East
Timor has been engulfed in a rising tide of violence since August
30, when voters in the province overwhelmingly chose independence
from Indonesia. Pro-Indonesia militia groups, angered by the
outcome of the referendum, have killed as many as 7,000 people,
including children, United Nations workers, and Catholic priests
and nuns. The anti-independence militias also have mounted a
massive program of forced deportation, driving up to a quarter of
East Timor's 850,000 people to makeshift refugee camps controlled
jointly by the militias and the Indonesian military.
Indonesian Military
Collusion.
From the outset, the military opposed President B. J. Habibie's
decision to allow East Timor to determine its own political future,
fearing that any referendum would embolden separatists in restive
provinces like Aceh and Irian Jaya. Military leaders believed that
they had invested too much blood and treasure in pacifying East
Timor since its forcible annexation in 1976 to allow it to split
away from Indonesia. Thus, in the run-up to the
referendum--postponed twice because of violence and intimidation by
the militias--the Indonesian armed forces were deeply involved in
arming and supporting the militias. Since the referendum,
Indonesian soldiers and police have failed to intervene even when
the militias have openly committed atrocities. More recently,
Indonesia's military has abandoned any pretense of concealing its
collusion with the militias, and has joined them in looting,
burning, and even killing.
The
situation in East Timor has degenerated to the point that many
countries are demanding an international peacekeeping force to
restore order because Jakarta cannot--or will not--rein in the
militias. Australia, Indonesia's southern neighbor, has volunteered
to head a force composed mainly of troops from Asian nations. The
United States has offered to help with support functions such as
intelligence, logistics, airlift, in-country transportation, and
communications.
The U.S. Interest in
Indonesia.
Beyond helping to alleviate the suffering in East Timor, the
United States, as the leading Pacific power, has an interest in
preventing violence and chaos from spreading to the rest of
Indonesia. The world's fourth most populous country, Indonesia is
important to both the U.S. and the Southeast Asia region. Indonesia
purchased over $2 billion in U.S. exports in 1998, thereby
supporting over 30,000 American jobs. It is the world's largest
Muslim country, with a tolerant brand of Islam that has served as a
moderating force in the Islamic world. Indonesia controls sea lanes
through which 40 percent of world shipping passes, including 80
percent of Japan's oil supply and 70 percent of South Korea's.
Indonesia also has served as a force for regional stability,
working through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
for instance, to convince China to scale back its claims in the
South China Sea.
-
Assist a regionally led peacekeeping
force for East Timor, but only in a support role.
In announcing U.S. willingness to participate in such a
peacekeeping force, President Clinton refuses to rule out
categorically a U.S. ground troop presence. He should do so. By
limiting U.S. participation to intelligence, logistics, airlift,
transportation, and communications support, the President would
prevent U.S. forces from becoming a lightning rod for violence and
anti-American terrorism.
-
Link a resumption of Indonesia's
International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance program to Jakarta's
cooperation on East Timor.
Indonesia highly prizes the $50 billion IMF bailout package it was
granted to cope with the effects of the Asian economic crisis.
These funds were suspended by the IMF on September 9 in reaction to
the abuses in East Timor. Washington should use its influence at
the IMF to make any resumption of aid contingent on Jakarta's
ending all support of the anti-independence militias. It should
also move to deduct the cost of rebuilding East Timor from
Indonesia's total assistance package.
-
Insist on the professionalization of
Indonesia's military.
President Clinton cut ties with Indonesia's military on September
9 to protest the conduct of Indonesian forces in East Timor. He
should condition a restoration of these ties on genuine progress in
reform of the Indonesian military. At a minimum, those implicated
in criminal activity in East Timor should be identified and brought
to justice. Additionally, civilian control of the military should
be strengthened. Ideally, the role of the armed forces in politics
should be reduced and ultimately eliminated.
-
Encourage Indonesia to step up efforts
to prevent other separatist-minded provinces from spiraling into
violence and chaos.
Jakarta fears that other regions will expect to follow East
Timor's example and be allowed to choose whether to remain part of
Indonesia. Washington should point out that Indonesia's best hope
of consolidating its polyglot country lies not in violence and
intimidation, but in greater respect for human rights and the more
equitable distribution of wealth between Jakarta and the outer
provinces.
John T. Dori is a former
Research Associate in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage
Foundation.