On
May 25, 1999, the bipartisan congressional Cox Committee issued its
872-page report detailing efforts by China to obtain, through legal
and illegal means, a stunning range of U.S. commercial and military
technology secrets. China's expanding nuclear capabilities and its
role as a proliferator of military technology highlight the need
for the United States to deploy a national missile defense. Yet,
despite the Cox report's startling revelations and clear evidence
that the Third World missile threat is growing, President Bill
Clinton refuses to make a decision on the deployment of a national
missile defense until June 2000.
For
its part, Congress recently declared it the "policy of the United
States to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective
National Missile Defense capable of defending the territory of the
United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether
accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate)." Congress now must make
this policy declaration a reality.
Espionage Damages U.S.
Security. The Cox report asserts that the "stolen
information includes classified information on seven U.S.
thermonuclear warheads, including every currently deployed
thermonuclear warhead in the U.S. ballistic missile arsenal." This
includes the most advanced U.S. warhead, the W-88, which is
deployed on the Navy's submarine-launched Trident D-5 missile.
China is expected to exploit this knowledge to modernize its
intercontinental ballistic missile fleet, which will include
submarine and road-mobile weapons potentially tipped with multiple
warheads and penetration aids.
China's relentless effort to acquire
sophisticated U.S. nuclear weapons designs is part of a larger
strategy to promote its position as Asia's hegemonic power. A key
element of this strategy is China's determination to threaten other
countries with ballistic missiles, as Beijing did in 1996 during
Taiwan's first presidential elections. Since then, China has
positioned more than 100 short-range missiles within striking range
of Taiwan. Unless the United States and its Asian allies move
quickly to deploy credible missile defense systems, China will
continue to flex its "missile muscles" to intimidate its
neighbors.
China's role as a proliferator of advanced
military technologies also has contributed to the spread of
ballistic missiles in the Third World. The Cox report emphasizes
that the "PRC has proliferated nuclear, missile, and space-related
technologies to a number of countries." These countries include
Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. The assistance to
rogue states is particularly worrisome. On August 31, 1998, North
Korea test-fired a three-stage rocket, the Taepo Dong-1, which many
experts believe has the capability to reach parts of Alaska and
Hawaii. Pyongyang is working overtime to build the Taepo Dong-2, an
even longer-range missile capable of reaching the U.S. West
Coast.
Implications for U.S. Missile
Defense
China's potential to arm its next generation of mobile
missiles with multiple warheads and penetration aids highlights the
flawed nature of the Clinton Administration's proposed architecture
for a national missile defense, which calls for two-ground based
sites in the United States. The ground-based interceptors would be
far more costly and less effective than sea- and space-based
alternatives. They would have a more difficult time coping with
multiple warheads and penetration aids, such as decoys.
To
counter the growing Chinese missile threat, the United States
should develop sea- and space-based defenses that can identify,
track, and shoot down hostile missiles shortly after liftoff and
before they can release multiple warheads or decoys. This
"boost-phase" intercept capability will offset China's ability to
threaten the United States and its allies with ballistic missiles.
The ability to shoot down missiles over an adversary's own
territory also will make Third World tyrants think twice before
attempting to attack the United States.
Needed: Concrete Action
It is not enough for Congress to profess its commitment to
deploy a national missile defense. It must provide the requisite
funding, oversight, and programmatic direction to make this a
reality. In this vein, Congress must not allow the defunct 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to crimp the testing and development
of technologies that hold near- and long-term promise for defending
the United States against missile attack. To this end, Congress
should:
-
Mandate that the Department of
Defense test an upgraded version of the Navy Theater-Wide system in
a way that demonstrates a capability to destroy long-range Chinese
ballistic missiles in their boost phase. This technology
represents the best near-term option for defending the United
States against missile attack. The target missile in the test
should have the flight characteristics of a real-world, modern
intercontinental ballistic missile.
-
Revive the space-based,
low-altitude interceptor program formerly known as "Brilliant
Pebbles" that the Clinton Administration canceled in 1993.
This technology represents the best-long term option for defending
the United States against missile attack. It will require the
development and testing of space-based interceptors that are
capable of countering the real-world threat posed by China's
ballistic missile programs.
CONCLUSION
In
the post-Cold War era, ballistic missiles have become the coin of
the realm for states seeking to offset U.S. prowess on the
conventional battlefield. Indeed, U.S. vulnerability to missile
attack provides China with an added incentive to modernize and
expand its nuclear arsenal. It also encourages states like Iran and
North Korea to develop missiles that are capable of killing
millions of Americans.
In
January 1999, the Clinton Administration finally conceded that
"there is a [missile proliferation] threat and the threat is
growing." But despite this belated admission and the Cox report's
alarming revelations, President Clinton refuses to make a decision
on the deployment of a national missile defense until June 2000.
This policy of procrastination is indefensible. The United States
should not have to play a high-risk game of catch-up with states
developing ballistic missiles based on stolen U.S. nuclear secrets.
Prudence dictates that Congress take steps to translate its stated
objective of deploying a national missile defense into a
reality.
James H. Anderson,
Ph.D. is a Defense Policy Analyst in The Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis International Studies Center at The Heritage
Foundation.