominated State
Duma. First Deputy Minister Alexander Asmolov resigned in
protest.
Matviyenko may find her role as Deputy
Premier difficult because the government simply does not have the
resources to fund the social security safety nets. Yet her record
indicates that, under her guidance, the government will seek to
assume as many responsibilities as possible and control regulation
and distribution to the detriment of private initiatives.
Deputy Premier Vladimir
Bulgak, 57, is the least politically engaged of the Deputy
Premiers. He was not part of the high-ranking Communist
nomenklatura and is a typical technocrat whose career was centered
in the government's communications system.
Under Primakov, Bulgak will handle the
fuel and energy complex, communications, research and development,
nuclear projects, and transport issues--a job which demands a great
deal of purely technical skill. Since he is a protégé
of Boris Berezovski, a powerful oil, gas, and automobile tycoon, he
also will be instrumental in lobbying for Berezovski's
interests.
Finance Minister Mikhail
Zadornov. Mikhail Zadornov's age (35), record, and
political views seem unusual for a minister in Primakov's
government. He has never held a significant position in the Soviet
nomenklatura. In early 1990s, together with Yabloko party
leader Grigory Yavlinsky, he authored the liberal reform program
known as the "500 days" plan, rejected by Gorbachev and CPSU
conservatives as being too radical and market-oriented.
Zadornov, a close associate of Yavlinski,
was elected to the State Duma and chaired the Duma Budget and Tax
Committee for two terms. Widely respected as a professional
economist, he was appointed Finance Minister in 1997 and is one of
the few officials who survived the Cabinet shuffles after
Chernomyrdin and Kiriyenko left office. He is expected to proceed
with financial reform, but his freedom to maneuver will be
restricted.
Zadornov will be subject to pressures from
First Deputy Premier Maslyukov and Central Bank Chairman
Gerashchenko. Many predict that he will be accused of failing to
make any meaningful anti-crisis moves and eventually will be
dismissed.
Labor and Social Security Minister
Sergei Kalashnikov, 47, is another newcomer to the
Primakov government. He is the first representative of Vladimir
Zhirinovski's Liberal Democratic Party to be appointed to a Russian
Cabinet. This is clearly a political appointment meant to appease
Zhirinovski, a vocal opponent of Primakov's premiership. However,
unlike other appointees, Kalashnikov, as a former Chairman of the
State Duma Labor and Social Security Policy Committee, has a
thorough knowledge of the areas he was appointed to direct.
A
psychologist by education, Kalashnikov is also an experienced
business manager and joined the Liberal Democrats for career rather
than political reasons. He may be unable to institute his plans in
the current economic environment.
Tax Service Chief Georgy
Boos, 35, is another atypical political appointee to
Primakov's left-leaning government. This young politician is a
member of the Our Home Is Russia (OHIR) movement led by ex-premier
Viktor Chernomyrdin. OHIR claims to be center-right and sought
membership in the International Democratic Union (IDU), which
includes as members several Republican members of the U.S. Congress
and Conservative members of the British Parliament.
Boos
was once a prominent businessman responsible for lighting the
streets of Moscow. He was associated with Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov
before being elected to the State Duma in 1995 and will be an
influential lobbyist for Luzhkov in the Primakov government.
Economics Minister Andrei
Shapovalyants, 46, was once an official of the Soviet
GOSPLAN. Later, he served as Deputy Russian Economics and Finance
Minister, First Deputy Economics Minister, and Acting Economics
Minister. He has not been among the front-line reformers and has
not played an independent political role.
Other Ministers
The
ministers who head agencies in charge of separate Russian economic
branches and sectors fall into two categories. The first
group--Boris Pastukhov, Ramazan Abdulatipov, and Vladimir
Yegorov--includes ministers with broad experience in the Communist
nomenklatura. The second group--Mikhail Kirpichnikov,
Georgy Gabunia, Sergei Generalov, Sergei Frank, Nikolai Axyonenko,
and Pavel Krasheninnikov--represents a younger generation of
professionals with no prior political record.
Commonwealth of Independent States
Affairs Minister Boris Pastukhov, 65 and a Primakov
protégé, headed the Soviet Young Communist League
from 1977 to 1982. Before joining the Russian Foreign Ministry as
Primakov's deputy, he served as Soviet Ambassador to Denmark and
Afghanistan.
Nationality Policy Minister
Ramazan Abdulatipov, 52, headed the Ethnic Relations
Division of the U.S.S.R. Communist Party Central Committee from
1988 to 1990. He later was elected to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet
and was made Speaker of its House of Nationalities.
Culture Minister Vladimir
Yegorov, 50, another former high-ranking Young Communist
League member and CPSU apparatchik, is in charge of
ideology.
Science and Technology Minister
Mikhail Kirpichnikov, 53, is a biologist and member of the
Russian Academy of Sciences.
Foreign Trade Minister Georgy
Gabunia, 46, is an international economics professional
and has spent his entire career in the Foreign Trade Ministry. He
will be the chief World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiator for
Russia.
Fuel and Energy Minister Sergei
Generalov, 35, came to the government from the corporate
business community. From 1994 to 1998, he served as vice president
of a large oil and gas company and deputy chairman of the Bank
Menatep.
Transportation Minister Sergei
Frank, 38, is a sea transport engineer. His education is
in foreign trade and law.
Railroad Minister Nikolai
Axyonenko, 49, has spent his entire career in the railroad
system.
Justice Minister Pavel
Krasheninnikov, 34, is the Primakov government's youngest
member. He graduated from the Sverdlovsk Law School nine years ago
and has completed his law degree. Krasheninnikov faces two
difficult problems: integrating the penitentiary system he
inherited from the Interior Ministry in accordance with the Council
of Europe's human rights stipulations, and arresting the growth of
extremist organizations, especially the rapidly growing neo-Nazi
network.