Current U.S. policy toward Indonesia is designed to
promote political, economic, and military reform in that troubled
country, but finding sound policy prescriptions to accomplish these
goals has been difficult. Indonesia is the largest and the most
important country in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and a key to stability in the region. Despite U.S. aid and
international assistance, however, it is still undergoing the most
severe political, economic, and security crisis it has faced in the
past 40 years. Moreover, despite international attention and alarm,
the Indonesian military continues to abuse its power, undermining
democratic progress, economic development, and the rule of law.
Such
rhetoric is disingenuous: Indonesia is not about to disintegrate.
At the same time, however, its continued economic and political
turmoil prove that Jakarta's policies have failed. Washington
should avoid listening to myths and alarmist rhetoric about
Indonesia, and focus instead on the hard realities in order to
create a new U.S. policy that assists this important nation in
regaining stability and economic growth.
Myth #1: Indonesia is the world's third
largest "democracy."
One election does not make a democracy. Since its first free and
fair election in 1998, Indonesia has only begun its transition to
democracy; the full transition may not be complete even by the end
of this decade.
Examples of how far Indonesia must go are
widespread. The press, though reasonably open, is still subject to
violent intimidation from a variety of sources. The Alliance of
Independent Journalists reported 106 attacks against Indonesian
journalists last year alone. In the
current atmosphere of lawlessness and impunity, the frequently
violent attacks have come from the public, government officials,
and the police.
Moreover, government and military
activities in Indonesia are not transparent. Military "charitable
foundations," the principal source of income for the armed forces,
have not been satisfactorily audited. Corruption in the government
and the military is rampant. President Wahid has been censured
twice by the parliament for corruption. The Indonesian police still
jail people for the peaceful expression of political views that
differ from Jakarta's. Theys Eluay, president of the Papuan
Presidium, for example, was jailed simply for saying that West
Papua (Irian Jaya) should secede.
A
troubling development is that Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri,
who appears to be establishing herself to become the next
president, is reportedly in close contact with the military
generals, many of whom make no secret of their support. Relying on the
military to stabilize the presidential accession process would be a
blow to the country's nascent democracy.
Myth #2: If the provinces of Aceh and West
Papua (Irian Jaya) gain their independence, Indonesia will
disintegrate.
The domino theory does not apply to Indonesia. After East
Timor voted to secede from Indonesia in 1999, many political
analysts posited that if the rebellious provinces of Irian Jaya
and/or Aceh also were to break away, other provinces would follow,
desert Indonesia, and usher in the disintegration of the unitary
state.
That
end state is not a foregone conclusion. Without doubt, there are
very active independence movements in both Aceh and Irian Jaya; yet
these two provinces account for less than 10 million of Indonesia's
217 million people, and the other 200 million are not looking for
alternative homelands. Neither in Kalimantan nor in the Moluccas
islands, where sizeable outbreaks of communal violence have
occurred, are there important independence movements; almost all
sides of these disputes assert Indonesian citizenship. Thus, even
in the worst-case scenario in which Aceh and Irian Jaya seceded
from Indonesia, there is still a core population of 200 million
people who share a sense of national identity that would preserve
the integrity of the Indonesian state.
In
the words of Donald K. Emmerson, a Senior Fellow at Stanford
University, "The geographical and cultural patchwork of Indonesia
may shrink, but it is not about to unravel." Indonesia would
continue to exist even without Irian Jaya or Aceh, but the United
States should not inadvertently take steps that would encourage
their separation. U.S. policymakers should focus not on static
defense of personalities and territories, but on how to help
Indonesia though its economic and democratic transition.
Myth #3: Only the Indonesian military can
hold the country together.
The Indonesian National Army (TNI) is probably the country's most
hated institution. Although Indonesian army generals insist that
the military is the only Indonesian institution capable of holding
the country together, this runs counter
to the reality on the ground. The military wields power by virtue
of its arms, but every one of Indonesia's current security crises
is a manifestation of policies implemented by the government and
the military during the previous administrations and continued,
with little modification, by the present one.
For
example, the government's transmigration program, which encouraged
or forced migration from the island of Java to outer islands,
created the conditions for inter-communal conflicts in the Moluccas
islands and Borneo. Javanese migrants
were settled on land previously utilized by indigenous populations;
they were given government jobs and priority access to licenses and
permits that allowed their businesses to prosper. This marginalized
the indigenous populations of the outer islands, both politically
and economically. Decades of government neglect and military abuses
exploded, and they continue to feed the violence today.
Insurrections in Aceh and Irian Jaya,
which were present when Indonesia assumed control of those
provinces in 1950 and 1963, respectively, were aggravated by the
savage human rights abuses inflicted upon the people by the armed
forces. The movement of
additional troops to these trouble spots did little to improve
security.
In
fact, because of a gross lack of discipline and the propensity of
Indonesian soldiers and police to engage in illegal moneymaking
activities, security arguably has worsened since the TNI arrived.
Just this month, truck drivers in Aceh and North Sumatra went on
strike to protest ruinous extortion conducted by army battalions
deployed to their regions. New army units deployed to Aceh in April
to bring stability, for example, instead set up roadblocks to
extort bribes from the passing trucks. The strike brought
the Acehnese economy to a near standstill, with the prices of many
food products more than doubling.
In
short, far from being the institution best suited to bringing peace
and stability to Indonesia, the military is the institution least
likely to do so unless it undergoes serious reform and is made
responsive to civilian leadership.
Myth #4: The Indonesian military is
accountable to the civilian government.
Senior Indonesian army officers loudly declare their loyalty to the
civilian government, but they have failed to make the institutional
changes within the military and police forces to enshrine that
loyalty in law. Since President Wahid came to power 18 months ago,
there has been the appearance of reform in the security forces. The
national police were transferred out of the ministry of defense;
two civilians were appointed consecutively as defense ministers;
and a navy officer was appointed as commander in chief of the armed
forces--a position normally held by the powerful army.
In
Indonesia, however, the more things change, the more they remain
the same. Having taken these seemingly positive steps, Wahid then
created the position of Coordinating Minister for Political and
Security Affairs with responsibility over both the police and the
military. He then appointed an army general, Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, to fill this position, thereby effectively nullifying
his so-called reforms.
Not
a single member of Indonesia's military has been tried for crimes
that occurred in East Timor following the independence referendum
in August 1999. A still undetermined number of people--with
estimates running from the hundreds to the thousands--were killed,
and virtually the entire population was made homeless in September
1999 when the TNI burned down their houses.
Indonesia's generals are wrapped in a
self-made cocoon of patriotic rhetoric and legalistic arguments
that protect them from any accountability for their human rights
abuses or other crimes, and this legal impunity extends down the
entire chain of command, causing a gross disregard for discipline
throughout the ranks. Members of the TNI and police regularly
engage in competing criminal businesses, frequently resulting in
firefights over territory. In the inter-communal conflicts, the
soldiers and police often desert their units to fight on the other
side or sell guns to anyone who pays in cash. The TNI is the force
that is driving the country apart.
The
United States will not be able to avoid contact with the Indonesian
military, some of whom are bad actors. Many Indonesian
generals
in positions of authority have been indicted for or are suspected
of committing crimes against humanity. But while limited military
engagement with the TNI is necessary for promoting U.S. security
interests in the region, the program must be executed carefully
with an eye toward avoiding contacts with, or reinforcing the
importance of, officers indicted for or suspected of war
crimes.
THE REALITY: REFORM IN INDONESIA IS VITAL
TO SECURITY
Even though Indonesia is not about to disintegrate, the manifest
incompetence of the Indonesian government is such that, without
reform, the repercussions caused by its economic and security
policies could still be extremely serious.
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Indonesia is the world's fourth most
populous country.
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Its archipelago stretches across strategic
sea-lines of communication.
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It is an important trading partner of the
United States, as well as of Asia and Europe.
-
An interruption in the flow of its oil and
gas exports could precipitate another round of regional economic
crises. When Exxon/Mobil closed three liquid natural gas fields in
Aceh this past March for security reasons, for example, customers
in South Korea and Japan had to scramble to find other sources.
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With millions of Indonesians already
displaced internally, continued inaction by the central government
could send millions of refugees spilling into neighboring
countries, creating a humanitarian crisis.
- Indonesia has the world's largest Islamic
population. If that population turns to sectarian violence, it
could spread instability to other parts of Southeast Asia.
Other security interests are also at
stake. Incidents of maritime piracy have more than quadrupled over
the past decade, and the bulk of the attacks against maritime
commerce have occurred in an area adjacent to or within Indonesia's
territorial waters. A further decrease
of Jakarta's ability to enforce law and order would result in a
commensurate increase in piracy. The loss of central control also
would make it more difficult for international institutions to
assist Jakarta in its efforts to promote reform.
From
the U.S. perspective, Indonesia is extremely important. From the
perspective of Australia, America's closest ally in the region, it
is indispensable. Of ASEAN's member countries, it is both the
largest and the one with the largest economy. In the past, by
virtue of its size, strategic attributes, and sense of destiny,
Indonesia exercised a leadership role in ASEAN; after the fall of
President Suharto, however, its capacity for such leadership
deteriorated.
Reestablishing this leadership is even
more important now that the United States and China are entering a
period of competition and the South China Sea could become the
cockpit for their tension. A strong, independent, and effective
ASEAN community is vital to protecting the economies and
democracies of countries in that region; but ASEAN cannot prosper
without a stable Indonesia.
WHAT WASHINGTON SHOULD DO
Indonesia, even in the midst of its most severe political,
economic, and security crisis, remains an important regional leader
for ensuring security and protecting U.S. interests. The Bush
Administration must develop a new policy toward Indonesia that is
based on this fact. Specifically, the Administration should: