President George W. Bush correctly points out that
years of neglect and overuse have put tremendous strain on
America's military equipment. Since the last comprehensive
modernization of the forces nearly 20 years ago, a host of new
threats to U.S. security has emerged from the proliferation of
ballistic missiles and other advanced military technologies.
Additionally, the U.S. armed forces--cut by around one-third in the
past decade--have been deployed more frequently than they were
during the Cold War. Because of these changing pressures, the U.S.
military must now deal with increasingly aging and obsolete
equipment. The Bush Administration faces difficult choices in
establishing its budget priorities for modernizing the armed forces
to meet both near-term and future threats.
Maintaining an aging force has two primary
drawbacks: higher costs and declining capabilities. Old equipment
costs more to maintain, is less efficient, requires more personnel
to operate, often is more expensive to transport, and breaks down
more often. Equipment designed decades ago for Cold War conditions
simply cannot fulfill the requirements of a modern military force
in an ever-changing, technologically advancing world. America's
potential adversaries are determined to develop capabilities that
focus on the weaknesses of the U.S. forces, such as their reliance
on electronics for transmitting battlefield information and the
need for forward-basing areas. Not addressing these issues puts
even the most modern carrier, like the recently christened
Ronald Reagan, at risk.
The
Administration must develop both a new military doctrine to address
the changing environment and a new generation of equipment to
counter the myriad threats growing around the world. Specifically,
so that America can meet its responsibilities to its allies and be
able to defend its own interests, the U.S. armed forces must be
prepared to:
The
Administration faces a dilemma, however, in deciding how to address
all three. It has inherited an aging force that will be ineffective
against the threats that are emerging, even if the forces are
upgraded with the latest technology. But creating a new military
force that is capable of dominating future combat will be quite
costly.
Significant investments must be made both
in modernizing existing weapons platforms to hedge against today's
threats and in the research, development, and acquisitions programs
needed to prepare for tomorrow's wars. Since the United States does
not have limitless wealth with which to fulfill all current and
future requirements, the Administration must establish clear
guidelines for modernizing the U.S. military so that the best
fighting force in the world remains prepared and ready for the
uncertain challenges of tomorrow.
THREE MODERNIZATION APPROACHES
The
debate over the modernization of the military forces is often
framed around three approaches: modernizing the current generation
of weapons; investing in next-generation technologies or developing
totally new and revolutionary technologies--the so-called
generation-after-next weapons. However, framing the issue as one of
needing to choose from among three distinct options oversimplifies
a complex issue and misleads the public. Modernization will require
program decisions from each of these options, based on their
advantages and disadvantages.
Investing in current-generation
weapons means procuring assets that are the same or marginally
better than what has been in the force for the past 20 years.
Military leaders often refer to this as the "legacy force." Such a
strategy is the least expensive up front and the least
time-consuming to put in operation.
Instead of developing an advanced
multi-role fighter, for example, the U.S. Air Force could quickly
build a consignment of F-16s--the mainstay of today's Air Force
that was developed during the 1970s. Or an aging weapons system
could be upgraded to a new version, retaining most of the
characteristics of the original system or program but employing
some new technologies to yield only marginally improved
capabilities. This approach characterized the production of F-16s
from the time they were introduced.
The
U.S. Navy took a slightly different route to modernize its strike
fleet. Given the extreme age of its carrier-based F/A-18 C/D
fighter planes (developed concurrently with the F-16), the Navy
chose to base the more modern fighter on the older plane. The
result is the F/A-18 E/F, which entered service in 1999. This
option will provide new planes but also will result in only
marginal improvements over the predecessor fighter.
The
disadvantages of choosing this path are many. Less advanced systems
cost more to maintain over their lifetime, may lag behind the
threat, and may divert money away from the acquisition of new, more
capable systems. Yet this path may be the best response when
quantity is more important than quality. For example, the threat of
imminent war or the need to reinforce equipment during a war of
attrition would require a rapid buildup of affordable forces. It is
also the best choice when the objective is to maintain a moderately
aged force. Purchasing new weapons to replace aging ones of the
same class will ensure a well-functioning and modern force until
the threat environment dictates a change.
Next-generation weapons are the
evolutionary extension of existing weaponry. Unlike the decision to
produce more of the same weapons or to make marginal improvements
in existing platforms, investing in the next generation of weapons
and applying new designs and technologies to current models will
yield much more advanced capabilities.
Such
new weapons systems, to a large extent, merely replace their
predecessors in a strategy to fight and win wars. For example,
where the F/A-18 E/F embodies the infusion of new technology into
an old design, the Joint Strike Fighter represents the next
generation of carrier-based tactical fighters utilizing advanced
technologies in both design and production. Yet the Joint Strike
Fighter is still a continuation of the carrier-based weapons
system. Although it incorporates many technological advances that
give it a distinct advantage over the F/A-18 E/F, it only begins to
redefine how the Navy will conduct its operations.
Investing in the next generation of
weapons will enable the United States to maintain military
superiority over potential adversaries that pursue similar
capabilities. The proliferation of modern aircraft, such as the
Russian MiG-29 and SU-27 and advanced air defenses like those being
built by the Chinese in Iraq, significantly decreases the advantage
enjoyed by American pilots. However, planes like the Joint Strike
Fighter and the Air Force's next-generation air superiority
fighter, the F-22, can continue to ensure U.S. superiority in
relation to these threats by employing new capabilities, such as
stealth (the ability to avoid radar and, in some cases, thermal
detection); supersonic cruise (the ability to fly faster than the
speed of sound without afterburners, to conserve fuel); and
advanced avionics. Furthermore, by building in cost-saving measures
and employing efficient production practices, these next-generation
weapon systems could cost less over their lifetime.
A
modernization strategy that relies too heavily on next-generation
weaponry, however, also has certain disadvantages. First,
next-generation weapons often require a greater initial investment
in order to complete development and begin production. Therefore,
it may take slightly longer to bring them into the force.
Furthermore, some evolutionary capabilities may not be sufficient
to meet the next threat, making further investment useless.
Finally, too heavy an investment in evolutionary systems could
interfere with the Pentagon's ability to allocate sufficient funds
for a comprehensive military transformation, which could be
required by a changing strategic environment.
Investing in next-generation weaponry is
the best way to maintain America's military edge over potential
adversaries in the near- to mid-term. But the proliferation of
weapons technology is ensuring that other nations eventually will
field weapons on a par with or exceeding U.S. capabilities. As such
advances emerge, the United States will need to be prepared to
field superior weaponry.
Investing in next-generation weaponry is a
good option when a current capability is still required but the
equipment is exceedingly old. For example, to conduct long-range
bombing missions, the United States still depends on the B-52
strategic bomber that was first fielded in the 1950s. These systems
should be replaced, but purchasing "new" B-52s would not be prudent
given their technological limitations and the additional
capabilities a new bomber could introduce into the force.
Generation-after-next weapons are
likely to include unmanned combat aircraft, "space bombers,"
advanced cruise missiles, new submarines, low-visibility surface
ships, directed energy weapons such as lasers and microwaves, and
space control assets. Most of these systems would require far fewer
soldiers to operate. Furthermore, these revolutionary capabilities
likely would take advantage of robotics, miniaturization, and
automation. Central to such a military revolution would be networks
of land, air, sea, and space sensors to collect targeting data and
other information that could be used to monitor the enemy's
activities in real time; monitor the presence of chemical, nuclear,
or biological contaminants; or develop navigation tactics.
By
skipping the next generation of weapons and investing in
generation-after-next systems, the United States would be better
prepared to defend its interests against future threats. The
Chinese, for example, are working to develop passive air-defense
systems that detect the slight turbulence of commercial radio and
television waves caused by aircraft flight--a capability that could
prove effective against America's stealthy aircraft. A revolutionary
approach to meeting that threat would be to develop space bombers
or hypersonic cruise missiles.
Revolutionary systems also could be
developed to defend against such asymmetric challenges as chemical
and biological contamination. They would be far less expensive to
develop and deploy over the long term than much of today's force
because they would be less manpower-intensive and would incorporate
new, more efficient technologies. For example, the arsenal ship as
currently envisioned would require only around 50 sailors, but it
would carry the firepower of five Ticonderoga-class cruisers
that together require 1,700 sailors.
Like
the other two approaches outlined above, a generation-after-next
modernization strategy also carries with it certain disadvantages.
Most of these systems exist only on paper or are early in their
development. Developing them on a more rapid timetable would
require a large up-front investment and involve a significant time
lag before they could be deployed--a significant problem when
America is already relying on an old and overused force.
Furthermore, funding for research, development, and acquisition of
these systems would be diverted away from other systems that could
be brought into the current force more rapidly. And there is always
the risk that the technologies may never pan out. Most important,
these systems do nothing to address current and near-term
threats.
Investing in generation-after-next
weaponry would be prudent, however, when current systems lag far
behind the threat, if asymmetric threats emerge that exceed current
capabilities, and if the technologically and strategically changing
environments require them.
WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES AFFORD?
The
defense budget measured as a percentage of gross domestic product
(GDP) has decreased steadily every year since 1986, with the
exception of 1991-1992 and 1999-2000, when it remained stagnant.
When President Bill Clinton entered office, the United States was
spending 4.4 percent of GDP on defense; by 2000, that amount had
dropped to around 3 percent.
The
Bush Administration could reasonably afford to dedicate up to 4
percent of GDP to defense. With the exception of 1948, the United
States spent over this amount on national security every year
between 1941 and 1995. Well within historical norms, this level of
spending would be adequate, given a focused and well-balanced
modernization strategy, to maintain a force capable of protecting
U.S. territory and U.S. interests today as well as to field an
adequate force in the future. Though this amount may not be
required, the Bush Administration should be prepared to increase
the defense budget substantially.
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OF MODERNIZATION
In a
recent speech at the Norfolk Naval Air Station, President Bush
promised to "modernize some existing weapons and equipment, a task
we have neglected for too long," but added that "our goal is to
move beyond marginal improvements to harness new technologies that
will support a new strategy." Defining this
strategy is one of the keys to successful modernization.
The
lack of a cohesive defense strategy since the end of the Cold War
is a primary reason the U.S. forces are in decline today. Given the
scarcity of resources with which to undertake urgent modernization,
the Administration should define its objectives for modernization
very clearly. Specifically, these strategic objectives should be to:
Protecting the Homeland
The
U.S. homeland faces at least three current threats: an attack by
ballistic and cruise missiles, terrorism involving weapons of mass
destruction, and electronic-cyber attacks against critical
infrastructure. U.S. military
forces are ill-prepared to respond to these attacks, and potential
adversaries like China have indicated a desire to target U.S.
weaknesses.
The
threat is anything but small. Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and
Iraq either possess or are developing intercontinental range
ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In addition, other nations are capable
of striking U.S. allies, U.S. bases, or U.S. assets with cruise
missiles or shorter-range ballistic missiles, and U.S. territory
when these missile are placed on ships. The very nature of
America's open democratic society makes it vulnerable to terrorism,
including attacks using weapons of mass destruction. Proliferation
of technologies has allowed nations like North Korea, Libya, and
Iran to develop their own chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons. These weapons can
be delivered by almost any means imaginable, including airplane,
car bomb, or ship.
Beyond this, the United States is
increasingly vulnerable to information and electronic warfare. Nearly every sector
of American society, including the armed forces, relies on the free
flow of information over electronic and digital networks, and
nations are developing methods that would destroy or disrupt these
networks.
The
Administration's modernization strategy must address such
vulnerabilities. Central to this effort must be a decision on the
roles that the armed forces and federal, state, and local agencies
will play in responding to attacks on the homeland. Both the U.S.
military's legal authority to operate within the United States and
its resources are limited. Although the armed services must counter
threats to the homeland as they evolve outside U.S. borders, they
must play a secondary role as that threat emerges within U.S.
borders.
The
Administration should establish clear guidelines and
responsibilities for the use of military forces in homeland
defense, and it should refrain from using its limited resources on
missions and capabilities that are better handled by others. Thus,
the U.S. military should be primarily responsible for defending
Americans from aggression and preventing attacks on the homeland.
Once an attack occurs, National Guard and Reserve units should take
over military activities while other government agencies and
private entities shoulder the rest of the burden.
Roles for which the armed forces should
prepare include deterrence, intelligence gathering, preemptive
strikes against entities posing imminent threats, missile defense,
and research and development of countermeasures and systems to
defend against threats against the homeland.
Deterring Near-Term Threats
There are nations in every region of the world that could threaten
America's vital interests in the near term. To assure stability in
those regions and protect U.S. interests requires the ability to
defeat any nation or group that threatens them, which itself
provides effective deterrence against large-scale aggression.
Potential near-term threats that the
United States must be prepared to counter include the
following:
-
Domination of Eastern Europe by a hostile
power;
-
A conflict on the Korean peninsula
exacerbated by North Korea's attempts to build nuclear bombs and
ICBMs;
-
Chinese aggression against Taiwan or other
U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific;
-
Attempts by Iran or Iraq to dominate the
Persian Gulf;
-
A combination of radical Arab and Islamic
forces endangering the survival of Israel;
-
A conspiracy involving Iran, Iraq, and/or
Syria to attack or destabilize Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or some other
ally in the region; and
- A resource war in the Middle East or Near
East that involves U.S. allies.
Modernizing the forces to enable the
United States to deter and defeat both current and near-term
threats is an imperative. The Administration should take every step
to strengthen its important alliances and be ready to respond
forcefully and immediately to aggression against them. This should
include effective ballistic missile defense for America and its
friends and allies around the world.
Ensuring Long-Term Combat
Effectiveness
During the Cold War, the United States
developed the carrier battlegroup to fight the Soviet Union on the
high seas. It developed its high-tech tactical fighter forces to
assure air superiority; long-range strategic bombers to penetrate
Soviet air defenses; and heavily armored, large, and powerful land
forces to win on the battlefield. To assure the effective use of
these forces, the U.S. military forces must have access to an
extensive network of forward-deployed bases and pre-positioned
weaponry.
Regrettably, however, such positions are
becoming increasingly scarce, and potential U.S. adversaries are
developing asymmetric tactics to target weaknesses in America's
capabilities and operational concepts. For example, U.S. military
strength is projected by air and sea (and increasingly by space).
It is reasonable to assume that potential adversaries would focus
on methods that disrupt these capabilities, such as advanced air
defenses, anti-satellite capabilities, and anti-ship cruise
missiles.
U.S.
armed forces rely increasingly on the ability to collect,
disseminate, and exchange vast amounts of accurate data. This
reliance creates the incentive for potential adversaries to disrupt
or destroy the networks upon which that capability depends. Such
information and cyber warfare could even include detonating a
nuclear warhead above the atmosphere, creating an electromagnetic
pulse that would severely debilitate all electronic devices within
the "line of sight" of the blast.
Such
diverse geographic and technological threats, largely undefined
today, make it imperative that the Pentagon develop new ways to
fight and win wars tomorrow. Its modernization strategy must
envision battles in which America will no longer have unhindered
access to forward-basing areas and where the enemy is well-supplied
with technologically advanced weaponry, including ballistic and
cruise missiles, and advanced imaging and tracking capabilities.
The Administration must invest in technologies that provide new
strategic options for rapid execution as each new threat develops.
Military planners must be vigilant and forward thinking, applying
each new advanced technology to weapons systems, force structures,
and combat doctrines.
GUIDELINES FOR MODERNIZING THE ARMED
FORCES
To
modernize the armed forces, the Bush Administration must first
decide what it wants the U.S. armed forces to do and build a force
capable of carrying out that mission. It must decide which programs
and capabilities to pursue, develop, or cut in order to achieve the
strategic objectives listed above. Given these objectives and the
limited resources with which to achieve them, the White House and
top officials at the U.S. Department of Defense must apply
principled guidelines to create a 21st century force that can
protect America's future interests with minimal risk to today's
national security.
Guideline #1: Long-term investments
must not be made at the expense of near-term requirements. A
prudent modernization strategy requires a deft understanding of
current and future threats to U.S. interests and America's current
ability to counter them. Identifying future threats is important,
but ignoring current threats can be deadly. Thus, priorities for
modernizing the forces must be balanced. Making long-term
investments should not be given a higher priority than addressing
near-term requirements.
America, as the sole remaining superpower,
has many adversaries. The U.S. military must be ready to deter
aggression in every region of the world and prepared to defend its
interests at any moment. The surest way to prevent aggression is to
maintain overwhelming military superiority, which undermines the
incentive for other nations to act against U.S. interests. The
surest way to protect the national interest is to be fully capable
of defeating aggression should such deterrence fail.
The
age of America's military forces combined with advances in the
capabilities of its potential adversaries creates an urgent demand
for new equipment to defend against current and near-term threats.
For example, the U.S. Marine Corps still relies on Vietnam-era
technology for its helicopter-based air transport fleet. The
evolutionary extension of these helicopters is the controversial
V-22 "Osprey" tilt-rotor aircraft. Crashes and accusations of
corruption have plagued the program in recent years. Skipping over
production of the V-22 to invest resources in the development of a
revolutionary lift capability may appeal to some planners, but the
risks associated with such a decision are extremely high. The
Marine Corps' current airlift fleet is wholly inadequate due to its
age and technological limitations. The Marine Corps desperately
needs agile, longer-range airlift. If its design problems can be
solved, the V-22 could satisfy this need.
Preparing for emerging threats without
being prepared for current threats makes little sense, and
long-term investments should never be made at the expense of
near-term requirements. However, this does not argue against the
desperate need for a robust research and development program.
Research and development must forge ahead, if at a slower pace, and
the technologies yielded should be brought into the force as combat
requirements change.
Guideline #2: Modernization efforts
must focus on warfighting. Every Defense program should enhance
the ability of the U.S. military to fight and win wars. Yet over
the past decade, the men and women in uniform have been sent
increasingly on so-called operations other than war. This use of
combat soldiers in non-combat missions creates an incentive to
modernize the military with weapons and capabilities that
facilitate peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention rather than
combat effectiveness. Making the U.S. military forces better suited
for humanitarian intervention at the expense of warfighting,
however, could invite aggression. Given the current fiscal
constraints on the Department of Defense, the focus of
modernization must be warfighting--the raison d'être of the
U.S. armed forces.
The
military equipment used to defeat Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf
war, however, is the same that has been used since then to conduct
operations other than war. The deficiencies of America's
warfighting forces in those non-combat missions are helping to
define the requirements for the Army's current modernization
efforts. Thus, modernization is reflecting America's past
commitment to non-combat operations. Continuing along these lines
would be folly because deterring aggression against America's
interests requires a strong combat capability, not the ability to
conduct non-combat operations.
Guideline #3: Modernization must secure
a competitive advantage for the United States over its potential
adversaries. Modernization must address the military's unmet
needs and unmet threats and assure America's competitive advantage
over its potential adversaries. The failure to modernize to meet
these goals over the past decade, combined with the rapid
proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons technology even to
Third World states, has narrowed the technological gap. For
example, the superiority of the U.S. submarine fleet is threatened
by the proliferation of submarines and anti-submarine technology,
and America's space-based assets and computer-based infrastructure
are not effectively protected against attack.
Some
programs to address such vulnerabilities already lag behind the
threat, and others could be obsolete shortly after they are
introduced. The U.S. Navy's ship-based theater missile defense
program, for instance, is testing missile interceptors against
target missiles that are slower than the existing threat, as North
Korea's test launch of the Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile in August
1998 demonstrated.
Sometimes an evolutionary approach to
modernization is enough to extend America's competitive advantage.
The almost-completed Virginia-class attack submarine is an
evolutionary system that can counter near-term threats, and the
added capabilities it brings to the battlefield ensure that it will
continue to be a superior submarine over its lifetime.
Some
circumstances, however, require a revolutionary approach. The
extended range cruise missile as currently envisioned neither
offers the United States a lasting competitive advantage nor
addresses an unmet threat. The new cruise missile--the follow-on to
the conventional air-launched cruise missile now in use--will have
many of the same limitations as its predecessor. Both systems are
subsonic, and neither is stealthy. Instead of investing limited
dollars in a system that likely will be vulnerable to air defenses
in the near future, it would be prudent for the Pentagon to skip
that generation of cruise missile and develop a more
technologically advanced system to gain greater utility over a
longer period.
Guideline #4: Modernization must
balance capabilities with efficiency. Efforts to modernize the
U.S. military must also achieve efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
New technologies should produce a more efficient and lethal
platform than current capabilities, but trading efficiency for
capability would be a mistake.
For
example, the U.S. Army is attempting to become lighter and more
mobile. Although the objective is desirable, it is technologically
not yet feasible for the Army to maintain its lethality while
increasing its mobility. The Army is diverting resources to procure
an interim armored vehicle (IAV) that is lighter and more mobile,
even though it is less lethal and less durable than today's armored
vehicles. To achieve the efficiency associated with greater
mobility, the Army is forfeiting lethality and durability.
Today's armored units are slow and heavy,
making them vulnerable to advanced anti-armor weaponry. But if the
traditional armored vehicles are vulnerable, any evolutionary
vehicle would likely be vulnerable as well. Instead of investing in
evolutionary armored land combat systems that may add some
efficiency but not effectiveness, it would be better to maintain
the current technology for the near term and at the same time
invest in developing revolutionary land-combat systems that are
mobile, durable, and lethal to address future threats.
Guideline #5: Modernization must
respond to a technologically and strategically changing security
environment. A new strategic environment is emerging as
nations continue to develop more advanced systems and tactics that
could target U.S. weaknesses, including access to space,
vulnerability to ballistic and cruise missiles, reliance on
information networks, and power projection force requirements.
China, for example, has purchased Russian cruise missiles that are
designed specifically to destroy U.S. ships deployed for power
projection. Beijing also is pressing forward in developing
space-based assets, cyber-warfare techniques, and long-range
survivable nuclear missiles.
The
fact that the United States currently has no defense against
ballistic missiles serves as an incentive for its adversaries to
obtain or develop missiles. Moreover,
America's military limitations force it to rely on alliances and
basing areas from which it could launch defensive or offensive
operations. Therefore, its adversaries have reason to try to deny
the U.S. military access to those basing areas. These threats are
revolutionary in nature and will require revolutionary responses.
The ability to counter them would enable the United States to
control the battlefield and fight wars on its own terms. An
inability to adjust to such asymmetric challenges would be
crippling.
MODERNIZATION CATEGORIES
The
five general categories of major weapons systems that the Defense
Department must modernize are:
-
Tactical fighters,
-
Armored combat vehicles,
-
Long-range bombers,
-
Submarines, and
- Aircraft carriers.
A
modernization approach for these systems that is based on the
foregoing guidelines would minimize the threat to U.S. interests
and ensure that America's armed forces are well-prepared to defend
those interests in the future.
Tactical Fighters
The poor condition and age of America's fighter force, the
proliferation of modern tactical aircraft, and the development of
modern air defenses that can counter U.S. capabilities undermine
U.S. tactical air superiority. The United States should focus on
modernizing this capability in the near term. To do so, however, it
must realize that it may one day face adversaries who have acquired
better air defenses to detect America's stealth planes, anti-ship
cruise missiles to target its aircraft carriers, and innovative
systems to deny access to the forward-basing areas from which the
United States could launch its tactical aircraft. Such developments
would seriously undermine America's reliance on tactical fighters.
The Bush Administration will need to decide how much to invest in
modernizing the tactical air fleet and how much to dedicate to
developing revolutionary capabilities that would not have the same
limitations.
The
guiding principle in this decision-making process should be:
Modernization must not sacrifice near-term capabilities for
long-term needs. Modernizing the tactical fighter force will
involve near- and long-term funding requirements. Funding should
focus first on meeting near-term requirements, but ignoring the
tactical fleet's longer-term needs at the same time could put U.S.
military forces at great risk. Rather than spending $300 million
over the next 30 years on 4,000 tactical aircraft as planned, the
Pentagon should diversify its air-to-ground strike options. It
should procure enough tactical aircraft over the next 10 years to
ensure a modern force, similar in size to today's, to meet
near-term threats. But it should minimize purchases of aircraft
that only marginally improve current capabilities and instead
invest in developing a reliable unmanned combat aerial vehicle
(UCAV) that could enter the force around 2010.
Beyond that date, the U.S. Air Force and
Navy should gradually reduce purchases of manned aircraft and
redirect funds to procure UCAVs consistent with technological
feasibility. The requirement to conduct air-to-ground strike
missions by tactical aircraft also should be augmented by
long-range conventional missiles.
By
2020, the U.S. force should rely not on 1970s-era tactical
aircraft, but on modern manned tactical aircraft, unmanned combat
vehicles, and long-range precision strike missiles.
Armored Combat Vehicles
Between 1975 and 1990, the United States annually
purchased an average of 2,083 large, heavy armored combat vehicles.
Between 1991 and 2000, the annual average dropped to 145. Consequently, the
United States now depends on an aging armored force--a force
designed to defeat the Soviet Union--to conduct 21st century land
combat. While the Army has begun to modernize this force to meet
the contingencies of the new battlefield, most of its activities
over the past decade have been in operations other than war,
including humanitarian interventions.
This
commitment to non-combat operations is now reflected in the Army's
modernization strategy, the "Army Transformation." The 2001 posture
statement asserts that the Army must better cope with the "full
spectrum of operations" beyond "conventional warfighting"--which is
a response to such commitments as the "implementation of the Dayton
Peace Accords," "activities in Haiti," and "support[ing] the
[Kosovo] peacekeeping process."
To
fulfill this mission, the Army plans to develop a new system, which
it refers to as the "Future Combat System" (FCS), to replace its
heavy armored vehicles with lighter and more mobile vehicles that
are increasingly lethal and equally durable. The problem is that
achieving this capability is not technologically feasible in the
near term. To cope with the full spectrum of operations beyond
conventional warfighting before the FCS is ready, the Army plans to
purchase interim armored vehicles that are more mobile than today's
armored vehicle but less lethal, less durable, and less conducive
to warfighting. While the Army is positioning itself to conduct a
variety of missions, however, it is also getting farther away from
assuring that it can fulfill its most important mission--to fight
and win wars.
For
the Bush Administration, the guiding principle is simple:
Modernization must focus on war-fighting, not peacemaking or
peacekeeping. The Army should refocus its transformation
strategy on war-fighting. It should reevaluate its plan to purchase
2,131 IAVs (at a cost of around $4 billion over the next six years)
and reduce the buy significantly. Spending such money to facilitate
a commitment to non-combat operations will do little to enhance the
Army's warfighting capabilities. Instead, the Army should
rededicate excess funds to accelerated development of the FCS so
that it can be brought into force before the planned deployment
date of between 2015 and 2025. The FCS program should be optimized
for warfighting requirements. Meanwhile, the Army should increase
the utility of its existing armored platforms, such as Abrams
tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers,
to extend their lifetimes.
Long-Range Bombers
One of the emerging dangers facing the United States is an
enemy that uses asymmetric means to challenge America's access to
forward-basing areas and hold regional combat assets at risk.
Modern, long-range bombers are vital in this environment because of
their ability to strike high-priority targets like air defense
batteries, command-and-control infrastructure, and missile
batteries without regard to asymmetric threats.
America's bomber force, however, is
already too old. It consists of 76 1950s-era B-52s, 93 aging B-1s,
and only 21 modern B-2s. The Air Force does not plan to purchase a
new bomber until 2037, by which time the
B-52 will be nearly 90 years old and many new threats will have
materialized. The Air Force needs a bomber modernization strategy
to preserve America's competitive advantage by addressing these
threats.
The
guiding principle in dealing with this problem should be:
Modernization must secure a competitive advantage for the United
States over its current and potential adversaries. The United
States now focuses bomber modernization dollars on programs that
extend the bombers' life spans. This is inadequate if the goal is
to maintain America's superiority over its potential adversaries,
given the bombers' limitations and the emergence of new threats. A
better near-term strategy would be to develop an advanced
air-launched cruise missile for use on the aging bomber force. This
would increase the utility of America's highly visible and thus
vulnerable bombers by allowing them to target locations from more
distant, safer locations.
At
the same time, the Air Force should begin phasing out the B-52 and
replacing it with the B-2. By 2015, only the best-conditioned B-52s
should remain in the fleet. Phasing in the B-2 as the primary
long-range conventional bomber over the next 15 years would give
the United States a competitive advantage over potential
adversaries well into the next decade.
Additionally, the United States must begin
to invest in new technologies that could be introduced into the
force around 2020 as the B-1 reaches the end of its service life
and potential enemies become more technologically sophisticated.
Research and development should focus on two new capabilities: an
unmanned intercontinental range bomber and a multi-purpose space
plane for bombing missions and space control.
Submarines
The nuclear-powered "attack" submarine (the SSN) is
America's premier advanced technology and a multi-mission weapons
platform. Though many of America's adversaries are gaining access
to modern submarine technology, advanced reconnaissance
capabilities, satellites, precision munitions, and ballistic and
cruise missiles, none currently has the ability to detect these
submarines or defend against them. Furthermore, the
submarine is impervious to any of the asymmetric threats described
above.
Consequently, the SSN is an essential
weapon with which to engage enemy submarines and surface ships in
war, deliver cruise missiles with pinpoint accuracy, collect
essential intelligence in strategic regions, and show the flag in
ports around the world. Its effectiveness in diverse situations and
its long-term durability are what make it one of the most efficient
weapons systems in the U.S. arsenal.
The
submarine fleet, however, is aging and in danger of shrinking
because not enough sub-marines are being bought to replace those
leaving the fleet. The efficiency and effectiveness of the
submarine makes its modernization both strategically imperative and
fiscally responsible.
The
guiding principle for the Administration in this case is:
Modernization should balance efficiency with capability. The
SSN maximizes both efficiency and capability, but since 1990, the
number of SSN attack submarines in the arsenal has fallen from 96
to 56. The Bush Administration should reverse this trend as a top
priority of modernization. The first step should be to refuel the
seven Los Angeles-class SSN submarines scheduled for
decommissioning before the end of their useful lives. This would
alleviate short-term pressure on the current fleet. At a cost of
$200 million per submarine, such refueling would add on average 12
additional years of service life to each sub.
Next, the Administration should provide
funding to increase production of the new Virginia-class
submarines. A substantial increase in procurement is necessary
because submarines that were built during the late 1970s and 1980s
will retire at the same rate at which they were put into service.
Thus, the Navy should plan to build two submarines per year until
2005, and then increase production to three to four submarines per
year until 2019. This accelerated production schedule would avert a
dramatic decline in fleet numbers in the 2020s.
Finally, the Administration should provide
funding to convert the four Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines
now scheduled for early decommissioning to conventional cruise
missile submarines. Each submarine could be armed
with 154 cruise missiles, advanced sensing and surveillance
equipment, and special operations capabilities--a unique
combination that makes the platform unparalleled in the Navy and
especially useful against an enemy that employs asymmetric threats.
The refueled and converted subs would last an additional 22 years
and would provide the first generation of a new underwater strike
platform to augment America's carrier-based forward presence around
the world.
Aircraft Carriers
The
United States depends on 12 aircraft carriers to maintain America's
global forward presence and to maximize its deterrence, crisis
response, and warfighting abilities. Additionally,
these carriers serve as joint command platforms in the worldwide
command-and-control network.
Potential U.S. adversaries are developing
methods to degrade the effectiveness of this force. For example,
they are developing and proliferating high-speed anti-ship cruise
missiles and making advances in sensing capabilities that will
place the carrier battlegroup at greater risk in the future.
Advances in air defenses are making the non-stealthy aircraft that
project power from the ship to the shore increasingly vulnerable.
Moreover, each carrier is expensive: In addition to an acquisition
cost of around $5 billion, a carrier's annual operating cost is
around $200 million, and its midlife modernization cost runs
between $2 billion and $3 billion.
For
the Administration, the guiding principle should be: Military
modernization must address the technologically and strategically
changing security environment. Although the aircraft carrier
will remain a fundamental part of America's forward presence and
power projection, the Navy should not rely solely on it for those
missions in the future. The strategically changing security
environment dictates that the Navy should develop a new, more
stealthy missile-intensive platform, such as an arsenal ship or
some sort of missile submarine, to augment the current fleet. A
submersible or semi-submersible platform would be able to operate
largely alone and thus avoid many of the threats that surface ships
face. It also would be far less expensive to operate.
To
diversify its power projection abilities, the Navy should introduce
the four converted Ohio-class submarines now scheduled for
decommissioning into the fleet, and then introduce the new platform
as soon as possible to share power projection and forward-presence
missions. These new systems would alleviate the Navy's need to
maintain 12 aircraft carriers. The number of platforms, operational
concepts for their use, and process of integration would be
determined as development of the new platform progresses.
The
Navy should continue production of the tenth Nimitz-class
carrier.Carriers that are
not Nimitz-class should be decommissioned as planned, with at least
10 carriers remaining operational through 2025. A fleet of up to 10
carriers should be maintained through 2032, depending on the
requirements.
CONCLUSION
The
U.S. armed forces must take full advantage of the emerging
revolution in military affairs that is yielding advanced weaponry
based on stealth, robotics, speed, precision, and
information-sharing technology. But weapons based on these
developments are not ready for deployment. In fact, many are still
designs on paper. Regrettably, the existing force is neither
prepared to defend U.S. territory nor to protect U.S. interests
abroad. Furthermore, operations other than war continue to place
further strain on the overly burdened and smaller forces.
The
Bush Administration must demand that significant investments are
made, both in modernizing today's force by procuring evolutionary
systems to handle near-term security risks and in the research,
development, and acquisition of revolutionary systems that will
enable America to maintain its superpower status into the
future.
A
successful modernization strategy will adhere to the core missions
of the U.S. military: to protect and defend Americans at home and
abroad; to deter aggression and defeat near-term threats; and to
ensure long-term combat effectiveness. Following principled
guidelines will help the Administration to determine a military
modernization strategy that will prepare the United States for an
uncertain future while keeping America and its interests secure
today.
Jack Spencer is
Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security in the Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The
Heritage Foundation.
Endnotes