Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
Edward C. Aldridge announced on December 14, that the Department of
Defense is canceling the Navy's missile defense program for
protecting small areas such as port facilities.
This program until recently was called the Navy
Area-Wide (NAW) program and it was designed to destroy attacking
missiles in the terminal-phase of flight. According to Aldridge,
the program was canceled because of cost growth.
While the press has focused on the cancellation
decision itself, as opposed to the reason for it, and its
supposedly negative implications for the technical feasibility of
missile defense, it has not paid as much attention to the fact that
Under Secretary Aldridge also stated that the Department of Defense
will continue to pursue a sea-based terminal defense capability. It
is now up to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), the
Pentagon office that runs missile defense programs generally, to
define the ongoing effort. The Bush Administration and Congress
should insist that BMDO propose this alternative program as quickly
as possible.
Three Sea-Based Missile Defense
Programs
Earlier, BMDO maintained three sea-based missile defense
programs. The first was the NAW program, which was designed to
counter ballistic missiles in the terminal phase to protect small
areas. It is the program the Department of Defense just cancelled.
The second, and more promising program, was until recently called
the Navy Theater-Wide (NTW) program. Now called the Sea-Based
Midcourse program, it is designed to protect entire regions against
missile attack by destroying attacking missiles outside the
atmosphere. With upgrades, this system will also be capable of
defending U.S. territory against long-range missiles. The final
sea-based program is called the Sea-Based Boost-Phase program. It
is designed to counter the North Korean threat in particular by
deploying Navy ships off the Korean coast in the event of a crisis
and use surface-to-air missiles to destroy target ballistic
missiles shorting after they are launched.
Congress should not confuse these three programs. The most
important of them is the Sea-Based Midcourse program. This is the
system that offers the best near-term option for providing a
reliable defense of U.S. territory against ballistic missile
attack. This program is not affected by Under Secretary Aldridge's
December 14 announcement. The Department of Defense generally and
the BMDO in particular are continuing the Sea-Based Midcourse
program. Congress, in recent years, has provided additional funds
to this program. It should continue to pay special attention to
this program. Now that the ABM Treaty is being set aside, BMDO
should be able to make this system capable of defending U.S.
territory without the legal impediments that stood in the way of
the program in the past.
Picking Up the Pieces of the NAW
Program
The Department of Defense canceled the NAW program because the
law requires that a program that exhibits a 25 percent increase in
unit cost may continue only if the Secretary of Defense certifies,
among other things, that there is no reasonable alternative for
providing a capability essential to national security. The
Department of Defense chose not to make the certification. It did
not cancel the program because it believes a sea-based terminal
defense is infeasible. The Department of Defense seems to believe
an alternative is available. Under Secretary Aldridge stated that
BMDO will continue to work on obtaining the kind of capability that
would have been provided by the NAW system. Congress should press
BMDO to provide the alternative plan as quickly as possible.
The nation needs a sea-based terminal defense against ballistic
missile attack, primarily for the defense of U.S. friends and
allies. Given that several of these important friends and allies,
Saudi Arabia and South Korea, for example, face a serious missile
threat now, the U.S. needs to field a system quickly. While the
Army has begun initial production of the Patriot PAC-3 ground-based
terminal defense, Congress needs to realize that there may be
political or logistical reasons that bar the deployment of the
Patriot PAC-3 in a timely fashion. The highly mobile sea-based
alternative, which also can patrol in international waters, is the
logical alternative. BMDO has a responsibility to Congress and the
American people to share its plan for the replacement to the NAW
system.
Conclusion
The Department of Defense's decision to cancel the NAW program
is a disappointment; it is not a disaster. The decision does not
signal that missile defense generally or sea-based missile defense
in particular is technologically infeasible. Further, it does not
signal that the U.S. is abandoning the sea-based terminal defense
as a part of an overall missile-defense-system-design. Finally, the
cancellation of the NAW program does not interrupt the more
important work taking place on the NTW or Sea-Based Midcourse
program.
Thus, Congress and the American people need to put this decision
in perspective. Missile defense program activities are varied and
widespread. President Bush understands, and has stated publicly,
that the missile defense development effort is designed to
determine what systems will work best. It is to be expected that
some setbacks will occur. The main thing is that the Administration
remain focused on putting the most capable defenses into the field
as quickly as possible. The missile threat to the American people
and America's allies is growing. By announcing U.S. withdraw from
the ABM Treaty, the single most important obstacle to the
deployment of effective missile defenses is being removed. The Bush
Administration needs to take advantage of the opportunity it has
created for itself by moving missile defense programs
forward.
Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research
Fellow in National Security Policy, in the Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage
Foundation.