Congress is currently reconciling House and
Senate versions of a package of trade-related legislation that
includes trade promotion authority (TPA)--the ability of the
President to negotiate trade agreements and submit them to Congress
for a straight up-or-down vote. TPA is an important foreign policy
tool: It will enhance the credibility and influence of the United
States in negotiating trade agreements that benefit American
consumers and workers.
Conferees should keep in mind that the purpose of the final
trade legislation is to liberalize, not protect, markets. While
both the House and Senate versions of H.R. 3009 1 contain trade
promotion authority, Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), and the
Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), they also contain mandates that
would undermine that important goal. For instance, the trade
package includes protections for certain industries, additional
subsidies for industries already heavily subsidized, potential
limitations on health care assistance for TAA-eligible workers, and
provisions that would allow Congress both to amend any agreements
that relate to U.S. trade remedy laws and to revoke TPA when
Members feel they have not been consulted sufficiently.
The President's ability to influence and negotiate beneficial
trade agreements will require clean trade promotion authority.
Encumbering TPA with protections for certain industries and
provisions that allow agreements to be opened by Congress will
discourage America's potential trading partners. The United States
already trails far behind other countries in trade agreements,
having signed only three of the 150 agreements currently in force,
2 leaving U.S. exporters at a significant competitive
disadvantage.
Measures that enable Congress to open an agreement and that
provide special protections for particular U.S. industries simply
do not belong in a bill designed to promote free trade. Even33
though both versions of the trade bill state that "trade is
critical to the economic growth and strength of the United States
and to its leadership in the world," such anti-trade measures would
have the opposite effect.
Why TPA is Important
The House and Senate both have passed trade bills that include
trade promotion authority to enhance the Administration's ability
to negotiate agreements that would reduce barriers to U.S. goods
and services. These include agreements negotiated in multilateral
venues, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO); bilateral
agreements with countries such as Chile; and regional agreements,
such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
The benefits derived from reducing trade barriers are enormous.
According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR),
the two major trade agreements of the 1990s--the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round establishing the
WTO--generate annual benefits of $1,300 to $2,000 for the average
family of four. 3 A University of Michigan study found that the WTO
Doha Round 4 could generate an annual income gain of nearly $2,500
for the average family from a global reduction in tariffs and trade
barriers. 5 Both NAFTA and the Uruguay Round included fast-track
authority, which is now known as TPA.
TPA is not only important for America's families; it is
important for America's farmers and manufacturers as well. One in
three U.S. farm acres is planted for export, and 25 percent of
gross farm income is derived from exports. America is the world's
largest agricultural exporter. U.S. agricultural exports face a 62
percent average tariff rate. 6 TPA would enable the United States
to negotiate lower tariffs on agricultural goods, which would
greatly help U.S. farmers remain competitive in global markets.
Similarly, TPA is important for U.S. manufacturers. 7 Each time
a free trade agreement is negotiated without the participation of
the United States, U.S. manufacturers are put at a competitive
disadvantage. In 1997, for example, Chile began to lower its
tariffs on foreign manufactured goods based on agreements it
negotiated with Canada, Mexico, and some South American countries.
Today, countries like the United States that do not have a free
trade agreement with Chile pay a uniform 8 percent tariff on all
their exports to Chile; those that have secured a free trade
agreement with Chile pay either no import tariffs or a reduced
rate. The National Association of Manufacturers estimates that the
failure of the United States to secure a free trade agreement with
Chile has resulted in a loss of $800 million in exports to Chile
each year. 8
Why Industry Protection is Bad Policy
Recent decisions by the U.S. government affecting trade, most
notably the steel tariff and the farm bill, 9 have left a bitter
taste with respect to U.S. trade policy around the world.
Provisions in the current bill that protect or subsidize particular
industries in the United States should be removed if America is to
regain its stature and credibility on trade and advance its trade
agenda globally.
A prime example is the U.S. sugar subsidy program. Rather than
promote trade, this program protects domestic producers and
maintains high sugar prices that must be paid by U.S. consumers.
According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, raw sugar prices
in the United States are almost three times the world price. 10
The Senate bill states that, "unless action is taken to prevent
circumvention, circumvention of the tariff-rate quotas will
continue and will ultimately destroy United States sugar policy."
11 It requires the Secretary of Agriculture to identify "imports of
articles that are circumventing tariff-rate quotas on sugars,
syrup, or sugar-containing products" 12 and the President, once
such items have been identified, to raise trade barriers on those
products.
This is bad policy; maintaining these quotas hurts U.S. trading
partners and American consumers. As a study published by the Cato
Institute explains,
America's sugar quotas pose a threat to multilateral and
regional trade negotiations. U.S. trading partners routinely and
rightly point to quotas as being inconsistent with U.S. demands for
more open markets abroad. The sugar program has become an obstacle
to lowering foreign trade barriers to U.S. exports. 13
The Trade Adjustment Assistance portion of the Senate bill also
mandates assistance for farmers, even though the recent farm bill
14 increases subsidies to farmers to $182 billion over 10 years.
Such subsidies are non-tariff barriers that thwart trade and
encourage overproduction, putting downward pressure on agricultural
prices. As a result, underdeveloped countries that rely heavily on
agricultural production find it difficult to compete with
artificially low prices on U.S. agricultural goods. According to
one recent article in The New York Times,
the United States is flooding the world market with inexpensive
corn, wheat, rice and soybeans, which are sold at half what it
costs to produce the grain. That leads to artificially low world
prices, which in turn undercut grain produced by farmers in
countries that do not give subsidies. The grain market becomes
distorted, domestic markets are ruined for producers overseas and
their chances of making inroads into foreign markets are reduced.
15
Moreover, the Senate bill would allow U.S. farmers to receive up
to $10,000 if it could be shown that imports had "contributed
importantly" to a decrease in the price of an agricultural
commodity by 20 percent or more in a year. 16 The Senate bill,
however, limits this benefit only to farms that have an adjusted
gross income of less than $2,500,000; wealthy farmers would be
eligible for this benefit. Every dollar spent on such subsidies is
another dollar spent against free trade and the prospect of a
better life for the world's poor.
Farming, like any other business activity, comes with
unavoidable risks. Yet American farmers demand a free market when
they make a profit but want any losses to be socialized.
Welfare-to-work measures have ended welfare "as we know it" for
most Americans; it should be ended for the American farmer as well.
According to a recent article in The Wall Street Journal,
rich countries now spend $1 billion per day to subsidize their
agricultural sectors. This policy succeeds in creating both more
expensive food in the developed countries and poorer farmers in the
developing one[s]. 17
As the world's largest agricultural exporter, the United
States should be taking the lead in lifting barriers, not creating
them.
Additional Concerns
Reneging on TPA?
The purpose of TPA is to grant the President clear authority
to negotiate trade agreements, not to provide provisional authority
that Congress could decide to take back for any reason. Including a
provision in the trade bill that allows Congress to revoke TPA will
leave America's potential trading partners questioning the
credibility of this grant of authority.
Both versions of the trade bill now in conference require
extensive consultation with Congress before and during trade
negotiations, especially with respect to such politically sensitive
items as textiles and apparel, agriculture goods, or U.S. trade
remedy laws. Regarding agricultural trade barriers, for example,
the Senate version of the trade bill would require the President
to
consult with the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee
on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
of the Senate [as to] whether it is appropriate for the United
States to agree to further tariff reductions based on the
conclusions reached in the assessment, and how all applicable
negotiating objectives will be met. 18
Certainly, both President Bush and U.S. Trade Representative
Robert Zoellick can be expected to recognize that communicating
with Congress will be essential to ensuring the passage of any
trade agreement. Yet some Members of Congress insist on including a
"procedural disapproval resolution" in the trade bill to allow
Congress to open an agreement rather than put it to an up-or-down
vote when Members feel they have not been consulted sufficiently by
the Administration. The House bill, for example, states that "the
trade authorities procedures under that Act shall not apply to any
implementing bill submitted with respect to such trade agreement or
agreements." 19 Such a provision frustrates the intent of TPA and
should not be included in the final legislation.
The Senate version of TPA includes an amendment (S. Amdt. 3382)
sponsored by Larry Craig (R-ID) and Mark Dayton (D-MN) that would
give Congress the right to amend any part of a trade agreement that
involves U.S. trade remedy laws, such as antidumping and
countervailing duty laws. Other countries view these trade remedy
laws as some of the most protectionist aspects of U.S. trade
policy. Including the Dayton-Craig amendment in the final trade
bill would have counterproductive consequences. It would legitimize
the efforts of countries to exclude their own politically sensitive
subjects, such as agricultural subsidies or their own antidumping
laws, from negotiations, and it would undermine both the
Administration's trade agenda and its credibility in conducting
trade negotiations.
Around the world, trade remedy laws are being enacted to protect
industries. According to the Chicago-based law firm of Mayer,
Brown, Rowe & Maw, an average of 313 antidumping cases per year
were initiated between 1999 and 2001, compared with an average of
139 cases per year during the 1980s. 20 As Cato Institute trade
policy analyst Dan Ikenson points out, 62 countries now have
anti-dumping laws on their books, and the United States is the
third largest target of antidumping actions. 21
As more countries adopt trade remedy laws and become more
skilled in using antidumping laws, cases against the United States
are expected to increase. Therefore, it is important that President
Bush be able to negotiate agreements involving U.S. trade remedy
laws that are not threatened by the prospect of vitiating
congressional amendment. Without that assurance, foreign countries
will be reluctant to enter into trade negotiations with the United
States, and the President will be deprived of the opportunity to
address the increasing use of antidumping cases against U.S.
exporters.
Providing Health Care Assistance.
For the first time, the TAA provisions in the Senate and House
trade bills include health care coverage assistance for displaced
workers in the form of refundable tax credits. Both bills
incorporate similar financing structures, but the methods for
implementing these credits differ. The Senate version imposes
strict limitations on recipients and states, while the House
version provides a more flexible approach for recipients and
states.
These and others issues will need to be resolved in ways that do
not undermine the market, that maximize patient choice, and that
provide flexibility for states to design affordable private
purchasing options. (See text box, "The Health Care Tax Credit in
the Trade Package.")

Crafting a clean version of TPA
Mounting evidence indicates that increased trade provides
significant benefits to the average American family as well as to
U.S. manufacturers and farmers. To increase trade, however,
Congress must give President Bush clean trade promotion authority.
The conference committee reconciling the two versions of the trade
bill should:
-
Reject the Dayton-Craig amendment in the Senate
version. It is important that President Bush have the authority
to negotiate all areas of U.S. trade policy, even U.S. trade-remedy
laws such as antidumping and countervailing duty laws. The
Dayton-Craig amendment would give Congress the right to amend any
part of a trade agreement that involves these laws, which are
viewed by other countries as some of the most protectionist aspects
of U.S. trade policy. Including such a measure in the final bill
would both legitimize efforts by other countries to exclude their
own politically sensitive subjects from negotiations and undermine
the credibility of the United States.
-
Remove the "procedural disapproval resolution" in the House
version. This resolution would allow Congress to amend an
agreement if Members believe the President has not consulted with
them sufficiently on an agreement. It is bad trade policy.
Potential trading partners need the assurance that, with TPA, once
an agreement is negotiated with the United States, Congress will
vote either up or down on it without the possibility of
amendment.
-
Eliminate special provisions for industries. Special
protections for such sectors as the U.S. sugar and agricultural
industries should not be included in the trade bill. These
industries are not only key in many of the underdeveloped
countries, but often their only likely resource for economic
growth. Giving these industries special provisions in the trade
bill would undermine the Administration's efforts to encourage
these underdeveloped countries to lower their trade barriers and
open their markets to U.S. goods.
Conclusion
President Bush's trade agenda is at a critical juncture. If the
President is not able to secure trade promotion authority without
the Dayton-Craig amendment and the "disapproval resolution," his
trade agenda will be difficult to achieve. Including special
provisions for the sugar and agricultural industries--key sectors
in underdeveloped countries--would also undermine the President's
efforts to advance free trade.
Increased trade with other countries is vital to American
families, farmers, and manufacturers. In order to secure the
benefits that trade offers, President Bush needs Congress to send
him a trade bill that includes a clean version of trade promotion
authority.
Sara J.
Fitzgerald is a Trade Policy Analyst in the Center for
International Trade and Economics, Nina Owcharenko is
a Health Care Policy Analyst in Domestic Policy, and Aaron Schavey
is a former Policy Analyst in the Center for International Trade
and Economics at The Heritage Foundation.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. The House passed H. Res. 450 on June 26, 2002, agreeing to
Senate amendments to H.R. 3009 and incorporating various other
trade measures, such as H.R. 3005. For the status of H.R. 3009, see
http://thomas.loc.gov.
2. The North American Free Trade Agreement and bilateral
agreements with Israel and Jordan.
3. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, "Trade Promotion
Authority--Overview," at http://www.ustr.gov/new/2001-12-03-tp
a-overview.htm.
4. Trade negotiations launched by the WTO Doha (Qatar)
Ministerial began in January 2002 and are scheduled to end by
January 1, 2005.
5. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, "Trade and American
Families," at http://www.ustr.gov/new/2001-12-03-tpa-families.htm.
6. Sara J. Fitzgerald, "H.R. 3019: Undermining Trade Promotion
Authority," Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 795,
December 5, 2001.
7. Aaron Schavey, "How Trade Promotion Authority Bolsters the
U.S. Manufacturing Industry," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.
1561, June 21, 2002.
8. National Association of Manufacturers, "Absence of Chilean
Trade Agreement Costing U.S. Over $800 Million per Year," October
2001.
9. See, for example, Aaron Schavey, "The Ailing Steel Industry
Needs Less Government Intervention, Not More," Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 1519, February 22, 2002, and Sara J. Fitzgerald,
"$175 Billion Barrier to Trade," Heritage Foundation Web Memo,
March 15, 2002.
10. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural
Service, "World Sugar Situation," at http://www.fas.usda.gov/htp/sugar/2002/May/sugsit.htm.
11. H.R. 3009,Title X--Miscellaneous Provisions, Section
1002(a)(5).
12. Ibid., Section 1002(c)(A).
13. Mark Groombridge, "America's Bittersweet Sugar Policy," Cato
Institute Trade Briefing Paper No. 13, December 4, 2001.
14. Public Law 107-171.
15. Elizabeth Becker, "Raising Farm Subsidies, U.S. Widens
International Rift," The New York Times, June 14, 2002.
16. The Senate bill defines the term "contributed importantly"
as meaning "a cause which is important but not necessarily more
important than any other cause." The determination of whether
imports "contributed importantly" to the decline in the price of an
agriculture commodity is made by the Secretary of Agriculture. See
H.R. 3009, Section 291(3)(A)(B).
17. Carl Bildt, "Want to Help Africa? Stop Farm Subsidies," The
Wall Street Journal Europe, June 18, 2002.
18. H.R. 3009, Section 2104(b)(1), "Consultations and
Assessment."
19. H. Res. 450, Section 2105(B)(i), "For Lack of Notice or
Consultations."
20. Cliff Stevenson, "Global Trade Protection Report 2002,"
Mayer, Brown, Rowe and Maw, April 2002.
21. Dan Ikenson, "Dump Antidumping Regs," National Review
Online, August 27, 2001.