The
International Trade Commission (ITC) is preparing a report for
Congress and the executive branch on the advisability of
negotiating a formal free trade agreement (FTA) with Taiwan, one of
America's top trading partners. Indeed, a bill already drafted by
Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) would authorize the Administration to
negotiate such an agreement on a "fast track" basis. Consideration
of this bill awaits the release of the ITC report, due out later
this summer.
Signing an FTA with Taiwan would benefit
both sides. For the United States, it could mean as much as $500
million a year in increased U.S. farm exports to Taiwan, a
substantial increase in U.S. automobile exports, and an expanded
market for American financial services. For Taiwan, it would
certainly help its high-tech sector, which began recovering from
its poor performance in early 2002. But there are significant
issues that must be addressed as well.
While the United States should seek a free
trade agreement with Taiwan in the near future, that FTA must
address deficiencies in Taiwan's laws and enforcement structure
regarding, for example, its rice quotas and intellectual property
rights (IPR) protections, especially the limited sanctions against
those who pirate copyrighted optical media.
Taiwan recognizes that the political
benefits of establishing closer ties with the United States go
beyond free trade. Once an FTA with the United States is completed,
Beijing would be less likely to assume that it could take military
action against the island without involving America and more likely
to seek a resolution of frictions by using enticements and general
goodwill than by threatening military force. If a U.S.-Taiwan free
trade agreement can have this effect alone, it is worth the
Administration's priority attention.
The Merits of an FTA with Taiwan
Throughout the past decade, Taiwan
consistently ranked as one of America's top 10 export markets. Now,
with its successful accession to the World Trade Organization
(WTO), Taiwan has reached a level of economic and trade competence
that would enable it, through an FTA, to open its still-restricted
agricultural, manufacturing, and service markets to American
business. Moreover, a free trade agreement with Taiwan would be a
creditable addition to America's existing pool of FTAs: with Canada
and Mexico in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
with the considerably smaller trading partners of Israel and
Jordan.
Taiwan's exporters enjoy relatively free
access to U.S. markets today. Nevertheless, there are several
international political considerations that lead Taipei to seek an
unrestricted trade and investment regime with the United States,
despite some domestic political resistance in Taiwan. Specifically,
it seeks to expand its participation in the international community
and fears further isolation by China.
It
is hard to see a downside to a free trade agreement with Taiwan for
American exporters or investors. The process of negotiating the FTA
would give the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
significant leverage to prod Taipei to expand market access for
American businesses and investors, to liberalize trade, and to
close some loopholes in IPR protection and elsewhere, which Taiwan
was able to preserve in negotiations over its WTO accession.
Benefits for
U.S. Farmers.
Taiwan, which imports over $2 billion in U.S. farm
products annually, is America's fifth largest export market for
agricultural goods and a bigger customer than China. In fact, it
ranks as one of the top three consumers of U.S. corn, feed grains,
peaches, plums, celery, apples, cherries, broccoli, and hides.
To
enter the WTO, Taiwan had to reduce its duties on imported
agricultural products, which dropped from an average of about 20
percent to the current 14.5 percent. These duties will continue to
fall to 12.86 percent by 2010. Yet American rice, poultry, and pork
remain under Taiwan's "Tariff Rate Quotas," which means Taiwan will
import limited amounts of these items at the new duty rates while
the rest will continue to face tariffs of up to 300 percent. U.S.
agricultural products will not be able to compete against homegrown
Taiwan farm goods. An FTA with Taiwan would give agricultural goods
such as American rice, pork, chicken, and beef access to a market
in which these commodities are now excluded by strict non-tariff
barriers.
When
Taiwan signs the WTO's Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), and
provided China does not block Taiwan's adherence, American rice
will receive preferential treatment from Taiwan's official buyers
over rice from non-GPA members. This is because Taiwan's government
purchases 65 percent of all quota rice on a first-come,
lowest-price basis. With an FTA, all U.S. farm products should gain
direct tariff- and quota-free access to Taiwan's consumers.
It
is important that U.S. negotiators pay special attention to
Taiwan's restricted rice market. This is a politically sensitive
issue with politicians in Taipei, and understandably so. Taiwan's
government estimates that overall domestic farm production will
drop $1.5 billion (in U.S. dollars)--and it announced a $330
million support budget just for rice farmers in 2001--simply to
cope with the pressures of WTO accession. In 1999, Taipei purchased
415,000 metric tons of locally grown rice for $275 million. Under
an FTA, virtually all of that market would face competition with
good-quality, competitively priced American rice. Across the board,
American farmers stand to gain $500 million in new income from
exports to Taiwan once an FTA is signed.
The
value of an FTA with Taiwan would dim considerably, however, if
Taiwan seeks to exempt rice--or anything else--from FTA
negotiations. Such an attempt would run counter to the underlying
principles in Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), the precursor of the WTO. That article notes the
contribution to the expansion of world trade that comes from closer
integration between the economies of contracting partners. In 1994,
GATT/WTO members agreed to an understanding of Article XXIV,
"recognizing also that such contribution is increased if the
elimination between the constituent territories of duties and other
restrictive regulations of commerce extends to all trade, and
diminished if any major sector of trade is excluded."
Benefits for
U.S. Banks, Automobile Manufacturers, and Drug Companies.
American farmers would not be the only Americans to gain
from a free trade regime with Taiwan. Service industries,
especially financial services, would be able to compete freely
against Taiwan's top-heavy, Japanese-style, state-dominated
banks.
Although Taiwan's financial services
markets have opened substantially since its accession to the WTO,
the annual market potential for U.S. financial institutions in
capital management is in the hundreds of millions of dollars, and
there remain restrictions on foreign bank, insurance, and capital
firms that could usefully be relaxed. Under an FTA, for example,
Daimler-Chrysler, the last American automobile maker without an
assembly footprint in Taiwan, would be able to sell its cars
directly in Taiwan without the much higher tariff rates for
imported vehicles.
American pharmaceutical companies also
would gain from an FTA. They seek fewer restrictions, equitable
pricing regulation, and rational market access policies. They want new
reimbursement regimes and less cumbersome validation data
requirements. An FTA would help bolster Taiwan's nascent biotech
industry as well by making Taiwan more attractive to international
companies looking for research and development partnership
opportunities. Taiwan would do well to study Singapore's experience
in luring global pharmaceutical firms and, in a broader sense, must
look to the future, not to the present, if it hopes to expand its
biotech sector.
Political Benefits for Taiwan Outweigh
Economic Benefits
An
FTA with the United States would certainly help Taiwan's high-tech
sector--which has been in the doldrums for the past 12 months but
also has been recovering nicely this year. Taiwan's leadership also
looks to an FTA regime with the United States as an essential part
of its global strategy to develop economically so as to maintain
its independent political identity.
This, of course, is the compelling reason
for Taipei to move ahead, but moving to an FTA with the United
States will not be painless. An FTA would certainly affect Taiwan's
farmers, who employ 8 percent of the workforce while producing only
2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). It will affect Taiwan's
banking and other services as well. However, these are costs Taiwan
tallied up as it entered the WTO, and no doubt President Chen
Shui-bian has considered the additional social pressures of signing
a U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement and decided they are worth the
shock.
In a
broader sense, there are political benefits to tying Taiwan closer
to the United States that argue for moving ahead quickly with an
FTA in Washington. The closer U.S.-Taiwan economic ties are seen to
be in Beijing, the less likely Beijing will assume that it can take
military action against Taiwan without involving America. Beijing
would then see the benefits of resolving frictions with Taipei
through enticements, concessions, and general goodwill rather than
with threats of military force. If a U.S.-Taiwan FTA can have this
effect alone, it would be worth giving it priority attention in
Washington.
An FTA Must Close IPR Loopholes
Pressure to sign an FTA with Taiwan,
however, must not overlook serious issues. U.S. Under Secretary of
Commerce for International Trade Grant Aldonas, for example, has
complained bitterly about Taiwan's spotty record in protecting
intellectual property rights and asserts that Taiwan's laws
designed to protect intellectual property are not compliant with
international norms and that enforcement remains weak.
On
their face, Taiwan's laws comply with WTO norms, but it is also
true that Taiwan did manage to negotiate loopholes in the
U.S.-Taiwan WTO "working party" talks that showed up in
less-than-ideal legislation. Legislation that applied to Taiwan's
optical media companies would have confiscated companies with
production lines that were found to be churning out pirated DVDs,
VCDs, and CD-ROMs, but it was diluted to specify that the
confiscated equipment had to be used "entirely for" the
infringement of copyrighted products. Needless to say, Under
Secretary Aldonas and the U.S. Department of Commerce demand "the
closure of plants engaged in these illegal activities," regardless
of whether they are pirating part-time or full-time.
Most
of Taiwan's pirates, who long ago fled to China, have returned as
investors/owners of legal "optical media" (OM) plants in Taiwan.
The U.S. industry fears that Taiwan's illegal OM manufacturing
capacity is migrating again to China, where factories can pirate at
will and re-smuggle their contraband across the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan's OM pirates are ruthless, and there are credible reports
that many are tied to organized crime. They are in the pirating business
because it is profitable and because Taiwan's anti-pirating laws
limit standing for a complaint to the copyright-owner only. Neither
private citizens nor prosecutors themselves have legal standing to
charge OM pirates. What Taiwan needs--and, indeed, may be
prepared--to do is to form a dedicated anti-pirating corps within
the police and customs services. In any case, Taiwan's IPR problems
must be remedied in negotiations before an FTA with Taiwan should
be completed.
While Taiwan's level of compliance with
the WTO's trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
norms (TRIPS) is good, by international standards (except for the
effective enforcement aspect), it could be improved. Laws passed
last winter in Taipei were a substantial move in the right
direction. They extended copyright protection to computer programs
and lengthened the validity of patents to 20 years; the Optical
Media Law and Motion Picture Law specifically punish pirating. In
addition, the extensive amendments to the Patent Law and the
Copyright Law resulted by September 2001 in the confiscation of
$228 million in pirated goods, with a further $83 million seized
between January 28 and March 31 of this year.
Further gains will occur if plugging the
last loopholes in Taiwan's IPR legislation, enforcement, and
sanctions is made a condition of a U.S.-Taiwan free trade
agreement.
What U.S. Negotiators Should Seek
The
United States should seek a free trade agreement with Taiwan on a
fast-track basis, but several areas of concern must be addressed in
the negotiations. Specifically, to create an open and beneficial
trade environment between America and Taiwan, the United States
should:
- Insist that rice
not be excluded from the negotiating agenda. Taipei is
under pressure to protect Taiwan's rice farmers, but the value of a
free trade agreement quickly diminishes if any major sector of
trade is excluded.
- Close the
remaining loopholes in Taiwan's intellectual property rights
protection regime. Minor adjustments in Taiwan's laws are
necessary if sanctions are to be extended to all pirating activity;
penalties must be stiffened, and further legislation is needed to
make IPR violations public crimes subject to direct police
enforcement without the need for a copyright-holder's
complaint.
- Discourage any
attempt by China to block Taiwan's accession to the WTO Government
Procurement Agreement. China is said to be blocking
Taiwan's accession to the GPA. Now that both China and Taiwan are
WTO members, Beijing's continued sniping at Taipei is
unacceptable.
Conclusion
A
free trade agreement between the United States and Taiwan would be
a significant boon to American agricultural, manufacturing, and
financial services exporters. But it must ensure both that Taiwan
cannot unreasonably close its important agricultural markets and
that its laws relating to the protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights are significantly strengthened.
USTR
negotiators should have increased leverage in negotiating a deal
with Taiwan, because Taiwan seeks the FTA for political as much as
for economic reasons. The real question is whether Taiwan's
political leaders are ready to face the challenges that an FTA with
the United States would pose.
John J. Tkacik,
Jr., is Research Fellow for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia in
the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.