On
June 6, President George W. Bush unveiled the most extensive
homeland security proposal of his Administration--the creation of a
Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to consolidate
many of the federal agencies that have missions related to homeland
security. The President had previously established the White House
Office of Homeland Security (OHS) to fill a much-needed
coordinating role for those agencies' activities.
Legislation to implement the President's
proposal has been passed by the House of Representatives and is
being reviewed in the Senate. In addition, the Administration has
worked with Congress to pass strong homeland security measures in
the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) and Aviation Security Act (P.L.
107-71), and the White House has released the nation's first
homeland security budget to focus Washington's energies on a number
of long-neglected policies.
Despite such progress, a number of key
policy issues and vulnerabilities that were not addressed before
September 11 remain to be dealt with this year. For example,
federal agencies continue to compartmentalize terror-related
intelligence information and block rapid access to it. America's
police, emergency medical services, fire departments, and public
health workers are not adequately prepared to respond to
mass-casualty terrorist attacks of any type, let alone those using
a weapon of mass destruction.
Federally sponsored training exercises
should be conducted for federal, state, and local personnel to help
them prepare for a broad spectrum of possible scenarios. In
addition, because there are only very limited means of detecting
the beginning stages of a bioterrorist attack, a nationwide health
surveillance network should be set up to enable local, state, and
federal decision-makers to respond in the early stages when rapid
responses are most critical.
The
role of the National Guard in homeland security has not yet been
adequately defined, despite the fact that the Guard is uniquely
positioned to assist state and local efforts during and after such
attacks. The Department of Defense (DOD) should redefine the
Guard's current support role for the active forces so that Guard
units would be better able to respond to homeland emergencies
without seriously affecting the military.
Finally, Congress lacks efficient
mechanisms to legislate and provide oversight of federal homeland
security efforts. It should restructure its committees, with new
standing committees to complement the establishment of the new
Department of Homeland Security.
All
of these areas should be top priorities for the remainder of 2002
and next year to target the federal government's resources more
effectively on homeland security.
Federal Homeland Security: A Progress
Report
After September 11, the immediate focus of
the Bush Administration was on finding ways to protect the country
from further terrorist threats, assess the resources available for
protecting the homeland, and establish a budget for homeland
security. Since the establishment of the Office of Homeland
Security last October, the Administration and Congress have sought
to address a number of serious related concerns.
The
President, for example, included innovative proposals in his first
homeland security budget to improve the way Washington assists
first responders and to augment the nation's stockpile of
medications. New customs initiatives and agreements with America's
trade partners sought to improve commercial security. State and
local government roles were integrated more fully into federal
security strategies for everyday security concerns as well as
special events, such as the Olympics. In addition, a new warning
system was developed to communicate information about potential
terrorist threats.
It
is President Bush's proposal for the creation of a Department of
Homeland Security, however, that will have the greatest effect by
targeting federal resources more effectively to the mission of
homeland defense. The consolidation of the majority of the 100
federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities into one
department will entail the most massive restructuring of the
federal government since World War II and, if implemented
correctly, will result in a more effective homeland security
policy.
Since President Bush presented his
proposal, Congress has been working to implement his vision. The
House of Representatives moved quickly by passing the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (H.R. 5005) on July 26, 2002. This bill, while
not perfect, closely reflects the President's plan. However, the measure is moving
more slowly in the Senate.
The
Governmental Affairs Committee, led by Chairman Joseph Lieberman
(D-CT), spent much of July developing an entirely different
proposal for establishing a new Department. The
legislation currently before the Senate denies the President the
ability to consolidate redundant homeland security programs and the
flexibility to quickly adapt the DHS's priorities to a changing
terrorist threat. Wisely, the President has
vowed to veto any of the provisions of this bill that would be an
impediment to an effective homeland security policy.
The
Office of Homeland Security, which has become an important advisory
body for the President on reorganizing the government, should
continue to serve in this capacity, working independently from and
cooperatively with the new department to coordinate federal
homeland security policy throughout the remaining agencies. The effectiveness of the
President's reorganization in preventing further attacks on America
will be affected by the specific details of the restructuring
determined by Congress.
Since September 11, Members of Congress
have proposed scores of bills, amendments, and resolutions related
to homeland security but have enacted only a small
percentage of them. Congress passed, and the President signed, the
USA PATRIOT Act and the Aviation Security Act last fall, and the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (P.L. 107-173)
earlier this year. Each of these laws is designed to address
fundamental security challenges facing the country. The USA PATRIOT
Act gives law enforcement the ability to combat terrorists with
21st century technology. The Aviation Security Act and the Border
Security Act seek to make it more difficult for terrorists and
their weapons to enter the country.
These efforts, well-intentioned as they
are, are just the first steps the federal government must take to
improve homeland security. As Congress debates the establishment of
the Department of Homeland Security, many additional efforts should
be undertaken. A review of what has been accomplished thus far will
be useful in determining what needs to be done next.
Determining Coherent Budget Priorities for
Homeland Security
Last
February, before announcing his intention to create a new
Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security, the President
released his fiscal year (FY) 2003 budget request, which included
funding for homeland security. This is the first budget proposal
ever submitted by a President that seeks to coordinate and
prioritize the homeland security policy, and it provides a baseline
for future budgets.
For
2003, the President has outlined four new initiatives to address
areas in which federal policies before September 11 were
particularly weak:
- Using
21st century technology to secure the homeland in the future,
- Supporting first responders,
- Defending against bioterrorism, and
- Securing America's borders.
These four areas account for approximately
55 percent of the President's $37.7 billion homeland security
budget request. They include a tenfold increase in assistance for
first responders and a 319 percent increase in funds for
bioterrorism preparedness.
President Bush and OHS Director Tom Ridge
have demonstrated their willingness to tackle the most difficult
homeland security problems facing the United States. For example,
while more than a half-dozen federal agencies currently operate
grant and training programs to support first responders, these
programs are neither coordinated nor driven by a common goal. As
the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore
Commission) reported last December, this disjointed approach
reduces the effectiveness of federal assistance.
Rather than requesting more money for
scattershot programs, the President's First Responder Initiative
provides a clear focus for federal first-responder assistance,
consolidating these programs within the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). The Office of National
Preparedness has been created in FEMA to manage this initiative and
is in the process of developing guidelines for more efficient
implementation. Under the President's proposal, the newly organized
and improved FEMA would be consolidated into the new DHS, resulting
in a concise federal response program more closely linked to
general homeland security planning.
The
Department of Justice has not actively fought this proposal,
despite the potential loss of $3.5 billion in its FY 2003 budget.
One reason for its lack of opposition may be the role of OHS
Director Tom Ridge in advising the President on homeland security.
Many skeptics had predicted that the entrenched federal
bureaucracies and their Senate-confirmed leaders would resist
initiatives developed by a presidential appointee who lacks
statutory authority. Even critics now admit, however, that Ridge
"has had his greatest success in the budget and personnel
process," the very areas where it was
predicted that he would fail. While the creation of DHS may foster
fierce turf battles in Washington, the end result may demonstrate
that the OHS Director can effectively direct the allocation of
federal homeland security money as well as the efficient
reorganization of the federal government to enhance national
security.
The
FY 2003 budget request for homeland security illustrates the
Administration's priorities, including working with state and local
governments to address the concerns of America's communities. While
the federal government can do many things to make the nation more
secure, many essential tasks remain the responsibilities of state
and local governments and the private sector. Rather than dictating
what these entities should do, the Administration is encouraging an
active partnership based on cooperation.
The
focus on partnerships with state and local governments can result
in tighter implementation, more innovation, and long-term attention
to the mission. The establishment of a division within the
Department of Homeland Security that is committed to working with
state and local governments, as proposed by the President, would
encourage this process, placing a high priority on communication
across the various levels of government. It would facilitate
first-responder exercises, strategic planning, vulnerability
assessments, prevention, and other homeland security efforts.
Forging a National Strategy
Building on many of the concepts described
in the President's budget request for 2003, Governor Ridge released
the nation's first National Homeland Security Strategy on July 16,
2002. The Strategy provides
specific programs for improving homeland security in six areas:
intelligence and warning; border and transportation security;
domestic counterterrorism; critical infrastructure protection;
defense against terrorism with weapons of mass destruction; and
domestic preparedness.
The
goal of all of these initiatives is to increase the nation's
ability to prevent terrorist attacks by reducing America's
vulnerability. In accord with the President's priorities since
September 11, Governor Ridge and the Office of Homeland Security
have emphasized the need to incorporate state and local government,
as well as the private sector, as partners in this plan.
The
Strategy also lays the groundwork for the 2004 federal budget,
identifying the following seven priorities for that year:
- Improve
the FBI's ability to analyze intelligence and law enforcement
information,
- Improve
intelligence analysis and infrastructure protection efforts through
the DHS,
- Finalize the "Smart Borders"
program,
- Secure
international shipping and commerce,
- Re-invest in the United States Coast
Guard to modernize its fleet,
- Deploy
new sensors and procedures to prevent terrorism with weapons of
mass destruction,
- Develop
modern medicines and vaccines to respond to biological terrorism,
and
- Improve
information-sharing horizontally across the federal
government.
The
National Strategy builds on many of the programs discussed in this
paper and constructs an agenda for immediate implementation and
planning for future years. The Strategy should be used, first, to
guide the construction of the new Department of Homeland Security
and, eventually, to help the DHS to assist state and local
governments in implementing their own plans.
Stockpiling Pharmaceuticals
In
the wake of the September 11 attacks and the subsequent anthrax
attacks, the Administration made it clear that America's lack of
preparedness for biological terrorism is an unacceptable
vulnerability. In less than two months, the Administration
requested an additional $1.5 billion for FY 2002 to decrease that
vulnerability. These funds are being used to build up federal and
state pharmaceutical stockpiles, expand America's smallpox vaccine
supplies, expedite the Food and Drug Administration's
pharmaceutical development activities, increase bioterrorism
preparedness at the local level, expand the response capabilities
of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and improve
food safety. The Administration should be
applauded for quickly laying the groundwork in this critical
area.
As
the anthrax strike demonstrated, early treatment in the event of
bioterrorism is vital. The Administration has been most successful
thus far in building up the nation's stockpile of smallpox vaccine,
a vital component of the nation's anti-bioterrorism strategy.
On
September 11, the national stockpile contained 15.4 million doses,
which is woefully inadequate for a population of nearly 300 million
people. In November 2001, HHS awarded a contract of $428 million to
Acambis, Inc., to produce 209 million doses by the end of 2002. On
March 28, 2002, HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson announced that the
existing U.S. supply of the vaccine could be diluted up to five
times and still retain its potency--essentially expanding the
existing vaccine supply from 77 million doses to up to 150 million
doses. The next day, the French firm Aventis Pasteur announced that
it would donate more than 75 million doses that have been
stockpiled in its Pennsylvania facility for the past 30 years.
Because reducing America's vulnerability to smallpox was deemed to
be a national priority, by the end of 2002 there will be more than
enough vaccine available to protect all Americans from a smallpox
attack.
In
the event that future terrorists use contagious agents as a weapon,
having an adequate supply of vaccines will be instrumental in
limiting an outbreak. The new Department of Homeland Security
should play a central role both in maintaining pharmaceutical
stockpiles and in developing and executing a strategy for early
treatment.
Strengthening America's Borders
The
September 11 attacks shattered the myth that the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans buffered the United States from foreign threats. The
19 terrorists involved in that day's carnage were able to enter the
United States legally-although three had overstayed their visas. It
became clear that the U.S. border is porous not only to terrorists
wishing to enter, but also to their weapons--including weapons of
mass destruction. One easy point of entry has been the nation's
seaports: As of early 2002, less than 2 percent of the over 11
million cargo containers entering the United States every year was
inspected.
The
United States cannot completely close its borders, and stifling
immigration and travel contradicts the free and open nature of
America's democracy. Moreover, conducting comprehensive inspections
of every person and cargo container entering the United States
would be extraordinarily expensive and damaging to the economy.
The
Administration has faced a daunting task in making the borders more
secure against those who wish to cause the country harm while also
remaining open to legitimate travel and trade. It has adopted a
multi-pronged approach, relying both on traditional means (such as
new immigration regulations and additional border security
officers) and on innovative approaches (such as using advanced
technology, signing new international agreements, and establishing
public-private partnerships on security issues).
One
of the hallmarks of the Administration's border security policy
since September 11 is the signing of the Smart Border Agreements
with Canada and Mexico in December 2001 and March 2002,
respectively. These agreements, negotiated in large part by
Governor Ridge, include both the traditional and innovative
measures mentioned above and serve the unique economic and security
relationships that the United States has established with its two
neighbors. Immediately after September 11, economic relations with
these North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partners--valued
at nearly $1 trillion--appeared in jeopardy, as long lines grew at
America's ports of entry. In fact, since September 11, Mexico has
experienced a 20 percent decline in trade with the United States.
The
Smart Border Agreements attempt to alleviate the pressure posed by
tightened trade and travel security measures. First and foremost,
both agreements include new intergovernmental customs standards and
public-private partnerships to speed the passage of non-threatening
people and products across the border and allow border security
officials to focus their efforts on travelers and goods that are
suspect. Companies that qualify under these agreements will be
permitted in the accelerated inspection lanes at enhanced ports of
entry. They must first ensure the government that their entire
supply chain--from manufacturing to the showroom floor--is secure.
The first operational port with such accelerated lanes is in
Detroit, near the border with Windsor. As many as 100 companies
have already applied to be part of this program.
While improved security at points of entry
will make it more difficult for terrorists to transport personnel
or material over the northern and southern borders, they may still
find opportunities along America's unguarded borders. To address
this danger, the Smart Border Agreements also include provisions
for sharing intelligence and immigration information and
coordinating visa and asylum policies.
The
specific provisions of these agreements are in varying degrees of
implementation, but significant progress has been made, and
Governor Ridge continues to work with his Canadian and Mexican
counterparts. Having similar security standards in all three
countries will make it more difficult for terrorists and their
weapons to enter any of them.
The
Smart Border Agreements also can serve as a model for securing
global trade and commerce. Point-of-origin inspections of cargo and
travel documents that cannot be easily forged will help secure
trade and travel with all of America's friends and allies. The U.S.
Customs Container Security Initiative, announced in January 2002,
will provide screening services to sea containers before they reach
the United States. The objective of this initiative is, first, to
target the ports that send the highest volume of container traffic
into the United States: Nine ports have already signed on to the
program.
In
April 2002, the U.S. Customs Service unveiled the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) to provide advantages
similar to the Smart Border Agreements with security-minded foreign
companies from other nations that trade with the United States.
C-TPAT rewards companies that ensure the security of their supply
chain, regardless of their location, by accelerating the processing
of their products at customs inspections stations at the ports of
entry. This multifaceted approach to enhancing point-of-origin
inspection systems would allow customs inspectors to focus on cargo
originating from sources that are of greater risk because their
security measures are not known.
The
Administration has also sought to strengthen the federal agencies
that are responsible for securing the border. The President's FY
2003 budget request seeks a substantial increase in border security
personnel--an additional 1,160 Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) inspectors and 570 Border Patrol agents--as well as a
tenfold increase in the federal investment in developing an
entry-exit monitoring system.
Congress has also made border security a
priority since September 11. The USA PATRIOT Act, passed last
October, provides additional personnel for securing the northern
border, expresses the sense of Congress that a mechanism is needed
to monitor entry and exit of visa holders, requires the FBI to
share more information with the Department of State, and makes it
more difficult for terrorists to enter the country and easier to
deport them by redefining "terrorist activity" for immigration
purposes.
On
May 14, the President signed the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Reform Act of 2002, an important step in improving border security.
Specifically, it authorizes appropriations for additional border
security personnel and technology, requires that the law
enforcement and intelligence entities more effectively share
terror-related information with the Consular Affairs division of
the State Department and INS, establishes additional requirements
for INS implementation of an entry and exit monitoring system,
restricts visas to citizens of countries designated as state
sponsors of terrorism, reforms the visa waiver program, and
establishes a program for monitoring foreign students studying in
the United States.
Consolidating all the agencies that are
responsible for securing the nation's borders-- including the
services of the Border Patrol, INS, the new Transportation Security
Agency, and Visa Processing--under a new DHS would help to ensure
that border security personnel are more adequately prepared and
better organized to deal with terrorist incidents. Regrettably,
both the House and Senate bills establishing the DHS create
obstacles to such consolidation.
In
the House bill, the Customs Service is retained as a "distinct
entity," preventing its consolidation with other border security
programs. The Senate bill not only retains Customs as a "distinct
entity," but removes the Coast Guard, Border Patrol, and
immigration enforcement activities from the authority of the Border
and Transportation Security Directorate. The Senate bill further
prevents the Secretary of Homeland Security from consolidating
functions of programs created by law or transferring authorities
between directorates. The result would be an unacceptable
disorganization of security efforts at the nation's points of
entry.
Developing a Partnership with State and
Local Governments
As
noted above, both the President and the OHS Director consider the
involvement of state and local governments in the development of a
coherent homeland security strategy a priority.
Improving communications between local,
state, and federal authorities, as well as the private sector, will
foster the development of a coherent national strategy and inform
officials about what each sector can expect of the others.
Currently, a fireman in Nebraska may have a vision of homeland
security that is far different from that of a Washington
bureaucrat. An agreed upon, or at least formally recognized, vision
or definition will be necessary before a strategy can be
implemented across all jurisdictional boundaries.
To
facilitate communication and coordination among the federal, state,
and local governments, the Administration has established the
Office of National Preparedness under FEMA. This is an important
first step in creating the framework through which local
authorities can consult with and receive support from the federal
government.
A
key component of the President's proposed Cabinet-level DHS is an
intergovernmental affairs office that would consolidate and
streamline intergovernmental relations and coordinate federal
programs with state or local governments. The existence of one
central point of contact at the federal level would greatly
facilitate the dissemination of information to state and local
authorities. Such lines of communication are already being put in
place. FEMA sought input from state and local authorities, for
example, on how it should spend the $3.5 billion set aside for the
First Responder Initiative in the spring of 2002. It held a
listening session with over 50 representatives from the
first-responder community and relevant federal agencies.
In a
similar outreach effort, the OHS provided a 45-day comment period
to get feedback for its terrorism alert system. The office has held
less formal meetings with members of the homeland security
community and also has addressed numerous state and local
associations, including the National Governors' Association and the
U.S. Conference of Mayors.
In
terms of first response, the burden of preparedness ultimately
rests with the political leaders of each city and state in the
United States. Leaders such as those in Baltimore and New York who
have taken the initiative to increase the security of the citizens
they represent have found that there are federal tools available to
help them. Once established, the DHS would be able to improve these
tools and make them more accessible, in addition to facilitating
communication among all levels of government.
Securing America's Public Gatherings
In
1998, President Bill Clinton issued a presidential decision
directive (PDD 62) to, among other things, address "National
Special Security Events." These are high-profile events
of national interest that attract national and international media,
and often thousands of people, and are considered high security
risks. The presidential directive established a framework for the
coordination of federal, state, and local counterterrorism efforts
at these events. Once an event is assigned this designation, the
Secret Service becomes the lead federal agency working with local
and state authorities to develop and execute a security
strategy.
Since September 11, the "Special Event"
designation has taken on new importance. In two recent cases, the
Administration has had success in working with local and state
authorities to ensure the public safety. The 2001 Super Bowl and
the 2002 Winter Olympics entailed especially complex security
environments. In both instances, good planning, willing
cooperation, and proper training resulted in safe events. A total
of 5,000 to 7,000 local, state, and federal security personnel were
on duty at the Winter Olympics, and approximately 3,000 were on
duty at the Super Bowl, where representatives of the
National Football League, the FBI, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
the Louisiana State Police, the Louisiana National Guard, the New
Orleans police, and private individuals cooperated on security. By all accounts, security at
these events was stellar.
These successes show how the homeland
security community, across all levels of government and the private
sector, can train and prepare for large-scale events. Further, they
demonstrate the importance of having a guiding framework, such as
PDD 62, that delegates responsibilities among the agencies
involved. The creation of a Cabinet-level Department of Homeland
Security would streamline this framework by placing the Secret
Service under the direct authority of the Secretary of Homeland
Security. The Secret Service would retain its primary mission--the
protection of the President and key government leaders--while
providing its unique and highly specialized expertise as a
complement to the security activities of the new DHS.
Improving Communication and Warning
The
new Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) announced by Governor
Ridge in March should greatly improve communication between the
federal government, state and local officials, and the public once
it is fully implemented. Though frequently ridiculed, this system
will fill a major communication void once it is tied to specific
actions.
The
consequences of warnings that have been issued in the past
highlight the value of establishing a well-defined categorization
of threats. Late last year, the FBI issued a warning to Governor
Gray Davis of California that it had uncovered a "credible" threat
to a number of bridges in that state. The governor took the threat
warning to be more severe than the FBI had intended and, in the
view of some observers, overreacted. The failure was not in
Governor Davis's response, but in the miscommunication.
Similarly, in April, after the FBI had
warned banks in the Northeast of potential terrorist attacks, the
response was not uniform; some banks closed while others remained
open. The FBI failed to coordinate its warning to the banks with a
public relations strategy to ensure that the public knew of what
was happening and what a proper response to the warning should be.
The HSAS should provide detailed mobilization plans and a
coordinated public relations strategy when it considers releasing a
general warning.
The
FBI, in coordination with the OHS, should continue to work on this
system. However, with its specific homeland security mission, the
new Department of Homeland Security would be better positioned to
operate it. The system should be incorporated into DHS operations,
and a formal, permanent office should be established to manage
it.
TOP PRIORITIES FOR THE REMAINDER OF
2002
Improving the Dissemination of
Intelligence
The
intelligence community has been the object of increased scrutiny
since September 11, with criticism focused largely on the inability
of the agencies to predict the terrorists' attacks. However, even
if substantial information was available, unless agencies within
the intelligence community can share information across
departmental and agency boundaries, an accurate assessment of
threats to national security would not be possible.
Before September 11, various intelligence
agencies had identified specific al-Qaeda operatives as possible
terrorists. Nevertheless, a breakdown in interagency communication
allowed two people on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) watch
list to board commercial planes and hijack them. The CIA's
intelligence on Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi was not collated
with that of other agencies (Alhazmi was in the United States on an
expired visa) or made available to the end user--in this case, the
airline reservation system. There was a failure to link information
from various sources because no single agency was tasked with
piecing together the bits of information on potential terrorists
into a single recognizable picture.
Numerous agencies and departments at the
federal level either monitor terrorist activity or respond to
terrorist attacks. The Department of Justice controls the FBI, INS,
and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). At the CIA, there is an
all-source intelligence collection agency, the Counter Terrorism
Center (CTC), which is restricted to collecting foreign
intelligence. FEMA and the CDC in HHS are essential first
responders in the event of an attack. The Department of the
Treasury and the Coast Guard also have pieces of the
counterterrorism intelligence puzzle.
If
U.S. intelligence gathering is to be effective, the federal
government must be able to look at all available pieces of the
terrorist puzzle and provide the President with a comprehensive and
timely analysis. Intelligence fusion for the country is currently
the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),
who has the resources of a Community Management Staff (CMS), a
dedicated Deputy for Collection, and a dedicated Deputy for
Production. Although the CMS is responsible for making
organizations share intelligence, before September 11, the CMS and
the primary agencies within the intelligence community (the CIA,
the FBI, and the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Energy, and
State) failed to ensure intelligence-sharing. With the Office of
Homeland Security, the proposed DHS would be responsible for
ensuring that homeland security-related intelligence is shared.
The
President has proposed a number of new policies to promote such
information-sharing. The most important is the creation of a center
that would fuse and analyze terrorism-related intelligence within
the Department of Homeland Security. The fusion aspect of this
center would remedy part of the problem of compartmentalization
that still characterizes the collection of intelligence in the
nation. The fusion center should ensure that intelligence is not
only collected and analyzed, but also disseminated to appropriate
federal, state, and local agencies with homeland security missions,
including the FBI and CIA. If the DHS intelligence office does not
facilitate the sharing of information, it may do no more than
create an additional "stovepipe" that further compartmentalizes the
intelligence that is received.
Other steps taken after September 11
include daily briefings of the President by FBI Director Robert
Mueller and DCI George Tenet. Each agency head now knows what is at
the top of the other's agenda. In addition, federal intelligence
agencies conduct two secure video conferences each day to discuss
information related to terrorist threats.
These are good first steps that will
improve information-sharing at a number of levels. However, they do
not ensure that all necessary information will reach all decision
makers in a timely fashion. Midlevel officials in the agencies
frequently decide whether or not to pursue the recommendations of
field agents and whether a specific issue deserves a director's
attention. This was the case regarding the lack of action on FBI
Agent Kenneth Williams's July 2001 memo to FBI headquarters on the
potential threat of terrorists attending American flight schools.
To
ensure that all federal terrorism officials have access to the full
scope of government information related to cases they are
investigating, it is necessary to establish an institution that
pulls together information from all pertinent intelligence agencies
and makes it accessible on a need-to-know basis. Such an
institution must be independent of the intelligence community and
free from the cultural limitations of the existing bureaucracies
within these agencies. Although the establishment of an
intelligence fusion center within the new DHS could serve this
purpose, neither the Senate nor the House legislation, as currently
written, provides the department's Secretary with the authority he
would need to implement such a program.
Conducting First-Responder Exercises
While the federal government has done a
commendable job of laying the foundations for terrorism response
capabilities, it should expand this effort to reach all levels of
government. The funding of these initial activities is targeted to
122 of America's most vulnerable cities. The time has come to
ensure that every American community is prepared to recognize and
respond to terrorist attacks.
Part
of the $3.5 billion in anti-terrorism grant funding in the
President's FY 2003 budget request has been earmarked to fund
first-responder exercises. What is lacking is a coherent strategy
that incorporates all appropriate elements of the local, state, and
federal governments and the private sector.
The
proposed new department could clear up the confusion about the
appropriate roles and responsibilities of the local, state, and
federal governments in first responses by establishing a national
policy and guidelines. The DHS should direct training exercises and
drills for federal, state, and local response teams for attacks
using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
weapons. A mechanism will be needed within the DHS to report the
lessons learned from each exercise to all communities. Conducting
such exercises will be one of the most important aspects of
domestic security.
First-responder exercises will force
authorities at all levels to analyze their capabilities, identify
where their responsibility lies, and critique the weaknesses in
their response structure. By juxtaposing this information with
their goals and performance indicators, local, state, and federal
authorities will be able to establish more accurate baselines of
preparedness that can be used to identify where future federal
grant dollars should be targeted.
Although last year's attacks were
devastating, they were minuscule in comparison to the carnage that
would result from a chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological
event in which the entire first-response community of a
metropolitan area could be killed. Were that to occur, it would be
up to the surrounding suburban and rural first-response units to
react. Cross-jurisdictional exercises must be included in the
preparedness planning.
Establishing a Health Surveillance
Capability
The
community of health providers--including doctors, nurses,
veterinarians, and public health workers--may be the first people
in a position to detect an environmental contaminant or biological
weapon attack in the form of smallpox, anthrax, or some other
agent. The damage from such an attack could be reduced
significantly if these officials know how to recognize, diagnose,
and treat the early symptoms of an outbreak associated with agents
that are known to be in the possession of terrorists and the rogue
states that support them. Individuals equipped with
such training would provide the basis for a national health
surveillance network.
The
Bush Administration has taken several important steps to educate
the public health community. Its FY 2003 budget request includes
over $500 million for preparing hospitals to respond to CBRN events
and another $100 million to train and prepare health care
professionals to respond to terrorist attacks.
Further, the DOD will be establishing such networks in four
cities--Washington, D.C.; Albuquerque, New Mexico; and two other
cities--as part of a two-year, $300 million pilot program to
increase cities' abilities to detect an attack.
However, the President's proposal for
establishing the Department of Homeland Security fails to mention
this important element, although the Senate bill does discuss such
a capacity. The new department would be a logical place to house
such a surveillance system, since it would also have the important
communication link with state and local governments mentioned
above. Congress should include such a health surveillance system in
the legislation establishing the Department of Homeland Security
and should duly recognize the health community as a key component
of preparedness for CBRN attacks.
Early detection and treatment is vital to
mitigate the consequences of a biological attack. A biological
incident, unlike other terrorist incidents, is not likely to be
marked by a visible or audible event because the delivery of a
biological agent does not rely on explosives or other
distinguishable means of delivery. Rather, a biological attack is
more likely to occur by nondescript means, such as delivery through
the mail or the covert release of an aerosol agent. In fact, in 28
percent of the previous terrorist attacks using chemical or
biological agents, the means of dissemination
was not identified. Recognition that an attack
has occurred happens only after a significant number of people
start to become sick and an investigation is begun. By this time,
many Americans may have been exposed to the pathogen.
For
early recognition of such an attack, a number of states, cities,
and communities have established municipal or regional health
surveillance networks. Kansas City, Missouri; Baltimore, Maryland;
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania; and the state of Florida have
established or are developing monitoring and reporting systems. Yet
there is no effective way to connect all of these systems into a
single national network, and even if there were, there is no
guarantee of compatibility since each system is based on different
techniques of data collection and distribution. It is
therefore essential that the federal government develop monitoring
standards for state and local health agencies and the health care
community, as well as the DOD's new pilot program.
While governors and mayors should
designate a top public health official to oversee the development
of health-surveillance networks in their communities, the
Administration, working with the CDC, should develop and implement
a strategy to link existing systems and establish a national system
to collect and analyze relevant data. Once established, the
Department of Homeland Security should be given the authority to
oversee this system jointly with the CDC to ensure its
effectiveness and communication among the federal, state, and local
levels of government and among all members of the health
community.
Improve Enforcement of Immigration
Laws
Though all 19 terrorists involved in the
September 11 attacks entered the United States legally, a number of
them were on federal terrorist watch lists or had overstayed their
visas. Since the attacks, the nation's beleaguered immigration
system continues to prove that it is not up to the task of
monitoring those who cross our borders.
Incredibly, in March 2002, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service sent notification to two of the dead
hijackers, Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi, that their student
visas for flight training had been approved. By September 11, both
men not only had completed that training, but had used their new
skills to attack the World Trade Center.
To
correct such glaring problems, Congress, the Department of Justice,
and the Administration are all seeking to restructure the INS. The
centerpiece of all three reorganization proposals is a separation
of the INS's enforcement and service functions, which are currently
performed simultaneously by all INS officers.
Prior to his recent resignation, INS
Commissioner James Ziglar began implementing internal reforms to
streamline management and communications. His reforms were designed
to create two new bureaus for Immigration Services and Immigration
Enforcement. The Commissioner of the INS would still oversee both
bureaus, but INS field offices would report directly to the
appropriate bureau at headquarters instead of to dual-hatted
district and regional directors. Removing layers of bureaucracy
should increase the INS's ability to act more swiftly.
Last
November, Representative James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) offered
legislation that would create a more dramatic distinction between
the roles of immigration enforcement and immigration services. The
Immigration Reform and Accountability Act of 2002 (H.R. 3231) would
abolish the INS and transfer its responsibilities to a Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services and Bureau of Immigration
Enforcement within the Department of Justice. A new Associate
Attorney General for Immigration Affairs would supervise these
bureaus.
Meanwhile, OHS Director Ridge has offered
a proposal that would go even further by removing immigration
enforcement responsibility from the INS and establishing a border
security agency comprised of the Border Patrol, the U.S. Customs
Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard.
President Bush and Attorney General John
Ashcroft have voiced their support for the Immigration Reform and
Accountability Act. Both Governor Ridge's consolidation of federal
border security programs and Representative Sensenbrenner's
proposed reforms of the immigration system have been incorporated
in versions of the legislation to establish the DHS.
The
President's proposal for the new Department of Homeland Security
calls for "an immigration services organization that would
administer our immigration law in an efficient, fair, and humane
manner" and "assume the legal authority to issue visas to foreign
nationals and admit them into the country." This
important federal consolidation effort would help to improve
communication and efficiency in the important task of issuing visas
while maintaining a separation between immigration services and
enforcement consistent with the restructuring plan proposed by
former INS Commissioner Ziglar. As details emerge as to how the
proposed new INS structure will function once it is inside the new
department, it will be important to make sure that the Service
cooperates and communicates with the State Department, which will
continue to play a critical role in administering the visa
application and issuance process.
As
the proposals for the DHS, the INS restructuring plan, and the
Immigration Reform and Accountability Act all recognize, separating
immigration enforcement from immigration services makes sense.
Enforcing immigration laws is different from promoting citizenship
and requires unique skills. However, it is not enough simply to
separate these two functions. New policies and technologies are
also needed. For example, whether the INS Commissioner, a new
Associate Attorney General, or a new agency head is responsible for
managing immigration policy, accountability on the part of the
enforcement arm must be ensured and new technology should be
obtained to combat terrorism more effectively.
One
of the hallmarks of a strengthened immigration regime must be a
mechanism to monitor the entry and exit of visa holders. Currently,
once visa holders have entered the United States, the INS has no
way to determine whether they leave the country before their visas
expire. In 1996, Congress required the INS to establish an
entry-exit monitoring system as part of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (P.L. 104-208). No such
system was ever implemented. The President's FY 2003 Immigration
Budget includes $488 million in resources for the nation's ports of
entry, including the development of an entry-exit system.
Last
year, Congress again called on the INS to establish an entry-exit
monitoring system in the USA PATRIOT Act and the Enhanced Border
Security Act. The visa application and approval process is a vital
element in the effort to protect Americans against terrorism.
Properly empowered, consular affairs and immigration officials can
use this process to determine whether an applicant may be a threat
to national security. However, without the means to monitor a visa
holder's entry and exit, this system can break down.
The
visa renewal process offers immigration officials an important
mechanism for continually checking that a visitor is not engaging
in terrorist activities. When this process can be circumvented,
appropriate law enforcement responses become more difficult. The
new DHS and OHS, working with the Attorney General and Congress,
should maintain active oversight of the INS or any successor
organization to ensure that a comprehensive entry-exit monitoring
system is implemented as swiftly as possible.
The
INS currently maintains more than 80 computer networks that are
poorly connected with each other and rarely connected to other
federal agencies. INS's information technology failings complicate
accurate record keeping on immigrants and visitors, as well as
information- sharing among offices and agencies, and make enforcing
immigration law more difficult. INS enforcement officials
frequently must sift through large paper files, which in some cases
must be transferred between field offices before they can be
reviewed.
Past
efforts to improve the INS's computer systems have met with only
moderate success. The U.S. General Accounting Office and the Office
of the Inspector General have been critical of how the INS manages
technology upgrades. Further, the INS has not
taken measures to ensure that its staff are trained in and utilize
available technology. For example, Glenn Fine, Inspector General
for the Department of Justice, testified before Congress that
[The Office of the Inspector General] had
found that the INS was not enrolling all of the aliens apprehended
along the U.S.-Mexico border into IDENT [Automated Biometric
Identification System] and had virtually no controls
to ensure the quality of the data entered.... INS had not
adequately trained its employees on the system.
Quick, reliable access to information is
vital for making good decisions. The INS must modernize and
simplify its computer networks, ensure that they are linked to an
all-source intelligence fusion center, and train employees in the
use of technology to meet this objective. Since establishment of
the DHS would require integrating more than 20 unique federal
networks, its creation presents an exceptional opportunity for the
government to upgrade the INS's outdated networks. Congress should
authorize funds for this purpose as part of the DHS founding
legislation.
Reforming How Visas Are Issued
As
part of the President's proposal to establish the Department of
Homeland Security, responsibility for instituting visa policy would
be transferred to the new department while authority for issuing
visas would remain with the Consular Affairs division of the
Department of State. This arrangement makes sense and has been
incorporated within both the House and Senate bills establishing
the DHS.
During the 1970s and 1980s, security
functions were formally removed from the consular bureau, and the
mission of visa officers at embassies overseas shifted away from
security concerns and toward facilitating travel. While visa
officers continued to enforce provisions of immigration law that
excluded certain classes of aliens, far more attention was devoted
to "managing" the visa process, which processed over eight million
tourist visa applications and nearly a million immigrant visas
annually. This meant that a high priority was placed on ensuring
the smooth flow of interviews, handling visa application forms,
systematizing name-checks, and issuing visas while attempting to
maintain the integrity of the physical visa impressions and/or
serial-numbered paper visas.
The
President's proposed arrangement would strike an appropriate
balance between diplomatic concerns and homeland security needs if
some additional measures are taken. A security focus could be
re-installed in the consular process by making the DHS responsible
for ensuring that the State Department's Consular Affairs officials
at embassies abroad review visa applications in accord with federal
law.
However, the DHS should also be made
responsible for developing software and training programs for the
consular division and should station an official at each embassy
and consulate to conduct on-site training and review. To support
these objectives, the State Department's Visa Office, which is
currently responsible for setting visa policy, should be
transferred to the DHS.
Defining the Department of Defense's
Role
The
Department of Defense has a critical role in protecting Americans
from foreign threats. Although it has appeared reluctant to adopt
the homeland security mission, it does have a role to play in
homeland security beyond fighting the war on terrorism. The DOD
possesses the domestic infrastructure, equipment, and experience to
support and train state and local authorities to respond to
large-scale attacks on U.S. soil. In addition, the Pentagon
recently established a new force command structure, the Northern
Command (NORTHCOM), which will become active on October 1, 2002.
NORTHCOM will be responsible for protecting North America from
attack and managing the DOD's contribution to the federal response
in the event of an attack.
A
Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security would not take
homeland security responsibilities away from the Department of
Defense, which will play a crucial support role in the event of a
catastrophic terrorist attack. Adequate communications between the
two departments, however, will be critical.
The
primary military conduit to facilitate the Defense Department's
contribution will be the National Guard--the logical element of the
armed forces to act as lead military agency for homeland security.
By law and tradition, the Guard connects local communities to the
federal and state governments. Units are located in every American
community and have the capabilities, legal authority, and structure
to respond to attacks on the homeland. The Army National Guard has
over 3,000 armories across the nation, and the Air National Guard
has 140 units throughout the United States and its territories. The
close relationship between Guard units and their locales must be
leveraged to ensure that local units are prepared and have the
capacity to respond to an attack and that they help train other
first responders in their communities.
The
National Guard's State Area Commands (STARCs) are well-situated to
oversee its contribution to such training for WMD-consequence
management. Currently, the Guard maintains approximately 30 Civil
Support Teams (WMD-CSTs), each with 22 Guardsmen trained and
equipped to respond to CBRN events. These units could provide
valuable training to state and local first responders.
The
Guard also could help state and local authorities understand how to
maintain vital equipment and sustain operations in a CBRN
environment and to plan for medical treatment after an attack
(combat triage). Local health authorities are not adequately
prepared to address the mass casualties that would result from CBRN
events; many would not know, for example, whether or not to enter a
contaminated environment or whether to admit patients to a public
facility or send them to an off-site secure facility.
To
ensure the Guard's availability, however, its mission must be
refocused on homeland security. Currently, the active military
force relies heavily on the National Guard and Reserves to carry
out its missions. The reserve components cannot easily be extracted
from support duties and redeployed for homeland security unless the
active force rosters are expanded to provide that support. To
alleviate the operational strain on the Guard, rather than
deploying units to help active forces meet the operational tempo of
continuous deployments for nation-building and peacekeeping
missions, President Bush should commit U.S. forces only to missions
that advance America's vital national interests.
The
Defense Department's role in homeland security will largely be one
of supporting civilian agencies and departments, so it must be able
to work cooperatively with state and local officials who must
manage the response to an incident. Defense assets will prove
useful only if they have been incorporated in local response plans.
The entities of the federal government should approach homeland
security with a one-voice and one-policy strategy. The Defense
Department, therefore, must ensure that its activities complement
those of the Office of Homeland Security and the other federal
civilian agencies with homeland security roles.
The
Defense Department should work more closely with Canada and Mexico,
given that terrorist threats against the United States are likely
to affect these neighboring countries as well, just as attacks
against them could affect the United States. Such cooperation with
Canada has a long history of success in the North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). However, this cooperation must
move beyond air attack and missile warning and into the areas of
homeland security, including mutual responses to attacks, coastal
defense, and responses against weapons of mass destruction. Similar
arrangements must be made with Mexico. As NORTHCOM's structures,
policies, and plans develop, these new relationships must be
addressed.
The
Coast Guard (USCG), which is primarily responsible for defending
the country's maritime approaches, has done an admirable job of
adapting to the post-September 11 environment. Its National Fleet
Concept has enabled it to complement and support the Navy. The USCG
should continue to be recognized as the lead element in coastal
security, with Northern Command's naval component detailed to
support it, just as this relationship has largely worked since the
attacks. Arrangements must be made now to define Canada and
Mexico's roles in the Northern Command.
Further, NORTHCOM must develop a close
relationship with the governors of each state, the Adjutants
General, and the State Area Commanders. Since most states have designated an
official responsible for homeland security, NORTHCOM may want to
detail an official to each of those offices. In addition, to ensure
that planning is complementary, and to avoid miscommunications,
divergent homeland security strategies, or overlapping
responsibilities, a liaison element of the Northern Command should
also be detailed to the new Department of Homeland Security.
Improving the Congressional Committee
System
No
single congressional committee has responsibility for homeland
security. Instead, responsibility is spread across 88 committees
and subcommittees. As a result, it is difficult for the
Administration to communicate its plans to Congress. OHS Director
Ridge and his staff have had to spend too much time meeting with
committee staff, and the senior political leaders of the Cabinet
departments are too heavily burdened with other demands to provide
testimony.
Unless structural change is implemented,
as a new Department of Homeland Security is established,
communication could worsen and homeland security efforts could
languish, as many DHS officials would have to spend a significant
amount of time testifying before the various committees and
subcommittees. The best way to deal with this problem would be for
Congress to create standing committees in both the House and Senate
with specific responsibility for homeland security.
Clearly, the time of the Secretary of DHS
and Director of OHS would be better spent in developing solutions
to security problems than in delivering the same message to each
existing congressional committee. The current structure needlessly
slows the legislative process; concurrent referrals of legislation
to multiple committees can keep bills from being brought to a
vote.
The
committee system in Congress complicates the development of a
cohesive homeland security policy even more than dividing the
authority for implementing policy among dozens of federal agencies
does. Any congressional committee can hold a comprehensive hearing
on homeland security budgets and policy, such as the one held
recently by one of Governor Ridge's most ardent opponents, Senator
Robert Byrd (D-WV). That two-day hearing included testimony from
every federal agency and department head on their offices' homeland
security programs. If every committee with jurisdiction were to
hold such a hearing, progress on homeland security would grind to a
halt.
Congress should develop a system that will
allow agency heads and department secretaries to meet with a single
committee in the House and Senate to discuss their involvement in
homeland security. Once the DHS is established, each house of
Congress should create a standing committee for homeland security,
and that committee should establish a subcommittee for each of the
four missions described by the President in his proposal.
What Is Needed Next
Despite the progress that has been made on
homeland security thus far, much more needs to be done to eliminate
blatant vulnerabilities, increase security, boost efficiencies, and
facilitate preparedness and response capabilities in every
community. To that end, the Administration and Congress should work
together to:
- Establish an
effective Department of Homeland Security. The Senate is
currently debating legislation to create the President's requested
Department of Homeland Security. After they pass a bill, both
houses of Congress will need to rectify their versions of the bill
in conference to present a final proposal to the President.
However, whether the Congress's final draft will actually improve
homeland security policy implementation is yet to be seen. If it
does not, the President should veto the bill as he has threatened
to do.
If the version of the National Homeland
Security and Combating Terrorism Act of 2002 (S. 2452) now before
the Senate survives in its current form, homeland security will be
significantly weakened. This draft legislation would prevent
the necessary consolidation of federal homeland security programs,
protect existing information stovepipes and create new ones, create
a rigid bureaucracy instead of a flexible agency, and micromanage
both the federal government and the interagency process.
The House-passed National Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (H.R. 5005) would establish a much better
foundation for the DHS but can still be improved by removing
component agencies' status as "distinct entities" and giving the
Secretary of Homeland Security the authority he needs to datamine
intelligence community databases as part of a fusion capability.
The 107th Congress must dedicate the remainder of its term to
establishing a Department of Homeland Security that will be
effective, promote good governance, be flexible to meet the
changing terrorist threat, and protect American civil liberties.
- Create a better
federal intelligence fusion system. The new Department of
Homeland Security should create an intelligence fusion center that
brings together intelligence and law enforcement information from
across the entire federal government, analyzes it, and shares it on
an as-needed basis. That fusion center should work closely with the
FBI and CIA, which should remain independent of the new department
because their broad missions extend beyond counterterrorism.
To be effective, the fusion center must be
able to maintain a combined intelligence database. Contributing
agencies should be able to access this information at a level
consistent with their mission and security clearance. The President
should direct the Secretary of DHS--working with the Attorney
General, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Transportation, and the DCI--to create this fusion center.
The Secretary of the DHS should have
direct access to all information relevant to homeland security, and
this information should be made accessible to federal agencies,
states, and local law enforcement agencies with homeland defense
responsibilities, as required. The final legislation establishing
the DHS should incorporate this concept by giving the Secretary the
authority he needs to access this information, rather than making
the members of the intelligence community responsible for giving it
to him.
- Consolidate
first-responder programs and develop a national training network
for state and local first responders. The President's First Responder
Initiative is a good first step in boosting federal efforts to
prepare first responders for terrorist incidents. The
Administration should continue to build on this program to ensure
that more first responders receive federal training through a
national system of hands-on educational facilities. These
facilities could be based on the model of the Center for Domestic
Preparedness in Anniston, Alabama.
Each facility should consolidate federal
assistance programs for two FEMA regions. FEMA should manage each
facility, acting as lead federal agency for consequence management
until the new DHS is established. Each facility should function as
a "one-stop shop" where first responders in each region can go for
training and information on distance-learning programs and
available federal grants.
All first responders--including local
law-enforcement and public-health officials, emergency medical
services, fire departments, and HAZMAT squads--should be included
in this initiative. This would further the President's goal of
improving preparedness by increasing the number of first responders
who could receive hands-on training almost fivefold while also
promoting better coordination and consolidation.
Rather than making all first responders go
to Alabama for training, a regional-based network would provide
facilities closer to home for volunteers who are on limited
budgets. To keep costs down, the Administration should transfer
excess base infrastructure within the Defense Department to FEMA
for this training and consider utilizing a portion of the
Department of Energy's Nevada test site as a facility.
- Develop a
comprehensive program of terrorism-response exercises. It
is not enough simply to earmark funds for training exercises.
Because exercises are central to learning how to respond to WMD
events, understanding a jurisdiction's deficiencies, and developing
mutual-response models, training and response exercises should be
instituted as part of the national homeland security strategy.
The Office of Homeland Security should
establish a task force to develop a national strategy that includes
a more comprehensive exercise regime. The task force should include
representatives from OHS, the Department of Defense, state and
local government agencies, National Guard units, the CDC, other
relevant agencies, and representatives from local and state
governments that have dealt with CBRN-type events--such as
officials in Oklahoma City; Arlington, Virginia; Baltimore; and New
York. Once the DHS begins operating, it should be responsible for
implementing the policies developed by this task force. The task
force should establish national standards for what constitutes
"preparedness" for CBRN events so that officials can identify what
they must do to be prepared.
The first tool the task force should
produce is a short checklist that local and state officials can use
to assess their vulnerabilities and determine what they need to do
to prepare for CBRN events. For example, among other prevention and
precautionary measures, the checklist could ask whether the
localities have systems in place to identify open hospital beds,
recognize the symptoms of CBRN attacks, provide back-up
communications in emergencies, and provide adequate medical
supplies.
Second, the task force should help local,
state, and federal officials set up exercises that walk them
through different scenarios of attack. These exercises, whether
simulated in a classroom or in the field, could help them to
identify key weaknesses in their civil defense and response systems
and provide guidance on what they should do to improve. It also
should offer guidance on how to request federal funds to address
specific weaknesses and should serve as a measurement tool for the
federal government to gauge the effectiveness of state and local
initiatives.
The Department of Homeland Security, once
established, should initiate CBRN response exercises with each
state. States deemed most at risk should be among the first to
undergo the exercises, and all states should participate in these
exercises within the first five years. Over time, multi-state
preparedness and cross-border exercises could be held. The
governor's office in each state would be responsible for including
state and local officials and private-sector or volunteer
participants.
Finally, the DHS should create a center
that analyzes the lessons learned from these first-responder
exercises. Such a center could be modeled on the Army's Center for
Army Lessons Learned, located at Fort Leavenworth, which analyzes
Army operations and training exercises. It would have the primary
responsibility of evaluating all exercises for which federal
assistance is given or in which federal assets participate. It
should also be prepared to observe and evaluate independent state
and local exercises upon request.
A library of lessons learned from
exercises conducted by other public or private institutions should
be created. All of these materials should be made available to all
first responders so they can better prepare for any contingencies
and avoid making mistakes made by others during their own
exercises. Copies of all of the lessons learned should be
distributed to the chief homeland security official in each state
and the largest 120 cities by FEMA's Federal Response Plan Exercise
Planners Working Group.
- Expedite the
development of a national health surveillance network.
Since September 11, concerns about the ability of terrorists to
harm large numbers of civilians with a CBRN agent such as anthrax
have focused attention on America's lack of preparedness in this
area. To mobilize a rapid response to such attacks, officials must
be able to recognize the outbreak of a catastrophic CBRN-related
illness or the contamination of food and water supplies. Because no
system currently exists to detect such early signs, the United
States lacks the necessary resources to coordinate and execute an
immediate response plan.
A National Health Alert Network of local
surveillance systems should be established to monitor and
disseminate such information across all levels of government as it
becomes available. First, the federal government should develop a
set of monitoring standards for state and local health care
officials. Each state governor and the mayors of major cities
should designate a top public health official to oversee the
development of the surveillance network in their community. The
monitoring and reporting standards should be implemented in
accordance with the federal guidelines.
Simultaneously, the CDC, in collaboration
with the DHS and the FBI, should develop a national system for
collecting and analyzing relevant data from the state and local
surveillance systems and federal health networks, such as the
Poison Control Center. By monitoring and disseminating such
information, all levels of government would be better prepared to
recognize and respond to an attack in the earliest stages and thus
limit its catastrophic effects.
- Develop a
specific policy for smallpox vaccinations. The United
States will soon have stockpiled more than enough smallpox vaccine
to protect every American citizen. The next step is to decide
whether each American should be vaccinated. According to a recent
University of Michigan study, such a vaccination campaign could
lead to 200 to 300 deaths and thousands of illnesses. On the other hand,
should the United States come under a smallpox attack, the
vaccinations would save millions of lives.
The Administration should first establish
how safe or risky the current vaccine options are. Based on those
conclusions, it should then develop a strategy to allow Americans
to receive smallpox vaccines on a voluntary basis. This approach
has numerous benefits. In the event of a smallpox attack, it would
minimize the panic that would ensue after the beginning stages of
the attack are publicized and would significantly decrease the
number of citizens who would be infected and the number who would
need or want to be vaccinated. Each individual could evaluate the
risk involved in receiving or not receiving the vaccine for his or
her own case.
- Expand the role
of the National Guard. As a first responder in domestic
emergencies, the National Guard is well-positioned to assume the
lead military role in homeland security. The Guard, the Department
of Defense, and the states already have in place much of the
administrative and command infrastructure that is needed to enable
the Guard to take on a greater role in homeland security. However,
as described in Title 32, Section 102 of the U.S. Code, the
National Guard is mandated to focus on supporting the active
forces.
Today, Guard units are deployed to provide
combat support and combat support services for the active duty
forces. Additionally, they often make up substantial portions of
the forces used for peacekeeping missions. Refocusing the Guard's
mission on homeland security would leave the active forces with a
shortfall of personnel to perform the services that the Guard
currently performs. Therefore, the Guard cannot easily be extracted
from its support duties and redeployed for homeland security
without either expanding the active force rosters to fill that
support role or decreasing the commitments of that active
force.
Moreover, when Guard resources are
directed toward homeland security, it will be important to ensure
that these resources are not wasted on missions that would be
better handled by the private sector or other government agencies.
For example, the National Guard should not be guarding airports or
the nation's borders. Those jobs should be performed by trained
police or security personnel. National Guard members have
specialized training and legal standing that gives them a unique
role in homeland security that should not be squandered.
Finally, because the federal government's
primary purpose is to protect the people of America, the homeland
is the most important theater of war. Active service in defense of
the homeland should be given the same weight and respect as service
abroad. Those serving in the homeland should receive appropriate
benefits, and adequate resources should be dedicated to the
mission.
- Establish a
federal team to facilitate state and local strategies that
complement the national homeland security strategy.
Homeland security responsibilities transcend all levels of
government and much of the private sector, and establishing an
effective homeland security strategy depends on the willing
cooperation of all involved. It will be vital for the success of
the national effort to help state and local officials adapt their
counterterrorism plans so that they are compatible with the federal
homeland security strategy. This will require close coordination
between the Department of Homeland Security and state and local
government officials.
Even a mass briefing with all 50 governors
would not be sufficient to address the specific needs of each
locality. OHS Director Ridge should establish a team of staff
members who can travel to the states and local communities to help
local homeland security officials develop and implement plans that
complement the national strategy. Team members should be able to
work with first responders, public health leaders, and law
enforcement officials, as well as local and state political
leaders. Once the DHS has been established, this team should be
transferred to its state and local coordination arm.
- Establish
standing committees on homeland security in both houses of
Congress. Homeland security and terrorism transcend all
aspects of congressional committee authority. In the House of
Representatives, there are at least 14 full committees and 25
separate subcommittees that claim jurisdiction over some aspect of
homeland security. To facilitate Congress's legislative and
budgetary role in defending the homeland, both the House and Senate
should form a standing committee on homeland security with sole
jurisdiction for functions assumed by the Department of Homeland
Security.
These committees should establish their
own subcommittees that parallel the four divisions proposed for the
DHS. Existing committees and subcommittees that currently have
authority for these areas should cede them to the new committees.
In addition, the appropriations committees should establish their
own subcommittees on homeland security to supplement the work of
the standing authorizing committees.
In revising the committee structure,
Congress's top priorities should be streamlining the legislative
process and providing acute transparency of its workings.
Establishing authorizing committees and appropriations
subcommittees on homeland security would give the DHS a central
committee in each house with which to discuss homeland security
legislation. This new system would also make it more difficult for
Members of Congress to attach non-homeland security earmarks to
homeland security budgets.
Politically, such structural reform will
be challenging because powerful committee chairmen are often
reluctant to relinquish power, even for the sake of national
security. As Senator James Jeffords (I-VT) noted in describing his
reluctance to give up oversight of nuclear power plant, dam, and
drinking water security, "we're very jealous about these things."
But the jealousy of Members of Congress is
clearly not an acceptable reason to forgo necessary reform,
especially at such a critical time. All Members have a
responsibility to conduct the people's business in an efficient
manner and to develop policies that protect their constituents from
international terrorism, even if doing so may disrupt the hierarchy
of power in Congress. House and Senate leaders should make clear
that they intend to match the President's leadership in this matter
by streamlining communication and action through the creation of
new committees for homeland security.
Conclusion
The
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on
September 11, 2001, placed homeland security at the top of the
nation's priorities. Since then, the President and Congress have
done much to meet daunting new challenges to security, including
the development of a bold proposal to create a Cabinet-level
Department of Homeland Security. They also have established budget
priorities, quickly enhanced the nation's stockpile of smallpox
vaccine, increased security on America's borders, and increased
cooperation and communication with state and local government
officials.
At
the same time, however, there are many areas that require
additional commitment from the federal government. As the proposal
for a new homeland security department lies in the balance, it is
more important than ever that the right decisions be made in a
timely manner.
For
example, Washington must do more to improve intelligence-sharing
among agencies and with state and local authorities. An
intelligence fusion center must be created to collect, analyze, and
disseminate intelligence on a need-to-know basis. The federal
government should expand its CBRN training programs for first
responders and should establish a national health surveillance
network that could detect the presence of a bioterrorism agent at
the ground level. The Defense Department's role in homeland
security should be better defined, especially with regard to the
National Guard, which is well-positioned to assume the lead
military role in homeland security. Finally, Congress must reform
its committee structure to enhance its budgetary, legislative, and
oversight functions.
A
year has passed since September 11, and while the federal
government has done much to increase the nation's security, more
still needs to be done. Now is the time to take these next critical
steps to ensure the protection of the American people.
Michael
Scardaville is Policy Analyst for Homeland Defense
and Jack Spencer is Policy Analyst for Defense
and National Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies at The Heritage
Foundation.