Early in the next decade, China will begin
to field modern, long-range ballistic missiles that will be capable
of reaching the continental United States. Two recent reports from
the U.S. Congress explain in disturbing detail the ways in which
China's missile programs have benefited from the theft of U.S.
nuclear and missile technology secrets over many years. The most
comprehensive report is that of the Select Committee on U.S.
National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the
People's Republic of China, chaired by Representative Christopher
Cox (R-CA), which was issued on May 25, 1999. A second important
report was released in April by the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence.
The
sobering revelations in these reports, especially when viewed in
light of the volatility of U.S.-China relations and China's record
of conducting provocative missile tests to pressure Taiwan and the
United States, make it imperative that the United States develop
and deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system as soon as
possible. This means the Clinton Administration should abandon its
adherence to the defunct 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,
which prevents the United States from developing effective missile
defenses, and increase funding for existing national and theater
missile defense programs.
CHINA'S NEW LONG-RANGE BALLISTIC
MISSILES
Today, China may have 18 to 26 DF-5
intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs). These missiles,
with a range of 8,000 miles, are unwieldy due their use of liquid
fuel, which takes a long time to fill. To remedy this deficiency,
China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is developing two new ICBMs
and one submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Its most
advanced missile program is the solid-fueled, 5,000-mile-range
DF-31 ICBM, which would be capable of hitting the western United
States. The Cox Report estimates this missile could be deployed by
2002. The DF-31 is
expected to be nearly identical to China's next SLBM, the JL-2,
which recent reports indicate China intends to test this year. If the test is
successful, it will enhance the likelihood that the DF-31 will be
deployed by 2002. Deployment of the JL-2 itself will take longer
because China must complete building a new class of nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine that will be quieter and faster and
reach greater depths than China's current submarines.
In
2005 and beyond, it is likely that China will field the
8,000-mile-range DF-41 solid-fueled ICBM. This missile could target
almost the entire United States from bases inside China. Both the
DF-31 and DF-41 are expected to be mounted on mobile
transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) developed with the help of
technology from Russia. Likely to be
concealed within a network of mountainside caves, China's new
missiles would be much more difficult to find, thanks to these
TELs, and could be launched with much less warning for the United
States. Both of the new ICBMs are expected to incorporate multiple
independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads. This means
a single missile based in China could threaten a number of cities
or military targets inside the United States.
Impact of U.S. Technology on China's New
Missiles
China's potential near-term ability to
threaten the United States with modern, solid-fueled ICBMs armed
with multiple warheads is a direct consequence of its
access--illegal and legal--to U.S. technology. The Cox Report and
the Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence outline
several areas in which stolen U.S. technology probably has assisted
China's nuclear missile development programs and enabled them to
advance much more rapidly than they otherwise could have. China has
obtained U.S. information or technology in the specific areas of
solid-fuel motors, nuclear warhead design, and missile guidance. In
addition to becoming able to build new modern ICBMs, China also now
has the ability to retrofit existing ICBMs to carry multiple
warheads. U.S. technology has been instrumental to China's new ICBM
programs in the following areas:
Solid-Fuel Motors.
Access to U.S. solid-fuel missile technology is perhaps one of
the most important elements that have enabled China to build new
modern, small-sized nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. China's
existing ICBMs, like the DF-5, are somewhat less threatening to the
United States because they are large, immobile, and use
slow-loading liquid fuels. China now is able to make modern
ballistic missiles, however, that have a high degree of flexibility
and can be launched much more rapidly because it acquired U.S.
solid-fuel technology in the course of commercial cooperation with
a U.S. company. In 1994, with the approval of U.S. Department of
Defense monitors, a U.S. corporation helped China to perfect its
Perigee Kick Motor (EPKM), which "kicks" a satellite into a precise
orbit. Prior to this help, the EPKM failed repeatedly because of
poor motor wall insulation. U.S. know-how
apparently helped to solve the problem. According to a Chinese
former rocket motor engineer, this new knowledge was applied
quickly to the motors of China's DF-21 intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) and the DF-31 ICBM. According to this defector,
before the U.S. assistance, the DF-21 had a record of failure and
the DF-31 program was at a standstill.
Nuclear Warhead Design.
Equally important to China's new ballistic missiles as U.S.
solid-fuel motor technology is U.S. technology for making small,
accurate nuclear warheads. China has had to rely on large, unwieldy
liquid-fueled missiles in part because it could not build small,
lightweight nuclear warheads. The Cox Report details the ways in
which, most likely since the late 1970s, China has infiltrated
agents into U.S. nuclear laboratories who have "stolen classified
information of every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in
the U.S. ICBM arsenal." The Cox Report
concludes that China's next-generation small nuclear warheads will
emulate U.S. designs, most likely either the W-70 Lance warhead or
the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead. China also has stolen very important
"legacy codes" that are critical to testing the reliability of
nuclear weapons by computer without the need to detonate a nuclear
device. This stolen information could have saved China 2 to 10
years of effort.
Warhead Accuracy.
Thanks again to technology stolen from the United States,
China's new nuclear warheads will be much more accurate. Along with
information on the nuclear payload of the warhead, China also
obtained information on modern U.S. reentry vehicles. The shaping
of warhead reentry vehicles is essential to improving the accuracy
of such nuclear warheads, and increased accuracy is needed to
compensate for the reduced nuclear yield of the smaller-sized
warhead. A brochure of the Beijing Institute of Aerodynamics shows
China's small, modern shape reentry vehicles in development. In contrast with
China's early nuclear reentry vehicles that were large and blunt,
and thus less accurate, the new warheads will feature sharp conical
bodies characteristic of modern, accurate reentry vehicles.
Multiple Warhead Delivery.
U.S. technology also has been critical to enabling China to
develop MIRVs. To increase their effectiveness against a larger
number of targets, most modern ICBMs are equipped with these MIRV
warheads. MIRV delivery requires an advanced warhead "bus" that is
able to point and release warheads with precision. Although it does
not appear that any stolen or purchased U.S. technology has helped
China to develop such a warhead bus, commercial interaction with a
U.S. satellite maker did provide China the impetus to build a Smart
Dispenser that allows a single space launch vehicle to place
multiple satellites in orbit. The technology required for the
satellite Smart Dispenser is virtually identical to that needed for
a MIRV bus. To date, Motorola has launched 12 of its Iridium
communication satellites from China's Long March LM-2C/SD rockets
that use the Smart Dispenser bus. According to the Chinese engineer
mentioned earlier, the Smart Dispenser project was moribund until
it was revived by commercial funding from U.S. firms. The Report of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concludes that
commercial interaction with a U.S. company had a "pulling effect"
on China's satellite Smart Dispenser program.
Because of its progress in building small,
accurate nuclear warheads and its development of a satellite Smart
Dispenser that can be converted to a MIRV bus, China now has the
option to retrofit its existing 8,000-mile-range DF-5 ICBMs to
carry multiple warheads. In fact, the Long March LM-2C/SD used to
launch the communication satellites is only a slightly modified
DF-5 ICBM. Outfitting China's estimated 26 DF-5s with an 8-warhead
MIRV bus would increase the number of nuclear weapons carried by
the DF-5s from 26 to 208.
Missile Design, Testing, and
Reliability.
In the course of commercial cooperation with U.S. companies, China
has acquired information that can improve the design, testing, and
reliability of its satellite space launch vehicles--information
that can be used to improve current and future strategic missiles.
Following the failure of two Long March launches in 1992 and 1995
that destroyed satellites made by a U.S. company, China was given
information to improve the cone, or "fairing," atop the missile
that covers the satellite. This same
information could be used to build better fairings for MIRV ICBMs.
China also received analysis of the ways in which stress affects
missiles, thereby helping it to improve the reliability of future
missiles. In the course of
the review of the February 14, 1995, failure of a Long March LM-3B
launcher, which also destroyed a U.S. company's communication
satellite, China was given information that could improve the
reliability of missile inertial guidance systems and diagnostic
processes that could reduce the failure rate of future missiles.
A DEFENSIVE RESPONSE
The
impending improvements to China's missile arsenal carry several
important implications for the future of the U.S. NMD program.
First and foremost, China's advances increase the urgent need for
missile defense just to address the threat to the United States and
it allies. It is clear that China's strategic nuclear missile
arsenal of the future will be mobile--deployed on trucks or
submarines--and therefore more difficult to target with offensive
forces. This is not to say that U.S. offensive strategic forces
will have no role in holding China's missile arsenal at risk; instead, it
acknowledges that the technology for making U.S. offensive weapons
capable of countering missiles mounted on trucks and advancements
in anti-submarine warfare are not yet sufficient to counter China's
emerging missile threat effectively. Missile defenses are the
logical near-term answer to the mobile missile threat.
The
second implication is that the U.S. missile defense program will
have to accelerate the development and deployment of systems that
are capable of destroying ballistic missiles in their ascent or
boost phases. It is clear that the ability to build smaller nuclear
warheads will allow China to mount more than one warhead on each
missile. It also is likely that China's future missiles will
include decoys and penetration aids that can be used to overwhelm
or fool certain kinds of missile defense systems.
Ascent-phase Missile Defenses
The
missile defense systems that are susceptible to being overwhelmed
or deceived are those that perform intercepts in the midcourse or
terminal phases of a ballistic missile's flight, after each
warhead, decoy, or penetration aid has separated from the booster.
On the other hand, a defense capable of intercepting missiles in
their ascent phase--or, even better, their boost phase--could
destroy a missile before individual warheads and decoys or
penetration aids could be released. Thus, an ascent-phase defense
would undermine the military purpose of deploying multiple warhead
missiles that included decoys or penetration aids.
There are several additional reasons that
a boost-phase missile defense system is preferable. First, during
its ascent phase, and even more so during its boost phase, a
ballistic missile travels fairly slowly. It also emits a large
plume of heat and light at this stage. Taken together, these two
characteristics of ballistic missile flight make such a missile
relatively easy to track and target, and therefore intercept,
during these early stages of flight. Moreover, a boost-phase
defense could be coupled with midcourse and terminal defense
systems to provide a layered defense capability. This layered
system would provide the opportunity to shoot at the attacking
missile several times during the course of its flight. Obviously, a
multiple-shot defense would be more capable than a single-shot
defense, particularly against the kinds of sophisticated missiles
that carried multiple warheads, decoys, and penetration aids.
Countering China's Nuclear Strategies
Finally, an ascent-phase defense would
provide the United States with the greatest leverage for countering
what may be China's emerging nuclear strategy. Because of the small
number of deliverable strategic nuclear warheads currently in
China's arsenal (several dozen) and the low alert status of the
missiles (indications are that, on a day-to-day basis, the missiles
are neither mated to their warheads nor fueled), the speculation is
that China has adopted a "limited deterrence" nuclear strategy.
Such a strategy assumes that China's leaders see their nuclear
arsenal as essential to deterring enemy attacks by maintaining a
capability to inflict unacceptable damage in a retaliatory
strike.
China's strategic modernization effort,
however, may signal the intention of its leaders to jettison their
existing strategy of limited deterrence in favor of a more
aggressive strategy to actually fight a nuclear war. If China is
pursuing such a strategy, its success will depend on obtaining a
more survivable strategic nuclear arsenal that is appropriate for
warfighting against perceived regional rivals and for deterring a
U.S. military response. It almost certainly would involve targeting
Taiwan with nuclear weapons and even Japan, a strong ally of the
United States. Most important, it would target U.S. territory in an
attempt to deter a U.S. intervention to protect its friends and
allies in Asia. Ascent-phase missile defenses, which are capable of
protecting both U.S. territory and U.S. allies, would directly
undermine the viability of China's more threatening potential
nuclear strategy. In ideal circumstances, the deployment of such
defenses could serve to persuade China's leaders to retain the less
threatening nuclear strategy they are thought to have today.
First from the Sea
The
Heritage Foundation released a report in March 1999 that was
prepared by a panel of experts on missile defense chaired by
Ambassador Henry Cooper, the former director of the Strategic
Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) in the Bush
Administration. The missile
defense plan outlined in the Heritage study would give a limited
capability for countering ballistic missiles in their ascent phase
(prior to the release of individual warheads, decoys, or
penetration aids) by the deployment of sea-based interceptors. A much more robust
boost-phase intercept capability could be achieved from the later
deployment of space-based interceptors (SBIs) and space-based
lasers (SBLs).
To
field a global, sea-based ballistic missile defense system, the
Heritage experts recommend upgrading what is called the Navy
Theater-Wide (NTW) system for defending against IRBMs. The cost of
acquiring 650 interceptor missiles, to be deployed on 22 existing
U.S. Navy Aegis cruisers, would be about $3 billion. With
streamlined management, this system could be deployed as early as
2003. An undated and unclassified summary of a classified study
undertaken by the Department of Defense's Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization (BMDO) confirms that the NTW system could be refined
and adapted for intercepting long-range missiles of the type China
is working to modernize. Making the NTW system fully capable also
would require that it be supported by a constellation of sensor
satellites deployed in low-earth orbit. This system, currently
under development, and is called the Space-Based Infrared
System-Low (SBIRS-Low). If the program were accelerated and managed
as a national priority, this satellite constellation could begin
operations as early as 2003 as well. It would cost some $5 billion
to acquire.
Under certain circumstances, this enhanced
NTW system would be capable of intercepting ballistic missiles in
their ascent phase, and even their boost phase. The limitations on
the NTW system's ability to perform ascent-phase and boost-phase
intercepts are derived in part from the range of the target missile
and the location of the Navy ship relative to the launch site of
the target missile. Generally speaking, the longer the range of the
target missile and the closer the ship is to the launch site, the
more likely the NTW system is to intercept and destroy the target
missile in the ascent or even boost phase. The NTW system has been
hampered, however, by the Clinton Administration's policy of
constraining the development and testing of the system. The
Administration has reduced the velocity of the NTW system's
interceptor missile and denied the use of external sensor data in
the course of tests on the system.
These restraints should be removed in
order to allow a demonstration of the system's ability to counter
missiles of the kind China soon will begin to produce.
Specifically, Congress should require that the BMDO conduct an
intercept test of the NTW system against a target missile with the
flight characteristics of a modern ICBM in a way that demonstrates
the ability to intercept the target missile in its ascent phase.
The urgency of the threat dictates that this test should occur no
later than the end of fiscal year (FY) 2001. Finally, the BMDO
should be required to maintain the speed of the NTW interceptor at
4.5 kilometers per second to allow it to counter faster, long-range
missiles, and to allow the use of external sensor data during the
intercept tests.
And Then from Space
Building a more advanced capability for
performing intercepts of long-range missiles in the ascent phase
than what is available with the NTW system would require
developing, testing, and deploying SBIs and SBLs. Both systems
would have greater capabilities for defending against long-range
missiles in the boost phase than an upgraded NTW system would.
Because SBLs still are in the technology demonstration phase, the
best option would be to resume the development and testing of SBIs,
which could be deployed within five years for an initial investment
of $4 billion to $5 billion.
The
Clinton Administration cancelled the SBI program in 1993. Thus, it
is up to Congress to revive the program. It could do so by
allocating $250 million of the $836 million the Administration
plans to make available for the development of an NMD system. Congress should
insist that the BMDO test an SBI against a target test missile with
the flight characteristics of a modern ICBM similar to what China
is working to develop, to demonstrate the interceptor's ability to
counter such missiles in the ascent phase. This requirement would
mirror the one proposed for the NTW system. In this case, however,
the required test should occur no later than the end of FY
2003.
THE ABM TREATY
The
primary reason the Clinton Administration has restrained the NMD
program is its policy of honoring the ABM Treaty with the former
Soviet Union. The ABM Treaty barred the deployment of a territorial
NMD system. It also imposed a variety of restrictions on even the
development and testing of certain kinds of missile defense
systems, including those that could be deployed at sea and in
space. It is likely that, for these reasons, China supports the ABM
Treaty and even has suggested that it become party to the treaty.
The
ABM Treaty, however, no longer is legally binding, if for no other
reason than the only treaty partner with the United States, the
Soviet Union, no longer exists. No individual state or group of
states--including Russia--is capable of assuming the obligations of
the Soviet Union under the treaty.
Despite the ABM Treaty's lack of legal
standing, the Clinton Administration honors its terms on a
unilateral basis. Further, it in effect is trying to revive the
treaty through the adoption of a new treaty with four states, which
was signed by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on September
26, 1997. This new treaty contains many of the provisions of the
old ABM Treaty, but would apply them to a new, multilateral
setting. This new treaty requires the approval of the Senate prior
to ratification. But the Administration has not transmitted the
treaty to the Senate yet, let alone obtained its approval.
The
tests of the NTW and SBI systems proposed above are not consistent
with the Clinton Administration's policy. Enactment of these
requirements by Congress effectively would end the Administration's
policy. Such tests also would be inconsistent with the new
multilateral treaty, at least according to the Administration's
descriptions of the ways it intends to interpret and apply it if it
is ratified. Thus, enacting these testing requirements would be
tantamount to rejecting the new treaty because statutory
requirements supersede the provisions of even ratified treaties,
and certainly of treaties that have been signed but not
ratified.
Although the two tests would not
necessarily violate a provision of the ABM Treaty directly--if it
remained in force--they would not be consistent with the Clinton
Administration's "narrow interpretation" of the treaty. The subsequent
deployment of the upgraded NTW system and the SBI system generally
would be viewed as inconsistent with the treaty, if it were still
in force. As a result, the enactment of these testing requirements
would signal that the United States no longer considered itself
bound by the ABM Treaty and would codify in U.S. law the fact that
the ABM Treaty has lapsed under international law.
Establishing these legal precedents,
however, should not be the primary purpose of performing the tests
of the NTW and SBI systems. The primary purpose should be to
develop, test, and deploy the most capable missile defense
technologies obtainable to counter the growing missile threat
presented by China and other countries. Only in the absence of ABM
Treaty-derived restraints would the United States become able to
address the urgent missile threat from China and similar serious
threats from such rogue states as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. This
is the reason it is important--indeed vital--that the United States
abandon these restraints now. It is important to note that China
never has been party to the ABM Treaty and always has been free to
develop, test, and deploy any kind of missile defense system it is
capable of producing.
CONCLUSION
A
defensive response would be the most effective way to address the
China's emerging missile threat. Doing so, however, would require
that the existing program to develop and test the Navy Theater-Wide
missile defense system be accelerated and expanded. The system
should be upgraded to make it capable of intercepting long-range
missiles in their ascent phase, before individual warheads and
decoys could be released. Responding to the missile threat from
China also requires that the Clinton Administration's decision in
1993 to cancel the space-based interceptor development program be
reversed. This system, when deployed, would have an inherent
capability to defend against long-range missiles in the boost
phase.
The
problem is that the Clinton Administration, because of its policy
of observing the now-defunct ABM Treaty, is effectively blocking
much-needed progress in both programs. In the case of space-based
interceptors, the Administration has no program whatsoever. The
alarming developments regarding China's use of U.S. nuclear and
missile technology to modernize its strategic forces means there is
no time to waste. The United States urgently needs to develop and
deploy both the Navy Theater-Wide and space-based interceptor
systems to address the emerging threat from China, or it runs the
risk of being blackmailed by China with missiles designed with
stolen U.S. technology.
Richard D. Fisher, Jr.,
is a former Director of The Asian Studies Center at The Heritage
Foundation. Baker
Spring is Senior Defense Policy Analyst in The Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis International Studies Center at The Heritage
Foundation.