Since late September, Russian troops have been
bombing and shelling the territory of Chechnya, a secessionist,
self-proclaimed "independent" republic in the Northern Caucasus.
Although this second Russo-Chechen war was triggered by a number of
security challenges to Russia, it has escalated to a point where
the West must act to curtail the carnage. If the war is not
stopped, the future of democracy in Russia will be endangered, as
will the stability of the Southern Caucasus and the security of oil
transportation from the region.
After the Russo-Chechen war in 1996, the
security situation in and around Chechnya remained chaotic. Chechen
gangs kidnapped and ransomed hundreds of civilians and military
personnel, including some Russian generals, senior government
officials, and journalists. Some hostages, including Westerners,
were brutally murdered. These activities, which the government of
President Aslan Maskhadov apparently could not curtail,
demonstrated how the Chechens had failed to build an autonomous
state that could live in peace with its neighbors or with itself.
Maskhadov allowed terrorism, Islamic militancy, and crime to
overwhelm Chechnya and spread beyond its borders, ultimately
provoking the current hostilities.
In
July and August of 1999, several thousand Muslim fighters, mostly
Chechens, invaded the neighboring republic of Daghestan, which is
part of the Russian Federation. The leaders of the invasion,
warlords Shamil Basaev and the Jordan-born Khattab, declared that
their goal was to detach Daghestan from Russia and to establish a
Muslim Northern Caucasus federal state from the Black Sea to the
Caspian. Several hundred
Russian soldiers were killed while pushing these guerrilla fighters
back into Chechnya.
Also
in August, four explosions rocked the homes of civilians in Moscow
and other Russian cities, killing over 300 men, women, and
children. Although the Kremlin blamed the Chechens, General
Alexander Lebed and other prominent figures of the Russian
political opposition accused the Russian secret services, Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin, and other political allies of President
Boris Yeltsin of instigating and bankrolling these brutal crimes.
Thus
far the war has caused civilian and military casualties in the
thousands. On the weekend of November 27-28, the Russian military
unleashed the heaviest bombardment against Grozny, Chechnya's
capital, using incindiary bombs. Over 500 people, including many
civilians, were killed. Over 200,000 refugees are camped out in the
impoverished, neighboring republic of Ingushetia or in the frozen
fields of Southern Russia.
WHAT IS AT STAKE?
The
war in Chechnya has repercussions beyond security in the Northern
Caucasus. At stake are several important issues. Among them:
The Russian Presidential Elections
On
December 19, Russia will hold elections for the State Duma (the
lower house of Parliament). The Fatherland Party, led by President
Yeltin's opponents, former Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov and
Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov, is projected to come in first or
second. This would boost Primakov's chances for a successful run
for president in July 2000. Yeltsin's chosen successor is Prime
Minister Putin, an ambitious former security official. Putin
succeeded in using the war to divert international media attention
from the corruption investigations involving President Yeltsin's
entourage and family. He has clearly linked his political future to
the success of the campaign in Chechnya. The stakes for Putin and
Yeltsin's inner circle are very high.
Under the guidance of Yeltsin and Putin,
the Russian General Staff has thrown its massive Soviet-era
conventional weaponry against tiny Chechnya. Putin has repeatedly
claimed that the hostilities are an anti-terror operation, and that
civilians are not being targeted. Unfortunately, the facts tell
another story: The second Chechen war is, first and foremost, about
making Putin a viable presidential contender against the popular
front-runner, Primakov.
Russian Military Prestige and Civilian
Control
The
Russian military suffered defeats in Afghanistan and during the
first Chechen war at the hands of Muslim mountain fighters.
Military leaders blame the civilian leadership for the Chechen
disaster, as the Kremlin repeatedly halted hostilities to pursue
negotiations. The Russian generals desperately need a clear-cut
victory, one that would restore their reputation and vindicate
their demands for a greater share of the shrinking budget pie.
Trying to justify the mounting war expenses, Defense Minister Igor
Sergeyev has gone so far as to blame the United States for the
current Russian involvement in Chechnya.
The
Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin, who
has overall responsibility for the war and is a contender for the
post of Defense Minister, reportedly threatened President Yeltsin
with mass resignations--or worse--if the hostilities are stopped to
pursue a negotiated solution. Yeltsin has backed
off, at least for now, but civilian control of the military--a
necessary feature of any democratic regime--is in jeopardy.
The Nature of Russian Democracy
The
current war has exposed the deep well of xenophobia and ethnic
hatred that imbues the Russian polity. Mayor Luzhkov of Moscow
ordered massive expulsions from the city of dark-skinned citizens
from the Caucasus and Central Asia. Other cities have followed
Moscow's example. In the prevailing climate of fear and suspicion,
the Russian state, including the military and the police, have
violated the Constitution, the rights of Russian citizens and
foreigners, and due process under Russian law. The news media,
controlled by either pro-Kremlin or anti-Kremlin factions, as a
rule have been unanimous in demonizing the Chechens. Racism often spills
from the TV screens and newspapers into the street, inciting
beatings, harassment, and discrimination against dark-skinned
persons, regardless of their religion or birthplace. The political
debate also has become shrill: Yabloko party leader, Grigory
Yavlinsky, who supports the military operation but advocates a
pause in the bombings to allow refugees to leave and negotiations
to begin, has been labeled a traitor by Anatoly Chubais, the
prominent liberal reformer.
Pipeline Politics
The
war will affect the outcome of the Great Game to build pipelines to
export oil from the Caucasus. Lack of Russian control over the
pipeline that runs from Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, to
Novorossiysk in Russia (the so-called Northern route) allowed the
Chechens to steal oil and generate cash flow over which Moscow had
no control. Russian plans to build a pipeline bypass via Daghestan
were jeopardized by the summer incursion of the Chechens. If Russia
returns to Chechnya, it may revive the Northern route. But in an
anti-Western, adversarial scenario, Russia may be able to threaten
the pipeline from Baku to the Georgian port of Supsa by supporting
internally unstable Armenia against Azerbaijan. Russia may thus try
to shut off both current export routes for the Caspian oil, which
will benefit its own oil industry and those of the Persian Gulf
states by decreasing the market supply. Moscow may do this in the
belief that the United States will not allow any oil to flow via
Iran, the third export route. (The presidents of Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkey agreed on November 18 to support
building a pipeline that would carry Caspian oil to the
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan via a route that does not pass through
Russia or Iran. However, this pipeline, if built, would not be
ready until sometime in 2004.)
The Rise of Militant Islam
The
final important dimension of the conflict is the rise of radical
Islam in Eurasia. Islamic indoctrination, as well as some weapons
and money, come to the Northern Caucasus from the Muslim world.
According to Russian sources, some support for the Chechen
militants comes from radical Sunni Muslim elements in Saudi Arabia
and the Gulf. There are also allegations that Osama bin Ladan has
been involved in fanning the flames of conflict in the North
Caucasus. The Kremlin has charged that the Moscow bombings were
carried out by students in a medrese (a college for Islamic
studies) in Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, a thousand miles away
from Chechnya. The fusion of Chechen nationalism and Wahhabism, a
strict form of Islam that originated in Saudi Arabia, is typical of
trends in the Southern tier of the former Soviet Union. In the past
several months there were hostage takings by anti-government
guerillas in Kyrgyzstan, explosions aimed at the regime of
President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, and continuing unrest in
Tajikistan. According to their commander, Shamil Basaev, Muslim
veterans of the Afghanistan resistance, the mujahiddeen--Uzbeks,
Kazakhs, Arabs, and Pushtuns--have fought in Daghestan and in
Chechnya.
As
the corrupt post-Soviet elites in Russia and in the area continue
to prove incapable of providing security and economic development
for the population, the attraction of the radical Muslim model is
likely to grow. Impoverished and unemployed youth will flock to
Islamic preachers in Chechnya and Uzbekistan as they did in
Algiers, the Gaza Strip, and Pakistan. The proven system of
building a social services infrastructure and recruiting youth from
poor families, first to the medrese and then to military training,
will find fertile ground in the former Soviet South.
WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. DO?
For
over a year, while the clouds of war were gathering over the North
Caucasus, the Clinton Administration did nothing to defuse the
ticking bomb. Now the
Administration has begun to issue weak statements of concern about
the level of violence by Russia against the civilians in Chechnya.
At the same time, however, President Clinton, in a speech to
Turkey's parliament on November 15, proclaimed, "We must help
Russia to complete its momentous democratic revolution." National
Security Adviser Sandy Berger urged that the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) credits scheduled to be delivered to Russia in December
not be halted because this "goes to the very stability of
Russia."
The
Administration has not endorsed calls from the foreign ministers of
Finland and Germany to stop the random violence and move to a
negotiated solution. Nor did the White House support a NATO
parliamentary assembly resolution calling on Russia to withdraw its
troops from Moldova and Georgia. The Administration
did not even support the position espoused by Russian liberal
politician Grigory Yavlinsky, who called for a 30-day respite in
the bombings to allow civilians to evacuate the war zone.
It
is time for the Clinton Administration to work resolutely to
facilitate a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Therefore, the
United States should:
-
Suspend IMF credits to Russia.
The war costs at least $1 billion a month. The IMF is
scheduled to provide Russia with $640 million in December to be
applied toward Russia's IMF payments. Western assistance funds are
fungible, which means that the money provided to repay the debt
could be used instead to step up the war in Chechnya. IMF
assistance to the Kremlin should be suspended until the war is
over.
- Demand that Russia obey its commitments
under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.
Russia violated the current CFE treaty during the first Chechen
war. It then requested a revision of the treaty, to which the
United States agreed. Now, Russia again is in violation of the
revised CFE treaty, which was signed at the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit in Istanbul on
November 19. It has surpassed the limits for aircraft and heavy
military equipment it is allowed to keep in the Caucasus. Prior to signing
the document, Russia demanded an expansion of the flank
limitations, and NATO agreed. So far, Moscow has announced that it
will comply with the treaty after it terminates the Chechen
operation.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman Jesse Helms (R-NC), Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS), and
a number of other Senators wrote to President Clinton on November
10, calling Russia's conduct in Chechnya "a brutal assault on the
core values of the OSCE. ...[T]hese military operations weaken each
day the credibility and reliability of arms control treaties that
are a cornerstone to international peace and stability." The
Senators demanded that the President refuse to sign the Adapted CFE
Treaty unless Russia ceased hostilities in Chechnya, withdrew its
troops, and opened negotiations with the government of President
Maskhadov. The Senators indicated that the Senate would be
"reluctant to endorse" the treaty while Russia is in violation.
- Encourage Russia to start peace
negotiations under OSCE sponsorship and request that a permanent
OSCE mission be dispatched to Chechnya.
To date, Russia has refused to negotiate with President Maskhadov
or with other Chechen leaders under the aegis of the OSCE. Under OSCE rules,
humanitarian issues are not exclusively the internal matter of any
member, but can be addressed by other OSCE members. An OSCE mission
in Chechnya functioned during the first Chechen war, and it is time
to revive it. In addition to observing and facilitating
negotiations, this mission could coordinate humanitarian
assistance.
Western European leaders, such as Germany
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and NATO Secretary General George
Robertson, have appealed to Moscow to initiate peace talks. They and other European
leaders should be supported in their efforts to end the war. When
the Russians are ready to talk, the United States and the European
Union should sponsor a broad conference for peace in the Northern
Caucasus.
-
Insist on assurances from the
Chechen leaders that they will cooperate with Russia in a crackdown
on terrorism and crime.
Some of Russia's security grievances against Chechnya are
justified. Russia cannot be pressured into stopping the war unless
the Chechen leaders agree to cooperate in ending the terrorism and
crime which originated from Chechen territory. Moscow needs
unequivocal security guarantees from credible Chechen leaders,
including President Maskhadov, to justify the end of hostilities.
Such security guarantees should include the disbanding of guerrilla
units and training camps, extradition of wanted criminals, and
close cooperation between Chechen and Russian security forces.
- Provide military assistance and expand
security cooperation with the countries of the Southern
Caucasus.
The United States should be concerned that Russia will further
destabilize the fragile equilibrium in the Southern Caucasus by
forcing Chechen fighters to leave Chechnya and relocate to Georgia
and Azerbaijan. The Russian Ministry of Defense has already
demanded that Georgia allow Russian border guards to patrol the
Georgian-Chechen border. The Defense Ministry also accused Georgia
of planning to host the Chechen government in exile, and Azerbaijan
of harboring Chechen fighters. Russian military
aircraft have twice bombed Georgian villages. This heavy-handed
pressure against a sovereign state is unacceptable. Washington
should clarify to Moscow that it is in Russia's interests to build
and nurture good relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan.
The United States should step up its
bilateral military cooperation with Georgia and, for the first
time, consider providing defensive weaponry. In particular, it
should boost the training of Georgia's border guards and naval
units, as well as speed up delivery of coastal radars and
surveillance systems scheduled for installation in the year 2000
and beyond. The United States should consider helping Georgia
develop an air defense component and assist in conducting an
assessment of Georgia's ground forces and security needs.
Additional steps should be taken to strengthen command, control,
communications, and intelligence (C3I) and mobile components of the
Georgian military. Officer and NCO training in the framework of the
Partnership for Peace (PfP) should be expanded. The President
should also provide a national security waiver to Sec. 907 of the
Freedom Support Act. This waiver would lift the ban on
military-to-military contacts and allow necessary support to
Azerbaijan.
CONCLUSION
The
war in Chechnya is more about Russian politics than about a
legitimate response to security problems Russia faces in the
Northern Caucasus. This war is not in the interest of the Russians,
the Chechens, or the other peoples of the Northern or Southern
Caucasus. Continuing hostilities may endanger the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the countries of the Southern Caucasus.
Moreover, they could threaten the transportation routes of Caspian
oil and the potential development of a new Silk Road--a land route
connecting Europe with the Far East via the Caucasus and Central
Asia. The hostilities also threaten the future of Russian
democracy, breed xenophobia, and jeopardize civilian control of the
military. Thus, the atrocities and the indiscriminate use of
military power against civilians must be stopped.
Dr. Ariel
Cohen is the Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian
Studies in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis International
Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.