After years of delay, it appears that President
Bill Clinton may announce a decision to deploy a limited national
missile defense, perhaps in his State of the Union message in
January. Many supporters of missile defense will be tempted to view
this as a victory. Their reason: Any defense of the American people
from long-range missiles, however limited, is better than the
current state of total vulnerability. They should be careful not to
celebrate prematurely, however. All indications are that the
national missile defense system envisioned by the Clinton
Administration will be of doubtful effectiveness. Worse, it
probably will preserve the basic framework of the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which leaves Americans
vulnerable to missile attack. In fact, the Administration's missile
defense plan could prove to be a political trap that allows the
President to co-opt a key policy of his opponents while avoiding
any truly meaningful action.
START II WILL
PAVE THE WAY
Russia's State Duma soon may approve the
1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II). As a condition
of approval, the Duma probably will insist that the United States
continue to observe the ABM Treaty. This is a bedrock policy of the
Clinton Administration as well. But the former partner of the
United States in that treaty, the Soviet Union, is no more; and
there is no clear successor that can carry out its terms as
ratified. In other words, under international law, the ABM Treaty
is dead.
To
solve this legal problem, the Clinton Administration entered into a
new ABM agreement in September 1997 in New York. This new treaty
must receive Senate consent before ratification under Article II,
Section 2 of the Constitution. On September 25, 1998, Senate
Majority Leader Trent Lott and the top Republican leaders of the
Senate wrote President Clinton to criticize strongly his stance on
the ABM Treaty and to insist that the New York agreement be
submitted for the Senate's advice and consent. The Senate is not
likely to approve the New York ABM agreement, and the White House
knows it. If the Duma acts as expected, however, the White House
can link Senate approval of the New York ABM agreement with the
fate of START II. Any Senator voting against the New York treaty
could be accused of "killing START II" or "undermining arms
control." And if the President has announced a national missile
defense, however ineffective it might be, it would deflect the
criticism that he is leaving America vulnerable to a severe and
growing threat.
This
is a brilliant political strategy, but it would be dangerous to
U.S. security. America would be left devoid of any meaningful
defense as the price for Russian arms reduction.
THE CRITICAL
QUESTION
If
President Clinton adopts this strategy toward missile defense, the
critical question will be his Administration's attitude and policy
on the ABM Treaty. The President is expected to propose a two-site
deployment plan, with one site in North Dakota and the other in
Alaska, claiming that this can be accomplished within the framework
of the ABM Treaty. It cannot. Most experts agree that the
deployment of even two sites would require renegotiating the treaty
to add amendments. The President may be all too happy, however, to
let missile defense proponents argue the legal point as he claims
credit for nationwide defense in principle. Whether the ABM
Treaty is changed marginally or is not changed at all, the
Administration's political purpose of keeping the treaty will not
change. What would be truly unacceptable to the Administration is a
concession that the ABM Treaty is binding no longer and that it has
become an obstacle to a truly robust defense of the American
mainland, which would require considerably more than two
ground-based sites.
The
Clinton Administration's strategy on a missile defense system must
be understood against the backdrop of Russian politics and the
Russian government's position on START II and the ABM Treaty. If
the Duma approves START II with the condition that the United
States continue adherence to the ABM Treaty, the White House is
likely to argue that a Senate vote against the New York agreements
on the ABM Treaty will be tantamount to killing arms control with
the Russians. Even though START II and the ABM Treaty are not
linked legally, the Clinton Administration and many in the Duma
could be expected to link them politically in the Senate debate on
ratification of both the New York agreements and Russian agreement
of START II.
As
part of this debate, the Clinton Administration could argue that
its modest deployment plan may be acceptable to Russia--and
therefore would not kill Russian compliance with START II--because
it accepts the need to continue the ABM Treaty. This strategy may
or may not work; Russia can be expected to object to any deployment
plan, even one consisting of only two ground-based sites. But a
Russian objection to a two-site plan actually could help the
Administration's political campaign to save the ABM Treaty. The
reason: A Russian fuss over the Administration's plan could be used
as political cover to gain approval in the Senate for the New York
agreement to establish Russia and other former Soviet republics as
partners with the United States in a new ABM Treaty. In the end,
the Russian government might agree to a modest modification of the
ABM Treaty to allow two missile defense sites--which it knows would
be inadequate--as the price for gaining Senate approval of the New
York agreements. Even if the Russians do not agree, however, the
Administration still could hide behind Russian ire, claiming that
its deployment plans must be serious if they are producing so much
objection from the Russians. Either way, the purpose of the
Administration's strategy is the same: saving the ABM Treaty.
It
is true that the ultimate purpose of this strategy would be to
preserve the essential structure of Cold War arms-control policy,
of which the ABM Treaty is the centerpiece. And it is true as well
that a minor rhetorical concession on the need for missile defense
could be a calculated tactic to divide missile defense proponents
between those who want to claim this as a "victory" and those who
insist on the "real thing" on missile defense.
WAKING UP TO THE
MISSILE THREAT
The
fact remains, however, that if President Clinton indeed announces a
nationwide, two-site missile defense plan, he is doing so because
he no longer can ignore the reality of the growing missile threat.
This would represent a critically important concession. It would
mean that the President and his supporters have been wrong in
downplaying the missile threat and delaying the decision to deploy
defenses against it. It also would mean that once the President has
conceded the point for the need for a nationwide defense, the
debate then should become how to make it the most effective defense
possible. Once the President concedes that the United States needs
missile defense, more defense always will be better than less.
After all, if the threat is real, no rational person would argue
that the government should intentionally limit the effectiveness of
the defense against it.
The
Clinton Administration may try to dispute this very point, but it
is a fatally weak argument. No President will be able to contend
that the missile threat is real and growing--the point that must be
conceded if a nationwide missile defense system is needed--but that
America must settle for a self-imposed weak defense. In the long
run, it will not be politically tenable to contend that arms
control with a former Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union, must
prevent the United States from deploying the most effective missile
defenses possible against growing threats from Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea. If the threat is real, the defense against it must be
the most effective system possible.
No
matter how the Administration may try to spin the issue, the choice
remains the same as it always has been: Shall the United States
perpetuate the ABM Treaty, or shall Americans be defended against
the world's deadliest weapons? The President is fond of claiming
that history is on his side. In this case, history is on the side
of defense.
-- Kim R.
Holmes, Ph.D., is Vice President, and Thomas Moore is
former Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis International
Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.