In the immediate aftermath of three
Senate Medicare prescription drug proposals collapsing one after
another for want of consensus in the Senate, the Senate leadership
is scrambling to cobble together some sort of compromise package,
trying desperately to combine disparate elements into a coherent
legislative proposal that will attract broad political support.
In undertaking this effort, Senate
Majority Leader Thomas Daschle (D-SD) reminded his Senate
colleagues that they should remember the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic
Coverage Act. In that year, with the support of the Reagan
Administration, Congress enacted a Medicare prescription drug
benefit, garnered massive congressional support, but the bill was
repealed one year later. The provisions of the 1988 law, instead of
winning favor among senior citizens, engendered a huge backlash
among the beneficiaries themselves, largely because of the design
and financing of the program, including the Medicare prescription
drug benefit.
Rostenkowski Remembers. Writing in the
July 24, 2002 edition of The Washington Post, former Congressman
Dan Rostenkowski, the once powerful Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, who served from 1959 to 1995, recalled that
experience and concluded that Congress is now engaged in an unreal
debate.
He writes, "My fear is that we're witnessing an
unrealistic debate that will, at best, yield nothing more than a
crop of partisan and empty talking points."1
"A Bit More Liberal." Rostenkowski, a
once prominent leader of liberal House Democrats, reminds us that
the 1988 Medicare prescription drug benefit was based on the simple
principle that the Medicare beneficiaries who got the benefit
should pay for the benefit. But that in "today's free spending
atmosphere", he notes, the current Medicare drug proposals are "a
bit more liberal".
As Rostenkowski relates, under the 1988
Medicare bill, beneficiaries would secure Medicare payment for 80
percent of their drug costs, after paying a $710 annual deductible,
and an income-based premium payment starting at $4 per month and
capped at $800 per year for the wealthiest retiree.2 The former House Ways and Means Chairman
estimates that in today's dollars, the financing requirements of
the Medicare bill that liberal Democrats supported in 1988 would
raise the basic monthly premium from $4 to $8, the deductible would
rise to roughly $1,100 per year, and the maximum premium would
double to around $1,600 per year. 3
In 2002, the House Republican Medicare
plan (H.R 4924) would require an average premium of $408 per year,
with a $250 deductible, and a sliding scale Medicare payment of
prescription drug costs up to $3,700, at which point catastrophic
coverage would take over. The leading Senate Democratic plan would
require a $300 annual premium, no deductible at all, no cap on
benefits, and a $4,000 limit before catastrophic coverage would
take over. As Rostenkowski observes, the range of costs of "the
dueling plans" runs from $350 billion to $800 billion over ten
years. "That's not chump change, especially considering that the
Medicare program is already unstable and expected to run out of
money fairly early in this century unless some big changes are
made," he writes.4
Mistakes Were Made. Rostenkowski says
that the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 failed because
of serious political mis-steps and mistakes in its implementation.
But the 1988 bill was in fact, the product of extensive internal
deliberations at HHS, preliminary public hearings around the
country, and months of careful consideration in the House Ways and
Means Committee, the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and the
Senate Finance Committee and Senate Labor Committee.
In other words, Congressional
consideration of the 1988 Medicare drug program was a model of
decorum compared to the current Senate roller coaster process. But
there were many reasons why the Medicare catastrophic bill,
including the drug benefit, failed.
For Members of Congress and
congressional staff, wrestling with the same issues 14 years later,
the lessons are worth remembering. In the attached Backgrounder
from 1996, The Last Time
Congress Reformed Health Care: A Lawmaker's Guide to the Medicare
Catastrophic Debacle, Director of Domestic Policy
Robert Moffit, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary at HHS who was
present at the creation of the legislation, recounts the story of
the rise and fall of the biggest Medicare expansion in the
program's history.
Robert
E. Moffit is Director of Domestic Policy at The Heritage
Foundation
Endnotes
1 Dan Rostenkowski, " We Filled The
Prescription," The Washington Post, July 24, 2002, p. A-19.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.