The
nation's long-standing commitment to expanding homeownership
opportunities for all Americans is facing its most serious
challenge--a series of smart growth initiatives that are
effectively pricing most new homes beyond the reach of entry-level
buyers. These initiatives, which attempt to limit a community's
growth and development through such regulations as growth
boundaries, lower population densities, "downzoning," impact fees,
construction prohibitions, and land set-asides, all have the effect
of raising home prices in ways that have a disproportionately
negative effect on lower-income buyers. The result will be the
reversal of one of America's greatest public policy successes--a
historically high rate of homeownership.
Throughout U.S. history, most Americans
have lived as tenants, renting a room, apartment, shack, farm, or
house from a landlord. Up until the eve of World War II, America's
homeownership rate never exceeded 50 percent. And as a result of a
decade-long economic depression during the 1930s, the homeownership
rate in 1940 stood at 43.6 percent, several percentage points lower
than it had been in 1890. (See Chart 1.)
The
federal government made its first formal commitment to the goal of
encouraging homeownership in 1934, when Congress enacted the
National Housing Act establishing the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), which in turn created FHA-insured mortgages.
The purpose of the act was to aid in the recovery of the private
housing industry by reducing the financial risk of investing in
mortgages and by encouraging the adoption of a new type of mortgage
instrument--the fixed rate, long-term, level-payment, and fully
amortized mortgage.

Although the FHA was unable to revive the
Depression-ravaged homebuilding industry during the 1930s, its
innovative mortgage instrument became popular among those few who
were buying homes during the Great Depression and the war. Between
1936 and 1940, the FHA's share of new housing starts was 31
percent, which rose to 43 percent during World War II. After the
war, innovations pioneered by FHA were adopted by most mortgage
lenders, and in 1944 these changes were incorporated into the newly
authorized Veterans Administration (VA) guaranteed mortgages that
were offered to veterans under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of
1944 (P.L. 78-346).
The
consequence of these innovations, combined with rising postwar
prosperity, was to push America's homeownership rate to a record 55
percent in 1950. Chart 1 shows that the rate went above 60 percent
in 1960 and since then has been inching its way higher to new
records, reaching 67.7 percent in the third quarter of 2000.
Regionally, homeownership exceeds 70 percent in the Midwest and is
almost that high in the South.
This
great success, however, is now at risk because of poorly conceived
"smart growth" strategies that raise housing costs and diminish
homeownership opportunities among modest-income households.
THE BENEFITS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP
Quality and Quantity of Housing.
America's commitment to homeownership and to the competitive
markets in property, land development, construction, finance, and
insurance has allowed its citizens to become the best housed people
on earth. (See Appendix A.). According to data compiled by the
United Nations and the U.S. Department of Energy, the typical
American occupies a housing unit with an average of 718 square feet
per person nationwide, and as much as 738 square feet in a
prosperous metropolitan area like Washington, D.C. These estimates
compare with almost 544 square feet in Australia (Melbourne), the
runner-up in the U.N. survey. Norway (Oslo) is next with 452 square
feet, just ahead of Canada (Toronto) with 442 square feet. To put
these international differences in perspective, America's poor
families occupy housing units providing 440 square feet per person
(320 square feet in apartments), while the average household in
Great Britain (London) gets by with just 343 square feet, the
typical Dutch household (Amsterdam) has 256 square feet per unit,
and the Japanese (Tokyo) make do with just 170 square feet.
Wealth Creation.
Homeownership offers families the opportunity to accumulate
substantial wealth over their lifetimes. As monthly mortgage
payments reduce the debt on the home and as its value rises over
time, homeowners generally experience an increase in the value of
their equity--the difference between what their house would sell
for and the amount of debt they still owe on the mortgage. Counting
both value of the home and all other assets, including financial
assets, the median net worth of the American homeowner in 1998 was
$132,100, compared with only $4,200 for renters, who make up about
one-third of households. Although differences in age
and income explain some of the differences in wealth between
renters and owners, much of the wealth held by homeowners,
particularly those who have annual household incomes below $50,000,
is in the form of home equity.

For homeowners with incomes between $20,000 and
$49,000, home equity accounts for 40 percent to 45 percent or more
of their net worth; and for households with incomes below $20,000,
it accounts for as much as 65 percent of net worth. (See Chart
2.) For households with incomes in excess of $100,000, home equity
makes up 16 percent of net wealth holdings. Significantly, this
concentration among households below $50,000 prevails in an
investment environment in which more and more choices are available
and in which record numbers of Americans are participating in
financial markets, either directly or through employer-provided
401(k) plans.
Social Stability and Civil
Society.
Advocates of greater homeownership have long argued that high rates
of homeownership contribute to political and social stability and
civic responsibility. Because they own property, homeowners are a
more locationally permanent group than are renters, and this
greater sense of permanence induces them to focus more on the
longer-term implications of their actions as well as those of their
neighbors and political leaders. Robert C. Weaver, the first
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), best summarized this view when he noted that "To own one's
home is to have a sense of place and purpose. Homeownership creates
a pride of possession, engenders responsibility and stability." In
addition, a number of academic studies in the field of criminology
report a measurable linkage between the absence of a relatively
permanent place of residence and a propensity toward criminal
behavior. (See text box, "Influence of Residence Stability on
Criminality.")
Ownership of such valuable property
encourages households to take care of their homes, invest in them,
and ensure their safety because the house embodies a significant
portion of their personal wealth and savings. Any personal neglect
or social instability that would diminish the value of the property
infringes directly on the household's financial well-being.
Similarly, homeowners have a powerful
interest in how their surroundings affect their property and
quality of life. In turn, this interest in the external environment
contributes to a sense of community and civic spirit that is
considerably greater than critics of the owner-occupied suburbs are
willing to admit. President Lyndon Johnson spoke of these linkages
in submitting housing legislation to Congress in 1968:

Owning a home can increase responsibility and
stake out a man's place in his community. The man who owns a home
has something to be proud of and good reason to protect and
preserve it.
HOMEOWNERSHIP AT RISK
Historically, the greatest threat to
homeownership and the stability of the residential construction
industry have been the occasional recessions and periods of
financial market instability that often cause more harm to the
housing market than to most other sectors of the economy. Chart 1
and Table 2, for example, show that the Great Depression led to the
lowest homeownership rate (43.3 percent) since the U.S. Census
Bureau began measuring that rate in 1890. The rate reached about 62
percent in the late 1960s, after which frequent bouts of high
inflation, financial instability, and economic recessions kept it
from rising much higher until 1995. From then on, stable financial
markets, low inflation, and one of the strongest economic
expansions in U.S. history pushed the rate above 65 percent for the
first time, and ultimately to nearly 67 percent in 1999 and over 67
percent through mid-2000.
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Influence of Residence Stability on
Criminality
David Muhlhausen
Criminology studies have tested measures of "residence
stability" on criminal behavior. Several studies have found that
unstable living arrangements contribute to criminality, although
that factor is not one of the strongest predictors compared with
other factors.
Juvenile Delinquency.
A 1995 study of Seattle youth found that the number of residence
changes in the prior year for 16-year-olds predicted violent
behavior (self-reported) by age 18.1
In fact, residential instability more than doubled the risk of
violence by age 18 for youths in the study.2 This finding suggests that residential
instability can disrupt the bonds that youth form with their
schools and neighborhoods.3
Recidivism.
Edward Zamble and Vernon L. Quinsey, professors of psychology and
psychiatry at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, studied the
rate of recidivism of Canadian offenders.4 They found significantly different lengths
of time living in the same place between recidivists and
non-recidivists. The longest mean time lived in the same place for
recidivists was 27.2 months, compared with 62.6 months for
non-recidivists.5 Moreover, 25.8
percent of recidivists lived in the same place for less than six
months, compared with 8.6 percent of non-recidivists.6
Pretrial Release.
According to criminologists, one of the factors that bail bondsmen
use to determine whether a person is a flight risk is stability of
residence in the community.7 Social
maturation, considered one of the best predictors of court
appearance,8 includes being married,
living with a spouse, age, owning one's home, and having utilities
in one's own name. Homeownership and having utilities in one's
name, however, were weaker predictors than being married, living
with a spouse, and age.9
Sentencing Guidelines.
Joan Petersilia, professor of criminology at the University of
California at Irvine, and Susan Turner, Director of the Sentencing
and Corrections Center at the RAND Corporation, have found that an
offender's number of address changes in the past year is frequently
a factor used in determining sentence length under the sentencing
guidelines used by state judges.10
1. J. David Hawkins, Todd
Herrenkohl, David P. Farrington, Devon Brewer, Richard F. Catalano,
and Tracy W. Harachi, "A Review of Predictors of Youth Violence,"
p. 137, in Rolf Loeber and David P. Farrington, eds., Serious
and Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk Factors and Successful
Interventions (London: Sage Publications, 1998). Hawkins et al.
cite E. Maguin, J. D. Hawkins, R. F. Catalano, R. F. K. Hill, R.
Abott, and T. Herrenkohl, Risk Factors Measured at Three Ages
for Violence at Age 17-18, paper presented at the American
Society of Criminology, Boston.
2. Hawkins et al., "A Review of
Predictors of Youth Violence," pp. 143-144.
3. Ibid., p. 137.
4. Edward Zamble and Vernon L. Quinsey,
The Criminal Recidivism Process (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), p. 71.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Daniel Glaser, "Classification for
Risk," in Don M. Gottrefson and Michael Tonry, eds., Prediction
and Classification: Criminal Justice Decision Making (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 269-270.
8. Ibid., p. 270. Glaser cites
Marq R. Ozanne, Robert A. Wilson, and Dewaine L. Gedney, Jr.,
"Towards a Theory of Bail Risk," Criminology, Vol. 18
(1980), pp. 147-161.
9. Glaser, "Classification for Risk,"
p.
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Although federal policymakers during the
1990s have had considerable success dampening the cycles of
economic instability that often deterred homeownership in the past,
this success story is threatened by the smart growth initiative
that is taking hold in several states and many communities. Though
smart growth strategies vary significantly across the country and
among their advocates, at their core is the goal of preventing or
slowing suburban sprawl by limiting the amount of raw land--usually
found on the ex-urban fringe of most metropolitan areas--that is
available for new construction.
Recognizing that a growing population will
need a steady flow of new housing units each year, some smart
growth advocates seek to direct new construction into higher
density developments using a fraction of the land area typically
used by current housing patterns, which are characterized by
single-family detached houses on lots of one-eighth to one-quarter
of an acre or more. Other, more extreme growth control advocates
want to discourage any growth at all, regardless of density, and
promote strategies that discourage or limit new construction.

Policies typically adopted by those wanting to
guide growth into more compact forms usually involve a growth
boundary and/or zoning requirements that rigidly define where
growth may and may not occur, and often mandate smaller lot sizes.
By restricting the amount of land available for development,
growth-guiding policies indirectly raise the price of homes
by rationing the supply of raw land. Policies designed to reduce or
discourage growth, by comparison, generally involve techniques and
approaches that directly raise the price of new housing
through a variety of mechanisms, such as minimum lot sizes, impact
fees, or mandated amenities.
By
raising home prices, such policies force families of modest means
into smaller units, as is the case with growth policies that
emphasize guidance, or out of a community altogether, as is the
case with policies designed to slow or stop growth. In either case,
the burden is borne largely by entry-level homebuyers and other
families with low to moderate incomes who are priced out of the
homeownership market. To the extent that such growth control
policies become more commonplace across America, the rate of
homeownership will fall from its current levels as more and more
moderate-income households are forced into the rental market.
GROWTH BOUNDARIES IN PORTLAND, OREGON: A
CASE STUDY
Portland, Oregon, offers an excellent case
study of how a well-meaning but poorly conceived growth control
policy can diminish housing affordability. A 1974 state law
mandated that all Oregon communities above a certain size establish
growth boundaries to guide future real estate development. In its
simplest form, a growth boundary is a line drawn around a
metropolitan area at some distance from the edge of the developed
fringe, incorporating much of the existing development as well as
contiguous undeveloped land. The boundary delineates where new
construction may occur (generally within the boundary) and may not
occur (generally outside the boundary line). The purposes of such
boundaries are to confine new development to land that is close to
existing development and public infrastructure, to increase the
average density of the developed portion of the region, and to
preserve undeveloped land--including farmland--outside the
boundary.
In
1979, in response to this mandate, Portland and all of Oregon's
other incorporated cities imposed rigid growth boundaries around
their communities or metropolitan areas. When drawn decades ago,
these boundaries included substantial areas of undeveloped land;
but by the early 1990s, much of this land had been built upon, and
the boundaries began to impose a significant constraint on the
amount of land available for new construction. As a consequence,
land prices soared, and developers and builders attempted to
maintain affordability by offering new homes on smaller lots. Their
efforts to hold the line on price were only partially successful,
however. Portland's home prices raced ahead of the national average
during the mid- to late-1990s. Not surprisingly, over the same
period, homeownership rates in Portland bucked national trends by
actually declining, compared with the rise to record levels that
had occurred nationwide. (See Chart 3.)

The costliness of a community's housing prices
compared to regional incomes can be captured in the Housing
Opportunity Index, a measure of regional affordability calculated
by the National Association of Homebuilders from U.S. government
and private survey data. The index for the nation
and for any community is derived by calculating the percentage of
homes sold in a community that the median-income household in that
community would find affordable. An opportunity index of 50, for
example, means that 50 percent of the houses recently sold in a
community could have been purchased by that community's
median-income household. In contrast, an index of 30 implies that
only 30 percent of homes sold were affordable to the median-income
household, meaning that 70 percent were beyond that household's
purchasing power. The higher the index, the greater the
affordability or homebuying opportunity for the typical household
in that region or community. (See Appendix B.12 )
In
1991, Portland was one of the most affordable communities, with a
housing opportunity index of 68.3; but by late 2000, it had become
one of the least affordable: Its opportunity index had plunged to
27.6. (See Chart 4.) Indeed, over a period in which affordability
nationwide was rising, Portland's fell faster and farther than that
of the other 79 large metropolitan areas. By comparison, the
average housing opportunity index for the top 80 metropolitan areas
nationwide was 60.0 in 2000, more than twice as favorable as
Portland's measure that year. (See Chart 5.)

Between 1991 and 2000,
Portland's opportunity index declined by 59.6 percent, compared
with an increase in homeownership opportunity of 5.4 percent in all
major metropolitan areas over the same period. By 2000, only four
other large metropolitan areas were less affordable relative to
community income levels: San Diego, San Francisco, Oakland, and San
Jose--all in California and all with housing markets encumbered by
a variety of government-imposed "smart" growth control measures
going back to the mid-1970s on a county-by-county basis.
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Are Other Factors Influencing Portland Home
Prices?1
Defenders of Portland's growth boundary acknowledge its
escalating home prices over the 1990s, but they argue that they
stem from faster income growth, population increases, a West Coast
location, and the willingness of residents to pay more for the
higher quality of life that the growth-limiting policies allegedly
provide. Some claim the higher prices stem from Portland's
relatively greater prosperity and rising household incomes, but
this is a tough case to make. Portland's increase in median
household income is below the average for 80 metropolitan areas
with populations exceeding 500,000. Among those 13 metropolitan
areas that experienced rates of increase in household incomes
similar to Portland's during the 1990s, housing affordability
increased by 14.5 percent, while Portland's declined by 59.6
percent.
An equally tough case to make is that Portland's escalating home
prices are due to faster population growth, which in fact was
higher than the average for the 80 cities surveyed. Compared with
trends in other fast-growing cities, however, population growth
does not appear to have had a discernible impact on prices in any
of the other fast-growing metro areas. Portland's annual average
population growth of 2.31 percent during the 1990s was less than
the average of 3.33 percent for seven metropolitan areas that had a
faster population growth. Yet, despite the higher rate of growth in
these seven areas, their housing became more affordable on
average, not less. In contrast to Portland's nearly 60 percent
decline in affordability, homeownership affordability
increased an average of 15.6 percent in the faster growing
metropolitan areas, reflecting an increase in affordability in four
of the seven.
In Las Vegas, with an average annual rate of population growth
of 5.63 percent, affordability increased 34.5 percent, while
Phoenix's population growth of 3.43 percent per annum coincided
with a 4 percent increase in affordability. Among the seven fastest
growing urban areas, only Austin, Orlando, and Raleigh-Durham
experienced a decline in affordability, and Austin's decline was
less than half as great as Portland's, while Raleigh-Durham's fell
by only one-half of 1 percent and therefore is probably not
statistically significant.
Another factor often raised to explain Portland's high housing
costs is a historic propensity for high home prices on the West
Coast, particularly in California, where home prices in major
metropolitan areas frequently lead the nation. However, as can be
derived from Appendix B, western urban areas excluding Portland
averaged an increase in affordability of 9.4 percent during the
1990s, compared with Portland's fall of 59.6 percent.
Adding to the evidence that Portland's growth boundary has
contributed to its rising home prices is the experience of Oregon's
other major cities. All incorporated cities, regardless of size,
were required by the state to impose growth boundaries. In cities
where data are available, housing affordability plummeted during
the 1990s-by 65.2 percent in Eugene (worse than Portland) and 49.4
percent in Salem.
Typical of efforts to exonerate Portland's growth boundary is a
recent report by Arthur C. Nelson, a professor of planning at
Georgia Tech.2 Nelson argues that
Portland's land rationing policies have not led to reduced housing
affordability. He compares smart growth Portland with more
laissez faire Atlanta and finds, as do virtually all other
researchers, that from the middle 1980s to the middle 1990s,
average house prices increased at a substantially greater rate in
Portland. But he also contends that the percentage of income spent
by the average homeowner in both areas remained constant,
suggesting that housing is equally affordable when adjusted for
income differences as the housing opportunity index also attempts
to do.
There are two problems with Nelson's approach to relating income
to home prices. The first is that the period studied by Nelson does
not conform to the period during which Portland's urban growth
boundary began seriously to impede the supply of developable land
and limit competition among builders. It was during the middle
1990s that Metro (Portland's land use agency) adopted policies
virtually stopping expansion within the urban growth boundary and
beginning a more restrictive period of land rationing. Had his
analysis been confined to a more meaningful period of time when
land became scarce, Nelson's findings might have been very
different. Second, Nelson's analysis compares all homeowners,
including those who purchased their houses many years before when
Portland home prices were very affordable. (See Chart 4 and
Appendix B.) As a result, Nelson's analysis, in contrast to the
Housing Opportunity Index data used in this report, tells more
about the Portland of the past than the Portland of today.
1. For a more comprehensive review of
these factors, see Wendell Cox, "Amendment 24: Pulling Up the Home
Affordability Ladder & Risking Higher Taxes," Independence
Institute Issue Paper No. 9--2000, October 26, 2000.
2. See http://www.edd-apa.org/archives/1099A1.htm
.
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Confronted with evidence of escalating
home prices, many defenders of the Portland growth control measures
argue that the area's rising home costs are caused by a booming
economy and an influx of residents attracted to the unique quality
of life that the growth boundary creates. But other cities
experiencing the same or stronger population growth trends, such as
Atlanta and Seattle, were able to accommodate these successes while
also experiencing a rise in their affordability index. (See text
box, "Are Other Factors Influencing Portland Home Prices?")
Not
surprisingly, diminishing measures of housing affordability have
led to declining rates of homeownership in the Portland area, from
67.1 percent in 1991 to 60.9 percent in 1999, making Portland one
of just seven (out of 61) metropolitan areas for which such data
are available to run against the national tide by experiencing a
statistically significant decline in homeownership.Chart 3
compares Portland's homeownership rate with national trends and
also with Atlanta, a metropolitan area that has experienced even
faster rates of economic and population growth than Portland but with
rising measures of housing affordability (Atlanta's housing
opportunity index improved from 66.7 to 68.7 between 1991 and 2000,
in contrast to Portland's reduced opportunity).
As a
result of favorable cost and income trends, Atlanta's homeownership
rate soared from below the national average to above it within a
decade and a half, making it one of the nation's most accommodative
markets for homeownership. However, Atlanta may soon see diminished
opportunities as a result of misplaced efforts by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to force communities in the
Atlanta metropolitan area to adopt stringent restrictions on land
use and development to meet mandated federal air quality
standards. If the EPA prevails,
homeownership rates in Atlanta will likely decline, and families
with modest incomes will suffer first.
With
the exception of Portland and a few counties in California, growth
boundaries have rarely been imposed on American communities. In
general, notwithstanding the considerable discussion such
boundaries have generated in the media and in public policy
circles, efforts to impose them have met with considerable citizen
resistance. During the November 2000 election, referenda proposing
to impose growth boundaries in Colorado and Arizona went down to
defeat by margins of more than two to one, thereby offering a
powerful deterrent to further attempts to implement such boundaries
elsewhere.
Although the use of Portland-style growth
boundaries elsewhere is likely to be severely limited by citizen
opposition, other types of strict growth control limits--such as
impact fees and "downzoning"--have received broader public support.
Scores of communities across the country are implementing them.
IMPACT FEES
California imposed impact fees as a
mechanism to limit growth on a large scale in the late 1970s as a
way to get builders and/or new residents to help fund basic public
services that are thought to be burdened by an increase in
population. The approval of Proposition 13, which limited local
property taxes, in 1978 further encouraged the use of impact fees
as an alternative revenue source.
To
justify impact fees, proponents argue that growth does not "pay for
itself" and that new residents should be required to make an
up-front contribution to the additional public infrastructure--such
as schools, wastewater treatment, and roads--that they use.
Although these new residents will be taxed by the community at the
same level as existing residents, the critics of growth contend
that the additional tax revenues generated by these new households
would fall short of the net public cost that they impose on the
community and therefore would require an extra up-front fee to
compensate the community for the additional burden.
The
widespread perception that such burdens exist receives slim support
from public finance literature or from the few independent academic
studies of the subject that have been conducted. If sprawling low-density
development is more costly to government services than the higher
densities typically associated with older urban areas, one would
expect that sprawling suburban communities would have high tax
burdens while older communities with higher densities would have
low tax burdens. Significantly, however, in practice the opposite
generally holds. Sprawling suburbs have lower per capita tax
burdens than older closer-in suburbs, and both of these types of
suburbs generally have lower tax burdens than the dense central
core of the metropolitan area, where the basic public
infrastructure has long since been paid for and where the
population is often declining.
Nonetheless, and despite the availability
of any compelling evidence to support the contention that
low-density growth and development is more costly than
higher-density growth and development, many communities have
imposed impact fees on new homes to recoup some of the alleged
extra costs. Where imposed, such fees currently run from a few
thousand dollars to levies in excess of $20,000 per new house in
some fast-growing communities.
As
an attempt to recoup whatever growth-related costs may exist,
impact fees are remarkably inefficient and inequitable. For buyers
of new homes, they amount to double taxation because payment of the
fee does not exempt the new homeowner from his or her share of
property, income, and/or sales taxes that communities levy to fund
basic public services, including their share of the community's
past, present, and future infrastructure investment.
In
addition to being an inequitable form of double taxation, impact
fees represent a highly regressive tax that imposes a
disproportionate burden on homeowners who buy newly constructed
homes, with the greatest burden falling on those who have the
lowest qualifying incomes. In contrast to the regressive nature of
most impact fees, the existing system of funding local public
infrastructure--through a property tax based on the assessed value
of a house--is more equitable because a property's value and its
owner's income tend to vary roughly in direct proportion to one
another. Thus, the current system better ensures that the burden of
funding community expenses is more equitably distributed in accord
with the ability to pay.

Raising the price of new homes by the amount of the
impact fee or some fraction thereof will cause the homeownership
income hurdle to be raised accordingly, and some families that
would otherwise qualify for the least expensive home will be
excluded from the market altogether. Table 3 and Table 4 illustrate
the effects of impact fees of $10,000 and $20,000 on prospective
buyers across a range of incomes and home prices that might
typically be found in most major metropolitan areas. The
relationships in the tables assume a 20 percent downpayment, a 7.5
percent interest rate, a fixed rate/level payment mortgage, and an
income requirement that limits the monthly payment of interest,
principle, taxes, and insurance to no more than 28 percent of gross
monthly income if the buyer has no other debt obligations. The
analysis also assumes that the household is buying as much house as
it can afford.
As
the tables reveal, households with incomes that just qualify them
for the least expensive new home confront the equivalent of a
one-time tax equal to 33.1 percent of their income when the impact
fee is $10,000 but 66.2 percent of their income if the fee is as
high as $20,000. Of course, households at this income level will
never get to pay that tax because the impact fee prices the low-end
buyer out of the new house market altogether. By raising the price
of the home, the impact fee raises the monthly mortgage payment at
the entry level by almost 8 percent if a $10,000 fee is charged or
16 percent if a $20,000 fee is assessed. As a result of the
increase in the monthly mortgage payment, the income needed to buy
the entry-level new house rises from $30,215 to $32,612, or to
$35,009 if the fee is $20,000. Nationwide, a $20,000 fee would
price 5.84 million households out of the market for this
entry-level house.
Table 3 and Table 4 also reveal that the
regressive nature of impact fees leads them to impose a
disproportionately modest diminution on housing affordability for
higher-income households. For the richest income group in Table 3
and Table 4, the monthly payment rises by only 1.6 percent, or 3.2
percent for the higher fee. Consequently, moderate-income
households largely bear the burden of any growth control scheme
that relies on a substantial impact fee or any similar mechanism
that raises new home prices.
In
addition to their regressivity and tendency toward double taxation,
the incidence of impact fees is highly random and thus inequitable
for reasons other than regressivity. Although applicable only to
new homes under the presumption that this is the best way to tax
new entrants to a community, in practice it does no such thing. New
entrants to a community who purchase an existing home or rent an
existing apartment or house would not be charged the fee, even
though they would be using the community's infrastructure and
public services to the same extent as a new homebuyer. On average,
one-third of households are renters, and five of every six home
sales involve an existing house; therefore, an impact fee added to
the price of a new home will capture only a small fraction of new
entrants, and most will escape it altogether.
One
particularly bizarre effect of such fees is the burden they impose
on new homebuyers who are also long-standing taxpaying residents of
the community. For them, an impact fee amounts to triple taxation
because they are being charged to use infrastructure that their
past tax payments helped finance.
For
these reasons, including their profoundly regressive nature, impact
fees levied on new homes in an effort to fund whatever additional
costs new entrants are believed to impose on a community have a
variety of defects. These types of fees are erratically targeted,
randomly burdensome even to existing residents, and applicable to a
fraction of the new residents who may or may not impose financial
burdens on a community beyond what they would normally pay in
existing local, state, and federal taxes.
Despite these manifest deficiencies,
impact fees are becoming increasingly popular as a growth control
mechanism, largely because these inequities discourage some
potential homebuyers from moving into a community. By discouraging
new homebuyers, particularly those with modest incomes (who
outnumber those with high incomes), communities can limit their
population growth through explicit impact fees that act as implicit
admission fees.

Such efforts at exclusion by income are becoming
increasingly creative, and some communities are supplementing their
impact fees (or mandatory proffers) with other costly mechanisms.
For example, some communities have even begun to require specific
high-priced amenities on new homes to discourage growth even
further. Stafford County, Virginia, an exurb of Washington, D.C.,
whose population grew by 50 percent during the 1990s, has added to
its $20,000 fee per detached new house the requirements that all
lawns be sodded rather than seeded and that all new subdivisions
have sidewalks. Local builders estimate that these requirements
will add another $6,000 to $7,000 to the price of a new detached
home over and above the $20,000 impact fee already levied.
DOWNZONING
With
the courts disinclined to interfere with most government decisions
regarding restrictions on land use, more and more communities are
choosing to use existing statutory powers to rezone land in order
to implement restrictions on the growth of residential housing. One
form of rezoning that has become a popular way to deter growth is
called "downzoning" and is either used in lieu of impact fees or
combined with them. Typically, downzoning involves reducing the
maximum density--usually expressed as housing units per acre--on a
parcel of undeveloped land.
For
example, a parcel of land that may have been zoned to allow for the
construction of up to four houses per acre (or one house per
quarter-acre lot, the minimum lot size permitted) might be rezoned
to permit only one house per acre or one house per five acres.
Parts of Prince William County, Virginia, now have maximum
densities of one house per 10 acres, while the rural parts of
Loudon County, Virginia, are limited to one house per 25 acres.
Both counties are on the fast-growing exurban fringe of the
Washington metropolitan area, and both have implemented a variety
of regulatory impediments to slow population growth.
Limiting new construction to lots that are
much larger than previously required means that new homes in the
community will cost more; all prospective homebuyers will be
required to purchase larger lots than they might otherwise have
wanted, and this will raise home prices by the cost of the
additional land. If, for example, an acre of undeveloped land in a
community sells for $100,000, the land cost associated with homes
built on quarter-acre lots would be only $25,000; and if a
four-bedroom home costs $100,000 to construct, the price of the
home and land would be $125,000 plus the builder's mark-up and
other non-building expenses. But if the minimum lot size is
increased to one acre, the cost of that four-bedroom house and lot
will now be $200,000, or 60 percent higher. Using the
income-to-home-price rules of Table 3 and Table 4, the minimum
income required to buy that four-bedroom house (at cost) rises from
$37,750 on a quarter-acre lot to $60,400 when a full-acre lot is
required. Under this example, an estimated 22.2 million American
households would be priced out of the new homebuying market.
In
practice, however, an acre of land downzoned from four houses per
acre to only one is likely to fall in value as a result of the more
limited market for larger lots. Fewer prospective buyers can afford
that much land, and many who can might not be interested in owning
that much land because of the higher maintenance costs and tax
assessment. As a result of diminished marketability, land that
might sell for $100,000 per acre if zoned four houses per acre will
likely sell for less if its use is limited to a smaller fraction of
the homebuying market. In the event that its value falls to, say,
$60,000, the owner of the land has suffered a financial
loss--$40,000 per acre in this example--as a consequence of the
downzoning.
Some
legal experts consider such downzonings a "taking," a legal term
that describes government confiscation of property or the value
thereof as a result of some regulatory or other action, such as
invoking the powers of eminent domain. In the event of a taking,
the government is generally required to compensate property owners
for the loss of value caused by the government's action against
their property. The "Takings Clause" of the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution states that "nor shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation." It is interpreted by
property rights advocates as a broad constitutional protection for
private property. Despite the view held by many that the
Constitution requires compensation when loss of value stems from
regulatory change or other legal mechanisms, the courts have been
reluctant to rule in favor of property owners, except when the
government's actions have been sufficiently extreme as to reduce
the value of the affected property to zero or close to it.
Typical of the courts' reaction to a
drastic downzoning is a decision recently handed down by a Prince
William County, Virginia, Circuit Court judge. The judge upheld a
1998 decision by the Board of County Supervisors to reduce
significantly the number of houses that could be built on a
500-acre parcel owned by the same individuals for more than 40
years. The board's action was one of many recently taken to limit
growth in the county through application of a new comprehensive
plan that, among other changes, eliminates thousands of potential
homes from county planning maps and rezones nearly 100,000
undeveloped acres in another part of the county to no more than one
house per 10 acres.
The
parcel subject to court challenge originally was zoned (in 1958 and
again in 1991) for four homes per acre, but in 1998 the county
downzoned it to one house per acre, reducing by 75 percent the
number of houses that could be
built on the parcel. The owners sued, and after a three-day trial,
the judge ruled that although he considered the county's action
unfair, it was not unlawful.
Such
actions are by no means uncommon, and more and more communities are
altering their zoning rules to reduce the number of houses that
once would have been permitted; but while courts have been
reluctant to intervene on the side of the property owners, the
voters in some states are taking action on their own to protect
property rights. In Oregon, on November 7, 2000, voters approved a
referendum requiring the state to compensate property owners for
any loss of value due to a downzoning in allowable land uses. Although a
state appeals court judge issued a temporary injunction barring the
initiative's implementation, its endorsement by the voters of a
state that has some of the nation's most coercive growth controls
suggests that there are limits to the public's forbearance and that
a backlash may be brewing.
CLOSING OFF HOMEOWNERSHIP OPPORTUNITY
Although the emphasis in this analysis has
been on the general loss of opportunity for entry-level homebuyers,
the specificity of the data available from the U.S. Bureau of the
Census can help to identify which segments of the U.S. population
are most likely to be affected by growth control measures that
impair homeownership affordability. Obviously, the nearly 68
percent of American households who already own their own homes are
least likely to be affected; and to the extent that such growth
controls raise home prices, existing homeowners will benefit from
the boost such price escalation will provide to the value of their
home's equity.
Those harmed, however, will be the
prospective owners, and this group is comprised disproportionately
of racial minorities and those with household incomes below the
median. As of the third quarter of 2000, 81.7 percent of households
with incomes at or above the median income were homeowners, whereas
only 52.2 percent of those with incomes below the median owned
their own homes. Households with incomes
below the median--who are already underrepresented as
homeowners--will bear the brunt of any smart growth strategy that
relies on higher home prices to curb growth.
Racial minorities have quite a bit of
ground to cover before they even come close to achieving
Reform Federal Programs
A
good starting point for reform is federal programs--many of which
were implemented during the Clinton Administration--that promote
coercive smart growth strategies for reluctant communities. Both
Congress and the Bush Administration should review the activities
of executive branch departments and eliminate programs that
undermine property rights and market-based solutions. Agencies
recently exhibiting coercive anti-growth strategies include the
EPA, the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the Department of
Justice.
The
EPA has been the worst offender. It has used its enforcement powers
under the Clean Air Act to force some communities to limit
road-building and to channel future growth into high-density forms
of residential housing even though all evidence indicates that
dense development yields dirtier air. Atlanta's failure to meet
the EPA's air quality goals led the agency in 1998 to threaten to
withhold all federal funds from communities in the Atlanta
metropolitan area until a density-promoting smart growth plan was
implemented. The EPA also contributes
funds to many anti-growth activist groups that work directly to
undermine property rights. For example, the EPA provided grants to
groups in Oregon that actively fought a referendum that would have
required the state to compensate property owners for any loss in
value as a result of a downzoning.
The
SBA, whose mission is to encourage small business formation and
entrepreneurs, was recently sued by environmental groups that
accuse it of helping to finance suburban businesses that contribute
to sprawl by dispersing business from central cities to emerging
suburbs. Although initially inclined to fight the suit, the SBA is
now negotiating with the plaintiff in an effort to find a
compromise that could lead the agency to consider formally the
impact on suburbanization when it decides whether to grant a loan
or loan guarantee to a small business.
The
Department of Justice in the past has aided anti-growth groups by
joining lawsuits they filed to discourage growth and limit property
rights. In 1994, for example, it joined with city and state
attorneys general in Oregon and several anti-property rights groups
to oppose the Dolan family's effort to be compensated for property
they were required to give up for a bicycle path in Tigard. The
case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, where Justice filed an amicus
brief and the U.S. Solicitor General participated in the oral
arguments against the family. The Supreme Court decided in favor of
the Dolans.
These are just a few of the instances in
which agencies of the federal government have worked to undermine
property rights and individual choice and have contributed to land
use restrictions that may have diminished homeownership
opportunities. Similar activities by these and other agencies
should be reviewed, and Congress and the President should:
- Insist that all agencies consider the
impact that their actions may have on property rights and related
activities, such as homeownership and business creation. It
makes little sense for the President to propose a new homeownership
initiative operated by HUD and focused on entry-level buyers if
counterproductive anti-growth actions by other agencies will negate
the effort, either in whole or in part.
Promote Creative State and Local
Solutions
State and local governments should refrain
from implementing coercive and costly growth control mechanisms
that limit freedom of choice and raise house prices beyond the
affordable range of the entry-level buyer. Mechanisms such as
growth boundaries, impact fees, downzoning, and regulatory mandates
on size, design, and amenities for new homes effectively slow
growth by limiting the number of people who can afford to live in a
community. These actions also discriminate against the less
well-to-do by pricing them out of the homeownership market. Rather
than merely continuing to perpetuate such counterproductive
policies, state and local governments should:
-
Encourage
flexibility in design. Instead of the coercive mechanisms that
many state and local governments have adopted, communities should
consider reforms and remedies that encourage flexible and creative
alternatives to traditional development patterns, harness the power
of the competitive market, and respect property rights and
individual choice.
A good starting
point for any community looking to improve future growth patterns
is its existing zoning code and land use plan. Notwithstanding the
popular perception that much past housing and commercial
development was unplanned and subject to the whimsical preferences
of rapacious developers, virtually all postwar real estate
development in America took place according to professionally
prepared land use plans that were adopted by each community. Such
plans were usually the product of formally trained and certified
land use professionals acting in accord with the best practices of
the day, working in close consultation with elected officials, and
with members of the public at large who often participated in the
process.
These traditional
land use plans were also very rigid and allowed for little
variation or creativity, or for changing tastes and preferences
that would occur over time. Ironically, one of the main casualties
of these inflexible plans are the innovative, smart growth
communities that many builders are offering in response to
public dissatisfaction with the status quo. Sometimes called "new
urbanist" and/or "enviro" communities, such designs use road grids,
minimal setbacks, lot sizes, and high densities, which existing
land use plans often forbid.
-
Focus on
better road designs that reduce congestion and improve
mobility. Such new urbanist designs also incorporate a mixture
of commercial and residential units, or at least place them close
to each other to allow for more convenient shopping and less use of
automobiles. Traditional American land use planning, in contrast,
requires rigid separation of retail-commercial and residential
zones, thereby encouraging, if not requiring, strip shopping
centers and other such retail concentrations that necessitate the
use of automobiles and travel for even the most basic shopping
needs.
While flexibility
in planning and zoning would have some effect in reducing auto use,
the impact would be modest, and the automobile would remain the
preferred and predominant mode of transportation for American
families. Therefore, the limited public resources available for
community transportation needs should not be wasted on costly
transit schemes that few will use. Instead, the state, local, and
federal governments should be prepared to accommodate America's
preference for the automobile with more thoughtful road design,
expansion, and construction that help reduce congestion and
facilitate mobility. Money wasted on expensive light rail
initiatives will encourage few motorists to give up their cars and
lead to underinvestment in roads, more congestion, and worse
pollution.
-
Find
innovative ways to preserve open space. One of the chief
reasons many people choose to live and work in more distant suburbs
is the access that such neighborhoods provide to a more natural
setting with greater privacy and open spaces. But as populations
increase, new developments frequently encroach on the farmland,
woods, and meadows that are (or were) a community's chief
attraction. In response, many existing residents seek to preserve
the rustic and rural nature of their communities by rezoning land
to extremely low densities (for example, one house per every 25 or
more acres) or by forbidding any growth, as is the case with some
growth boundaries. Such mechanisms infringe on property rights and
raise land (and therefore housing) costs.
A less coercive
alternative being implemented in many communities is to create a
land trust or some other public entity to acquire, own, and manage
strategically located undeveloped land at market prices and to hold
the land in perpetuity as a natural preserve, park, or
greenbelt-type buffer against future development. Under such
programs, communities agree to devote some portion of the public
budget (taxpayers' money) to land purchases and the creation of
more parks and preserves. A less expensive alternative adopted in
many communities is the purchase of development rights to
strategically located land, but not the land itself. This type of
exchange is used most often with farmland lying in the path of
encroaching residential development.
Recognizing that
farmers on the fringe of a metropolitan area often receive
lucrative offers for their land from developers, this approach
allows farmers to sell their development rights to the community
and continue farming. Once the development right is sold, the land
can be used only for farming unless the community is willing to
sell the development right back to the landowner. By selling
development rights, the farmer is able to benefit financially from
the enhanced value of his property but does not have to give up
farming to achieve it. The community, in turn, benefits from the
preservation of open space, diminished congestion, and lower
population densities.
CONCLUSION
These innovative proposals are but a few
of the policies that communities are adopting to maintain a high
quality of life in the face of accelerating development pressures.
Such strategies are proving more effective than the poorly
conceived smart growth policies that lead to escalating housing
prices and harm the people who need homeownership opportunities the
most--those with below-median household incomes and racial
minorities.
Governments can foster effective solutions
to sprawl-created problems by resisting demands to impose coercive
growth control policies and by clearing away the aging regulatory
impedimenta that often direct development into unattractive
patterns and directions. Potential solutions include purchasing
more park, woodland, and farmland to provide more greenspace and
improving transportation to facilitate mobility. Such strategies
would preserve freedom of choice, demonstrate government's respect
for property rights, and foster homeownership opportunities for
all.
--Wendell Cox, Principal of the Wendell
Cox Consultancy in St. Louis, Missouri, is a former Visiting
Fellow at The Heritage Foundation. Dr. Ronald D.
Utt, is Senior Research Fellow in the Thomas A. Roe
Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage
Foundation.


