As
the Administration intensifies its efforts to build international
support for a U.S.-led campaign to end Saddam Hussein's brutal and
menacing regime in Iraq, some are questioning America's commitment
to an effort to rebuild Iraq after such a war. The Administration
has yet to present its plans for post-war Iraq. Its plans should be
the last element of its argument that military force is needed to
oust a regime that actively supports terrorism and pursues weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), despite pressure from the United Nations
to stop. (Details of Iraq's WMD programs are included in the
Appendix.)
The
Administration should make it clear that a U.S. military presence
in post-war Iraq will be deployed to secure vital U.S. interests,
not as an exercise in so-called nation-building--the Clinton
Administration's open-ended policy of sending American troops into
troubled regions where vital U.S. security interests were not
directly threatened. In many cases, the Clinton Administration used
this approach reactively to accommodate the concerns of other
countries, mistakenly assuming that their interests were always
America's. Often, this meant expanding the definition of
peacekeeping beyond what it was intended to accomplish.
Consequently, U.S. forces found themselves in situations not suited
to the use of military force.
To
make it clear that a post-war U.S. military operation in Iraq is
not a nation-building exercise, the Bush Administration should
state that the U.S. military will be deployed to Iraq to secure the
vital U.S. security interests for which the campaign is undertaken
in the first place. Specifically, these war aims should be to:
- Protect the
American homeland, people, and institutions against
attack, which will require the U.S. military to destroy
Iraq's terrorist infrastructure and weapons of mass destruction
programs;
- Prevent the rise
of Iraq as a dominant and hostile power in the Persian Gulf
region, while not allowing its elimination to become an
opportunity for domination by a hostile Iran;
- Protect Iraq's
energy infrastructure against internal sabotage or foreign
attack to return Iraq to global energy markets and ensure
that U.S. and world energy markets have access to its
resources.
At
the political level, the Administration also should utilize the
post-war U.S. military presence to help give Iraq's new, presumably
more friendly leaders a better opportunity to develop an inclusive
federal system of government. But U.S. military forces should not
be organized specifically to meet that objective. The development
of a new government requires efforts beyond the means of military
forces. And ensuring that the government is inclusive may require
the commitment of a larger force for an extended period of time,
which could jeopardize U.S. security interests in other parts of
the world.
Organizing the post-war U.S. military
presence in Iraq around these three specific war aims would enable
the Administration to define the scope of the military mission for
the American people and to justify the continued presence of about
40,000 troops in Iraq. The exit criteria for the
post-war forces should be the President's certification that each
war aim has been achieved. The size of the force in Iraq should be
reduced incrementally as each war aim is certified. U.S. and allied
military forces that remain in Iraq should be seen as a
reconfiguration of the forces in the Persian Gulf prior to the war
in order to bolster the efforts of the new friendly government and
to ensure that the vital U.S. interests in the region remain
secure.
Securing Vital U.S. Interests
The
Administration's plan for the involvement of U.S. military forces
in Iraq after a war to eliminate Saddam Hussein's brutal regime
should rest on three foreign policy pillars:
- Post-war
military activities should be focused on securing war aims, not on
administering the country or creating a new government.
That should be left to the civilian authorities of an interim Iraqi
government.
- A force
sufficient to topple the Iraqi regime would be more than sufficient
to conduct the post-combat military activities. A combat
force for dislodging the current regime in Iraq should require
roughly 100,000 U.S. troops. The
post-combat U.S. military presence augmented by allied forces
should require roughly 40,000 U.S. troops to destroy the terrorist
networks and cells, eliminate Iraq's WMD arsenal and
infrastructure, protect its energy resources, and block Iranian
hegemony in the region. U.S. military planners should keep the
focus of a U.S. post-war military presence on securing these war
aims, and should not allow the missions to expand into other vague
"peacekeeping" activities, as they often did under the Clinton
Administration.
- Post-war
military activities in Iraq should not be subject to arbitrary
deadlines. Securing the U.S. war aims cannot be
accomplished according to arbitrarily established deadlines.
However, the Administration should avoid making the U.S. military
presence appear to be indefinite. Specific end goals for the U.S.
military should be established and, once they are achieved, U.S.
forces should be pulled out to enable them to prepare for other
contingencies.
Why Nation-Building is the Wrong
Approach
Under the Clinton Administration, the
United States adopted a new approach to addressing turmoil in
far-flung regions of the world called "nation-building." According to the Clinton
Administration's national security strategy, U.S. forces would
participate in so-called peace operations that "support democracy
or conflict resolution." Because of this vague policy,
U.S. military forces found themselves committed to many
ill-defined, open-ended missions where no vital U.S. interests were
at stake--such as in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans--in order to
achieve unrealistic or inappropriate political or social goals.
Thus, under President Clinton, the policy
of military interventions focused too little on national security
requirements, too often on appeasing foreign views or demands, and
too little on the circumstances necessary for undertaking
successful peace operations. Specifically,
The Clinton
Administration's nation-building policy frequently put U.S.
military personnel at risk for reasons that had little to do with
national security. The American people, quite properly,
are reluctant to put U.S. military personnel in harm's way unless
the action is justified by threats to national security. The
Clinton Administration ignored this wisdom when it changed the
mission of U.S. military forces in Somalia from one of humanitarian
relief, with relatively little risk of combat, to that of
confronting Somali warlords. Removing the warlords may have been a
desirable outcome, but their presence in Somalia posed an
insignificant risk to the security of American citizens or their
standard of living. Removing the warlords from power was an
insufficient reason to place U.S. forces at greater risk. The
intervention in Haiti had little to do with threats to vital U.S.
security interests, while the Balkans intervention had peripheral
but not vital security implications.
Clearly, Iraq is a different situation. It
is a state sponsor of terrorism that is building and obtaining
weapons of mass destruction, which could find their way into the
hands of terrorists. Iraq under Saddam Hussein used chemical
weapons against its own people and against other states, and it
launched Scud missiles against Israel during the Persian Gulf War.
Since it blocked the return of U.N. weapons inspectors in 1998 in
defiance of the United Nations, the regime's policies continue to
threaten the stability of the region, U.S. allies, and world energy
markets--all clear and vital security interests of the United
States. Removing that regime from
power and contributing a post-war military presence in Iraq to
assure stability in the region and in energy markets is
justified.
-
The Clinton
Administration would too often accommodate foreign interests at the
expense of U.S. security. The Clinton Administration's
nation-building efforts frequently were undertaken on behalf of
what President Clinton in his first inaugural address called "the
will and conscience of the international community." Too often, the decisions of
when and how the United States would intervene militarily in a
conflict were based on incoherent foreign concerns rather than
specific U.S. security interests. In 1993, U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations, Madeleine Albright strongly advocated this type of
"assertive multilateralism," calling
on the people of the United States "to open our minds to broader
strategies in multilateral forums."
Under-Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff acknowledged in an
off-the-record briefing that this approach assumed a declining U.S.
leadership role in international affairs. He
explained that the Clinton Administration believed in the concept
of collective security, and that this new approach was "different
by design," or intentional.
Not surprisingly, the Clinton
Administration's nation-building efforts were unsustainable. The
U.S. government found it impossible to match military means with
the Administration's political goals. This mismatch became most
evident in Bosnia, when the Clinton Administration abandoned its
own ill-advised plan in deference to European and Russian plans to
establish U.N.-declared safe havens. There were insufficient
military forces to protect these safe havens, however, and Serbian
military forces were able to overrun them and conduct a campaign of
ethnic slaughter.
The Bush Administration's plan for a
post-war military presence in Iraq should not suffer from the
policy shortcoming in Bosnia. The Administration is clearly in the
lead regarding a military intervention in Iraq. The reasons that
the United States sees Iraq as a serious threat to vital U.S.
interests are clear and justified, in terms of combat operations
and a post-war presence. The Administration is working to achieve
international consensus for the use of military force in Iraq, not
to accommodate the political desires of other countries.
-
The Clinton
Administration adopted an overly expansive definition of
peacekeeping. The Clinton Administration's nation-building
policy also failed to keep traditional peacekeeping missions
distinct from its more expansive peacemaking interventions. The
United Nation's efforts to provide humanitarian assistance in
Cyprus (UNFICYP) since 1964 and its efforts to provide civilian
administration, aid, and rebuilding assistance in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
since 1978 are good examples of traditional peacekeeping missions.
Both missions were conditioned on the cessation of hostilities and
an agreement among the warring parties.
The extended peacekeeping operations of
the 1990s, such as those in Somalia and the Balkans, were vastly
different from the missions in Cyprus and Lebanon in scope and
complexity. They were in effect liberal Wilsonian exercises in
nation-building that went far beyond maintaining peace or providing
aid. They sometimes necessitated using force and choosing sides in
a civil conflict. U.N.-led peacekeepers were expected to make the
peace, not just keep it. Further, soldiers trained for combat
missions were expected to engage in the reconstruction of entire
civil and social structures, often in countries that had very few
such structures in place. The pace of operations was furious: From
1992 to 2000, the U.N. approved 34 such missions involving 182,000
troops, compared with 22 missions using 61,000 troops in its
preceding 44-year history. For U.S. troops, this expansion came at
the expense of their ability to train and prepare for fighting the
nation's wars.
Organizing the Post-War Force by War
Aims
A
U.S. and allied military presence in post-war Iraq would, by
definition, not be an extended operation in which making peace was
the goal. Rather, it would be an exercise involving a residual
force tasked with achieving the three specific war aims described
in this study. The post-war military force in Iraq would be tasked
primarily with confronting any remnant elements of Saddam's deposed
regime and deterring other regional powers from exploiting the
situation for purposes injurious to the interests of the United
States and its allies.
Given the specific war aims, the post-war
U.S.-led military forces should be organized around three important
missions:
- To find and
destroy the current regime's WMD arsenal and its infrastructure of
support for terrorism. The military force should be large
enough to perform this mission rapidly. At the outset, this effort
may require up to 5,000 specialized personnel, but as the effort
progresses the size of the post-war force should be reduced. When
the President is able to certify that all of Iraq's terrorist
support and its weapons of mass destruction infrastructure,
programs, and arsenal have been accounted for and destroyed, this
element of the post-war force should be withdrawn.
-
To secure Iraq
and the region against Iranian ambitions. The post-war
force would need to be large enough to block any Iranian incursions
into largely Shiite areas south of Baghdad and capable enough to
block Iranian infiltration into the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq
to bolster Kurdish separatist movements. Ultimately, this element
of the post-war force should be the largest. The time it will take
to secure this aim will likely be lengthy, since it will depend on
the reconstruction of a reliable and friendly Iraqi military force
capable of standing up to Iran with a relatively modest U.S.
security commitment.
At the outset, this task may require up to
30,000 U.S. military personnel, with additional allied troops
numbering perhaps 15,000. As Iraq's military proves
itself able to defend the country against Iran, this element of the
post-war force should be reduced incrementally.
- To provide
physical protection to Iraq's energy infrastructure. Given
Iraq's relatively dispersed energy sources, this element may
initially require about 5,000 U.S. military personnel and an equal
number of allied personnel. It is uncertain how long this effort
could take, but it is a less complex and narrower mission than the
other two. At the outset, protecting the energy infrastructure
should involve infantry brigades, but over time, this element of
the force could gradually transition to military police brigades
before eventually drawing down the force size as the situation
stabilizes. This would provide the United States military
commanders with the necessary flexibility to transition from a
combat force to a military police presence. The United States also
should seek to turn this responsibility over to reconstituted Iraqi
security forces.
Using these estimates, the total U.S.
contribution to the post-war force in Iraq would be roughly 40,000
troops, the allied contribution an additional 20,000. The combined
force should include a corps headquarters with the flexibility
needed to oversee and manage operations for the specialized task of
rooting out and destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
programs and its terrorist infrastructure. The U.S. contribution to
the post-war effort should include two divisions, one light and one
heavy (armored), with the ability to patrol Iraq's border with
Iran, along with other specialized units for destroying Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction and securing its energy sector.
Moving From a Combat Force to a Post-War
Force
Public reports indicate that the Bush
Administration is considering the use of two alternative forces for
toppling the current regime in Iraq: a traditional invasion force
of up to roughly 250,000 personnel or a
far smaller "de-capitation" force of perhaps fewer than 100,000. Such a de-capitation force
should prove adequate to winning the warproviding the air
power and limited ground force necessary to cut off Iraq's
leadership from its deployed forces and to weaken its military to
the point that Iraqi dissident forces could prevail in orchestrated
ground assaults. This approach would avert the need for the larger
force of 250,000.
If
the Administration chooses the "de-capitation" force course, it
should bear in mind three key points.
First, success of the smaller force would
depend on the Iraqi dissident forces conducting a successful ground
campaign, which means arming them sufficiently for a campaign
against the forces of Saddam Hussein and backing them with U.S. and
allied air power.
Second, an aggressive public diplomacy
campaign should be conducted to secure the support of U.S. friends
in that region. Their participation will increase the likelihood of
success in the effort. These countries must be convinced that
America's war plan is all but certain to succeed, since they will
not want to participate in an unsuccessful military operation
against the Iraqi regime.
Third, the success of the de-capitation
force will be highly dependent on the transformation of the U.S.
military forces as planned by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
The transformation effort should accelerate before combat
operations against Iraq are initiated. A successful operation in
Iraq also would prove the wisdom of the transformation effort, just
as the Persian Gulf War justified the air-land battle doctrine
designed by the U.S. military following Vietnam.
The
"de-capitation" combat force should be slightly larger than the
force needed to undertake post-war activities in Iraq. The combat
phase of operations would establish a foundation for U.S. and
allied post-war forces to position themselves at terrorist and
weapons sites, along the border with Iran, and at energy
infrastructure sites. The post-war force should be withdrawn
incrementally as responsibilities are transferred to U.S. and
coalition civilian authorities and eventually to reliable and
friendly Iraqi officials and an Iraqi military.
The
Bush Administration must pay attention to the drawdown because, in
undertaking this war against Saddam, the post-war force will be
drawn from the current fabric of the military. The Administration's
Quadrennial Defense Review refers to an operation of the size
described here as a "smaller-scale contingency." It also
wisely acknowledges that care must be taken, even with the
relatively small force required for such a contingency, to avoid
overstressing elements of the total military force.
Making the Drawdown of the Force
Event-Driven
It
would be unwise to pre-determine timelines for achieving the three
war aims in Iraq described above. No one can reliably predict how
long it will take to locate and destroy the terrorist
infrastructure and all the weapons of mass destruction. Iran's
moves will depend on efforts to establish a new, responsible
government and military force in Iraq. Building a responsible Iraqi
military is an unpredictable process and, while securing Iraq's
energy infrastructure is a more predictable task, establishing a
deadline for that would be shortsighted. In short, the process for
drawing down a post-war military force in Iraq must be
event-driven.
Following the end of the combat operation,
President Bush should state that he will certify to Congress when
each assigned war aim has been completed by the post-war force,
that the portion of the post-war force assigned to that task will
be withdrawn following certification, and that an end to post-war
military activities will be declared when all three tasks are
certified complete. He should also make clear that any remaining
forces in Iraq will be a peacetime presence.
By
adopting this approach to drawing down the force and ultimately
ending post-war activities, President Bush will have established an
exit strategy for the forces he commits to Iraq that is not bound
by a timeline that permits hostile forces to regroup and launch
counterattacks.
Conclusion
The
Bush Administration and most Americans are rightly concerned that
Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq is a growing and grave threat. Its
support for terrorists, its violation of U.N. agreements on weapons
inspections, and its programs to develop weapons of mass
destruction can no longer be tolerated.
The
use of military force in troubled regions must depend on direct
threats to vital security interests, not just any interest. The
Bush Administration should announce its plans for a post-war
military force in Iraq that is designed, not for nation-building,
but specifically to secure the very vital interests for which the
United States seeks to remove Saddam's rogue regime from power. It
should present a plan to Congress and the American public that is
based on three war aims: eliminating Iraq's terrorist
infrastructure and weapons of mass destruction programs, precluding
a hostile Iraqor Iran once Saddam Hussein is removed from
powerfrom dominating the Persian Gulf region, and
protecting Iraq's energy infrastructure to ensure that world energy
markets continue to have access to those resources.
--Baker Spring is F.M. Kirby Research
Fellow in National Security Policy and Jack Spencer is Policy
Analyst for Defense and National Security in the Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage
Foundation.
APPENDIX
A Survey of Iraq's Arsenal and Use of
Weapons of Mass Destruction
For
nearly three decades Iraq has demonstrated an insatiable desire to
acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and longer range delivery
systems. Iraq has approached the acquisition of these weapons with
dedication and creativity. In 2000, for example, Saddam Hussein
imported over 4,000 Playstation and Playstation 2 video game
systems, which are not subject to embargoes that prohibit Iraq from
importing advanced computers. A home video-game system is not
extremely capable, of course. However, according to intelligence
sources, it is likely that Saddam is using these systems linked
together to help in the development of sophisticated guidance
systems for missiles.
Nothing has deterred Saddam from advancing
his WMD aspirations. Iraq's WMD programs, prone to failure, have
been subjected to direct bombing campaigns and international
inspection regimes, yet they continue to move forward. Even under
the most tenuous of circumstances, Iraq has been able to produce
one of the most lethal WMD arsenals in the world. Worse, Saddam
Hussein has demonstrated his willingness to use these weapons
against his enemies, both at home and beyond Iraq's borders.
In
1998, former U.N. weapons inspectors asserted that Iraq maintained
substantial WMD capabilities. Former weapons inspector Scott Ritter
said it would not take Iraq long to reconstitute its nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons, as well as long-range ballistic
missile programs. Richard Butler, executive
director of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) for
weapons inspections in Iraq, called its WMD capabilities "truly
alarming."
Since the end of the Gulf War, Iraq has
conducted a policy of distraction, denial, and deception. According
to an official U.S. Department of State document, the Iraqis are
much more forthcoming with details on how many ballpoint pens were
ordered in the 1980s than they are on WMD procurement. Their failed cooperation with
UNSCOM, which was charged with disarming Iraq, and their
manipulation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
evidence, demonstrates Iraq's determination to not abide by
accepted international norms.
The
overwhelming evidence that Saddam Hussein maintains active and
fruitful chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, as
well as ballistic and cruise missile research and development
facilities, indicates that, beyond any doubt, Saddam will use these
weapons in the future.
Iraq's Ballistic Missile Program
According to the Commission to Assess the
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (the Rumsfeld
Commission):
Iraq has maintained the skills and
industrial capabilities needed to reconstitute its long-range
ballistic missile program. Its plants and equipment are less
developed than those of North Korea or Iran as a result of actions
forced by UN Resolutions and monitoring. However, Iraq has actively
continued work on the short-range (under 150 km) liquid- and
solid-fueled missile programs that are allowed by the Resolutions.
Once UN-imposed controls are lifted, Iraq could mount a determined
effort to acquire needed plant and equipment, whether directly or
indirectly.... Iraq could develop a shorter range, cover,
ship-launched missile threat that could threaten the United States
in a very short time.
Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq employed
a virtual hodgepodge of methods and sources to field an offensive
ballistic missile capability. It had acquired Frog-7 missiles from
the Soviet Union as early as 1969, but did not establish the core
of its ballistic missile capabilities until it signed a deal with
the Soviet Union in 1974. This deal gave Iraq a number of
short-range Scud B missiles and transporter erector launchers
(TELs). Iraq made additional major missile purchases during the
Iran-Iraq War, including 350 Scud B missiles in 1984 and another
300 in 1986. This unparalleled demonstration of resourcefulness
rose out of an international network of experts, suppliers, and
entrepreneurs.
Even
before the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein had come dangerously close to
deploying nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In fact, Iraq
had fielded a few Scuds tipped with poisonous chemicals by the time
the Gulf War broke out. It launched 190 Al Husseins
at Tehran in the 1988 "War of the Cities" and 96 at Israel, Saudi
Arabia, and the Gulf states during the Gulf War.
Many
believe that, if the Gulf War had not occurred, Iraq would be well
on its way to deploying ballistic missiles with ranges of up to
2,500 miles (4,023 km). Nevertheless, pre-Gulf War Iraq serves as a
stunning example of the ways in which any state can acquire
ballistic missile technology when the appropriate resources combine
with political will--it had invested some $50 billion into
ballistic missile development in the decade before the war.
Saddam Hussein's ballistic missile
research and development facilities were severely eroded as a
result of the Gulf War. U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 of
April 1991 and the cease-fire arrangement mandated that Iraq
destroy all nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic
missiles with ranges that exceeded 94 miles (150 km), as well as
all related technologies. Although U.N. inspections were carried
out to one degree or another since the end of the war, Iraq
probably was able to maintain enough of its original ballistic
missile infrastructure to continue to build weapons that could
threaten its neighbors and the interests of the global community.
In fact, reports regularly recount attempts by Iraqi officials to
acquire prohibited missile and weapons technology from sources
around the world.
Some
estimates indicate that Iraq might be hiding up to 40 Scud
missiles, while others suggest numbers
as high as 85. Scott Ritter, who had been
the lead member of the UNSCOM team inspecting Iraq's weapons
program after the war, estimates that the number is closer to seven
to 12, with the possibility of another 25.
Although U.N. Resolution 687 prohibited
Iraq from possessing ballistic missiles with ranges that exceed 94
miles and all related facilities, Iraq still possesses the
knowledge, trained personnel, and specific equipment to continue to
produce ballistic missiles. This fact led some analysts to suggest
that Iraq could field as many as 150 Scud missiles by 2000. Since UNSCOM was forced to
withdraw its staff on December 16, 1998, Iraq's eventual deployment
of longer range ballistic missiles is much more possible now that
it is no longer subject to thorough outside scrutiny. In 1999, the
National Intelligence Council estimated in its National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that "[a]lthough the Gulf War and
subsequent United Nations activities destroyed much of Iraq's
missile infrastructure, Iraq could test an ICBM capable of reaching
the United States during the next 15 years" (by 2014).
Cruise Missile Capabilities
France and Russia supplied Iraq with most
of its cruise missile technology with their export of the Exocet , with a range of 50-75 km, and
the SS-N-2 Styx , with a range
of 45-100 km. Between 1980 and 1988, Iraq launched nearly 100
French Exocet missiles against Iran, destroying ships and oil wells
and sinking five Iranian vessels with the Russian SS-N-2 Styx
missile. Indeed, Iraq fired cruise missiles against American
targets in May 1987, when it fired Exocets at the USS Stark.
Iraq
maintains modified versions of the Russian SS-N-2C Styx missile in
the FAW series of cruise missiles (FAW 70/150/200), and with a maximum range of
200 km, the FAW missiles have more than twice the maximum range of
the Russian missile. Although some of the FAW 70 missiles are
likely renamed Chinese HY-1/HY-2 missiles, Iraq probably has the
means to build them domestically. Several FAW 70 missiles were
fired at American ships during the Gulf War, but failed to reach
their targets. Development of the FAW 200 is uncertain since U.N.
Resolution 687 required their production to cease and existing
missiles destroyed. However, this supposes that Saddam Hussein
would have kept his word following the 1991 Gulf War, which is
likely not the case.
Other cruise missile schemes employed by
Iraq included using ballistic or surface-to-air missile (SAM)
technology to achieve cruise missile-like results. For example,
Iraq modified its Ababil missile, which is based on a Russian SAM,
to act as a land-air cruise missile. It has a range of 500 km with
a maximum payload of 250 kg. There is also Project 144 to design a
surface-to-surface missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads
over long distances. Project 144 used Scud missile technology and
the second-stage engine of the Al Abid satellite launcher, which
has a maximum range of 1,250 miles. Iraq began Project 144 in 1989
and planned to complete the project by 1993. Its
current status is unknown.
Iraq's Chemical Weapons Program
Iraq
began a chemical weapons research program in the 1970s. Initially,
research concentrated on such agents as tear gas, mustard blister
agent, tabun, and sarin gas. Batch production, or the production of
larger quantities, began in the early 1980s and, by 1982, these
chemicals were part of the Iraqi arsenal.
Tear
gas (CS) research and production began in the 1970s as a
means of riot control under the auspices of the Committee for
National Security, not the military. Exposure to CS causes tearing,
coughing, sneezing, etc. Production for military
purposes commenced during the early years of the Iran-Iraq War.
UNSCOM inspectors were unable to determine the quantities produced;
however, it is known that the Iraqis filled munitions with the
gas.
Mustard blister
agent (HD) is considered non-lethal, but complications
from exposure can result in death. HD exposure affects the eyes,
lungs, and skin. Inhalation causes irritation in the throat,
tightness of the chest, hoarseness, and coughing. If not treated
during the early stages of contamination, individuals may suffer
bronchopneumonia and high fever. Iraq
first produced HD in 1981 at a high quality that was at least 80
percent pure. The earliest declarations indicated a cache of 3,080
tons, but that estimation was reduced in 1995 to 2,850 tons.
Tabun
(GA), the first nerve agent discovered, is a tasteless, colorless
liquid with a slightly fruity odor that was first developed as an
insecticide in Germany in 1936. Contact with the agent causes
respiratory complications, nausea, vomiting, muscular disruptions,
headache, coma, and eventually, breathing cessation and death. Although Iraq attempted to
weaponize GA, development was wrought with problems. Initial
production produced an agent only 60 percent pure, making storage
difficult. Production problems included salt blockages in the pipes
during synthesis. Iraq abandoned the effort and transferred
research, development, and production assets to a sarin (GB/GF) gas program. The sarin gas program also
had problems. Production again yielded a low (60 percent) purity,
causing storage problems. To compensate, precursor chemicals were
stored separately and mixed in munitions immediately prior to
use.
Iraq
also dedicated research and development assets to its VX nerve
agent program, a paramount project after September 1987. VX, also
discovered under the auspices of insecticide research in the 1950s,
is an oily, clear, tasteless, odorless liquid. It can be
amber-colored resembling motor oil. Symptoms of overexposure range
from constriction of pupils and headaches to tightness in the
chest, vomiting, muscle twitches, diarrhea, and eventually,
convulsions and respiratory failure. Between
1987 and 1988, the Iraqi government imported 250 tons of
phosphorous pentasulphide and 200 tons of di-isopropylamine, two of
the key precursors for VX. It produced 660 tons of another
precursor, methyl phosphonyl chloride, but claims to have used only
1 ton of it. The last precursor, ethylene
oxide, is a general purpose chemical that is readily available.
The
entire VX program is said to have been unsuccessful. Experimental
quantities (260 kg) of VX were reportedly produced. Iraq admitted
to having filled three 250-gauge aerial bombs with VX for trial
purposes. It declared that it abandoned
the program in September 1988. Iraqi reports claim the remaining
quantities of phosphorous pentasulphide and di-isopropylamine were
burned, discarded, or destroyed by 1991, but UNSCOM could not
confirm the quantities destroyed. Nearly 250 tons of VX nerve agent
remain unaccounted for. Scott Ritter confirmed that
the UNSCOM teams had found undeniable proof of the VX program as
recent as June of 1998. After 1995, Iraq admitted to
falsely reporting its chemical weapons arsenals, including
producing more VX than previously divulged, and that it had
perfected techniques to give VX a longer shelf life--further
indications that the program had not been abandoned.
Iraq's Use of
Chemical Weapons. Like with ballistic and cruise missiles,
Iraq has not shied away from the use of chemical weapons to achieve
military aims. In 1982, it used riot control-level agents against
Iranian attacks. Iraq quickly began using more deadly agents, such
as mustard in 1983 and tabun in 1984, the first time that a nerve
agent had been used in a war.
The
State Department lists 10 incidents of chemical attacks by Iraq
between August 1983 and March 1988 against Iranian and Kurdish
populations, with casualty tolls in the tens of thousands. The Central Intelligence
Agency maintains that Iraq did not intentionally use chemical
agents during the Gulf War for fear of U.S. and coalition
retaliation. The conclusion is based on inconsistencies in
casualties compared with those seen during the Iran-Iraq War.
From
1992 to 1998, UNSCOM oversaw the destruction of 40,000 chemical
munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million liters of
chemical precursors, and eight types of delivery systems. These quantities include 30
tons of tabun, 70 tons of sarin, and 600 tons of mustard blister
agent stored in bulk and munitions. The
Iraqis declared that 2,500 munitions containing about 17 metric
tons of sarin that had been stored at the Muthanna chemical
facility were destroyed by coalition bombing during the Gulf War.
Iraq
has rebuilt its chemical weapons program since 1991. While many of
its facilities were crippled in the Gulf War, it has retained the
human knowledge needed to revive these programs. There are 41 sites
with equipment that can be converted quickly to manufacture
chemical weapons agents and their precursors, and four sites
capable of producing chemical munitions. It is estimated that Iraq
is able to organize its assets and production to manufacture
chemical weapons in a matter of days or weeks.
Biological Weapons Program
In
1974, the Iraqi government adopted a policy to acquire biological
weapons technology. A year later, research and production were
initiated, but they had largely failed by 1978. The
program was revived in 1985 at the Muthanna chemical plant and by
1986, Iraq was importing strains of bacterial growth from Europe.
Research was focused on Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) and
Clostridium botulinum (botulinum toxin).
Inhalation is the most common means of
contraction in biological warfare. Initial symptoms of inhalation anthrax are similar to those
of a common cold. Within days, severe breathing problems and shock
occur, followed often by death. Botulinum toxin causes muscle paralysis,
evident in blurred vision, drooping eyelids, slurred speech,
difficulty swallowing, dry mouth, and muscle weakness. If
untreated, it could cause paralysis in the limbs, trunk, and
respiratory muscles. Iraq had developed adequate
bioweapon expertise by 1987 when it officially began full-scale
production of botulinum toxin and anthrax for weaponization.
Within a year, Iraq expanded its
bioweapons program to include research into the weaponization of
Clostridium perfringens and aflatoxin. Clostridium perfringens causes a condition known as
gas gangrene. The bacteria can produce several types of toxins that
cause potentially fatal syndromes, such as tissue death, blood
destruction, decreased circulation in the affected area, and
leaking of the blood vessels. Aflatoxin is naturally occurring in
grain crops and foods such as peanuts, millet, pecans, corn, and
cottonseed. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration says aflatoxins
produce acute necrosis (cell or organ death), cirrhosis (a
progressive liver disease resulting in liver failure), and cancer
in several (not all) animal species.
In
1988, Iraq dedicated significant resources to the weaponization of
ricin , a toxin derived from
castor beans, which is highly attractive as a biological agent
because of its stability and wide availability.
Following inhalation, ricin breaks down lung tissue, resulting in
hemorrhagic pneumonia and eventually death. Tests were conducted
but the project was considered a failure and abandoned.
Iraq
also conducted research on the effectiveness of wheat cover smut,
hemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus, rotavirus, and camel pox as
bioweapons. Large-scale production of wheat cover smut , a fungal contaminant
of grain food crops, was carried out between 1987 and 1988, but the
project was not developed further. Hemorrhagic conjunctivitis causes
extreme pain and temporary blindness. Rotavirus causes diarrhea with the
possibility of dehydration and death. Camel pox causes fever and skin rash in
camels, but rarely affects humans. Little additional work was done
on these toxins.
By
1990, Saddam Hussein had commenced a crash program to produce and
weaponize bioweapons; after the invasion of Kuwait, the program
intensified. In December 1990, Iraq attempted to attach a spraying
device onto a modified aircraft drop tank, which would be fitted to
a piloted fighter or even an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). It was
intended to spray nearly 2,000 liters of anthrax over enemy territory. Although
Iraq claims that the prototype has been destroyed, field trials
were conducted in 1991.
Current Status
of Iraq's Bioweapons Program. In total, Iraq declared
production of nearly 19,000 liters of concentrated botulinum toxin
(10,000 liters of this in munitions), 8,500 liters of anthrax
(6,500 liters in munitions), and 2,200 liters of aflatoxin (1,580
in munitions). All biological agents and
delivery systems supposedly were destroyed before or following the
Gulf War, but no Iraqi official recalls
the time of the orders, given orally, or the destruction dates.
Ken
Alibek, a former Soviet scientist, testified to the U.S. House
Armed Services Committee that Russia had planned to sell large
fermenters to Iraq after the Gulf War. Iraq's
medical, veterinary, and university facilities, many of which are
staffed by former scientists in the bioweapons programs, are
believed to be capable of research and development of biological
weapons on demand.
A
biological weapons laboratory in Iraq is believed to be
manufacturing a virus code named "Blue Nile." U.S.
intelligence agents suspect that agent is the Ebola virus , a highly fatal hemorrhagic
contagion. The Tahhaddy ("Challenge") lab may have 85 employees. On
July 30, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld concluded that
it would be reasonable to assess that Iraq's biological weapons
production capabilities now are mobile, hidden in trailers and
train cars. On August 14, an article in
The Washington Times reported satellite intelligence that proved at
least one of Iraq's biological weapons factories is active. That factory, outside
Baghdad, was bombed by coalition forces during the Gulf War in
1991.
Saddam Hussein not only tested his
biological weapons on animals, especially large mammals, but it is
strongly suspected that testing has been done on humans as well.
Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz adamantly denies this, but
UNSCOM reported that teams found two human-size inhalation
chambers. According to Scott Ritter,
live tests of binary biological and chemical weapons were conducted
in 1995 on nearly 50 subjects taken from Abu Ghaib prison.
Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program
Like
in its other WMD programs, Iraq's strategy has been to harness a
diverse group of sources and relationships to build a successful
program. Its nuclear program, with a code name of
"Petrochemical-3," was divided into four groups:
- Group I, production of uranium through
diffusion barriers and centrifuges;
- Group II, production of uranium through
chemical and electromagnetic methods;
- Group III, computer monitoring; and
- Group IV, weaponization.
Khidhir Hamza, a former Iraqi nuclear
engineer, estimates that by the year 2005, Iraq will have enough
weapons-grade uranium to build three nuclear bombs. Although Iraq signed the 1969
Non-Proliferation Treaty, it has never ceased its quest to
weaponize nuclear energy. By 1971, its nuclear program had been
underway for several years under the cover of a nuclear power
program. Iraq manipulated the International Atomic Energy Agency to
support its efforts. The IAEA not only approved of but also
arranged the purchase of basic plutonium production components as
well as the training to operate the equipment.
In
1973, Iraq acquired a 40-megawatt research reactor, a
fuel-manufacturing plant, and nuclear fuel processing facilities. Hamza testified before the
U.S. Senate that Iraq has enlisted a number of foreign corporations
to aid in its nuclear procurement efforts. For example,
corporations in India import equipment that they then ship to Iraq
through Malaysia.
When
the Banco Nazionale del Lavoro scandal came out of the debate in
the U.S. House in 1992 over foreign banking reform in the United
States, the Italian-based branch in Atlanta was found to have
loaned over $4 billion to Iraq between 1986 and 1990. About $2
billion of this went to Iraq's Ministry of Industry and Military
Industrialization, and consequently was used to procure nuclear
technology. No later than 1988 Iraq had
tried to acquire nuclear technology for uranium enrichment from
Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and France.
Iraq
kept its nuclear program well-hidden until the Gulf War, and even
today little is known about it. Saddam Hussein continues to seek
nuclear weapons and acquire associated technologies in novel ways.
For example, in 1998 he ordered six lithotripters, high-tech
machines used in the medical community to pulverize kidney stones
without surgery. Operating each machine requires an electronic
switch, so he also ordered 120 spare switches, and these same
switches can be used to trigger nuclear explosions. The discrepancy
in the order was noticed, and Saddam was denied the "spare"
switches; but Saddam did receive the lithotripters and eight
switches. The United Nations and the U.S. government believe it is
likely he obtained many more.
Prior to the Gulf War, U.S. intelligence
listed two possible nuclear facilities for target during Operation
Desert Storm. After the war, UNSCOM identified more than 20 sites
in Iraq involved in its nuclear program.
The
priority Saddam Hussein places on the nuclear program is reflected
in the number of personnel and funds assigned to it. Though Iraq's
biological and chemical programs were assigned a few hundred
engineers each, the nuclear program employed 12,000. After the Gulf
War, 5,000 more engineers were added to the program.
Acquiring
Nuclear Materials. With the technical knowledge and
resources in place to produce a nuclear weapon, Saddam needed only
to gain access to weapons-grade nuclear material. Iraq sought
uranium-235, an element that had to be separated from uranium-238
or plutonium, which was manufactured in reactors.
Iraq
had advanced its nuclear program so rapidly that, in 1981, Israel
was compelled to destroy the Osirak nuclear research facility near
Baghdad. The damage severely
debilitated the program, which relied on foreign imported nuclear
material. Iraq then decided to reduce its dependence on foreign
suppliers. It invested billions of dollars into the "calutron"
program, which used a process called electromagnetic isotope
separation (EMIS) to enrich uranium. The
system was not very economical and did not produce the quantities
of weapons-grade material Iraq desired. Iraq claimed that only
about half a kilogram of uranium at an average enrichment level of
4 percent had been produced through EMIS.
Iraq
also attempted to develop a gas centrifuge enrichment capability,
relying heavily on foreign technology and knowledge. Uranium-235 is
separated from uranium-238 in a centrifuge, as heavier atoms spin
away from lighter ones. In the late 1980s, Iraq began experimenting
with a "model 1" centrifuge. Early
models used oil bearings and thus ran into vibration problems, also
consuming a lot of power. Between 1988 and 1991, the Iraqis
received help from German scientists in building a new "model 2"
centrifuge, a Zippe-type gas centrifuge that uses magnetic bearings
and a maraging steel (two times harder than stainless steel and 85
percent harder than pure titanium) rotor that spins at sub-critical
levels. Using the German design and
equipment, Iraq succeeding in producing an output of 1.9 kg SW (of uranium-235) in 1990.
The
program was meant to be vast, beginning with a 50-machine cascade and progressing to a
500-machine cascade by 1996. The final IAEA inspection concluded
that Iraq would have the capacity to produce 25 kg per year of
highly enriched uranium (HEU), enough to make about 1.5 nuclear
bombs per year.
Gaseous diffusion is the most widely used
method of uranium enrichment. More than 57 percent of the world's
enriched uranium goes through the gaseous diffusion process. According to Hamza, the
Iraqis perfected this method in 1993. Hamza expects gaseous
diffusion to be the method of choice in Iraq's nuclear program.
New
opportunities to acquire nuclear materials have emerged since the
end of the Cold War. Russia's economic problems have become a
security nightmare for its nuclear facilities, such as plants at
Seversk, Zelenogorsk, and Novouralsk, which
account for 30 percent of the world's gas centrifuge enrichment
capability.
Iraq's ties to Russia from the Iran-Iraq
War may open the door for weapons-grade plutonium and uranium
procurement through bribery. After
Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, General Hussein Kamel, defected, he
revealed that Iraq had planned to build a nuclear bomb out of
IAEA-safeguarded nuclear fuel just before the Gulf War.
Hamza predicted Iraq would have had a
nuclear bomb in 1991 similar in destruction capabilities to the
bomb dropped on Hiroshima had Hussein not invaded Kuwait. The Hiroshima bomb had a
gun-like trigger to spark the nuclear
reaction. The Iraqis opted to explore an implosion-type design, which would make it small
enough to fit on a Scud missile. The model is similar to the
implosion-triggered "Fat Man" designed in the Manhattan Project,
which had a 23-kiloton yield.
The
issue of weaponization was dependent on the delivery systems of the
time. Group IV was advised to keep the total payload weight to less
than 1 ton. While the Scud or the Al Hussein--Iraqi modification of
the Scud--remain the most attractive delivery systems, Iraq studied
the possibility of a vehicle based on the second-stage engine of
the Al Abid satellite launcher. Iraq seeks a better method because
of the range limitations of the Al Hussein and Al Abbas (300 km/186
mi.).
Radiological Weapons
Saddam Hussein is not only trying to
develop traditional nuclear weapons but also radiological weapons,
the so-called dirty bombs. In 1987, Iraq tested a bomb that would
spread nuclear radiation over an area, causing birth defects,
cancer, and death. The bomb prototypes weighed
1,400 kg and carried radioactive material (2 curies) derived from irradiated
impurities in zirconium oxide. Further
prototypes were designed from the casings of 100 Muthanna-3
(renamed Muthanna-4) aerial chemical bombs. The
Muthanna-4 was then modified to a 400 kg weight so that aircraft
could carry more. Eighty casings of the modified Muthanna-4 were
produced, and their whereabouts are unknown. Of the
original 100 Muthanna-4 casings, 25 were said to have been
destroyed and 75 were sent to the Al Qa'Qa State Establishment for
an unknown fate.