Even
before an agreement on trade relations between Beijing and
Washington was finalized, Secretary of Defense William Cohen
announced that the United States will resume military-to-military
contacts with China. It would be easy
for Americans to assume that normalizing trade relations with China
also means normalizing military relations, but this is far from the
case. Under this Administration, military-to-military contacts--or
"engagement activities"--allowed Chinese military officers broad
access to U.S. warships, exercises, and even military manuals. Once it became
clear that China obtained U.S. nuclear weapons technology through
espionage, Congress felt compelled to caution the Administration to
limit such contacts by adding a restriction to the Fiscal Year (FY)
2000 National Defense Authorization Act.It
prohibited the Secretary of Defense from authorizing military
exchanges that "create a national security risk" by exposing
representatives of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to broadly
defined categories of U.S. advanced war fighting doctrine and
experimentation. Congress sought to
ensure that military contacts with the PLA would not improve
China's ability to wage war, project force, threaten Taiwan, or
repress its people.
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the
Pentagon understands the seriousness with which Congress considers
the risk. During the week of November 15, 1999, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell traveled to Beijing to meet with
PLA leaders about future military contacts. It is likely that
Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, a deputy chief in the PLA office
that handles intelligence and international matters, will be the
point of contact for these U.S.-China military exchanges. Although Xiong has
managed military contacts between Washington and Beijing for a
number of years, these meetings should be approached with extreme
caution.
In
1996, Xiong surprised the defense community when he asserted that
"Americans care more about Los Angeles than they do about
Taiwan"--a thinly veiled threat to remind former U.S. Assistant
Defense Secretary Chas Freeman that China's intercontinental
missile force could target the United States for siding with Taiwan
in cross-Strait confrontations. Xiong also
supervised Major General Ji Shengde, the head of the PLA's Military
Intelligence Department, when Ji arranged illegal donations to the
Democratic National Committee in 1996. Roughly the
equivalent of the director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency,
Xiong has some responsibilities that are similar to those of the
director of policy and strategy on the U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
These facts make military contacts between
an appointed civilian official of the Clinton Administration and a
high-ranking Chinese military and intelligence officer who
supervised operations designed to undermine the democratic process
in the United States troubling, at best.
CHINA'S MILITARY BUILD-UP
In
trade relations, Americans should welcome the recent agreement with
Beijing allowing China admission to the World Trade Organization
(WTO). For China, accession to the WTO will open its economy to
foreign trade, increase private ownership, and foster reforms and
the growth of a middle class. But in the defense and security
arena, Beijing's actions do not support a "business as usual"
approach. These actions include:
-
The deployment of hundreds of new missiles
near the Taiwan Strait--the same missiles China shot off the coast
of Taiwan in 1995 and 1996.
-
The acquisition of new aircraft,
submarines, cruisers, and missiles from Russia; radar equipment
from Israel; air refueling technology from Britain; and missiles
from Italy and France, which will improve the PLA's ability to wage
war beyond Taiwan and into the South China Sea.
-
The PLA Air Force's revision of its
strategic orientation from basically a defensive doctrine to an
offensive one.
-
Authoritative articles in the PLA's
official newspaper that call for the establishment of a new service
to carry out electronic and information attacks against enemy
forces and on an enemy's homeland. (The PLA appears
to have chosen the U.S. military as the model against which it will
train its forces to fight.)
The
Pentagon can no longer ignore the fact that the "Strategic
Partnership" heralded by President Clinton is, for China, strategic
competition. Any
military-to-military contacts must be structured with this
development in mind.
In
1996, China's military leaders were embarrassed by their inability
to respond to the presence of U.S. aircraft carrier battlegroups
off Taiwan, which were responding to China's military exercises in
the Strait during Taiwan's presidential elections. In the years
since then, the PLA has worked harder to find ways to deter U.S.
military involvement in the area, such as improving its
capabilities in information or electronic warfare; extending the
operational range and capabilities of its Air Force with airborne
early warning and control systems (AWACS aircraft), new missiles,
and air-to-air refueling systems; and making new missile threats
against Taiwan.
The
PLA wants to develop a military that can react quickly in the
region with new precision weapons and modern combat platforms. PLA
leaders want secure, world-class communication, computer, and
intelligence systems. They want the logistics capability to project
forces and sustain those forces. And they are going after them by
purchasing new systems from abroad, gathering intelligence on how
to use them, and developing them indigenously. The fact is, many
of the military contacts between the United States and China over
the years helped the PLA attain its goals.
APPROPRIATE U.S.-CHINA CONTACTS
Reopening normal military exchanges with
China as though it was just another Pacific region security partner
is the wrong approach. A new dialogue with China needs to focus
first on strategic issues like China's proliferation behavior, its
threat of force against Taiwan, its territorial ambitions in the
South China Sea, and the security of the Korean Peninsula. Instead
of seeking exchanges on military exercises and efficiency with its
Chinese counterparts, the Clinton Administration should be talking
with the PLA about:
-
China's proliferation of ballistic
missile technology.
China's missile and nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, which
the Clinton Administration ignored for years, led to the
nuclearization of South Asia. China exported the first
intermediate-range ballistic missiles to the Middle East, and
Beijing continues to engage in proliferation with Iran. The
Administration should directly address these issues with Beijing
when it takes PLA admirals and generals around to observe U.S.
military exercises.
-
U.S. responsibilities under the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA).
Elected congressional representatives of the American populace
passed the TRA to ensure America's friends in the Republic of China
on Taiwan can defend themselves against aggression. U.S. military
officers are required by law to ensure Taiwan's military defenses
are more effective than Beijing's offensive capability.
-
Security of the Korean
peninsula.
The United States and China have common concerns on the Korean
Peninsula. Neither country wants war to break out again; both
countries seek to end the conflict that has been festering since
1950 and to convince North Korea to modernize; and both countries
have established good trading relations with the Republic of Korea.
Common ground can be found on North Korea as well as other security
issues.
-
China's threats of force against
Taiwan.
Beijing should know that it is acting like a 15th century suzerain
by threatening to "punish" Taiwan, which is conducting democratic
elections, or any other country that does not do its bidding, with
military action. Threats against Taiwan are destabilizing.
-
Freedom of navigation of airways and
oceans.
The PLA should understand that its aggressive and irresponsible
actions in the South China Sea around the Spratly Islands, on
Mischief Reef off the Philippines, and in the Taiwan Strait impede
access to seaways and airways for trade and commerce. The Clinton
Administration should make it clear that the security and stability
of the western Pacific is a vital interest of the United
States.
-
Competing strategic visions and
priorities.
The National Security Strategy of the United States and the 1998
White Paper on China's National Defense present competing visions
on how alliances should function or whether there should be an
alliance structure in the Pacific region. The Clinton
Administration should work to ensure the PLA understands the
importance and strength of the U.S. security commitments to Japan,
Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Taiwan.
-
U.S. missile defense systems.
China has conducted an unprecedented military buildup of
ballistic missiles, particularly along its eastern coast. As a
consequence of the buildup and Beijing's missile threats in 1996,
the entire security equation in the Pacific has changed. The United
States needs theater missile defenses in Asia, and should extend
such protection to its allies and friends. Also, the United States
needs a national missile defense. Beijing should be confronted with
how its own irresponsible behavior has changed the security balance
in the region.
-
The role of the respective militaries
in the United Nations.
In the past, the U.S. military and China's PLA worked together in
Cambodia and in Kuwait on U.N. peacekeeping operations. The
Administration should seek ways to continue such cooperation, which
promotes China's position as a responsible member of the world
community and educates China's leaders and soldiers on the
difficulties of promoting peace in the world.
-
The role of the Chinese military in a
civil society.
The PLA is a "party army." Its primary allegiance is not to the
People's Republic of China but to the Communist Party. Exchanges
between the PLA and U.S. educators at military academies should
demonstrate how a military force functions as an organ of the state
and government in a democratic republic. Matters relating to the
rule of law and individual freedoms should be discussed, much as
they are at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii
and at the Marshall Center in Germany.
-
Domestic solutions to environmental
problems on military bases.
American industry can demonstrate positive activities to the
Chinese armed forces. The Administration should highlight the
accomplishments of U.S. entrepreneurs in turning military property
into productive civilian uses in the wake of the Cold War. For
example, PLA generals should tour the new college campus on the
former site of Fort Ord in California, and the new townhouse
subdivision at the former Cameron Station in Alexandria, Virginia.
Beijing should see how the free enterprise system can be harnessed
to clean up polluted military land.
U.S.
armed forces need to conduct a security dialogue with China. But
the Defense Department must make clear during these discussions
that the United States will continue to support the efforts of
Taiwan's armed forces to maintain its defenses; view China's
missile activities and nuclear proliferation as grave threats to
its security; and seek a theater missile defense system to protect
its forces in East Asia and offer that system to its friends and
allies.
The
Pentagon should establish clear standards for future U.S.-China
military contacts. There should be no further "joint exercises,"
and no suggestions that U.S. military units or special operations
forces will conduct military exchanges with the PLA. The release of
U.S. war-gaming or combat simulation computer software to the PLA
should cease. Such systems that were provided in the 1980s are in
use today, training regimental and division leaders to fight more
effectively against Taiwan. Finally, U.S. defense officials should
refuse to talk to the senior Chinese military intelligence officer
who ridiculed America's intent to ensure Taiwan's self-defense and
who supervised illegal contributions to a U.S. presidential
campaign. The Department of Defense should talk only with those
leaders in Beijing who will make the decisions governing when China
uses force or goes to war.
CONCLUSION
The
United States should gauge its military contacts with China
carefully. It should adopt a simple standard to govern future
military cooperation: It should do nothing to improve the PLA's
capability to wage war against Taiwan or U.S. friends and allies,
its ability to project force, or its ability to repress the Chinese
people. Relations with China must be kept in the proper
perspective. Normal trade relations do not mean normal military
relations.
Dr. Larry M.
Wortzel is Director of the Asian Studies Center at The
Heritage Foundation