President George Bush recently announced that he
will meet with Prime Minister John Howard of Australia on September
10 in Washington to discuss trade, regional security, and the
future of U.S.-Australian relations. Australia is one of
America's most durable and dependable allies and an important
trading partner. Indeed, Americans and
Australians have fought side by side in every major war of the last
century. Although their defense alliance with New Zealand, the
ANZUS Treaty, is marking its 50th anniversary this year, concerns
about regional security are growing, and Australia is seeking a
bilateral trade agreement with the United States.
Trade not only strengthens the economies
of trading partners, but also enhances the defense and security
ties of allies. In other words, promoting trade is both good
economic policy and good foreign policy. A bilateral agreement
should be promoted. Regarding security, Australia is one of
America's most supportive allies. Strengthening the
interoperability of U.S. and Australian forces to further buttress
the alliance should be a policy objective. In addition, although
the United States has not yet approached the Australian government
about a direct involvement in its missile defense efforts, there
may be a role for Australia to consider. The Bush Administration
has signaled its desire to establish closer relations with
Canberra, and the opportunity to do so is clearly at hand.
STRENGTHENING TRADE WITH AUSTRALIA
Australia is a pluralistic society that is
strongly democratic and relatively open economically. While
possessing its own unique and vibrant culture, no other country in
the Asia-Pacific region is more like the United States in its
political and economic values. Australia, a long-time ally, is
clearly a strong candidate for closer relations with the United
States, including a bilateral trade agreement. The reason: As noted
above, open trade between allies not only strengthens their
economies, but also enhances their defense and security ties. In
other words, promoting trade is both good economic policy and good
foreign policy.
The
United States has advanced global free trade as a key component of
its foreign policy since World War II. It has found that economies
that are open to trade and capital flows prosper over time.
Moreover, as countries liberalize economically, conditions are
created for them to do so politically. Thus, economically open
nations often transform themselves into politically open
societies.
In
Asia, that process occurred notably in Taiwan and South Korea, and
it is everyone's hope that it will occur in the People's Republic
of China as well. In the Americas, economic liberalization has
transformed Chile and Mexico. Regarding Mexico, Mary O'Grady,
editor of the "Americas" column in The Wall Street Journal,
explains the effects that opening an economy has on the political
system: "[I]t was NAFTA that brought Vicente Fox to power because
it weakened the grip of the PRI."
In
the 2001 Index of Economic Freedom, an examination of 161
economies published by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street
Journal, Australia achieved the ranking of the world's ninth freest
economy. According to the analysts who examined Australia,
With the election of a Labor Party
government in 1983, Australia began to shed its traditional
protectionist, regulatory practices by deregulating financial
markets, removing substantial trade barriers, improving ties with
its Asian neighbors, and privatizing many federally owned firms.
TRADE ISSUES
This
year, the government in Canberra, a coalition of the Liberal and
National parties, proposed a bilateral trade agreement with the
United States. It also secured the support of the opposition Labor
Party. The issue of more open trade with America has clear
bipartisan support in Australia, and it merits similar support in
the United States. Good trade agreements come from such bipartisan
efforts. Negotiating the final agreement will, however, require a
concerted effort by trade representatives from both the United
States and Australia.
All
trade agreements must confront the special concerns of sectors in
each country that would be particularly affected by greater
openness. The United States remains protectionist in many areas of
agricultural trade and in ways that are particularly detrimental to
Australian farmers and ranchers. For instance, in July 1999, the
Clinton Administration imposed special quotas on lamb imports,
which have been found to violate the rules of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). These objectionable barriers
to trade should be removed regardless of the progress of trade
negotiations with Australia. American consumers prefer choices and
should be able to choose from both Australian lamb and American
lamb. Such competition would lead to lower prices and increased
availability of high-quality lamb. The United States can hardly
take up the mantle of trade leadership globally while it is
violating WTO rules with its agricultural quotas.
Australia restricts the importation of
certain agricultural products due to legitimate environmental
concerns about its unique flora and fauna. Australia is an island
continent whose isolation has protected it over the years from many
destructive agricultural diseases and pests. For instance, it has
never experienced an outbreak of hoof-and-mouth disease. Nor have
its vineyards suffered infestations of Phylloxera, a louse that
attacks the roots and leaves of vines.
The
Australian government applies science-based rules to prevent the
importation of disease and organisms that would be destructive to
their flora and fauna. Such a process also enables the government
and trading partners to distinguish its legitimate health concerns
from protectionist impulses. Still, from time to time, countries
have questioned whether Australia's quarantine system has been used
for protectionist rather than public health purposes. U.S. trade
representatives should raise issues related to this regulatory
process during trade negotiations.
Both
the United States and Australia restrict foreign investment in some
sectors that are viewed as vital to national security. During trade
negotiations, both sides should reconsider their foreign investment
regimes. For example, they should liberalize investment in the
telecommunications sector. The need to do so was demonstrated on
April 23 when the Australian government decided to block the
purchase of Woodside Petroleum by the Royal Dutch/Shell Group.
Canberra "stunned" the markets when it rejected the takeover as
"contrary to the national interest." (Shell had already purchased
an energy company in New Zealand without encountering difficulty.)
Particularly for Australia and the United States, there are no
serious national security issues to justify such restrictions in
this sector.
Air
travelers in both countries would benefit from an "open skies"
agreement, including cabotage, the legal restriction to domestic
carriers of air transport between points within a country's
borders. At a time of consolidation among U.S. airlines and
concerns about diminished competition in the U.S. airline industry,
Americans would welcome and benefit from the choice of another
carrier on domestic routes. So too would Australian travelers.
Finally, the two countries must address
anti-dumping measures, characterized by Brink Lindsey, Director of
the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies, as the most
intellectually disreputable but politically popular trade measures
in the United States. It is also one of America's trade practices
that other countries find most objectionable. U.S. trade
representatives who attempt to negotiate a trade deal, whether
bilateral, regional, or multilateral, without showing a willingness
to discuss U.S. anti-dumping practices often find themselves mired
in fruitless efforts.
The
only intellectual justification for anti-dumping duties, such as it
may be, is that some countries unfairly subsidize their exports
(covertly or overtly). Possessing a substantially open economy,
Australia is an unlikely candidate for applying such duties.
Rather, negotiators on a trade agreement between the United States
and Australia should directly tackle issues of unfair trade
practices when such exist and settle them to their mutual
satisfaction within the bilateral agreement. The partners should
then waive the unilateral application of such duties.
Certainly, there is a need for a dispute
resolution process for the disagreements that inevitably will arise
over the trade agreement's language and implementation. The
resolution of disputes between these two allies, however, should
take place through the kind of friendly negotiations that have long
defined their relationship, not through unilateral actions.
Many
Americans believe that their jobs are threatened by expanding
international trade, and they think that the only solution is to
include worker-protection clauses in trade agreements. They do not
understand that a strong, vibrant entrepreneurial economy offers
the best job protection. History is proving Ross Perot's well-known
prognostication wrong; the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) did not force U.S. jobs to flee to Mexico and result in "a
giant sucking sound." Between 1994 and September 2000, the Bureau
of Labor Statistics reported that there were 14 million new
American jobs, the unemployment rate had fallen from 6 percent to
3.9 percent, and the number of workers in manufacturing jobs had
leveled off at around 14 percent of the total American workforce.
The
issue of "workers' rights" is irrelevant to negotiating a bilateral
trade deal with Australia, because Australia already has enacted
strong labor laws and cannot be characterized as having cheap,
low-wage labor. Anyone who opposes a trade deal with Australia on
grounds of "workers' rights" is a protectionist.
AUSTRALIA'S REMARKABLE REFORMS
Over
the course of the past decade, Australia has emerged as an open and
vibrant economy, achieving a 3.9 percent average rate of annual
growth during the 1990s. At the same time, its
average inflation rate was a mere 2.5 percent, lower than that of both the
United States (2.8) and the European Union
(2.83).
Australia can trace much of its success to economic reforms enacted
by successive governments, which raised the overall level of
economic freedom and, correspondingly, the level of prosperity.
Tax System Reform.
The most recent of these reforms, which has garnered the most
attention, is the overhaul of the nation's tax system that took
effect on July 1, 2000. The Howard government, which retained power
in the 1998 elections on a promise of tax reform, followed through
on its pledge and shifted the tax regime to a consumption-based
system based on a 10 percent goods and services tax (GST). The
value-added tax replaced inefficient indirect taxes, such as
wholesale sales taxes, which effectively amounted to a tariff on
exporters and manufacturers.
The
government also lowered personal and corporate income tax rates so
that 80 percent of Australians today face a tax burden of 30
percent of their income or less. The change most benefits
middle-income earners (whose incomes fall in the A$38,000 to
A$50,000 range), although the government has enacted significant
tax breaks for single-income families as well. Business tax rates
were reduced to 34 percent, which should fall to 30 percent in the
future. All of these reforms are boosting Australians' incentive to
work by reducing the penalty for doing so, while increasing
Australia's overall productivity as well.
Openness to Trade and Investment.
Australia's limited restrictions on trade and investment
likewise have contributed to the country's economic success.
Australia maintains an average tariff rate of just over 3 percent,
which is quite low by global standards. Its export base has
diversified in recent years (manufacturing and service exports have
surpassed the traditional mineral and rural exports), thus
providing the country with greater protection against the economic
shocks that plague nations whose economic well-being depends on a
few sectors.
The
government is continuing to reduce restrictions on foreign
investment, a policy that also has raised the level of economic
freedom in Australia. In 1999, for instance, it opened its
long-protected domestic airline industry to foreign investment.
Foreign airlines may now purchase 100 percent equity in a domestic
carrier and 49 percent in an international Australian airline
(although the former restrictions still apply to the national
airline, Qantas). Moreover, in the 1990s, the government partially
privatized the main telecommunications firm, Telstra, thereby
facilitating private participation in that booming sector. The fall
of these remaining barriers to foreign involvement allows increased
participation by private citizens in lucrative and expanding
industries and encourages more investment in the economy.
Labor Market Reform.
Over the past several years, labor regulation reforms have
been a central element of the government's structural reform
program. Australia's Workplace Relations Act of 1996 replaced
mandatory, centralized wage-fixing with enterprise bargaining in
which wage-setting takes place at the firm level through bilateral
negotiations. This reform allows private companies more leeway in
determining what economic course is best suited to their
circumstances. Wage flexibility has made the labor pool more
elastic, better able to adapt to the vagaries of the global
economy, and this in turn has contributed to the remarkable rise in
productivity in Australia over the past decade: Labor productivity
in Australia averaged an annual growth rate of nearly 2.5 percent
from 1990 to 1998.
In
this latest quarter, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised
the 2001 economic growth forecast downward for both the Australian
and U.S. economies. In Australia's case, it forecast growth of from
3.4 percent to less than 2 percent. Certainly, the slowdown in
the United States and elsewhere has had an impact on Australia, but
Australia is not entirely at the mercy of the ebbs and flows of
globalization: Australia's domestic policies ultimately determine
whether its people can turn globalization to their advantage or
must suffer its caprice.
Regulation.
Like many other countries, Australia falls short in
regulation. Excessive regulation stagnates economic activity; makes
it harder for businesses, be they domestic or foreign, to operate;
and discourages investment. Continuing government control of the
telecommunications industry through Telstra as well as the
maintenance of commodity boards to manage such agricultural markets
as the wheat industry remain a concern.
Nevertheless, Australia has come a long
way in deregulating its economy since the Hawke Labor government
began reforms in 1983. These reforms and those of the subsequent
Keating and Howard governments--including controlling inflation,
increasing labor market flexibility, privatizing government
businesses, and income and business tax reforms--have engendered a
far more dynamic, flexible economy. The benefits of instituting
those free-market reforms are clear in the overall success with
which Australia fared the 1997 Asian financial crisis. By
continuing the habit of economic reform that it has practiced so
diligently over the past decade, Canberra has virtually assured
itself of continued prosperity in the future.
STRENGTHENING DEFENSE AND SECURITY
RELATIONS
Without peer, Australia has been America's
most reliable ally and most valuable security partner in the
Pacific basin for many years. Australia fought beside the United
States in every war during the past century, including the less
popular conflicts such as Vietnam when many of its people objected
to its involvement. Already, in the new millennium, Canberra has
outlined a view of regional and global security that demonstrates
Australia's commitment to a broad strategic partnership with
America and has supplied detailed plans to support mutual interests
in the region. From the South Pacific to the South China Sea, both
Australia and the United States share the principles of promoting
freedom of navigation, political stability, and the peaceful
settlement of border disputes, although there still are areas of
disagreement, such as military funding to increase interoperability
between American and Australian military forces and approaches to
regional security problems.
On
the issue of ballistic missile defense, Australia is perhaps
America's most supportive ally. In an interview with the U.S. trade
journal Defense News, the Australian Minister for Defense, Peter
Reith, said of President Bush's plan to move forward on missile
defense, "We [Australians] understand that the U.S. government will
take whatever steps it thinks is in its national interest in
defending its territory." So far, the United States has not
approached the Australian government about direct involvement in
its missile defense effort. The Bush Administration should start
now to determine whether there is a role for direct Australian
involvement. This way, President Bush will be prepared to discuss
such a role for Australia when the Australian Prime Minister visits
Washington this fall.
How the Howard Doctrine Buttresses the
Alliance.
In September 1999, Prime Minister John Howard outlined his
vision of Australia's role in the next century in what has become
known as the "Howard Doctrine." In his statement, Howard
attempted to articulate a new concept of mutual security. He
asserted that since the United States and Australia share
significant security interests regionally and globally, they should
be more than simple alliance partners committed to the defense of
each other's borders. The Howard Doctrine proposes that Australia
and the United States protect their shared interests beyond the
nominal commitments of a defense alliance. Regrettably, the Prime
Minister referred to Australia's relationship with the United
States as a "deputy." His domestic rivals pounced on his
unfortunate choice of word to blur the substance of the doctrine.
Howard had used the word "deputy" to recognize America's regional
influence, not to indicate the subordination of Australia's
responsibility to the United States. In fact, Australia is
committed to acting independently in the Asia-Pacific region and
has the full support and confidence of the United States.
To
understand how this new concept differs from normal alliance
relationships, consider the military operations in the former
Yugoslavia and East Timor. In the former Yugoslavia, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies failed to initiate
resolute actions until they secured substantive U.S. involvement.
Even after Washington provided leadership along with large military
forces to its European allies, the most important events required
continued U.S. military commitment and supervision. American forces
remain there today, and the Europeans quail at any mention that the
United States could someday withdraw its troops. By contrast,
Canberra took bold and decisive action in East Timor without
waiting for the United States to jump in, and had only minimal U.S.
military participation and diplomatic support; there are no U.S.
forces in East Timor today.
The
yawning gap between Australia and America's European allies is
further demonstrated by the differences in risk they accept.
Australia took a far greater risk in entering East Timor than
Europe did in intervening in the former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is
an underdeveloped and strategically irrelevant country that poses
no real threat to a rich and powerful Europe. Indonesia, on the
other hand, is the fourth most populous country in the world, lying
only a few miles north of Australia and astride critical sea lines
of communication. Because of its size and location, Australia's
security is very dependent on good relations with Indonesia.
By
taking action in East Timor, Australia risked antagonizing its
giant neighbor. In fact, relations between the two countries soured
after the East Timor crisis and are only now beginning to heal. In
this case, Canberra did not act as a deputy to the Washington
sheriff, but stepped in where it was stronger and more familiar
than its ally. Canberra did not act at Washington's behest; rather,
it acted independently but in the greater interest of both
countries. A lesser nation could easily be excused had it chosen to
stand on the sidelines rather than taking action in this case, or
could have criticized American inaction rather than accepting the
obligations and risks of an alliance. But Australia demonstrated
its worth as an ally and a friend in East Timor.
Concern over Incompatible
Defenses.
Notwithstanding this performance, Canberra could do more to
improve its security position both as an alliance partner and as an
independent actor in the region. Australia has committed to
increases in defense spending, somewhat commensurate with its
perceptions of increased instability in the region; but it still
spends less per capita than the United States does on defense:
Australia spends about 1.9 percent of GDP per annum on defense
while the United States spends about 3.1 percent. Canberra has
committed to a 3 percent increase per year for the next 10 years,
but that additional spending is below the expected growth rate of
the Australian economy. Therefore, spending on defense will remain
below 2 percent of GDP.
A
more significant increase in defense funding would address critical
deficiencies in Australia's military establishment. Australia's
newest warships, the ANZAC class, lack a defense against anti-ship
missiles, and the navy's fleet in general is incapable of
long-range defense against air attack. The air force needs to
upgrade almost all of its systems, and its aging air-to-air
refueling fleet needs to be replaced. Without these upgrades,
Australia's military will not be able to operate with U.S. forces
in a conflict involving a moderately capable enemy. This task needs
to be accomplished in the near term so that Americans and
Australians do not face the need to fix interoperability problems
during a crisis against a strong opponent.
Australia's Other
Commitments.
Australia maintains defense commitments in the region and the
world as well. Canberra has retained its ANZUS commitment to New
Zealand despite Washington's suspension of its obligation when New
Zealand imposed a ban on nuclear-armed or -powered vessels. This
bilateral assurance is a burden to Australia, as New Zealand's
defense spending is low enough to appear as unilateral
disarmament.
Australia is also committed to the defense
of Papua New Guinea, East Timor, and the island countries of the
Southwest Pacific. It is a member of the Five-Power Defense
Agreement involving the United Kingdom, Australia, Malaysia,
Singapore, and New Zealand. It participates in the ASEAN Regional
Forum, and it maintains bilateral security relationships with
almost every country in Southeast Asia. Finally, Australia supports
the United Nations in a wide variety of peacekeeping missions.
A NEW U.S.-AUSTRALIAN RELATIONSHIP
Because Australia is both a strategic U.S.
ally in the Asia-Pacific region and an important trading partner,
the Bush Administration should waste no time in working to
strengthen the ties that bind these two countries. As a first step,
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Zoellick should not only
heed Canberra's call for formal trade negotiations, but initiate
them. These negotiations could be conducted as part of a
stand-alone deal with Australia or bundled with other trade deals,
such as those involving Chile and Singapore. What is most important
is that the Administration move forward on trade, particularly with
countries like Australia that are both democratic and
capitalist.
The
Bush Administration has signaled its desire to move forward on many
trade fronts, to pursue "free trade by any means." Bilateral trade
deals, such as that proposed between the United States and
Australia, do not stand in the way of more comprehensive
multilateral trade negotiations--such as those, for example, that
would involve a new WTO round. Indeed, bilateral trade deals could
help establish a new "bar" for a WTO round. Nations with open
economies like Australia and the United States are in a position to
raise the standard for future WTO rounds by moving beyond the
current boundaries in trade in services and foreign investment
codes.
The
Bush Administration should also encourage Australia to increase its
investment in defense to ensure that its forces are interoperable
with U.S. forces in any future conflict. To strengthen the trade
and defense ties between the United States and Australia, the Bush
Administration should take steps to:
Resolve expeditiously the dispute
over lamb quotas in accordance with the WTO ruling against the
United States. This would enable the Administration to re-assume
the mantle of global trade leadership.
Ensure that all Australian
restrictions on the importation of U.S. animal and plant products
are science-based and consistent with applicable WTO rules. This
would ensure that protectionist impulses do not masquerade as
environmental concern.
Negotiate a comprehensive bilateral
trade agreement with Australia covering such issues as agriculture
and services. The more comprehensive the agreement, the more it
enhances trade and contributes to the prospects for a meaningful
WTO round.
Continue to support Australia's
economic and security leadership in Southeast Asia and the South
Pacific in protecting its interests and those of its allies. This
would buttress a dependable ally in this important region.
Determine whether there is a role
for direct Australian involvement with respect to ballistic missile
defense. This will allow President Bush to discuss such a role for
Australia when the Australian Prime Minister visits Washington this
fall.
Encourage Australia to increase
funding for defense modernization in order to make its forces fully
interoperable with U.S. forces.
CONCLUSION
The
Bush Administration has signaled its desire to move forward on many
trade fronts, to pursue "free trade by any means." Bilateral trade
deals, such as that proposed between the United States and
Australia, would not stand in the way of more comprehensive
multilateral trade negotiations, such as those that would be
involved in another WTO round. Indeed, they can help to "raise the
bar" in such negotiations. Nations with open economies like
Australia and the United States are in a position to do just that
by advancing trade in services and improving foreign investment
codes.
Australia is a strategic ally in the
Asia-Pacific region and an important trading partner. It is time to
strengthen even further the ties that bind these two countries. As
a first step, the USTR should heed the Australian government's call
for formal trade negotiations and initiate them. Ambassador
Zoellick could do so as part of a stand-alone deal or "bundled" as
a package with others, such as Singapore and Chile. What is most
important is that the Administration move forward on trade,
particularly with countries like Australia that embody democratic
capitalism.
Dana Robert
Dillon is Policy Analyst for Southeast Asia in the Asian
Studies Center; Denise H. Froning is a former Trade Policy Analyst
in, and Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., Ph.D., is Director of, the
Center for International Trade and Economics at The Heritage
Foundation.