The steel industry is once again pressuring the
President to authorize subsidies and trade protection to curb what
it calls a "surge" of steel imports into the United States. The
U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) added its voice to the
debate last October by recommending that the U.S. government impose
tariffs of up to 40 percent on steel imports. The President, who
must decide on the commission's recommendation by March 6, should
reject this recommendation, explaining why that policy is wrong and
why the industry's claims are misleading.
THE STEEL INDUSTRY'S CLAIMS
In
June 2001, President George W. Bush asked the U.S. International
Trade Commission to determine whether steel imports were injuring
America's steel producers. Under Section 201 of the Trade Act of
1974, the United States can apply
tariffs or quotas on a temporary basis--as long as it can be shown
that the imports are seriously harming domestic manufacturers.
Section 201 cases are not required to prove unfair trade, by which
foreign governments subsidize products to give their goods an
advantage over U.S. goods. Rather, these cases must only prove that
imports are causing serious economic harm to the industry.
The
USITC issued a positive ruling on the steel industry's complaint on
October 22, 2001, finding that 16 out of 33 steel product
categories (which account for about 74 percent of the imports under
investigation) had been "injured" by steel imports. Despite the
fact that the steel industry is already heavily protected, the
USITC recommended that tariffs of up to 40 percent be applied to
steel imports.
This
policy, however, would increase government intervention in an
industry that is already heavily protected. According to the
Institute for International Economics, approximately 80 percent of
all steel imports are already subject to tariffs under U.S.
antidumping laws, which allow the government to
apply tariffs to products that are subsidized by foreign
governments and then "dumped" into the U.S. market.
Despite the protections that the U.S.
steel industry has already received, it is struggling. Since the
Asian financial crisis, 29 steel firms have declared bankruptcy and
have laid off 21,000 employees. Over the
past two decades, employment in the industry has fallen from
450,000 to 150,000.
But
these problems are not due to foreign competition. Steel imports
since the Asian financial crisis have been declining. Chart 1 shows that after
reaching a high of 4 million tons in August 1998, steel imports
have fallen by 36 percent to 2.6 million tons in November 2001.
Moreover, not only have imports declined, but the market share of
foreign steel has fallen as well. According to the Congressional
Research Service, the market share of foreign steel producers has
fallen from 28 percent in 1998 to 21 percent in 2001.

The evidence clearly shows that a "surge" of steel
imports is not occurring. Competition from imports is not the
problem. Steel manufacturers are suffering because of the worldwide
excess capacity in, and overproduction of, steel products. Steel
makers around the world are producing more than consumers demand.
In 2000 alone, according to one report, steel manufacturers
produced approximately 40 million tons more than consumers
demanded.
The
overproduction of steel is due to government intervention in the
marketplace. Steel producers, left to themselves, have an incentive
to produce only what consumers demand. Otherwise, they would be
adding needless costs to their operations. When government
intervenes and offers subsidies or other protections, normal market
incentives are altered. Government subsidies thus may encourage a
steel firm to produce more steel even if it exceeds consumer
demand.
Subsidies are a common practice in the
steel industry, both around the world and in the United States. For
example, the American Iron and Steel Institute reports that between
1980 and 1992, foreign steel manufacturers received over $100
billion in subsidies. In the United States, the
steel industry was the beneficiary of more than $1 billion in
federal loan guarantees in 2001. When an
industry produces more than consumers demand, the surplus puts
downward pressure on the price of the product and makes it
difficult for firms to earn a profit. As recently as January 10,
2002, even though the price of hot-rolled steel was rising, it was
still being sold below cost.
Homegrown problems are another reason why
the U.S. steel industry is suffering. Prior to 1968, the year the
steel industry began receiving government protection from foreign
competition, average compensation in the industry was roughly equal
to the average in the manufacturing sector. Today, the average
total compensation for the steel industry is $37.91 per hour--56
percent higher than the average compensation in the manufacturing
sector. One of the principal reasons
for this high average compensation is that the steel industry's
very strong unions, without the threat of foreign competition, are
able to negotiate high compensation packages for employees.
The
industry is also suffering because of increased domestic
competition without a corresponding increase in demand. Steel is
produced by two types of mills: integrated steel mills and
mini-mills. Mini-mills require much less capital to produce steel
and are able to produce steel much more efficiently than integrated
steel mills can. According to the Institute for International
Economics, mini-mills can produce a ton of hot-rolled steel at a
cost of $315, compared with a cost of $350 at an integrated steel
mill. This cost advantage enabled
mini-mills to raise their market share from 37 percent in 1990 to
nearly 50 percent in 2000.
At
the same time that domestic competition for producing steel has
increased, steel productivity has also increased significantly.
Output per worker increased from 400 tons in 1990 to 600 tons in
2000. Over this same time period, however, demand remained
constant. With increased productivity
and static demand, steel manufacturers have had to reduce their
labor force. Furthermore, worldwide capacity has not fallen fast
enough to reflect the stagnant demand.