Vital Provisions
The
following provisions currently in the draft of H.R. 5005, The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 are so vital, that if weakened or
removed the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) chances for
success would be significantly decreased:
1.
Require
Flexibility in Human Resource Rules:
Section
761: Allows the
Secretary of DHS with the Director of OPM to establish and adjust
the human resources rules of the Department.
-
The federal
programs that will comprise the DHS all bring with them unique sets
of personnel rules.
The Administration must have the flexibility to create one modern,
flexible personnel department free from politicization by
Congress. Section
761 is an excellent compromise but must be approached as a
compromise. If it is the starting point for further amendments from
the floor it will turn into a disaster.
2.
Ensure Budget Flexibility:
Section
763: 2% budget
transfer authority for 2 years.
-
The
Secretary of the DHS will need budget flexibility to meet the every
changing threat posed by terrorism and to expedite the transition
period. However, 2%
for 2 years is a bit thin, at least in the early years of the DHS's
existence. Instead the
Congress should provide for 5% flexibility (as the President
requested) for 5 years and should consider making such power
permanent and reviewing what percent is necessary at the end of
that 5 year period.
3. Provide a
Legal Framework to Promote Public-Private
Cooperation:
Section 753
& 754: Address
liability issues for the producers of anti-terrorism technology
(the SAFETY Act).
- The United
States develops some of the most advanced technologies for civilian
and military applications in the World. Unfortunately, manufactures
will be reluctant to invested time and millions of dollars on
developing technologies to prevent terrorism if courts are going to
hold them liable for incidences when their technology does not
prevent an attack. In
order to mobilize the full force of American industry for the war
on terrorism, this issue must be resolved through legal
protections.
Section
724: Protection
from FOIA of voluntarily shared information related to critical
infrastructure protection.
- FOIA is a
generally beneficially tool to hold government agencies accountable
to the public.
However, concerns over FOIA make the private sector reluctant to
share information regarding infrastructure vulnerabilities. Since the private sector
owns 85% of all critical infrastructure in the United States, its
cooperation will be vital to protection efforts. Limited FOIA exemptions
increase the likelihood of cooperation.
- The Congress
should consider building upon this philosophy and review the
relevant "right to know" and anti-trust laws and make necessary
modification to ensure they do not also leave the United States
vulnerable to terrorism.
4. Ensure a
Multi-Use Focus is Retained for the DHS
Section
101 (D)
:
Added "acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises
and emergency planning" to the DHS's mission.
-
Recognizes the necessity of a multi-use nature for the
Department.
Section 402
(2): Transfers
the United States Coast Guard to the DHS.
- The Coast
Guard is a vital component of the DHS's border security mission and
including its multi-mission culture in the Department will
contribute greatly to the overall success of the
DHS.
Section 501
3(D), 4, & 6: These
provisions basically consolidate responsibility for all elements of
the federal response to all disasters with the Undersecretary for
Emergency Preparedness and response.
- Federal
response programs have been fragmented since at least 1996. For years an artificial
distinction has been made between crisis management and consequence
management with responsibility of each role given to different
agencies. This creates
confusion both during and in planning for
disasters.
Section 502
(1): Transfers
FEMA to the DHS
- FEMA's all
hazards approach to natural, accidental, and terrorism related
disasters will be an asset to the new department. Further, state and local
agencies will rely on one set of first responders regardless of the
nature of an incident, necessitating the designation of one federal
agency to work with them in all occasions.
- For more
detail, please see Heritage Backgrounder #1571, "Why a Multi-use
Approach is Essential to the Success of the DHS"
5.Continue to
Ensure the Independence of the OHS
Sections
1001 - 1007: Establishes
through legislation the Homeland Security Council and an Executive
Secretary with a staff at its head.
- This
provision is the maximum legislation the Congress should pass
governing the HSC and the OHS. Any attempt to further
legislate the authorities or responsibilities of the HSC and OHS
would weaken
the President's decision-making abilities significantly and hamper
coordination. The HSC
and OHS should continue to be modeled after the NSC.
6.Lay the
Groundwork for an Intelligence Fusion Center
Section
212: Describes
the missions of the Intelligence Analysis Center of the DHS as (1)
Correlating and evaluating information and intelligence from all
sources. (B) Producing all source analysis. (C) Dissemination of
such assessments. (D) Sharing of information with state and local
agencies.
- Even with
the establishment of the DHS, other federal, state and local
agencies will still have a vital role to play in homeland
security. Assuring
these institutions have access to vital information will be
critical in the overall success of the homeland security
mission.
- For more
details, please see Heritage Backgrounder #1536, "Breaking Down
Intelligence Barriers for Homeland Security."
Positive Provisions
The following
provisions are generally positive and will strengthen the DHS. They should be retained at
all costs or, in some specific cases modified slightly to further
improve their value.
Title
I:
Section 101 (D): Added "acting as a focal point
regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning to the
DHS's mission.
- Recognizes the necessary
multi-use nature of the Department.
- For more detail, please
see Heritage Backgrounder #1571, "Why a Multi-use Approach is
Essential to the Success of the DHS"
Section 102
(3): Adds ensuring that IT
systems and databases of the DHS are compatible with each other and
those of other Departments.
- Compatible IT systems will
lay the groundwork for the efficient sharing of terrorist related
intelligence and information through an intelligence fusion
center.
Title II:
Section 205: Establishes a Privacy Officer and
directs that officer to conduct an assessment of proposed rules of
the DHS on the effect on personal privacy.
Section 206: Vests responsibility for improving the
security of federal computer systems in the Secretary.
Section 212:
Describes the missions of the Intelligence Analysis Center of the
DHS as (1) Correlating and evaluating information and intelligence
from all sources. (B) Producing all source analysis. (C)
Dissemination of such assessments. (D) Sharing of information with
state and local agencies. Also notes the Sense of
Congress that this center should be modeled on the Army's
Information Dominance Center.
- This section establishes the Intelligence Analysis Center to
function as an intelligence fusion unit. Even with the establishment
of the DHS, other federal, state and local agencies will still have
a vital role to play in homeland security. Assuring these institutions
have access to vital information will be critical in the overall
success of the homeland security mission.
- For more details, please see Heritage Backgrounder #1536,
"Breaking Down Intelligence Barriers for Homeland
Security."
TITLE
III:
Section 301: Broadens the responsibilities of the
President's proposed Undersecretary for Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures to encompass all science
and technology issues.
Builds on the recommendations of the House Science and Energy and
Commerce Committees.
- The Committees recommended creating a 5th
Undersecretary to handle science and technology issues. This approach would have
created duplicative responsibility between the Undersecretary for
S&T and CBRN Countermeasures. The Select Committee's
approach correctly elevates the need for non-CBRN research without
creating unnecessary bureaucracy.
Section 306 (a)(C): (Pryce Amendment to the Delay Amendment)
Provides the Secretary with flexibility in determining the criteria
necessary for establishing university based centers for homeland
security.
TITLE
IV:
Section 402 (2): Transfers the United States Coast Guard to
the DHS.
- The Coast Guard is a vital component of the DHS's border
security mission and including its multi-mission culture in the
Department will contribute greatly to the overall success of the
DHS.
- For more detail, please see Heritage Backgrounder #1571,
"Why a Multi-use Approach is Essential to the Success of the
DHS"
Section 403: Details the relationship between the DHS and
the Department of State in regard to visa issuance. Specifically makes the
Secretary of Homeland Security responsible for issuing regulations
related to the administering of immigration laws, develop training
programs for consular officers of the Department of State. Also provides for the
stationing of DHS officials at oversees consulates for training and
oversight purposes and provides for the assignment of DHS officials
to terrorist lookout committees.
- The Select Committee has generally divided responsibility
between the DHS and State appropriately. DHS should be responsible
for policy and training, while State should retain authority over
consular affairs officers.
- NEXT STEP: To facilitate this arrangement the Visa Office at
the Department of State should be transferred to the DHS.
- For more details, see Heritage Backgrounder #1569, "Why DHS
Should Control Visas."
Section 407 (b): Provides a sunset provision for Section 407
(a), which retains the TSA as a distinct entity with the DHS, after
two years.
- Generally, the Secretary of Homeland Security should have
the authority to consolidate functions and rationalize
programs. TSA should
not be exempt from this.
Section 409: Extends the deadline for deployment of EDS
machines at all airports by 1 year.
- When Congress passed the Aviation Security Act last year, it
established unrealistic deadlines. Providing for an extension,
is merely recognizing reality.
Section 411: Transfers responsibility for immigration
enforcement to the DHS and establishes the Bureau of Border
Security to manage this program.
- The INS has proven to be a dysfunctional agency unable to
meet the security needs of the country. Further, enforcing
immigration laws is different from promoting citizenship and
requires unique skills and the two do not mutually reinforce each
other (as is the case with the Coast Guard and FEMA).
TITLE
V:
Section 501 3(D), 4, & 6: These provisions basically
consolidate responsibility for all elements of the federal response
to all disasters with the Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness
and response.
- Federal response programs have been fragmented since at
least 1996. For years
an artificial distinction has been made between crisis management
and consequence management with responsibility of each role given
to different agencies.
This creates confusion both during and in planning for
disasters.
Section 502 (1): Transfers FEMA to the DHS
- FEMA's all hazards approach to natural, accidental, and
terrorism related disasters will be a vital asset to the new
department. Further,
state and local agencies will rely on one set of first responders
regardless of the nature of an incident, necessitating the
designation of one federal agency to work with them in all
occasions.
- For more detail, please see Heritage Backgrounder #1571,
"Why a Multi-use Approach is Essential to the Success of the
DHS"
TITLE
VI:
Section 604: Creates an Office for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties to review the effect on and accused cases of abuse of
civil rights and civil liberties of the new department. Also provides for making
such information public
- As the federal government continues to develop homeland
security policies, ensuring that new programs do not deconstruct
fundamental American liberties is essential.
TITLE
VII:
Section 724: Protection from FOIA of voluntarily shared
information related to critical infrastructure protection.
- FOIA is a generally beneficially tool to hold government
agencies accountable to the public. However, concerns over FOIA
make the private sector reluctant to share information regarding
infrastructure vulnerabilities. Since the private sector
owns 85% of all critical infrastructure in the United States, its
cooperation will be vital to protection efforts. Limited FOIA exemptions
increase the likelihood of cooperation.
- The Congress should consider building upon this philosophy
and review the relevant "right to know" and anti-trust laws and
make necessary modification to ensure they do not also leave the
United States vulnerable to terrorism.
Section 731: Grants the Secretary authority to conduct
R&D outside of normal procurement regulations in accord with
the powers given to the Secretary of Defense under Section 2371 of
Title 10 of the U.S. Code.
Section 753 & 754: Address liability issues for the
producers of anti-terrorism technology.
Section 761: allows the Secretary of DHS with the Director
of OPM to establish and adjust the human resources rules of the
Department.
- The federal programs that will comprise the DHS all bring
with them unique sets of personnel rules. The Administration must
have the flexibility to create one modern, flexible personnel
department free from politicization by Congress.
Section 761 is an excellent compromise but must be approached as a
compromise. If it is the starting point for further amendments from
the floor it will turn into a disaster.
Section 763: 2% budget transfer authority for 2 years.
- The intent of this provision is admirable. The Secretary of the DHS
will need budget flexibility to meet the every changing threat
posed by terrorism and to expedite the transition period. However, 2% for 2 years is
a bit thin, at least in the early years of the DHS's
existence. Instead the
Congress should provide for 5% flexibility (as the President
requested) for 5 years and should consider making such power
permanent and reviewing what percent is necessary at the end of the
5 year period.
Section 769: Establishes an office of International Affairs
to exchange information, engage in joint R&D, conduct joint
response training and exercises.
Section 770: Discontinuation of TIPS
TITLE
VIII:
Section 881 (d): Allows officials who have already received
the advice and consent of the Senate to service as acting officials
in DHS pending the appointment of a replacement and provided they
are serving in a similar capacity. And allows such individuals to
serve in that capacity should they be nominated by the President
without having to be confirmed by the Senate a second time.
Section 815: Prohibits a National ID.
TITLE
X:
Sections 1001 - 1007: Establishes through legislation the
Homeland Security Council and an Executive Secretary with a staff
at its head.
- This provision is the maximum legislation the Congress
should pass governing the HSC and the OHS. Any attempt to further
legislate the authorities or responsibilities of the HSC and OHS
would weaken the President's decision-making abilities
significantly and hamper coordination. The HSC and OHS should
continue to be modeled after the National Security Council,
including the National Security Advisor and staff. This language accomplishes
this.
Poor Provisions
The following
provisions should be amended:
TITLE
IV:
Section 402 (5),
(6), (7) & (8): Consolidates first responder assistance
programs, including the Office of National Preparedness (FEMA),
Office of Domestic Preparedness (DOJ), National Domestic
Preparedness Office (FBI) and the Domestic Emergency Support Teams
(DOJ) under the Undersecretary for Border and transportation.
- Consolidating federal grants programs and other assistance
for state and local first responders should be one of the primary
objectives of the DHS.
However, placing this kind of assistance in the division of the DHS
responsible for securing America's borders and modes of transports
does not make sense.
All federal assistance for crisis management and consequence
management functions should be consolidated and located either in
the Department's state and local coordination division or under the
Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness and response. These two divisions will
have the correct focus on the needs of states and localities and on
responding to attacks.
Political concerns that certain first responder groups may be
undervalued by either of these divisions, should be rectified by
ensuring that that division takes into account that groups
concerns, not by placing support programs in a completely unrelated
section of the DHS.
Section 452, 454, & 455: These sections outline the
relationship between the Department of Treasury and the DHS
regarding the collection of Customs Revenue Functions. Section 452 retains
authority for customs revenue collection in Treasury and prevents
the Secretary of DHS from consolidating rationalizing these
functions. Section 454
prevents the Secretary of DHS from reallocating funds designated
for the Customs Service. Section 455 requires DHS
submit a separate budget request for the Customs Service.
- Retaining authority for collection of customs revenues in
the Department of Treasury, but through the DHS is not a harmful
arrangement. However,
the details of these sections inhibit the Secretary's flexibility
to meet changing threats and prevent a full integration of the
Customs Service into the DHS.
TITLE
VIII:
Section 881 (f): Transportation Trust Funds
Michael
Scardaville is a Policy Analyst for The Heritage
Foundation.