By
2005, China's developing missile forces will pose a grave threat to
Taiwan. Chinese satellites and AWACS aircraft likely will be able
to provide constant targeting data for missile strikes by
satellite-guided DF-15s, M-11s, and new cruise missiles to attack
airfields, secondary airfields, ports, military command posts, and
major government buildings. Missiles and cruise missiles armed with
Radio Frequency warheads could attack communication and power grids
to sow chaos among the population. The same range of targets in
Japan could be attacked by future long-range cruise missiles and
DF-21 missiles armed with terminally guided high explosive or Radio
Frequency warheads. American military facilities in Japan and
Okinawa also would be vulnerable to new DF-21 missiles and future
long-range cruise missiles.
POLITICAL WARFARE
China also views missiles as a tool for
political intimidation. China fired ten DF-15 missiles near Taiwan
in July 1995 and March 1996, and could have fired 20 to 30 missiles
in March. The 1995 missile firing
affected Taiwan's stock market and caused some panic. In 1996, the
missiles were sent just outside Taiwan's two major ports, Keelung
and Kaohsiung. Both demonstrations were intended to illustrate
Beijing's anger over its perception that President Lee Teng-hui was
seeking an "independent" Taiwan that would never unite with the
mainland. This attempt to intimidate Taiwan backfired by increasing
the re-election margin of President Lee in the March 1996
elections, but China's use of missiles and the U.S.-China military
confrontation of 1996, in which the United States deployed two
aircraft carrier groups to deter China, may have unnerved the
Clinton Administration. By October 1997, the Administration
announced a new policy that set new limits on American support for
Taiwan: the "three no's."
From
this concession, China's political and military leaders very likely
drew the lesson that missile intimidation can work. Late last year,
China reportedly held missile exercises that targeted Taiwan and
U.S. forces in Asia. And in early March, it
was reported that China might now have 100 to 150 short-range
missiles in areas near Taiwan, with possible plans to increase that
number to 650 by 2005.
In 1994, the United States sold Taiwan the Patriot PAC-2 system,
which has a limited anti-missile capability to defend only a small
area. To meet the threat of increased numbers of Chinese ballistic
missiles and new cruise missiles, Taiwan will require much more
capable missile defense systems.
CHINA'S VERBAL VOLLEYS AGAINST U.S.
MISSILE DEFENSE
Despite clear evidence that it intends to
make missile forces a major component of its future military power
and is increasing its missiles deployed near Taiwan, China is
campaigning vigorously against American missile defense plans for
Asia. China has opposed U.S. missile defense plans since the Reagan
Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative and has continued its
criticism in recent years.
But in late 1998, as it became clearer that Japan would join the
United States in developing Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems,
that the United States would embark seriously on a National Missile
Defense (NMD) program, and that the United States might consider
selling advanced TMD systems to Taiwan, or might even include
Taiwan in multilateral TMD schemes, China decided to begin its most
vigorous campaign against U.S. missile defense plans to date.
Since the beginning of this year, China
has tried to portray American missile defense plans as a threat to
the balance of power in Asia, a threat to arms control, and a grave
affront to China's sovereignty if Taiwan were included in U.S.
missile defense plans. China has issued escalating bluster and
threats. China's chief arms control negotiator, Sha Zukang,
suggested in a February 12 speech in Washington that China would
develop more advanced ballistic missiles in response to NMD and
TMD, and declared in a press interview that TMD for Taiwan would
"bring severe consequences."
Sha also suggested that China may want to join the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to emphasize its opposition to
missile defenses. In late February, an unnamed Chinese official
made a veiled threat to "undertake cooperation on missiles and
missile technology with third countries" in response to a U.S. TMD
system for Asia. On March 5, a "senior
Chinese official" told The Washington Post that U.S. sale of
missile defense equipment to Taiwan would be the "last straw" in
U.S.-China relations and would lead to "serious
consequences." In late March, a Hong
Kong press report noted that Chinese Leader Jiang Zemin had told an
internal government meeting that China would use force against
Taiwan if it sought foreign help to prevent unification with China
and suggested further that Taiwan's joining U.S. TMD would lead to
a military confrontation.
Though this report cannot be confirmed, it is consistent with
China's escalating threats against U.S. missile defense plans in
Asia.
A Strategic Ploy
China's campaign against U.S. missile
defense plans serves military and long-range strategic goals.
First, China dearly wants to preserve the ability of its missile
forces to have a military and political impact on its neighbors,
which can be negated by missile defenses. Second, China is opposing
U.S. missile defense plans as a means of stopping a new area of
military cooperation between the United States and its Asian
allies. U.S-Asian missile defense cooperation, with U.S. technology
as its centerpiece, would preserve an American leadership role in
Asia well into the future. China knows that without the protection
of U.S. TMD systems, U.S. allies will come to doubt the strength of
U.S. defense commitments and become more willing to accommodate
China in the future.
CHINA'S EMERGING MISSILE THREAT REQUIRES A
FIRM U.S. RESPONSE
China's growing missile forces, its
willingness to threaten Taiwan, and its barrage of threats against
American missile defense plans all require a firm response from
Washington. At stake is nothing less than America's leadership
position in Asia--obtained at the cost of many American lives in
three major wars this century to defend the security and freedom of
Asia. The Clinton Administration must give Congress and the
American people a clear and frank assessment of China's developing
missile capability. In addition, the Administration needs to offer
Americans and Asian allies a firm rationale for missile defense
development and cooperation.
Cost of Weakness
By
refusing for most of his Administration to support aggressive
development of missile defense, and by his long-standing support of
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that would limit the
effectiveness of missile defenses, President Bill Clinton has
helped to undermine Asian confidence in missile defense. This plays
into China's clear attempt to divide Asians from their American
ally. In South Korea, and to a lesser degree in Taiwan, there is
growing interest in building offensive long-range missiles to deter
threats rather than building missile defenses. In the absence of
effective non-nuclear anti-missile defenses, countries that
succeeded in building long-range missiles would be tempted over
time to arm them with nuclear warheads. This would trigger U.S.
sanctions and cause the collapse of an alliance relationship.
Such
fears are not far-fetched. South Korea's Minister of Defense
declared recently that Seoul would not participate in U.S. TMD
plans because it was "not an effective countermeasure" against
North Korean missiles and would "also arouse concern from
neighboring countries."
South Korea is reported to prefer building offensive ballistic
missiles to deter missile threats from North Korea. Seoul's apparent lack
of concern about China's missiles is unfortunate. Effective missile
defense in Northeast Asia requires the cooperation of Japan, South
Korea, and the United States. American early warning satellites,
and even eventual space-based anti-missile systems, will be
necessary for the effective missile defense of both countries. For
example, to prevent Chinese missiles fired at Japan from being shot
down over Korea will require the cooperation of Japan, the U.S.,
and South Korea. It is necessary to secure Seoul's future
cooperation in missile defense.
Centrality of Taiwan
As
it used missiles to help force a limitation of U.S. political
support for Taiwan, China is now using its opposition to U.S.
missile defense to further weaken American support for Taiwan.
While not a treaty ally, the United States maintains defense
guarantees under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which stipulates
that the United States will sell Taiwan arms of a "defensive
character." If the U.S. bowed to China's demands and did not sell
missile defense equipment to Taiwan, that violation of the TRA's
arms sales provision would call into question Washington's broader
commitment to the TRA. China probably would then apply even greater
political and even military pressure on Taiwan to force unification
on terms that might limit Taiwan's newly developed democracy. Other
U.S. allies and friends in Asia understandably would regard such an
abandonment of Taiwan as the end of the period of American
leadership in Asia and begin to seek a strategic accommodation with
China.
The
Clinton Administration has been correct to urge Japan to enter into
theater missile defense cooperation with the United States and to
sell Taiwan advanced Patriot missiles with a point-defense
anti-missile capability. However, China's emerging missile threat
and its vigorous campaign against U.S. missile defense plans
require an active Administration strategy to sustain U.S. security
and leadership in Asia. The Clinton Administration should:
-
State clearly that China's
emerging missile forces threaten Asian stability.
The Clinton Administration needs to regain the rhetorical
offensive that has been ceded to China this year. The
Administration must mount its own diplomatic campaign that clearly
describes China's developing missile forces and how they threaten
U.S. allies and friends in Asia. The Administration also needs,
regularly and firmly, to challenge China's opposition to missile
defense. Administration officials should use every opportunity to
stress that U.S. National Missile Defense and Theater Missile
Defense programs are non-nuclear and defensive. U.S. officials
should stress publicly that China's and North Korea's missile
threats more than justify American development of missile defenses.
They should declare that China's attempt to deny other Asian states
their sovereign right of defense is an attempt to conceal the
challenge to peace in Asia posed by China's growing missile
forces.
-
Accelerate development of an
effective U.S. National Missile Defense.
Building an effective NMD capability is essential, not just to
defend Americans from China's modernizing ICBM force, but also to
demonstrate that missile defense works. This is necessary to
strengthen Asian confidence in U.S. missile defense technology over
ballistic missile or nuclear weapon alternatives. The Clinton
Administration can begin an NMD system by upgrading U.S Navy Aegis
cruisers with the Navy Theater Wide Upper Tier anti-missile system
and deploying associated Space Based Infra Red Satellite in low
orbit (SBIRS-Low) early warning satellites. Such a system could be
deployed as early as 2003 for about $8 billion. Furthermore, the U.S.
should end restrictions on the development and deployment of
missile defenses pursuant to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
-
Use TMD cooperation to
strengthen Asian alliances.
Washington should emphasize to Japan, South Korea, the
Philippines, and Australia that Theater Missile Defense will be a
key mission for U.S. military forces in the future. Japan is on the
verge of agreeing to cooperation in TMD development, while
Australia is quietly expanding cooperation with the United States
in some TMD-related areas. The United States should strongly
encourage all of its allies to cooperate in expanding regional
missile defenses. Washington should continue to urge Tokyo to
commit to TMD development projects and should strongly urge Seoul
to reconsider its recent opposition to TMD cooperation. Washington
should offer Seoul a less expensive means of participation that
allows South Korean access to early warning data and command
activities. The U.S. should also urge Japan and South Korea to
consider missile defense cooperation in conjunction with the United
States. The U.S. Pacific Command should also include missile
defense activities in its future regional military exercises with
allies.
-
Sell Taiwan missile defense
systems.
By selling missile defense equipment to Taiwan, the U.S. will
fulfill its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act and advance
the American interest in preserving Taiwan's democratic system. The
Clinton Administration should clearly identify China's increased
missile deployments as a threat to stability in the Taiwan Strait
and call on China to remove its missiles from regions near Taiwan.
China's increased missile threat to Taiwan makes it necessary for
the United States to offer Taiwan a range of missile defense
systems. When Taiwan is ready to formally request additional
missile defense systems, the U.S. should be ready to sell Taiwan
equipment such as Patriot PAC-3 missiles and the Aegis naval
missile defense system, in addition to long-range radar and
high-altitude unmanned aircraft like the Global Hawk to help detect
and intercept incoming missiles.
To counter a Chinese strategy that would
include deploying more missiles against Taiwan in response to a
U.S. sale of missile defense equipment to Taiwan, the United States
in the future should sell laser-based missile defense systems to
Taiwan. Because lasers use chemical fuel or an electrical energy
source, they offer the prospect of an unlimited number of defensive
"rounds." Washington should tell Beijing that its sale of missile
defenses to Taiwan is consistent with the long-standing American
goal that Taipei and Beijing settle the issue of their future
relationship by peaceful means.
- Pursue strategic agreements instead of
increasing technical cooperation in missiles and
space.
It is time for the United States to challenge China to enter into
broad understandings concerning missiles and nuclear weapons that
increase transparency and confidence. The strategic missile
de-targeting agreement that Presidents Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton
announced last June does not serve U.S. interests. It is a simple
declared agreement that cannot be verified; the missiles can be
re-targeted with a few computer keystrokes. Such agreements also
create a false sense of progress in arms control. Pakistan's newly
revealed Shaheen missile bears a close resemblance to China's
DF-15/M-9 missile. China consistently
refuses to sign minimal missile control agreements like the Missile
Technology Control Regime and in the past has sold significant
missile technology to Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps
North Korea. China has intimate knowledge of U.S. nuclear secrets
but has never disclosed the contents of its own nuclear and missile
forces.
Washington should make clear to Beijing
that America desires to avoid future missile competition.
Washington also should reject China's suggestion that it join the
now-defunct 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; this is merely an
attempt to constrain U.S. missile defenses. To demonstrate U.S.
resolve, Washington should suspend commercial missile and space
cooperation with China until both sides can reach agreements that
truly advance transparency and the confidence that neither side
will pose a threat to the other's security with nuclear
missiles.
- Prevent China from obtaining advanced
missile technologies.
Until China enters into agreements that increase transparency and
confidence in the areas of missile and nuclear forces, the United
States should seek to prevent leakage of sensitive U.S. nuclear and
missile technology to China and should urge allies and friends not
to sell missile technology to China. Both Congress and the Clinton
Administration should investigate the extent and the impact on U.S.
national security of Chinese nuclear and missile espionage. During
this review, the U.S. should suspend commercial satellite launches
on Chinese missiles to demonstrate U.S. anger over China's spying.
New security measures at U.S. nuclear laboratories should focus on
strict monitoring of all contacts with Chinese nationals. In
addition, Washington must make clear to allies and friends like
Russia, Israel, Britain, and France that they must not sell China
technology that could help China to build better military missiles
and space systems.
When China enters into broad strategic
agreements with the U.S. that avoid future missile competition, is
committed to a peaceful course to settle the issue of its future
relations with Taiwan, and does not challenge U.S. alliances in
Asia, then the U.S. should resume civil missile and space
cooperation with China. In such an environment, the U.S. could even
consider strategic military cooperation such as sharing missile
defense technologies that allow China to defend itself from nuclear
missiles.
CONCLUSION
At
the beginning of a new century, the United States faces the
prospect of a new strategic competition, this time with China.
China is stealing American nuclear secrets to build better missiles
that could be used to attack Americans more effectively. China is
using its growing missile forces and a campaign of threats against
American missile defense plans to advance its goals in Asia. China
is using its missile forces to create political pressures that,
over time, will divide the United States from its key allies. If
America does not develop missile defense systems that defend the
United States from missile attack, and theater-level defenses that
can be shared with Asian allies, these same allies will lose
confidence in American leadership. Furthermore, President Clinton's
lackluster commitment to missile defense and blind adherence to the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that limits U.S. missile
defenses are undermining allied confidence in non-nuclear missile
defense.
To
prevent the U.S.-China relationship from lapsing into a Cold
War-like confrontation, it is essential that America demonstrate
resolve and leadership by rapidly developing a National Missile
Defense system and theater missile defense systems that could be
sold to Asian allies and to Taiwan. Finally, the U.S. should
suspend commercial space cooperation with China--which has proven
to benefit China's missiles--until China reaches agreements with
the United States that advance transparency and increase confidence
that neither will pose a nuclear missile threat to the other.
Richard D. Fisher, Jr., is the former Director
of The Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.