For some, the outcome of the war in Kosovo is a
definitive foreign policy victory that vindicates the concept of
"humanitarian" interventions, and a military triumph that affirms
the primacy of air power. Some even speak of a "Clinton Doctrine"
that would commit the United States to using force to halt the
violent oppression of ethnic groups wherever and whenever such
oppression occurs.
THE WAR IN KOSOVO: AN UNEASY PEACE AT
GREAT COST
Despite the Clinton Administration's
claims, NATO did not win a clear-cut victory in Kosovo. Although
the military contest was one-sided, the end results were decidedly
mixed. The gradually escalating air campaign clearly failed to
avert a humanitarian disaster. In fact, the aerial bombardment
provided Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic with the pretext
to accelerate and intensify his ethnic cleansing campaign. The bulk
of the atrocities against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo occurred
after the air war commenced on March 24. And despite the
rhetoric about the war's "humanitarian" aim, NATO kept most of its
warplanes above 15,000 feet to minimize allied casualties, which
not only reduced their effectiveness in halting Serb aggression
against the Kosovar Albanians, but also increased the collateral
damage, including the accidental deaths of innocent Albanians and
Serbs. U.S. participation in Operation Allied Force involved
diplomatic costs as well, souring relations with both Russia and
China.
Peace Agreement Yields NATO
Concessions
There was also a diplomatic price to be
paid to President Milosevic. Although he was forced to withdraw his
military forces from Kosovo, he actually pocketed a better
diplomatic deal after the war than the one he rejected at
the February 1999 peace talks in Rambouillet, France. NATO
essentially settled for what could be described as
"Rambouillet-lite" by making three key concessions:
-
Putting a peacekeeping force under United
Nations--not NATO--auspices. The international
peacekeeping force deployed in Kosovo (KFOR) is organized under the
auspices of the U.N., not NATO as the NATO allies had demanded at
Rambouillet. This arrangement already has complicated the postwar
peacekeeping situation by allowing non-NATO members, such as
Russia, to participate and by giving two powers that were critical
of NATO's intervention--Russia and China--veto power over KFOR
policies in the U.N. Security Council.
-
Restricting KFOR peacekeepers to Kosovo.
KFOR's deployment is limited to Kosovo, without any access to
Serbia, as envisioned at Rambouillet. This means that President
Milosevic, indicted by the U.N.'s International War Crimes Tribunal
on May 24, 1999, will be safe from arrest by KFOR troops.
-
Allowing Yugoslavia to retain legal
sovereignty over Kosovo. One of the crucial allied demands made
at Rambouillet--a referendum that would determine Kosovo's future
status after a three-year period of autonomy--was discarded
summarily in the final peace agreement. The referendum held out the
promise of independence for Kosovo and was the principal reason
most leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) agreed to the
Rambouillet plan. This critical concession sets the stage for
continued instability and bloodletting in Kosovo.
Collectively, these terms constitute a
significant weakening of the ultimatum NATO issued at Rambouillet.
In return, President Milosevic made only one major concession--to
reduce the number of Serbian troops deployed in Kosovo from 5,000
to a few hundred.
KFOR's Open-Ended Mission
The
KFOR peacekeeping force charged with implementing the Kosovo peace
agreement faces a costly, risky, and open-ended commitment. Its
mission includes providing a secure environment for the return of
hundreds of thousands of refugees expelled by Yugoslavian forces
during the air war. In addition, KFOR will have to interpose its
troops between the Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo to prevent
reprisals while assisting the civilian agencies as they begin the
onerous task of rebuilding the war-torn province.
As
part of this peacekeeping force, the United States committed itself
to another open-ended Balkans deployment. Taking into account the
need to rotate troops, the deployment of 7,000 U.S. troops, in
effect, will tie up the equivalent of a U.S. Army division for many
years to come.
U.S.
participation in the Kosovo peacekeeping operation will be
dangerous as well. On July 18, two soldiers were killed in Kosovo
when their armored personnel carrier accidentally overturned. U.S.
servicemen have come under hostile fire in recent weeks as
well.
Since the end of the Vietnam War, more
U.S. troops have been killed by hostile fire in peacekeeping
operations in Lebanon and Somalia (285) than in military actions
against Iraq, Panama, and Grenada (189). Although such
casualties could be justified in military operations that advance
vital national interests, they have been rightly questioned when
incurred in peacekeeping operations in which U.S. interests are
minimal or nonexistent.
Operation Allied Force produced a fragile
peace that did not reconcile Yugoslavia's claim of sovereignty over
Kosovo with the Kosovars' burgeoning independence movement. It is
difficult to see how KFOR can obtain the KLA's long-term
cooperation while implementing an accord that admits Yugoslavia's
sovereignty over Kosovo. If KFOR merely freezes a tense situation
without addressing the underlying causes of that tension, the
result could be a protracted, low-level conflict in which the KLA,
or recalcitrant Serbs, attack KFOR to drive it out.
KFOR's open-ended peace enforcement
mission already is complicated by the participation of a Russian
troop contingent slated to reach 3,600 soldiers. There are concerns
that the Russians could act as surrogates for the Serbs, their
traditional Slavic allies, and become targets for vengeful ethnic
Albanians. They also could undermine KFOR's unity of command by
taking disruptive actions, such as the June 12 seizure of the
Pristina airport by 200 Russian troops, who unilaterally abandoned
their peacekeeping duties in Bosnia. Either possibility would
increase the danger to U.S. soldiers.
Even
if U.S. troops manage to avoid further casualties during the KFOR
peacekeeping mission, the strategic and economic expenses will be
burdensome. If the U.S. experience in Bosnia is any indication,
another Balkan peacekeeping deployment will be a costly, long-term
endeavor. The deployment of 7,000 U.S. troops in Kosovo will drain
the budget of the U.S. Department of Defense of an estimated $2
billion to $3.5 billion per year.
LESSONS FROM THE WAR IN KOSOVO
The
costs and risks of a protracted commitment to the peacekeeping
mission in Kosovo make it imperative that policymakers draw the
proper lessons from the war NATO fought in Yugoslavia.
Lesson #1. The United States never
should underestimate the resolve of determined adversaries to
resist military threats and pressure.
Before Operation Allied Force, the Clinton
Administration backed itself and NATO into a rhetorical corner by
repeatedly threatening Yugoslavian President Milosevic without
taking meaningful action. The threats included diplomatic warnings
and show-of-force demonstrations, such as Operation Determined
Falcon in June 1998. This NATO exercise, which involved hundreds of
warplanes, evidently failed to impress Milosevic of NATO's
resolve.
President Milosevic became emboldened by
the disconnect between NATO's increasingly strident rhetoric and
lack of meaningful action. Convinced that the threats were nothing
more than bluffs, Milosevic escalated his repressive policies in
Kosovo. For their part, the United States and its NATO allies
ultimately convinced themselves that only military intervention
could restore the organization's credibility. NATO thus found
itself impaled by not only a determined adversary but also a crisis
of confidence of its own making.
President Bill Clinton also underestimated
Milosevic's determination to resist military pressure. He belatedly
admitted that he had failed to recognize Yugoslavia's capacity to
withstand the bombing campaign, presuming Milosevic would submit to
NATO's demands and halt ethnic cleansing operations after a "couple
of days" of bombing. President Clinton
should have known better. Milosevic's previous ethic cleansing
campaigns in Bosnia and Croatia had ended only when he faced the
combined impact of NATO air strikes, a Croatian ground offensive,
and efforts to train and equip Bosnia's army. In addition, years of
air strikes against Saddam Hussein had failed to dislodge the Iraqi
leader or destroy his ability to manufacture weapons of mass
destruction. President Clinton's failure to anticipate Milosevic's
willingness to resist the opening salvos of Operation Allied Force
forced NATO to improvise its air campaign.
Lesson #2. Low-risk, incremental air
campaigns are insufficient to win wars.
For
most of the air campaign, NATO engaged in a slow-moving military
escalation reminiscent of the feckless strategy of the United
States in the Vietnam War. Self-imposed targeting restrictions
allowed Yugoslavian forces to escalate the ethnic cleansing. In
addition, they skillfully dispersed and concealed their military
troops and equipment to minimize the effectiveness of Operation
Allied Force. It is now clear that NATO dramatically overestimated
its destruction of enemy tanks, artillery pieces, and armor
vehicles. Yugoslavia's
military suffered relatively light losses until the last two weeks
of fighting, when a bold offensive by the KLA flushed the
Yugoslavian army into the open so that a series of B-52 bomber
strikes could inflict devastating casualties.
It
would be unwise to conclude that President Milosevic agreed to the
peace deal solely because of NATO's air campaign. This superficial
assessment would ignore not only the impact of the KLA ground
offensive, but also the broader political dynamics, such as intense
pressure on Milosevic from Russia to sign a peace agreement.
Moreover, there is little doubt that U.S.
adversaries will learn from Operation Allied Force how to offset
U.S. aerial advantages in future conflicts. North Korea already has
spent decades "digging in" to protect its military assets. Other
U.S. adversaries can be expected to follow suit--dispersing,
concealing, and burrowing their military assets to evade detection
and destruction by U.S. air strikes.
Lesson #3. Low-risk, high-altitude air
campaigns are ill-suited to achieve humanitarian
objectives.
Once
Operation Allied Force began, it quickly became apparent that
high-altitude NATO air strikes could not prevent the door-to-door
massacres of ethnic Albanians carried out by dispersed units of
Serbian police and paramilitary groups. The Clinton Administration
failed to make adequate contingency plans in the event the bombing
did not work.
Tragically, the chief victims of the
disconnect between President Clinton's lofty rhetoric about
stopping the ethnic slaughter and the bloodletting on the ground
were the Kosovars themselves. Serbian forces killed thousands of
ethnic Albanians, uprooted 1.4 million from their homes, and
expelled more than 850,000 refugees from Kosovo. Most of these
atrocities occurred after Operation Allied Force began its
campaign on March 24. Despite its best intentions, Operation Allied
Force demonstrated that air power has only limited ability to
prevent humanitarian abuses. There is no reason to believe air
power will be any more effective in preventing future door-to-door
killing sprees by determined ground forces.
Lesson #4. If the United States takes
sides in a civil war, then it should consider harnessing the
military potential of the indigenous forces willing to fight and
die for their territory.
NATO's air campaign was not solely
responsible for forcing President Milosevic to withdraw his forces
from Kosovo. It had significant help from the ethnic Albanian
resistance movement operating in Kosovo. Far from being a ragtag
group of bandits, as commonly portrayed in the Western press, the
KLA quickly developed into a well-organized guerrilla army--strong
testimony to its resiliency despite relentless Yugoslavian attacks.
Yet NATO sluggishly moved to exploit the KLA's military potential,
partly because of its natural bias against working with guerrilla
forces. Operation Allied Force probably would have been more
effective if the United States had moved earlier to harness the
KLA's military potential.
The
Clinton Administration should have known that U.S. support of
indigenous forces was effective in advancing U.S. foreign policy
aims in the past. In the 1980s, for example, President Ronald
Reagan's decision to back anticommunist guerrillas in Nicaragua and
Afghanistan demonstrated how successful such a strategy can be. The
sustained support of guerrilla groups can reduce the likelihood
that U.S. combat forces will become embroiled in conflicts that do
not threaten vital U.S. security interests.
Lesson #5. The United States should use
military force only when its vital interests are
threatened.
The
Clinton Administration shied away from discussing whether
Yugoslavia threatened vital U.S. interests. This is unfortunate
because, as Joseph Nye, Jr., a noted Harvard strategist, recently
observed, "In a democracy, such political struggles over the exact
definition of national interests--and how to pursue them--are both
inevitable and healthy."
NATO
intervened in Kosovo not to achieve clearly defined strategic
goals, but to assuage a humanitarian crisis. Although strategic
arguments like preventing the spread of the war or bringing
stability to the Balkans were made after the conflict began, it is
clear that the principal reason for waging the air campaign was to
halt the ethnic cleansing inside Kosovo. In his March 24
address to the country, President Clinton declared the United
States was "act[ing] to protect thousands of innocent people in
Kosovo from a mounting military offensive."
The
idea that the United States is obligated to intervene
militarily to stop human rights violations in certain
countries raises troubling strategic and moral issues. It raises
questions about why some people's human rights appear more
important than those of others. This is not an academic question;
clearly, the United States and its NATO partners lack the resources
necessary to intervene everywhere to stop every evil.
The
Clinton Administration's participation in Operation Allied Force
went far beyond the traditional conception of U.S. security
interests in Europe. The main U.S.
strategic interest in Europe has been to prevent any hostile power
or set of powers from dominating that continent. Although brutal in
his repression of Kosovar Albanians, President Milosevic did not
threaten the balance of power in Europe. By ruling out the
commitment of ground troops, even the Clinton Administration
tacitly admitted that the situation in Kosovo did not threaten
vital U.S. security interests.
Lesson #6. Military intervention should
strive to achieve goals that are clearly defined, decisive,
attainable, and sustainable.
Unable to compel President Milosevic to
stop his ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo, NATO resorted to
trying to achieve essentially non-political objectives, such as
returning refugees to Kosovo. As a result, the peace agreement
sidesteps, but does not resolve, the key issue of the territory's
ultimate political status.
Perhaps nowhere is NATO's lack of
coherence in its objectives more evident than its characterization
of, and subsequent dealings with, President Milosevic. The Clinton
Administration demonized him as the moral equivalent of Nazi
Germany's Adolf Hitler. In a discussion of Kosovo, President
Clinton declared,
What if someone had listened to Winston
Churchill and stood up to Adolph Hitler earlier? How many people's
lives might have been saved? And how many American lives might have
been saved?
Yet,
at the same time, President Clinton readily accepted Milosevic as
NATO's negotiating partner. On May 6, 1999, foreign ministers from
the Group of Eight (G-8) industrial countries released a
statement, now known as the Bonn Agreement, in which they outline
their desired political solution to the war in Kosovo. Nowhere in
the agreement do the participating states demand the removal of
President Milosevic from power. Indeed, they stress the need to
take into account the "principles of sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" in resolving the
conflict. NATO accepted
similar language in the accord that ended the war without even
mentioning the fact that Milosevic had been indicted as an
international war criminal.
The
chasm between NATO's rhetoric and reality raises troubling
questions about the purpose of NATO's intervention in Kosovo. If
President Milosevic is so evil, then why let him stay in power and
deal with him as a negotiating partner? If he is the root cause of
the problem, then why not cut out the root? And why make a leader
with a well-documented record of breaking agreements a party to yet
another one? NATO's failure to answer these pivotal issues ensures
a muddled peace agreement, which merely defers resolution of
Kosovo's ultimate political status.
Lesson #7. Political leaders should
create conditions that would permit the overwhelming application of
military force.
The
Clinton Administration's support of targeting restrictions in
Operation Allied Force crimped the military's ability to apply
force in a potentially decisive manner. As a result, the
opening phases of the bombing campaign clearly lacked the intensity
of Operation Desert Storm, the U.S.-led effort to oust Iraqi forces
from Kuwait in 1991. In addition, NATO's political leaders could
not agree to blockade Yugoslavian ports, thus allowing Yugoslavia
to refuel its military forces even though its domestic oil
refineries had been destroyed by air strikes.
The
restrictions, combined with the inherent limitations of air power,
resulted in an air campaign that failed to halt President
Milosevic's ethnic cleansing campaign inside Kosovo. Even air
attacks within Serbia itself were hampered by Vietnam-style
incrementalism throughout much of the campaign. This diminished
both the physical and psychological impact of Operation Allied
Force, thus making a protracted air campaign necessary.
Coalition warfare requires firm
leadership. As the NATO member that provided most of the aircraft
and flew most of the bombing missions during the campaign, the
United States should have pushed harder to convince its allies of
the importance of applying overwhelming force. The political
failure to create conditions whereby military force could have been
applied more quickly and decisively partially offset NATO's
technological advantages.
Lesson #8. Displaying an aversion to
casualties reduces military effectiveness and unnecessarily
protracts military intervention.
The
desire to avoid any NATO or U.S. casualties undermined Operation
Allied Force and exposed one of the inherent weaknesses of waging
so-called humanitarian wars. It severely limited NATO's ability to
curb Yugoslavian ethnic cleansing within Kosovo. The United States
was unwilling to unleash its military assets, such as Apache AH-64
attack helicopters, that could have inflicted greater punishment on
the Yugoslavian ground forces in Kosovo.
Operational restrictions to limit NATO
casualties, which forced NATO pilots to try to distinguish between
military and non-military targets from high altitudes, contributed
to tragic mistakes in the bombing campaign. Unfortunate incidents
included the accidental bombing of a refugee convoy in Kosovo and a
civilian train in Serbia. Tragically, the determination to avoid
casualties resulted in a longer and perhaps bloodier campaign.
Lesson #9. Military intervention in the
Balkans should not jeopardize the ability of the United States to
meet more important security commitments elsewhere in the
world.
The
military intervention in Kosovo reduced the capacity of the United
States to respond to other, more important security commitments
around the globe, such as those in the Middle East and on the
Korean Peninsula. The U.S. military commitment in Kosovo involved a
large number of transport aircraft and specialized reconnaissance,
surveillance, and radar-jamming planes. It forced the U.S. Navy to
reshuffle its deployment of aircraft carriers, leaving forces
assigned to defend South Korea without a carrier presence.
Operation Allied Force also severely depleted the U.S. arsenal of
conventionally armed air-launched cruise missiles, which the United
States would need in the event of a crisis in the Persian Gulf or
on the Korean Peninsula. The United States is fortunate indeed that
rogue states like North Korea and Iraq did not exploit the
diversion of U.S. military assets to the Balkans. Yet the next time
the United States commits significant military resources to a
strategic backwater like Yugoslavia, it may not be so lucky.
In
any event, the open-ended deployment of 7,000 U.S. troops as part
of the 50,000-strong peacekeeping force in Kosovo will strain the
ability of the U.S. armed forces to execute their assigned missions
elsewhere in the world. The rotation schedule of training for
peacekeeping missions and retraining for warfighting afterward
means the U.S. commitment to KFOR will divert 21,000 troops; the
equivalent of roughly 10 percent of the U.S. Army's combat force
would be unavailable for duty if a crisis suddenly erupted
elsewhere in the world.